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BRITISH DIPLOMATIC INSTRUCTIONS
SWEDEN, 1689-1727

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1689—1789

VOLUME I—SWEDEN, 1689—1727

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BY

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PREFACE

STUDENTS of diplomatic history know well the value of the great French publication, *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France* (1648-1789), of which up to the year 1912 nineteen volumes have appeared. Although unable to command the government assistance, which enabled that work to be produced, the Royal Historical Society has determined to attempt a similar service to British history, in the first instance of its own resources, and it is hoped in the course of years to furnish a series of volumes covering the century from the accession of William III. Choice has been made of Sweden (1689 to 1727) for the first volume, because the present editor had, with the necessary leisure, particular acquaintance with the relations of Great Britain with the states of northern Europe in the reigns of William III, Anne and George I.

The special value of the French series noticed above lies in the fact that each envoy, when he proceeded on his mission, was furnished with a review of previous relations with the court to which he was accredited. These illuminating recitals the British instructions lack. The want should be supplied by the full reports which the envoys were ordered to make on their return to England, but very few of these, if they were rendered at all, appear to have been preserved.

The instructions are of three kinds, public, additional, and private and additional. The first are of no great value, composed as they chiefly are of formal clauses common to them all. To avoid repetition in the documents the most usual of these are printed as an appendix to this preface. The other instructions, naturally, are much more enlightening, but all are necessarily concerned with the conditions of the moment. Circumstances changing, it not infrequently happened that the main attention of an envoy was directed to

matters not mentioned in his instructions at all. Instances of this in the present volume are the difficulties caused by the prohibition of trade with France in the time of William III and the negotiation for the accession of Sweden to the treaty of Hanover at the end of the reign of George I. To remedy the fault it has been decided to print a *selection* from the dispatches sent to the envoys subsequently, dispatches which often are equivalent to instructions.

The dispatches serving as material for the present volume are of very unequal distribution. During the reign of Charles XI of Sweden a number are to be found addressed to William Duncombe, but hardly any of importance to John Robinson, who took over his work on his recall. Charles XII, while he was king, kept the direction of foreign affairs entirely to himself, even when in exile. Dispatches of consequence in his time are only the few addressed to Robinson in Poland or Saxony, or to Captain Jefferyes, who attended him at Bender and afterwards at Stralsund. Robert Jackson at Stockholm had little with which to concern himself beyond matters of trade. For the years 1715 to 1718, however, the want is supplied by the dispatches to the Baltic admirals. After the death of Charles XII the work of Lord Carteret at Stockholm entailed a mass of correspondence, and then, after a few years of comparative quietude, that of Stephen Poyntz a series of communications of yet greater fulness and frequency.

The texts of almost all these documents are taken from office copies. The originals, no doubt, stayed in the hands of the envoys and, unless drifted into the havens of the British Museum or other public libraries, lie buried in private archives or have been lost. In view of the clerks' eccentric punctuation, distressing to the reader, and their arbitrary use of capital letters, these have been modernised, and abbreviations have been extended. The orthography, however, as of some historical interest, has been preserved. The dating of the documents is that of the originals; unless otherwise distinguished it will be understood to be in the Old Style.

EXAMPLES OF THE FORMAL CLAUSES OF THE PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS.

You shall protect and countenance on all occasions Our subjects trading to any of the dominions of that crown or who may have any suits or pretensions depending there, procuring for them good and speedy justice and all the favour you are able. Yet for Our honour and your own credit you must not

engage yourself in every complaint which may raise clamours without a justifiable cause, or legal proof, but only such as may deserve the interposition of Our name for Our subjects' rights.

You shall entertain a good correspondence and friendship with the ambassadors envoys and residents of other princes and states now in alliance or amity with Us, who shall happen to be at that court at the same time with you. And whereas Our ^{late dear Uncle} ~~royal predecessor~~ (Charles II) did by his Order

in Council bearing date the 26th day of August 1668 direct his ambassadors should not for the future give the hand in their own houses to envoys, in pursuance of what is practised by the ambassadors of other princes, and did therefore not think it reasonable his envoys should pretend to be treated differently from the treatment he had directed his ambassadors to give to the envoys of other princes, We do accordingly in pursuance of the said Order in Council direct you not to insist to have the hand from any ambassador in his own house.

You shall constantly correspond with Our ambassadors and ministers in foreign courts for your mutual information and assistance in your respective negotiations.

You shall diligently observe the motions of that court, and endeavour to penetrate into all their councils and designs, which may have an influence upon any of Our concernments, and what treaties may be entertained by them with any other prince or state; and of what you can discover, and of all occurrences which may be of consequence and may in any way concern Our interest at home or abroad, you shall give frequent accounts to Us by one of Our principal Secretaries of State.

During your residence in that court you shall make it your care to inform yourself of all matters and affairs relating to that government and the ministers principally employed in it, so as to be able at your return to give Us a perfect account in writing of the state of that monarchy as well with relation to their affairs abroad as at home.

You shall from time to time observe and follow such further directions and instructions as you shall receive from one of Our principal Secretaries of State, with whom you shall likewise constantly correspond and give an account of your proceedings and of all matters happening in the course of your ministry.

INTRODUCTION

WHEN William III came to the throne of England Sweden was once again the great power of the north. In 1679, after a five years' war in which disaster was more in evidence than success, Charles XI, by the favour of Louis XIV, stood again in possession of almost all that had been lost during the ruinous years of his minority. Denmark, the secular foe and the only other naval power in the Baltic, had once more been humbled and that sea made practically again a Swedish lake. The eastern coastlands, Finland, Ingria, Esthonia, Livonia, all were Swedish, and on the southern shore western Pomerania with Stralsund and Stettin, and in Mecklenburg Wismar and its dependencies. Russia had for the present no outlet to the Baltic saving for trade by permission through the Swedish port of Narva. Charles held besides in Germany the secularised bishoprics of Bremen and Verden, and so commanded the mouths of Elbe and Weser as well as of the Oder.

Previously to 1689 the political relations of Great Britain with Sweden were of no great import. There was always amity; the treaty of 1661 could recite, with some hyperbole, "*strictissimae illius amicitiae mutuorumque commerciorum exercitium inter inclita Regna Sueciae et Angliae a tot seculis indesinenter cultum.*" English sympathy with the efforts of the great Protestant champion of the Thirty Years' War had been strong, but domestic conditions had prevented help to Gustavus Adolphus beyond the supply of a few thousand soldiers. Money promised was not forthcoming. The "Triple Alliance" into which Sweden was brought in 1668, important enough in its effect, was short-lived and a Dutch rather than a British business.

Commercial relations with Sweden, on the other hand, were always of the first importance, and the trade was sedulously fostered. Not for the sake of profit; indeed, the economic maxims

of the time condemned it as positively detrimental, since imports largely exceeded in value exports. Moreover it was conducted under most burthensome restrictions laid upon it in the interests of Swedish commerce. Its value lay in the nature of the commodities imported: iron and copper, pine-timber, pitch and tar, hemp and flax; materials for ship-building. Most of the timber, indeed, and some pitch and tar were brought from Norway, and considerable quantities of hemp and flax by the Russia Company from Archangel, but the great bulk of these naval stores, as they were called, came from within the Baltic and before the time of George I were practically unobtainable elsewhere. Flax-growing in Ireland dates only from the act of 1696. Importation from the American plantations began to be adequate, as the result of legislation of queen Anne, only when the reign of George I was well advanced. More than once British ministers declared—Lord Townshend as late as 1715—that if the Baltic merchant-fleet miscarried, British men-of-war could not be equipped for sea at all. It was the prohibition of trade by Charles XII to ports then Russian that in the year named enabled George I to procure British naval help in the war with Sweden, into which he was about to enter as elector.¹

With the advent of William III to England political conditions changed. His business was to collect allies against Louis XIV, and foremost among those not yet gained stood Sweden. He sent to Stockholm William Duncombe, instructed to negotiate a treaty of alliance against France and as a necessary preliminary thereto composition of the present crisis in the perennial quarrel between Denmark and the related house of Holstein-Gottorp. For Charles XI had fleet and army ready for attack on Christian V of Denmark, in case he would not yield in the affair, and had definitely declared that settlement of it must precede consideration of entry into the war with France. Robert Molesworth, sent at the same time to Copenhagen, was empowered to threaten force, if Christian would not accept the terms proposed.

This Sleswick-Holstein question was already centuries old. The main contention was in what parts of the duchies the kings of Denmark held sovereign rights, and in what the dukes of Holstein-Gottorp. The difficulty of solution lay in the fact that arguments

¹ For particulars about the Baltic trade the editor may be permitted to refer to his article in the *English Historical Review*, XVI. (1901) 677 f.

on the one side were as good as on the other. The Swedes, enemies of Denmark, naturally sided with the dukes ; so also at this time did the princes of Brunswick-Lüneburg. Strong in influence at Stockholm was the queen-mother, Hedvig Eleonora, duke Christian Albert's sister. Ties were strengthened when Charles XII, in 1698, married his elder sister, Hedvig Sophia, to Christian Albert's son and successor, Frederick. In later years after ducal Sleswick, as part of the pacification of the north by George I, had been given to Denmark under British and French guarantees, the question dominated northern politics.

Christian V, menaced from all sides, submitted to terms at Altona. That effected, it was reasonable to expect that Duncombe and his Dutch colleague, the baron van Heeckeren, would prevail also in their main business at Stockholm. Although, however, Charles XI, guided by his president of the chancery, Count Bengt Oxenstierna, had long since seceded from the side of France, had undertaken to send 6000 men to the help of William III in his English enterprise and now agreed to send that force and twelve men-of-war besides for the service of the allies ; although Te Deums were sung in Sweden for their early successes on the Rhine and subscriptions opened for the victims of Louis XIV in the Palatinate ; that expectation was disappointed. As a "fundamentall reason" Duncombe gives the disorganisation of domestic affairs consequent upon the trenchant reforms of Charles XI, a matter which in his very complete report he explains fully.¹ Certainly Charles was engrossed with them, with rehabilitation of finance, promotion of Swedish coinmerce, and establishment of absolute monarchy. Besides which Louis XIV also offered inviting terms and had powerful support among the senators. The principal impediment, however, or "at least the pretence," in Duncombe's phrase, was a cause of discord unforeseen but which occupied the chief attention of the British ministers at Stockholm and at Copenhagen while the war lasted. A first measure of the sea-powers was to prohibit trade with France, to both Sweden and Denmark of great importance. Every year ships and their cargoes were seized and taken into English or Dutch ports. Actual conflicts occurred, as when in 1690 an armed Swedish convoy was taken by a British squadron, when in 1694 a Danish captain refused to strike his flag to the British fleet in the Downs and fought his ship till it was taken, or

¹ Record Office, *State Papers Foreign*, Sweden 13.

when in 1695 two of his Majesty's frigates engaged with a Swedish man-of-war. Action was moderated, when Sweden and Denmark agreed on mutual armed protection of their merchantmen; the Dutch paid the Swedes a good round sum in damages and a convention of 20/30 June 1691 regulated conditions for the Danes. With the Swedes, on the other hand, rupture and accession of Sweden to the side of France was saved only by the steadfastness, in victory and in defeat, of Oxentierna, of whom William III declared that his fall would mean quite other decisions on the part of Sweden, and Louis XIV that no success was possible without him, that all efforts to oppose or to overthrow him had failed, and that everything possible must be done to win him. Swedish troops served in the Netherlands in 1690 and 1691—they were badly mauled at Fleurus—or marched to the Upper Rhine in virtue of Charles's ten-year treaty with the emperor. Afterwards his part in the war was confined to offers of mediation, which became irksome by their repetition. Says Duncombe on this head: "That the king of Sweden and his council were from the beginning of the warr resolved to become mediators . . . is, I think, very certain." He deprecated the mediation as a "signall advantage" to France, since all the ministers capable of being employed in it were of the French party.

On the recall of Duncombe in 1692 charge of affairs in Sweden was committed to the Rev. John Robinson, the future bishop of London and senior British plenipotentiary at Utrecht, a man who had long resided at Stockholm as chaplain to the embassy and whose services as secretary Duncombe had found invaluable. He, while the French war lasted, had to experience the same difficulties and disappointments as had Duncombe. Returning to Stockholm at the beginning of 1697 from a visit to England, with the degree of doctor of divinity and the character of minister resident, he had little more to do with Charles XI, for he, having accepted the office of mediator at Ryswick, before the congress could assemble died, leaving his throne to his 14-year old son and the conduct of affairs to a regency. Christian of Denmark now saw opportunity to renew war. Immediately on receipt of the news at Copenhagen he sent an ambassador to Russia to propose alliance with tsar Peter and an ultimatum to duke Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp, quarrel with whom had broken out again after the death of his father, Christian Albert, in 1695, a quarrel once more temporarily

settled at a congress at Pinneberg. The Swedes armed by land and sea, sought renewal of help from the princes of Brunswick-Lüneburg, and sent the sea-powers strong reminder of their guarantees of the treaty of Altona. However, hostilities staying for new proposals of alliance between Denmark and Sweden, one of them for marriage of Charles XII to Christian's daughter, there ensued a period of negotiation. The young king, when he had taken over the reins of government, was besieged by proposals of alliance from all sides and a whole series of treaties and conventions were arranged. Last of them, in January 1700, were defensive treaties, the one with Great Britain, the other with Great Britain and Holland jointly; treaties to which Charles frequently appealed in the years of his misfortune.

Nevertheless war was brewing. In November 1699 the alliance of Denmark Poland and Russia, for which Reinhold von Patkul had been working, was completed. Already in the summer Charles XII had sent troops into Holstein to fortify duke Frederick, now his brother-in-law. In February 1700 Augustus of Poland, whom Charles supposed to be a friend, fell suddenly upon Livonia. In March the new king of Denmark, Frederick IV, invaded Holstein.

With him the fight was of short duration. An Anglo-Dutch fleet came to Charles's help and enabled him to cross the Sound. Copenhagen itself had fallen to him, for the Danish army was away across the water, but that it was not to the interests of his allies to let matters go so far. Frederick submitted to terms at Travendal. Eight weeks later Charles sailed for Livonia, to spend nine years in fighting, five in exile, and only to set foot again on his native soil at the end of 1715.

Next year the military aid of Sweden was wanted for the war of the Spanish Succession. William III sought to contract for 10,000 men. French English Dutch and Austrian envoys pursued Charles into Poland to persuade him to make peace, in order that they might engage him and his invincible soldiery. That peace he might readily have had; Peter of Muscovy and Augustus of Poland, cowed, both wanted it; loudest in advocacy of it were Charles's own ministers, despairingly aware of their country's exhaustion. The Englishman sent was Dr. Robinson, accredited in December 1702 as envoy extraordinary both to Charles and to Augustus. He lost no time. Arrived at Warsaw already on 18 February/1 March 1703 he insisted on seeking out Charles at his

camp near Lublin, and obtained his well-known interview in the open field. In April he and the other envoys laid siege to Charles at Warsaw. There was some result; a treaty of August 1703 promised the sea-powers a contingent of 10,000 Swedes, conditionally upon the war with Russia and Poland being ended. But for the present Charles was not to be turned from his purpose of vengeance upon the man who had broken faith with him. When three years later that vengeance was complete, when Charles was lord in Saxony, it was not his participation in the western war that was sought but his abstention. For he threatened to turn his arms against the emperor. It was then that Marlborough undertook his famous mission to Altranstädt. He could reassure, but the danger was not past. Robinson stayed on in Saxony, exerting himself to avert it, until at last, at the end of August 1707, Charles departed to meet his fate in Russia. Still accredited to him Robinson spent the next two years in mediatory work in Hamburg, being then recalled to England to be rewarded with the deanery of Windsor.¹

During his absence from Sweden affairs there had been conducted by his secretary, Robert Jackson, also a man of long residence in the country, in the quality of commissary. He had little wherewith to concern himself beyond matters of commerce, transmission of news, and the old question of the stoppage of trade, whether, as before, by the sea-powers to France or now, after Peter the Great's capture of Narva, by the Swedes themselves thither. On Robinson's recall he received the character of minister resident.

No sooner was the catastrophe of Poltava known than Augustus of Poland tore up his treaty of Altranstädt and reassumed his crown. He and Frederick of Denmark renewed their league with Peter the Great and a Danish army crossed the Sound. The Swedish force left on guard in Poland under general Krassow retreated before the Russians into Pomerania. The powers who should have interfered, as guarantors of the Swedish treaties, were engaged to the utmost of their resources in the war with France. Their preoccupation was to prevent the other war from crossing the frontiers of the empire. For then they might lose the services of some 60,000 Danish and German troops from the Netherlands alone. Instead, therefore, of taking up the cause of Sweden they resorted to earnest solicitation with her assailants to refrain from disturbing the peace of Germany, promising every effort on their

¹ Particulars of Robinson's doings, p. 15.

part to keep the Swedes quiet. Queen Anne went so far as heartily to congratulate Augustus on the resumption of his crown and Peter on his brilliant and God-sent victory.

The expedient devised was a plan of neutrality: the one side to undertake not to invade the Swedish provinces in Germany, the other not to use them as a base of attack. A convention for this purpose was drawn up and signed by the allied powers at the Hague on 20/31 March 1710. Force was to be employed, if necessary. Frederick and Augustus signified their adhesion, for the former's attack on Scania had been ignominiously repulsed and reprisals threatened in Jutland and elsewhere, while Augustus lived in terror of the irruption of Krassow's army, weak and plague-stricken as it was, into Saxony. The Stockholm regency agreed from sheer necessity.

The scheme was wrecked on the obduracy of Charles XII. In exile at Bender he was the same Charles as in supremacy at Altranstädt. Long before he heard of the convention he sent strict orders home that nothing should be done without his authority. He demanded of the guarantors of his treaties performance of their undertakings, recking nothing of their disability. They were wofully disquieted. Krassow's force was redoubtable, if only in reputation, and Stenbock, the recent victor of Helsingborg, was expected to bring over an army to his aid. Charles himself, it was believed, might at any moment reappear in Poland at the head of an irresistible army of Turks and Tartars, joining with Louis XIV in attack upon the empire from either side. Soon came news that he had succeeded in inciting the sultan to war upon the tsar. Proposals to hire Krassow's troops for service against France he contemptuously rejected; he wanted them, he declared, for his own purposes.

In these circumstances it was deemed necessary to put in execution the provision of the neutrality convention for the use of force. On 24 July/4 August 1710 a supplementary convention was signed prescribing the contingents to be furnished to an allied army which should hold the Swedes in check. It could not be assembled. Then, early in March 1711, a formal protest by Charles against the neutrality convention was presented at the Hague. He declared that relying on the Divine help and the justice of his cause he would reserve to himself the unrestricted power of employing against his enemies the means and strength which God had given

him, wherever and whenever the usages of war should demand. And if, contrary to all hope and expectation, any friend should hinder him in this, then he must deal with such an one also as an enemy and aggressor.

Previously to this, in January 1711, the British government had sent to reason with Charles at Bender Captain James Jefferyes, a man whom Robinson had taken to Poland as his secretary and who had been permitted to attend the Swedish army into Russia as a volunteer, being taken prisoner at Poltava. He spent nearly five years with Charles at Bender, in Turkey, or at Stralsund, and his narratives of all that occurred are the most particular that we have.¹ He was instructed to press for consent to the neutrality convention, for acceptance of queen Anne's mediation, and for revocation of a late edict prohibiting trade to those eastern Baltic provinces, of which Peter the Great had made himself master in the summer of 1710. This was an act of direct provocation to the sea-powers, and merchant-ships were already falling victims to the Swedish privateers.

Jefferyes, however, could not be heard from for months, and in the meantime queen Anne's new government could but confess to hopeless embarrassment. Rebellious from the first against entanglements abroad, they took refuge in denying the force of treaties, whose conditions were not observed by the parties to them, and in inveighing against Dutch mismanagement of the whole affair. St. John in his dispatches insisted that the queen could not undertake new responsibilities, when she had so much upon her hands already, and confessed to inability to furnish counsel. "Every measure that occurs to one's thoughts," he wrote, "is immediately attended by a crowd of objections; and yet the necessity of resolving on something presses us very hard." To force a peace upon Denmark would be to quarrel "with those northern powers who are at present our certain friends, and whose troops are employed in our service against the common enemy, and that in favour of a prince who is a very uncertain friend to us, and from whose troops we have many just apprehensions of disturbance, without the expectation of any assistance." Augustus, "a good ally," and Peter, could not be abandoned to Charles's fury. Only a "trimming dilatory game" could be played, a truce agreed with regard to the empire. Were that arranged, "whether the peace succeed or not we shall have

¹ Record Office, *State Papers Foreign*, Sweden 17.

consumed the summer and shall be got over the crisis of our present distemper."

Charles, as we have seen, would not have the truce. The Danes, said his minister, Count Gyllenborg, in London, had been beaten, Augustus was not to be feared, the Muscovites had come to the end of their conquests. A suspension of arms would oblige the Swedish armies to stay and starve at home. It would deprive the king of the fruits of his efforts at the Porte and be of advantage only to his enemies.

On 8/19 July 1711 came Jefferyes' report, to the effect that neither to the allies nor to England separately would Charles yield anything. The convention he declared to have been made without his knowledge and to his prejudice. It was not the queen's part to mediate; she was bound by treaty to force the Saxon and the Dane to peace. The blockade of the eastern ports must and should be maintained, so long as Peter held them.

This plain uncompromising refusal dispelled any remaining hope of accommodation. The British government now consented to, or rather declined to dissent from, attack upon the Swedes in Pomerania. A formal resolution to that effect was adopted at the Hague on 3/14 August. "A pretty considerable stretch for neutrals to take," St. John commented, "and nothing but the king of Sweden's obstinacy, which made it necessary, could render it tolerable." At once a great force of Danes Russians Poles and Saxons crossed the frontiers. Next year, 1712, Peter the Great, miraculously escaped from his disaster on the Pruth, appeared on the scene in person and took direction. The ensuing months saw Stenbock's victory over the Danes at Gadebusch, his retreat into Holstein, his vicious struggle against overwhelming odds, his final surrender and the loss of Sweden's last army. Its disappearance was followed in the summer of 1713 by a third and final peace between the sultan and the tsar.

These developments were by no means relished in England. To natural sympathy with the losing side was added consciousness that the ruin of Sweden was not a British interest. It did not appear that Russian mastery in the Baltic would be less burthen-some than the Swedish. Charles Whitworth, sent as ambassador to Peter the Great in 1711, had been able to obtain neither promise of redress of the merchants' grievances nor a treaty of commerce.

The sympathy found some expression; a squadron was promised

for the relief of Tönning and censure was passed on Sir Robert Sutton's successful efforts at Constantinople to keep the Turks quiet, efforts which had specially excited Charles's indignation. Jefferyes had orders to reassure him of queen Anne's goodwill and of her intention to maintain British guarantees and treaties. Charles in return affirmed confidence in her friendship and his own constant resolution to preserve it.

These, however, were words ; Anne could not act. The peace of Utrecht, for all its commercial advantages to Great Britain, deprived her of say in continental affairs, of all influence with the allies whom she had deserted. Remonstrance in all quarters, and declaration that the queen would not stand by and see a friendly nation brought to ruin, were to no purpose. The exhortations were disregarded and the threats mocked at. Quarrel with Peter the Great could not be ventured, for that, for one thing, would have given the Dutch the monopoly of the Baltic trade. St. John, now Viscount Bolingbroke, could see nothing but trial of the new friend, France, as the power " which can best be played off against the Muscovite," or waiting " for such incidents as either chance or management may create in order to dispose the parties concerned to a reasonable composition." During the remainder of Anne's reign her government was forced to look on while the affairs of Sweden went from bad to worse. Stettin fell into Russian hands and was transferred in nominal sequestration to Frederick William of Prussia. The battle of Wasa sealed the fate of Finland. In February 1714 a Danish army was expected again to cross the Sound and a Russian fleet to capture Stockholm. The Swedes themselves were on the verge of revolution. When there came letters from Charles XII absolutely refusing peace and ordering dissolution of the riksdag, had it been convoked, an outbreak was averted only by the firmness of the president of the chancery, Count Arvid Horn. The senate declared that it remained only to fight desperately to the end and so perish.

At the very end of queen Anne's reign new endeavours were made. More threats were launched and expostulations made at Copenhagen, and instructions to George Mackenzie, deputed to the tsar, included a strongly worded paragraph in favour of Sweden. The Danes took no heed, and the alienated Dutch declined co-operation. They would be glad, they said, to help in procuring a good peace, but were overcome by embarrassments resulting from

the late war. Deputies told Lord Strafford that they had little inclination to aid Sweden, who had done their commerce so much harm. He notified that if the Dutch took action in regard to the Baltic trade it would be on their own account, not conjointly with the queen.

This action in common had been solicited when the depredations of the Swedish privateers had grown so severe, that even queen Anne's pacific government could no longer disregard them. Something had to be done, even if alone. Three weeks before Anne's death orders issued to Captain Archibald Hamilton to convoy the traders through the Baltic.¹ He was not empowered to use force, indeed, with only three men-of-war he obviously could not, only to guarantee to the Swedes that they had proper passes. If he found himself opposed he was to return. That happened. Arrived at Elsinore he learnt of 24 Swedes of the line prepared to sink his ships, should they venture through the Sound. Putting into Gothenburg, he was hardly permitted to escape. The merchantmen that entered the port were seized, their papers confiscated and their masters thrown into prison.

With the accession of George I came sudden and complete reversal of the principles of foreign policy pursued by Bolingbroke. Great Britain re-entered the continental arena with France again accredited the enemy and Holland the close ally. The emperor was to be reconciled in due course. Hanover, the leading state in Germany—the Prussia of Frederick William I was yet nascent—was England's yoke-fellow. George himself had already for some years been accounted the first politician in Europe, consulted on all occasions. His acknowledged experience and the forcefulness of his unpleasing character enabled him to take strong personal share in direction of the foreign policy of his new kingdom. Already before he came to the throne of England he had associated himself, as elector, with the foes of Sweden.

In former years the dukes of Brunswick-Lüneburg had been close allies of Charles XI and of his son. They had taken their part in arms in forcing upon Denmark the treaties of Altona and Travendal. After Poltava George had declined proposals from Peter the Great and Frederick IV to join forces with them, on the ground of the necessity of keeping the empire at peace. He also had sent a man to Charles XII at Bender, Frederick Ernest de

¹ Admiralty orders, 9/20 July 1714.

Fabrice, in the service of Holstein-Gottorp but son of a trusted minister of his own. He offered a loan which should enable the fortresses of Bremen to be put in a proper state of defence. Fabrice, however, like Jefferyes, could only report insistence on rights and refusal of any concession. George, thereon, assented to the resolution of 1711 to reduce the Swedes by force. Bernstorff, his chief minister, declared that the king of Sweden's attitude obliged measures of defence against him. The Danish attack was actually made feasible by a loan from Hanover not of the 240,000 crowns, which Charles had refused, but of a whole million, the half of which sum was paid before the campaign began. George sought, indeed, to impose conditions; no prejudice to the war with France, Danish troops not to cross the Elbe, and his own lands and those of Holstein-Gottorp not to be compromised in any way; but he did not get them. Offers of mediation that he made were wrecked again on Charles's obstinacy.

On Bremen and Verden, the provinces which separated his dominions from the sea, George had always had his eye, in case the Swedes should lose them. A separate article of his treaty of July 1710 with Peter the Great allowed him to purchase or to hold in mortgage land subjects rights or revenues of the crown of Sweden. The crisis came when in August 1712 Frederick IV invaded Bremen, for the prospect of Danish possession of the duchies was insupportable. Nominally to save Verden for Sweden George sent troops to occupy the strong places of that duchy. The Danes did not stay long; their forces had to be withdrawn to meet Stenbock in Mecklenburg. But after the fall of Tönning they were back again, with the evident intention of remaining. George now finally decided to desert the cause of Sweden and to get the duchies for himself. In November 1714, after his accession to the throne of England, he concluded with Frederick William of Prussia a preliminary agreement that the one should have Bremen and Verden and the other Stettin and the southern half of Swedish Pomerania.

With Denmark accord was more difficult. The Danes at first paid little more respect to George as king than as elector. They expected, we are told, trouble for him in his new kingdom, an adverse parliament, perhaps war with France renewed. Frederick IV declined to make amends for damage to British commerce in the Elbe, long complained of, to evacuate Holstein, or to give up Bremen. When, however, they saw George well settled on his

throne and Charles XII returning from Turkey—it was in November 1714 that he performed his famous ride from Pitesti in Wallachia to Stralsund—they consented to accept the remainder of Swedish Pomerania in the place of Bremen.

These electoral arrangements of George I might nevertheless have fallen through, had not Charles stepped in again to forward them. Refusing proposals from Frederick William, which he might well have accepted, he attacked and drove the Prussians out from places they had occupied. By the end of April 1715 Sweden and Prussia were formally at war. Then the conditions required by George I were conceded. Hanover Prussia and Denmark agreed by formal treaties to divide the Swedish possessions in Germany among themselves. Hanover was to buy Frederick IV out of Bremen, Denmark to have the northern half of Pomerania, with Stralsund and Rügen, when conquered, Prussia the southern half, with Stettin. The treaty between Hanover and Denmark gave to the latter also the duke of Holstein-Gottorp's share of Sleswick, the two powers to share equally in compensation to him, should such be necessary.

Reduction of Stralsund was left to the Danes and Prussians. Peter the Great and Augustus II were occupied this year the one by operations in Finland and both by the civil war in Poland. George I, in his capacity of elector, undertook only to prevent Hessian or other troops from coming to the rescue. His real help was to be given through the British fleet ordered to the Baltic in consequence of what Townshend termed the "unexampled and outrageous severities" inflicted on the trade. He promised Frederick William on his royal faith and credit that the men-of-war should support the operations against Stralsund, excusing himself from a formal engagement to that effect on the ground that such must pass through the hands of his British ministers.¹

That he could give this promise was due to further headstrong action on the part of Charles XII. In February 1715 he issued a further Ordinance of Privateers so strict, that by Jackson's pronouncement no ship could enter the East Sea without being made prize. Already in January Jackson had entered claim for over £65,000 in respect of some 24 ships and their cargoes seized. In May Cyril Wich at Hamburg reported the Baltic to swarm with

¹ 5/16 April 1715, the words used, Michael, *Englische Geschichte im achtzehnten Jahrhundert*, I. 717.

Swedish privateers and 32 English and Dutch vessels to have been taken quite lately.

The fleet, eighteen of the line, left England at the end of May. Twelve Dutch men-of-war joined at Elsinore, for one of the results of the accession of George I, as said, had been to restore harmony between the two sea-powers. The British merchantmen numbered 86, the Dutch over 200. Ostensibly the British admiral, Sir John Norris, was instructed only to protect the trade and make reprisals. Privately, and with the connivance certainly of some of the British ministers, in accordance with the promise made to Frederick William he had orders to prevent relief from coming to Stralsund by sea. That service, in spite of reiterated personal appeal from Berlin, from Copenhagen, and from the Hanoverian ministers of George I he was neither inclined nor able to perform. As he himself observed, it could be of no advantage for the British and Swedes to destroy each other and leave the Danes and Russians masters of the Baltic. His force was not sufficient for both of his commissions; he might not join the Danes; and the Dutch admiral declined to act offensively. It happened that when the Swedish fleet did approach Stralsund he was away on his main duty at Reval. The Danes had to save the situation in a sea-fight by themselves.

There was angry Prussian and Danish remonstrance at what was held to be a breach of faith, and peremptory demand that the merchantmen should sail for home at once and Norris stay to help the confederate cause. That, for several reasons, could not be allowed; but as a compromise he was ordered to leave eight ships behind, and they were now permitted to join the Danish fleet and act with it. No opportunity, however, for that was given. At the end of December Stralsund fell. Charles, after protracting the defence beyond the limits of ordinary possibility, effected a miraculous escape to Sweden.

For the next year, 1716, conditions were changed. Frederick William of Prussia, after the fall of Wismar in April, took his cherished soldiers home. Peter the Great marched a formidable army into Mecklenburg and concerted with Frederick of Denmark an invasion of the Swedish mainland. To assist this George I could now turn the might of Great Britain openly. Conviction obtained in England that Charles XII had encouraged the late Jacobite rebellion and that the design of his present attack on Norway was to use the ports of that country for a descent on Scotland. The

instructions given to Sir John Norris, again appointed to conduct a fleet to the Baltic, made protection of trade this time a secondary matter. He was not, indeed, empowered at first to join in the attack ; he was to transmit to Charles XII demand for satisfaction and, while awaiting an answer, to stay quiet, excepting in case of absolute necessity for the defence of Denmark or Norway ; to discourage the invasion, and were it persisted in to threaten to withdraw his force. Accordingly, he refused at first to advance beyond the Sound and did his best to dissuade the Danes from invading Sweden. When, however, after two months there was no answer from Charles he received authority to join his ships with the Danish fleet, were there any apprehension of danger from the Swedes, and no longer to attempt to hinder the intended enterprise. Privately he was ordered, on the ground of reported dealings of Charles with the Jacobites and of the seizure of ships bound for Stockholm as well as to the East Sea, to facilitate the descent on Scania as the best means of diverting Charles from his Norway venture, and if the Swedish fleet approached to give it battle with the Danes. Ten days later, when his memorial to Charles had been returned unopened, he received instructions to sail the Baltic in company with the Danish and Russian fleets, execute reprisals, and drive the Swedes back into their harbours. All these orders emanated from the British ministers. The necessary arrangements made, the combined fleet sailed from Danish waters on 7/18 August, a noble array of some sixty men-of-war and over 400 merchantmen. It stayed at sea a month and then returned to Copenhagen, without hostilities committed, in time to protect the transport of the allied army of 52,000 men now assembled in Zealand. Then suddenly Peter the Great, after a personal inspection of the defences of the Swedish coast, announced that the season was too late for success of the undertaking. He was probably right in his expectation of failure, but his determination destroyed the confederation. Nothing could move him from it, although Norris and King George's ministers at Copenhagen, Lord Polwarth and General Bothmer, were as pressing with him as were the Danes. He prepared to move his army back into Mecklenburg.

In October 1715, when they concluded their guarantee treaty of Greifswald, relations between George I and Peter the Great had been of most friendly character. During the winter, when further negotiations had ended in failure, that friendship had cooled. Then

the quartering of the Russian troops in Mecklenburg, where Hanoverian interests were great and contrary, had produced gravest heartburning. Now the prospect of their return moved the court at Hanover to desperation. Peter was formally warned that the king of England could not suffer his troops to take up winter quarters anywhere in Germany. Norris told him plainly that their landing in Mecklenburg "would inevitably oblige the empire to an open rupture." There were proposals for compulsory conduct of the transports to a port of Poland. Frederick IV, however, would not help, all that he cared for was to get the Russians out of his own dominions. By the end of October they were back in Mecklenburg. George set about collecting a force on the frontier, sent for troops of Münster and Saxe-Gotha that he had at call, and sought for others from Hesse-Cassel. From this time forward he was the declared enemy of Peter the Great. Moreover it was this that brought him to accept that alliance with France,¹ which took first form in the "Triple Alliance" concluded between Great Britain France and Holland on 24 December/4 January 1716/7, and which remained the backbone of British foreign policy during the remainder of his reign.

The breach with Peter did not change the relations of George with Charles XII. On the contrary, his hands were strengthened against him by the publication in February 1717 of the so-called "Swedish Plot." How far the proposals made by Baron Goertz, that man of desperate expedients who alone now kept the cause of Charles alive, to the Jacobites in England were sincere, and whether or no Charles himself was privy to them, it is difficult to say. Certain it is that the object was to get money, no longer obtainable elsewhere, and that the Jacobites were ready to find it in return for men and arms. The correspondence was known to the British government throughout. The secret service of Hanover, conducted in chief by George's private secretary, Jean de Robethon, had long been the most highly organised in Europe and little escaped its cognisance. The letters were regularly opened and copied—the copies may be seen at the Record Office now—and when the time came they were published to the nation. Gyllenborg, through whom the intrigue had been conducted, was arrested in England; Goertz himself, at the request of the British government, in Holland.

¹ See Stanhope's dispatches from Hanover, Record Office, *State Papers Domestic*, Regencies 1.

In reprisal Robert Jackson at Stockholm was thrown into prison.

The object of these proceedings seems clear enough. The government was in a dangerous position. Strong agitation against the king's northern policy was on foot. The instructions to Norris to forward the invasion of Sweden, when he was supposed to be commissioned only to protect the trade and execute reprisals, had been made public by the king of Denmark in the previous October. It was possible that a reduction of the army might be insisted on and grants for a Baltic fleet refused. And there was schism in the ministry. Lord Townshend had lately been removed from his office of secretary of state to be lord-lieutenant of Ireland. He was gravely hurt, and Robert Walpole, the ablest debater in the House of Commons, was his brother-in-law and supporter. The nation had to be roused, and what so effective as this plot of invasion suddenly revealed? Even then the king's party hardly had the upper hand. True, that both houses of parliament expressed their indignation in the strongest terms, that trade with Sweden was prohibited and the estimates for the land-forces carried by a large majority, but a month later, in spite of alarming reports from Copenhagen, the supply against Sweden was strongly opposed. On 8/19 April, in committee, government had a majority of fifteen only, and next day, on report, of but four. But for the publication of the papers it would probably have been defeated.

In view of the belief, now absolutely entertained, that Charles XII intended a descent on Scotland the Baltic fleet this year comprised no fewer than 24 of the line and sailed at the beginning of April instead of, as in former years, towards the end of May. The instructions given to Admiral Sir George Byng were purely offensive; the merchantmen were to follow later under convoy of other men-of-war. Byng was to blockade Gothenburg and as his "great and principal service" to prevent the Swedes from passing the Sound. He was to seize ships sailing from or bound to Swedish ports, to stop provisions from reaching the country, and to join in action with the Danes. Moreover, drafts for treaties with Great Britain and Hanover for offensive action against Sweden and for defence in Germany were prepared and sent to Copenhagen. Their provisions show the animus prevailing. The British draft proposed joint naval armaments, payment to Denmark of 400,000 thalers subsidy and of the arrears from the French war, abolition of the Swedish exemption from the Sound tolls, the recovery of former

Danish possessions in Sweden, and efforts to obtain imperial confirmation to Denmark of the Swedish territory in Germany now occupied by her and of the duchy of Sleswick. A separate and secret article dealt with the possibility of sending land forces from England in addition to the naval aid. The Hanoverian proposals were for assembly of a joint force at Bergedorf across the Elbe, namely, 10,000 Danes and 12,000 Hanoverians, the latter force to be increased to 20,000 by means of imperial and other German contingents.

The Danes were deterred from conclusion by fear of offence to Russia and Prussia. Indeed, in the autumn of 1717 Frederick IV was still in negotiation with Peter the Great for a combined attack on Sweden in the coming summer, the one from Norway, the other from Finland. Although Lord Polwarth reported Frederick IV advised to do nothing, whether for peace or war, excepting in concert with Great Britain, although such a resolution, Sunderland wrote in answer, was "certainly the wisest they could take with regard to their own interest, since I know of no other power by which they can expect to be supported," and further that the king was "very ready to act in concert as to the operations of the next year" and "they may be satisfied that his Majesty will continue to assist them with his fleet, as he has hitherto done," concert for action in common proved impracticable.

Byng, meanwhile, had had little to do. Arrived in the Sound he found that the noise of Swedish offensive preparations was nothing but a scare. His first attention was directed rather to Russian doings in Mecklenburg. The Swedish fleet kept out of his way and the privateers transferred their activities to the North Sea. A proposed attack on Carlskrona was negatived as too difficult; an intended occupation of the isle of Gothland was forestalled by the Russians. A Swedish frigate was encountered and after a gallant fight of one against four was captured. In July the greater part of the fleet was recalled and for the ships that were left there was nothing to do.

The war, in fact, was at a deadlock. The confederacy against Sweden was hopelessly split up; Russia and Prussia on the one side, Hanover and Denmark on the other, were hardly less bitter against each other than against Sweden. General negotiation was begun. Peter the Great paid this year a visit to Paris and spent some months in Holland. At Paris he was persuaded to withdraw

his troops from Mecklenburg. On this Sir John Norris and Charles Whitworth were appointed to confer with him at Amsterdam. The negotiation came to nothing, and then both sides turned to accommodation with Sweden. French mediation obtained the exchange of Gyllenborg and Jackson, the latter reporting his arrival at Harwich on 10/21 October. Goertz, to the wrath of the British and Dutch governments alike, was set free by the independent action of the States of Gelderland. He had an interview with Peter, went on to Berlin, and finally under Russian escort got back to Sweden, escaping English frigates on the watch to catch him.

George I, for his part, entered into negotiation with Charles XII through Count Vellingk, the governor of Bremen, and through the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, while the regent Orleans, less from care for Sweden's welfare than because war in the north weakened the position of France against Austria, sent to Stockholm Count Louis Pierre de la Marck. Charles condescended to make counter-proposals, and at the end of the year George sent on a secret mission to him the Fabrice who had been at Bender. He, however, and the Hanoverian minister Schrader, who had been sent after him to discover what he was doing, could only bring to England in May 1718 proposals that were unacceptable. Again a British squadron sailed for the Baltic, again solely for the purpose of offensive action in conjunction with the Danes and of prevention of any Swedish naval expedition against Great Britain or elsewhere. When, as the result of the negotiations of Goertz at the Åland isles, it seemed possible that the Swedes might be joined by the powerful Russian fleet which had put to sea under command of Peter the Great himself, the British admiral, again Sir John Norris, was ordered to deal with the Russians in the same way as with the Swedes. No collision, however, occurred. Again proposals for a treaty between Great Britain and Denmark were put forward, again without result, for George I could not guarantee grant by parliament of the regular subsidies, which Frederick IV made his special condition. At the end of the year everything was changed by the chance shot which slew Charles XII at Frederikshald.

In Sweden followed revolution. Charles's sister, Ulrica Eleanora, was permitted to occupy the throne, but only by election and after abrogation of all autocratic privilege and hereditary right. The work of Charles XI was undone, and the most absolute monarchy in Europe was changed to the most limited. A year later, largely

by British influence, Ulrica surrendered the crown to her husband, prince Frederick of Hesse-Cassel. He was to reign as Frederick I without authority, without funds, and with no support save from the fourth estate and such as his father the landgrave and George I could give him.

The Swedes, compelled to peace, had to determine how to conclude it with least loss. Peter the Great was ready to make terms at the expense of Hanover and Denmark ; George I at Peter's cost. In the one case the Swedes must give up part, at least, of their eastern Baltic provinces, in the other most of their holdings in Germany. The former were of greater value ; Livonia was the granary of Sweden. Peace with Peter meant immunity from his attack, but also subjection to him ; George, now with both France and Austria for his allies the most powerful monarch in Europe, might both protect and rehabilitate. His plan was clear enough ; Sweden to surrender her German provinces to their present occupants and in return, as James Craggs, secretary of state, put it in a dispatch to Lord Stair at Paris, "by an alliance to be concluded between Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, Poland, the Emperor and His Majesty to recover to Sweden what the Czar has taken from her, and let him come into the treaty *nolens volens* upon these terms."

To open the ground George sent in March 1719 to Copenhagen and thence to Stockholm his Hanoverian subject Colonel Adolf Friedrich Bassewitz. The result was the mission of a British ambassador in the person of the already prominent young statesman John Carteret, Lord Carteret. At the same time Sir John Norris was again commissioned to conduct a squadron to the Baltic, not now in hostility to but for the defence of Sweden. Carteret on his arrival found that Bassewitz had obtained promise of the cession of Bremen and Verden on the condition, amongst others, of British action against Russia. Partly by undertaking that the fleet should at once come on into Swedish waters to relieve the pressure of the present Russian invasion, partly, it must be confessed, by free expenditure of money, he was able to procure signature of a preliminary convention with Hanover when he had been at Stockholm but eleven days. Its chief conditions were the complete cession of Bremen and Verden to Hanover in return for payment of a million crowns by George as elector, renewal of friendship and alliance with Great Britain, and an undertaking to protect and favour British commerce.

Meanwhile negotiation was proceeding at Berlin for Prussian treaties with Hanover and Great Britain, treaties concluded at last, after utmost recalcitrance on the part of Frederick William I, on 3/14 August. They guaranteed mutually Bremen and Verden to Hanover and Stettin and its district to Prussia. The latter cession, however, was no part of the Swedish-Hanoverian convention, and that had been received at Hanover, completed, on 25 July/5 August. To meet the difficulty, on the suggestion of Charles Whitworth, the British plenipotentiary at Berlin, and on the plea that they would have been signed earlier, had not the king been ill, the Prussian treaties were ante-dated by ten days. For the Swedes, as will be seen from Stanhope's second dispatch to Carteret of 6/17 August, the necessity of the cession to Prussia was grounded on the obsolete Prusso-Hanoverian treaty of 1715, and they were forced to make it a condition of a preliminary convention with Great Britain signed on 18/20 August. Final treaties with Hanover Great Britain and Prussia followed in that order. To be noted is the care taken to record that France, and to pretend that the emperor, had had share in the pacification.

To effect peace between Sweden and Denmark was more difficult. Besides retention of his Pomeranian holding Frederick IV demanded restoration of the provinces in Sweden held by Denmark formerly. His terms refused, he prosecuted war, assembled 34,000 men on the Norwegian frontier, blockaded Gothenburg, and captured the important harbour of Marstrand. One result of this was that Norris, in spite of Carteret's undertaking and his urgent appeals, was kept in the Sound till near the end of August, from fear that the Danes might attack him in the rear, if he went on. Meanwhile the French court was insisting that Sweden must retain some foothold in the empire, in counterpoise to Austria, and George I could not break with France, least of all at this time of their joint war with Spain. It was decided that Sweden must have Stralsund and Rügen back. Carteret was instructed not to insist on the cession of them to Denmark, nay, to intimate that the demand was put forward rather to make favourable impression at Copenhagen than in expectation of its acceptance.

What brought Frederick IV to submission in the end was the prospect of losing Sleswick as well as Stralsund and Rügen. Charles Frederick, the young duke of Holstein-Gottorp, nephew of Charles XII, after obtaining formal support to his claim for restitu-

tion at Vienna had repaired to and found asylum and real backing at Petersburg. Only by the support of Great Britain and France could Frederick IV stand against the combined insistence of emperor and tsar, and to obtain that he must submit to the terms imposed by George I. These were set forth plainly in instructions for Lord Polwarth; surrender of northern Pomerania in return for cash and for permanent possession of Sleswick under British and French guarantees; otherwise isolation. Pressed thus from all sides Frederick submitted. In return for surrender of the Swedish exemption from the Sound tolls and payment of 600,000 rixdollars he agreed to restore to Sweden his Pomeranian booty and Marstrand. British and French guarantees of Sleswick were duly given him, though the latter only with greatest reluctance.¹

For the rest the Swedes were wofully deceived. For all his might in the west George I could carry nothing against Peter the Great, who cared for him not a jot. The British squadrons which entered the Baltic with the expressed object of destroying Peter's naval power could neither penetrate his defences nor prevent his sending troops on galleys by the shallow waters of the islands to commit frightful havoc on the Swedish coasts. In August 1721 the Swedes were obliged to sign at Nystad the terms which Peter thought proper to impose.

Unable to coerce, there had remained nothing for George I to do but still to look after his own interests. He was reduced almost to supplication to the Swedes to make what terms with Peter the Great they could, rather than continue the war. He insisted on his own inclusion in the treaty to be made, and in particular on insertion of a clause guaranteeing Lower Germany against attack. The Swedes were willing, but Peter left his enemy in the cold. Reference to George I in the treaty of Nystad was confined to mention that the king of Sweden regarded him as included, subject to amicable arrangement by direct negotiation of his contentions with the tsar.

After Nystad and during the remainder of the reign of George I the Sleswick question dominated northern politics. Peter the Great and after him Catherine I ever kept the powers concerned in alarm by threat of setting the duke of Holstein-Gottorp on the throne of Sweden or of recovering Sleswick for him by force of

¹ Particulars of these complicated negotiations, Chance, *George I and the Northern War*, chapters 22 to 26.

arms. In 1722, indeed, Peter was engrossed with new enterprise on the shores of the Caspian, but in 1723, when he took his navy out to sea in person, he scared the court at Hanover to such extent that Townshend supposed that "we might in a little time see Swedish and Muscovite squadrons in conjunction at Gothenburg, able to terrify and distress all the coasts of Great Britain." He and Carteret, also at Hanover, pressed that £100,000 or £200,000 might be set aside "with the least noise possible" for use in aid to Sweden and Denmark, if required. Robert Walpole, however, was able to dissuade and soon the Russian fleet sailed home.

In the next year, 1724, prospects were yet more disquieting. In the autumn of 1723 negotiations for an offensive and defensive alliance between Sweden and Russia had been set on foot. The Swedes wanted to include Great Britain, but as a preliminary George I required settlement of his differences with the tsar, that was to say, Peter's submission to his will. Soon it was found that the Swedes only offered their mediation, and that was contemned. "Their government," the verdict ran, "is so weak and divided, and the Czar has so great an influence among them, that they could not but be the worst mediators we could pick out, if we wanted any." In January 1724 William Finch, who had succeeded Carteret at Stockholm with the character of envoy, was instructed that the king of England would not take "the least step that is derogatory to his honour to bring about a reconciliation with the Czar." There resulted the treaty of Stockholm, concluded between Russia and Sweden on 22 February/4 March. Inoffensive in its main clauses, it carried a sting in its tail. A secret article, which was not kept secret, stipulated joint effort to obtain restitution to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp and in case of failure reference of the matter to the imperial authority. It was this that galled, for by this time British relations with the emperor were completely changed. Counts of complaint against him had reached their climax with the issue of an imperial charter to the Ostend Company in 1723.

Before long came alarming reports of Russian and Swedish naval preparations, such that Frederick William of Prussia, on better terms with his father-in-law since their recent treaty of Charlottenburg, proposed assembly of a joint Prussian and Hanoverian force to oppose the expected invasion of Germany, while the Danes appealed anew to George I for help. It suited to discount the danger; the Danes were only told that if they had offers to make

for removing former difficulties they should send some one to London with them. For on the one hand it was not safe at present to propose in parliament another expedition to the Baltic, on the other French feeling had to be consulted. Assurance was given at Paris that although his Majesty would like to concert an answer to the king of Denmark's "daily instances," yet he "in this as in every thing else would do nothing but in concert with the court of France."

On the affairs of southern Europe, now in debate at the congress of Cambray, France and England were united, but not so on those of the north. The French court was always suspicious of the aims of George I there, disfavoured Denmark, and was all for the friendship of Russia. Ever since the peace of Nystad a French envoy, Jacques de Campredon, had been working at Petersburg to bring about alliance between France Russia and Great Britain. His efforts had continually been defeated by failure with the necessary preliminary, reconciliation between George I and Peter the Great. George was obdurate on the Sleswick question; "neither France nor England," he caused to be declared at Paris, "have any right to impose or even so much as recommend to Denmark their giving an equivalent for Sleswick." Still less was he disposed to lay his own Hanoverian resources under contribution. Of a separate treaty between France and Russia, to which he might be admitted subsequently, he would not hear. The *Sieur de Chavigny*, sent to him at Hanover in 1723 specially to advocate this expedient, met with the plainest of refusals. The French court had to acquiesce, for otherwise the indispensable alliance with Great Britain might have been imperilled.

In July 1724 came other disturbing news, report of desire on the part of Frederick of Sweden to abdicate, a thing, *Townshend* wrote, of "fatal consequence" to affairs at the present juncture. The fear was that the duke of Holstein-Gottorp would be elected king and so the country come under complete subjection to the tsar. *Finch* was desired to make private inquiry and report on the present strength of the king's party, of the "patriots," and of the Holstein faction. His reply was reassuring; he believed the reports to be set on foot with the object of obtaining financial assistance for the king. And *Horatio Walpole* corroborated from Paris on the strength of information from *Baron Gedda*, the Swedish minister there. Nevertheless disquiet was not removed; it was

decided to replace Finch by a stronger man enjoying the particular confidence of Townshend, Stephen Poyntz. He reached Stockholm in October 1724. Reporting, he had to confess a general leaning towards Russia but ascribed it not to any liking for the duke of Holstein-Gottorp but to dislike and jealousy of the king and consequently of any foreign power disposed to support him. That meant in particular George I, suspected, and with truth, of endeavouring to establish the succession in the house of Hesse. Discussing matters at length in January 1725 Townshend expressed his Majesty's concern at the miserable condition of affairs depicted, but also his conviction that the disorders arose from causes which no outside action could remove. In particular he blamed Frederick's weak conduct as forfeiting all confidence in him at home and disabling anyone abroad from helping him.

Two months later there was a dramatic change; again, as in 1689 and 1702, help from Sweden was required. In the first days of March information came to London of the final decision of the French government to send back to Spain the little infanta betrothed to Louis XV, in order that the young monarch might be married, as the phrase went, "out of hand." That meant rupture between France and Spain, dissolution of the congress of Cambray, and upset of the whole southern policy of George I. At the same time became known the direct overtures to the emperor which Elizabeth of Spain, tired of the futilities of the congress, had instituted in secret at Vienna through the baron de Ripperdà. To counter the threatened alliance of Austria and Spain it seemed necessary to bring in the powers of the north.

There also the situation appeared to be completely changed by the death of Peter the Great in February 1725. It was thought that his successor, his widow Catherine, must seek the help of Great Britain and France to maintain her position and that now that alliance with Russia, for which the French government had striven ardently so long, might be accomplished. Not that Catherine's help against Austria and Spain was to be sought immediately: first should be seen how affairs at Petersburg went. "The first and most necessary step," the duke of Newcastle, the new secretary of state for the southern province, wrote to Paris, was to send a proper French minister to Stockholm to work with Poyntz. Sweden secured, her "great number of very good troops" would intimidate any power that should attempt to disturb the peace of the north.

After Sweden Hesse-Cassel, Denmark, Poland ; unreliable Prussia to be left to follow.¹

The scheme miscarried. So far from giving up the duke of Holstein-Gottorp's claims Catherine proved more ardent for his cause than her husband had been. Peter, indeed, appears to have cared little either for the duke or for his interests, to have kept him rather as a convenient weapon in his armoury against George I. Catherine had personal affection for him and carried out his long proposed marriage to her eldest daughter. In June came word to Paris that she had rejected the treaty proffered and after an astounding outburst of rage had ordered immediate equipment of her fleet and army. The news roused almost consternation, for quite the contrary had been anticipated. Again George I was pressed to reconsider his attitude towards the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, again he refused. Both he and his ministers stood firm in their conviction that Catherine must yield in the end, that she could never make alliance with the emperor, as was threatened, and that if she did it would not greatly matter, provided that Sweden were gained.

Meanwhile Spain and Austria had come to terms. Elizabeth, in her first fury at the repudiation of her daughter, had accepted the poor conditions which Ripperdà had been able to transmit. Treaties of peace and alliance had been signed at Vienna on 19/30 April.

To meet the situation the French proposed a new treaty of alliance with England, so framed that any power, so minded, could join in it, not only now the protestant powers of the north, and Holland, but also catholic states, and in particular Savoy and Bavaria. The treaty was ready in draft when, at the end of July, Frederick William of Prussia came on a visit to George I at Hanover. Unexpectedly he was found amenable ; a secret article concerning the succession to Juliers and Berg was added for his benefit ; and the result was the treaty of Hanover concluded between Great Britain France and Prussia on 23 August/3 September.

The very next day orders went to the Hague and Stockholm for communication of the treaty in strict confidence to pensionary Hoornbeek and Count Horn, and as soon as could be arranged Holland and Sweden were formally invited to accede. It is

¹ For this illuminating dispatch see the *English Historical Review*, XXVIII (1913), 702.

unnecessary to enter here into particulars of the eighteen months' contest waged by Poyntz and his young French colleague, the count de Brancas-Céreste, with the equally strenuous partisans of Russia and Holstein. George I had failed the Swedes before, and was known to favour the king. Frederick William of Prussia not only did not help, but hindered. Arvid Horn, through whom alone Poyntz and Brancas could achieve success, was not yet sure of his ground and played a subtle game with either party. The senate was almost equally divided, and all sorts of objections were raised and restrictions demanded. There were shocks, as when Catherine I joined the allies of Vienna and Charles VI acceded to the treaty of Stockholm. All the while George I was in action against Spain and preparing war on Austria; all the while Catherine kept Denmark and Hanover in dread of attack and England in disquiet by supposed support of the Pretender. It is astonishing to read what turmoil the mere wind of Jacobite plots aroused. In the autumn of 1725, for instance, before Ripperdà, that is, made his astounding revelations, a commercial venture of three Russian ships to Spain and intercepted letters from Jacobites at Petersburg were supposed to herald a Spanish descent on Ireland and gave reason to call for the equipment of 30 or 40 British men-of-war. By almost every post and courier urgent injunction went to Poyntz to get the business of the accession finished lest the king's affairs both at home and abroad should be undone. Money was employed freely on both sides; the tsaritsa, says Poyntz in one place, was fairly outbidding himself and Brancas at the auction. British squadrons appeared again in the Baltic in 1726 and 1727, intended for action against Russia but in the former year to the alarm and indignation of the Swedes themselves, when Sir Charles Wager brought his ships near Stockholm. For they believed him to have come in the interests of the king.

In September 1726 a riksdag took control of affairs, and then at last, though not until 14/25 March 1727, the accession was obtained. Late as it came, it had its value. In May 1727 peace or war in Europe depended on whether or no the emperor would revoke his Ostend charter. The inclusion of Sweden in the ranks of his adversaries must have influenced his surrender, registered in the preliminaries of peace signed at Paris at the end of the month.

A fortnight previously the northern trouble also had been solved,

by the death of Catherine I. Few but she in Russia cared anything at all for the cause of her son-in-law. Before long he left Petersburg to settle down as a petty German prince at Kiel. In Sweden Arvid Horn, rid of Holstein opposition, achieved supremacy.

The Baltic expedition of 1727 was sent for the defence of Denmark, in accordance with the military convention concluded by Great Britain and France with that power on 5/16 April.¹ In view of what had happened in the previous year, Sir John Norris, once more in command, was ordered to go on to Stockholm only in case of necessity and if summoned. The force entrusted to him, eleven of the line of 70 guns besides his flagship of 80 and smaller vessels, shows the estimation in which the naval power of Russia was held. He stayed at Copenhagen, and the events of May enabled him soon to be recalled.

His orders to return came from the new king, for George I had died on his way to Hanover. Townshend, arrived at Osnabrück at an early hour on Monday, 12/23 June 1727, sent out the following hurried circular.

“ Osnabrug, 12/23 June 1727.

“ The King our late good and great master departed this life at this place yesterday morning between twelve and one. His late Majesty was seized in his coach between Delden and Lingen with a fit of an apoplexy on Friday last in the morning and was brought hither the same night.”²

The question arises—it has been debated from the first—whether, and if so how far, British interests were subordinated in these proceedings to those of Hanover. No doubt George I and his German ministers manœuvred to turn the power of the kingdom to the advantage of the electorate, but if they influenced British

¹ This was not accession of Denmark to the treaty of Hanover, as is usually stated, but a military convention which engaged Danish troops, paid for by France, to form the main part of an army to be stationed in Lower Germany for defence against Russia and Austria. Although Frederick IV was even desirous of joining the alliance of Hanover, Swedish and Prussian jealousies precluded invitation to him. It was well understood that if the Danes came in the Swedes would not.

² In spite of this testimony of Townshend it seems doubtful whether it was not on the Saturday that George was taken ill and brought into his brother's castle at Osnabrück.

foreign policy they could not direct it, there was always parliament to reckon with and public opinion was violently jealous of them.

In regard to Sweden, save in the questionable proceedings of the pacification of 1719-20, British action was taken without reference to Hanover. Fleets were ordered to the Baltic in 1715 to protect the essential trade on which Charles XII had laid his interdict, and in the following years also on the ground of his reputed relations with the Jacobites. Even were, as is probable, the accusations against him on that head untrue, there was ample reason for the credit given to them and genuine conviction of their truth. These were British interests, even if Hanover profited by the upholding of them.

In itself the transference of Bremen and Verden to Hanover was, or was claimed to be, of advantage to Great Britain; better for trade by Elbe and Weser to be commanded by a king of England than by either Swede or Dane. Heavy as were the duties laid on goods competing with Hanoverian home products, British merchants might expect to be favoured in regard to them and to trade to Germany generally as against those of other nationality.

With regard to Russia the case was different. That British ministers acted as they thought best for their country need not be doubted. They saw asylum given to Jacobites at Petersburg, and it was certainly not a British interest that Sweden should be subjugated by Russia. Yet Peter the Great, and Catherine I after him, consistently declared that hostility on their part extended to Hanover alone. They did not obstruct trade, but issued declarations of its freedom and kept their ports open, even when threatened by British squadrons. If Peter raised Jacobites to high command in fleet and army and protected them as merchants it was not from sympathy with their cause but because he gained for his service men who were useful and efficient. Given that condition, he cared not whom he employed.

What really kept Great Britain and Russia apart, with unhappy results, was the refusal of George I to meet the claims of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. That was a Hanoverian interest; it could not matter to Great Britain who held Sleswick. Would George I have accommodated the quarrel the course of European history had been changed. France would have succeeded in her efforts to bring Russia into alliance with Great Britain and herself, Sweden and Prussia would have followed readily, and with Holland, and perhaps

with Denmark also, a great confederation had been formed, which would have given the law to Europe. For the immediate occasion Great Britain had been spared the alarms resulting from the coalition of Austria and Spain and all the naval and military turmoil of the last years of George I.

WILLIAM DUNCOMBE

1689-1692

THE editor has been unable to discover more about this envoy than that in 1693, after his return to England, he was appointed one of the Lords Justices in Ireland and that at his death in April 1704 he held the office of comptroller-general of army accounts. There is suggestion in the dispatches that he was kin to the wealthy banker, Charles Duncombe, Lord Mayor of London in 1708, whose nephew was raised to the peerage as Lord Feversham, and it is probable that he was the member for Bedfordshire in the parliaments of 1688 and 1695.

When he reached Stockholm, on 16/26 July 1689, the Holstein affair, the secondary subject of his instructions, had been adjusted at Altona. The reasons for his failure to accomplish his primary commission, to negotiate treaties of alliance and commerce with Sweden, have been noticed in the introduction and are set out in detail, with the characters and dispositions of the leading ministers and other matters, in the very full and interesting report which he presented on his return to England.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR WILLIAM DUNCOMBE, ESQ., ENVOY EXTRA-ORDINARY TO CHARLES XI OF SWEDEN, 30 MAY 1689.

(Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 153, copy.)

Having thought fitt to make choice of you to goe as Our envoye extraordinary and reside at the court of Our good brother the king of Sweden, you shall with what convenient speed you can after the receipt of Our dispatches embarque your self on such ship or vessel as shall be appointed to transport you to Stockholme, whither you shall repaire or to such other place where you shall be informed that

king is and likely to continue. Our intention being you should constantly reside where the king ordinarily is and keeps his court or to follow the camp whenever he shall take the field in case you find it necessary for Our service.

Being arrived at the court you shall in the usuall forme give notice thereof and demand an audience, in which you shall deliver Our credentialls, accompanying the same with all fitting expressions of the esteem and friendship Wee have for the king's person and assuring him of Our firme resolution not onely to maintaine and cultivate the friendship and good correspondence which is between Us and Our subjects but that Wee desire toe improve the same by further allyances and entring into common measures with him for carrying on the warr against the French king until the quiett of Christendome can be secured against his attempts by a firme and useful peace. And in order thereunto you are to endeavour to prevent any rupture between the crownes of Sweedland and Denmark, that Wee and Our allies may not loose the king of Sweedland's assistance against the common enemy.

You are to assure him that Wee doe soe farr approve the answer and proposalls lately given by the mediators at Altena to the king of Denmark's ministers touching the affair of the duke of Holstein that Wee shall endeavour to persuade the king of Denmark to such terms as may be to the king of Sweden's satisfaction, with whome and with Our other allies Wee shall be ready to take such measures as may oblige the king of Denmark to a just and reasonable compliance.

And the better to obtaine this and all other advantages for the common good of Us and Our allies you are to concert with the ministers of the States Generall of the United Provinces residing in that courte, that such methods may be agreed on between you and pursued as shall be most proper in this conjuncture.

You shall protect and countenance on all occasions Our subjects trading, etc.

You shall entertaine a good correspondence and friendship with the ambassadors, envoys, etc.

And whereas Our late dear Unkle etc.

You shall constantly correspond with Our ambassadors, etc.

You shall diligently observe the motions etc.

During your residence in that court you shall make it your care to inform your self etc.

You shall from time to time observe and follow such further directions and instructions etc.

W. R.

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SAME, 6 JUNE 1689.

(*Ibid.*, copy.)

Taking into Our consideration the present controversie between the king of Denmark and the duke of Holsteyn, and of how great importance it is that the same should be speedily and amicably composed for preventing a warr between the kings of Sweden and Denmark, which would be of very great prejudice to the common interest of Christendome and the trade of Our subjects in the north and particularly in the Baltick Sea, Wee have thought fitt to give you these further instructions in that matter.

You shall therefore immediately upon your arrivall at the king of Swedens court informe your self in what terms that affair is and thereupon apply your self to the best means of preventing a rupture and bringing that matter to an amicable composition, if by any fitting offices on Our part the same can be attained.

Particularly you shall loose noe time in obtaining as soon as conveniently may be a private audience, even before your publick one if need be ; and in it you shall insist on these heads.

To declare the interest Wee have to desire a happy conclusion of this affair for the good of the common cause, wherein the greatest part of Christendome and even that king himselfe is concern'd, which cannot but suffer infinite prejudice by a warr in those parts ; next in regard of the trade of Our dominions and subjects, which will be much interrupted and lessen'd by it ; and lastly in respect of the obligation Wee are under by the guaranty given by Our late unkle King Charles the Second of blessed memory. That as to the points insisted on by the duke of Holsteyn Wee think these three very reasonable and fitt to be granted.

1. The restoring the dukedome of Sleswick with the mannor of Godsgaue and appurtenances as it was in the year 1674, before the seizure.

2. The evacuating and delivery to the duke the isle of Ternerne, the baillage of Trillau Tremsbuttell and Steinhorse.

3. The maintaining the northern peace, the enjoyment of the soveraignty of the dukedom of Sleswick to the duke and his posterity

pursuant to it, and the free exercise of the *Jus Collectandi Foederum et Fortalitii*.

But there is another article which Wee cannot think soe reasonable to be insisted on at this time, and Wee therefore hope his Majesty will prevail with the duke of Holsteyn to desist from it, which is this.

The laying extraordinary taxes upon the clergie nobility and subjects of the king of Denmark as well as the dukes owne, within the dukedoms of Sleswick and Holsteyn, towards the charge of building a new fortress and the payment of 500,000 rix dollars at three terms out of the king of Denmarks own treasure.

That as it has bin found by experience to be the best expedient, soe it seems to Us most reasonable for determining differences of this kind, which otherwise might prove endless, to remitt the pretension of satisfaction for injurys past and to accept such a security as may be sufficient and necessary against the like attempt for the time to come.

That Wee hope therefore the king of Sweden at Our request and in consideration of Our interposition, joyned with the generall benefit of Christendome and the concession of the second article, will advise the duke of Holsteyn to depart from his pretension to any such satisfaction or reparation, which being insisted on will involve that part of the world in all the miseryes attending a warr, and cannot in it self be esteemed of importance equall to answer the expense that must support it.

That Wee have given order to Our minister at Copenhagen¹ to communicate Our thoughts in like manner to the king of Denmark and to persuade him to consent to the three first demands upon condition of releasing the two last, which Wee hope at Our intercession he will doe.

In case you cannot prevail by these arguments you shall then declare in Our name, that if the conferences at Altena shall happen to break upon these two last demands and a warr should follow Wee must in justice impute the cause thereof to the duke of Holsteyn for insisting rigidly on lesser matters after the great essentiall points are yeilded, and then Wee shall then be obliged to consider of such other measures as may secure the peace of those countrys.

You shall use the like arguments with the king of Swedens

¹ Robert Molesworth, in 1719 Viscount Molesworth ; author of the malicious *Account of Denmark as it was in the year 1692*.

ministers and take care upon all fitting occasions in your whole discourse to give the king and his ministers all possible assurances of Our intentions to maintaine and cultivate a strict and firme allyance with that crowne and that Our offices on this occasion are founded on what Wee think just and reasonable and for the particular interest of that king as well as the generall good of those countrys.

W. R.

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SAME, 19 JUNE 1689.

(Ibid., copy.)

You will herewith receive the copy of a project of an agreement between the king of Denmark and the duke of Holstein proposed and prepared by the mediators at Hambrough, which was sent to Us since your departure from hence, and this containing the last demand and finall resolution of the king of Sweden, princes of Brunswick and Lunenburg and the duke of Holstein, Wee have thought fitt to write a letter to the king of Denmark to persuade him to accept it, and have directed our minister there to use his endeavours to that purpose.

You shall therefore take noe notice of the points relating to this affair of Holstein contained in your former instructions any further then they agree with this project, but acquaint the king of Sweden that Wee have employed Our offices with the king of Denmark to induce him to make an agreement upon the terms proposed in the project and will endeavour as farr as lyes in Our power that the same may be accepted. And in case it shall be necessary to have a further prolongation of time granted, in order to the obtaining the king of Denmarks consent, you shall concurre with the minister of the States Generall in making such instances as shall be necessary in this behalfe.

W. R.

DANIEL, EARL OF NOTTINGHAM, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO WILLIAM DUNCOMBE.

(Ibid., copies.)

August 13th, 89. Whitehall.

I congratulate your safe arrivall at Stockholme and hope the ceremonies of your reception are past and that you have made those

overtures of treaty with that crown, which your instructions directed you, for I am commanded by the King to lett you know that he would have you hasten the treatys both of alliance and commerce as you can, and thô you may not be sufficiently empowered to conclude them, yet you may enter those negotiations and by that means know from that court what is expected or desired and transmit the same hither, and thereupon you shall receive his Majesty's pleasure and such further authority to perfect those treatys as are necessary. And as to that of our commerce I presume our merchants will informe you what things would be usefull to our trade, that you may insist upon such of them as shall be reasonable.

The King has resolved to enter into the guaranty of the treaty relating to Holstein, etc., and has given directions for an instrument to be prepared for that purpose, which will be acceptable to the king of Sweden, as an evidence of our Kings resolution to preserve the peace of the north.

I have sent you with this a copy of a treaty we have made with the States to prevent all trade with France, which you are to acquaint the king of Sweden and to represent it to his Majesty as a thing so necessary to the diminution of France, that it is reasonable to hope that other princes will rather concur in these measures then look upon it as a hardship upon their subjects.

Whitehall, December 31st, 1689.

. . . I have already writt so much and so express about the prohibition of commerce with France that I should say no more of it, but that the convoy designed to goe with the Swedes merchant ships seems to be intended to break through this prohibition, which therefore you must use your utmost endeavours to prevent. For since 'tis evident that there was no other intent in our making this treaty with the States but only for the common interest, by impoverishing France, and that the ministers of Swede acknowledge it to be usefull and necessary, it will appear very ill in the world for the Swedes to obstruct soe good a designe, which all do approve and most princes in Christendome concurr in ; and as the thing it self that the Sweds seeme to attempt is prejudiciall to all the allies, so the manner is much like our sending a yacht into the Dutch fleet to oblige them to strike, when wee had a mind to quarrell with them, and can probably have no other effect ; for all the men of warr of England and Holland having orders to prevent all trade

with France it cannot reasonably be expected those orders should or can be revok't, and consequently there will be some hazard of these Sweeds ships falling into our fleet, nay, it may happen at a time when the 12 Sweeds ships designed to assist Holland shall be joined with the fleet, and 'twill be a little strange to see some of their ships carrying on the trade to France and others of them opposing it and seizing them for soe doing. But I should not write so much of this matter but onely to lett you see that you must be very pressing to stop the voyage of these convoys and to use such arguments against it as will easily occur to you and you shall find seasonable and proper, and they may the more easily gratifie the King in this (which is agreeable to their owne professions and desires of friendship with him) because (as I have formerly writt) the men of warr of England and Holland will protect the merchant ships of Sweed equally with their owne.

The reason that is given you for delaying the guarranty of the treaty of Altena, because the ceremony to be paid to the Sweeds admirall is not adjusted, you will be able to answer very fully out of my former letters, and I assure you till I read it in your letters I never heard it soe applied; and you may againe assure them that the King will signe that act of guarranty, and 'tis delayed only for want of an authentick copy of the treaty.

For the ceremony to the Swedes admirall, when joined with the two fleets of England and Holland, I do not wonder you find it difficult, for every body else does so too, but since they desired you to accomodate this question the best way will be to remove the cause of it, and therefore you may propose to them to send their ships without the pomp of an admiralls flagg, which not only avoids the point of honour but will really render their ships more usefull in a day of action.

Whitehall, January 17th, 1689/90.

I have read your letters of December the 25th to the King, who orders me to tell you that you may persue your former instructions and support the prohibition of commerce with France with such reasons as I have formerly hinted to you and any others that occur to you, for it is not possible to recede from a point upon which so very much depends the success of the warr against France, and without good success all Europe must be in a very miserable condition. But because the King is very desirous to shew his

respect to the king of Sweden and the value he has of his friendship, if they who talk so much of expedients could propose any that did not directly destroy the treaty of prohibition and deprive us of the benefit we propose by it to ourselves and allies, the King would readily consent to them. The trade of Sweden to France is generally in such commoditys as are necessary to their fleet and for that reason, although we had made no treaty of prohibition, it cannot be expected that we should allow it while we are in warr with France at sea, nor can it fairly be askd in the treaty of commerce, which wee desire and you have orders to make with them, that these materialls of shipping should be excepted out of the number of contraband goods, they being more prejudiciall to us than musketts or any other things that usually fall under that denomination. Their trade chiefly from France is of wine and salt and are the things they most complain of the want of ; but since they can have better from Portugal and Spain, and perhaps at as cheap rates, 'tis hard to imagine that the king of Sweden will endeavour to overthrow our designes against France for so inconsiderable a trade in such things as may easily be had from other places ; and yet even in this the King has so farr complied with him as at the desire of Mons^r Leyonbergh ¹ to give passes to some Swedish ships to fetch salt from France, and would do so to more if it were not asked for too great a number of ships. So that here is one expedient you may offer them, since they have proposed none to you.

I remember you mentiond one objection they made, which is that France would take their ships trading to England ; to which you may tell them that they shall be convoy'd by our ships of warr equally with our merchants while they sail together, and when I have told you that we shall have 31,000 men at sea this yeare you will conclude that such a fleet joined with the Dutch will be sufficient not only to protect our and their trade but to block up the French ships in their ports. And when we are at so vast expense to carry on a warr against the common enemy of Christendom we may reasonably hope the king of Sweden, who is so generously disposed to promote the publick wellfare, will not thwart the measures we have taken to contribute towards it. The summ of all is, if we recede from the prohibition we permitt our enemies to be furnished with materials to undo us, and if we adhere to it we

¹ Baron Hans Barikman Leyonberg, the Swedish envoy extraordinary to William III.

are like to be exposed to the resentments of our friends ; the first would be our fault, and the last our misfortune. And therefore we hope the king of Sweden will not put us upon so uneasy a choice, especially since he cannot but foresee what that choice must be

Whitehall, January 21th 1689/90.

I have read to the King your letter of January first, and his Majestys orders thereupon to you are to observe carefully the proceedings of Monsieur Biddal ¹ and to give a constant account of them, and if need be by an expresse as well as the post ; and though Mons^r Leyonbergh assures the King of the king of Sweden's good intentions and resolution to adhere to the interest of the confederates, yet their resentment of the prohibition and the arrivall of Mons Biddal to improve all occasions of that court's dissatisfaction and the inclinations of some of the ministers to the interest of France give the King reason to apprehend that the king of Sweden may be prevailed upon to take resolutions very prejudiciall to the public welfare. And therefore, as his Majesty has already given Count Oxenstierne ² a considerable mark of his favor and esteem, so he would be willing to gaine the other ministers, and such as have credit with the king of Sweden, to his interest by presents suitable to the service they shall do him in this criticall conjuncture. And though this will be a service to their owne master too, and consequently might fairly be proposed to them, yet you must be very cautious, in the management of these orders, that what you say may seem to proceed as from your selfe, and even so too not directly to offer any of them any money before you find upon generall discourses of their master's interest in concurring with the King, and of the sense his Majesty will have of their service in promoting the common interest of Christendom, that they are disposed to be obliged by the King. And if you can find that 4000^l can be usefully distributed among them his Majesty allows you to do so and to draw your bills as you did before, and to give them such further assurances of his Majestys bounty as you shall find necessary to engage them to prevent the king of Sweden's entring into any measures with France.

¹ According to Carlson (v. 409) this was Col. Bidal, baron von Hatzfeldt, presumably the French marshal Claude-François Bidal, marquis d'Asfeld, of later days. A brother of his, however, the Abbé Bidal, was French minister at Hamburg, 1690 to 1703, and was sent to negotiate with Charles XII in 1701.

² Count Bengt Gabrielsson Oxentierna, president of the chancery.

Whitehall, March 21th 1689/90.

I have received yours of the 22th of February and another of the 1st of March. I am very apprehensive that the treaty between Sweden and Denmark contains something extraordinary, since it is made so great a secret, and concurr with you in your conjectures of it, tho it is denyed here by both their ministers. You must still endeavour to get a copy of it. A Danish ship that came lately out of France has been taken and brought into our port and I believe will be condemn'd, for it is impossible to carry on the warr against France with that speedy successe as is necessary if we cannot maintain the treaty of prohibition of trade thither; for as the Lubeckers, Hamburgers etc. take passes from Denmark, thinking the king will protect and support them, so will even the English and Dutch do too, and France will be enricht and enabled by ourselves and allies to fight against us.

'Tis to be hoped therefore that both Sweden and Denmark too will be prevailed with to comply with so reasonable a desire in this conjuncture and that they will consider 'tis scarce possible to trade with France and us too at this time; and besides the interest of Sweden with respect to the publick I cannot imagine but they will find their particular advantage by us, if once you could send me the calculation they promist you.

Whitehall, May 9th, 1690.

I have received yours of Aprill 19th and 23th and by his Majesty's order have writ to my Lord Dursley ¹ the substance of them to be communicated to the States, that he may jointly with them take such resolutions as are fitt upon so important an occasion, and I presume they will be such as will give satisfaction to Sweden so as they do not peremptorily insist upon that which can't consist with the honour of the King and the safety of himselfe and his allies.

If there were any other reasons for the resolution that is taken there for trade with France then what are declared they were easily answerd, and you have done it already, for certainly their trade with France is too inconsiderable to be a motive to this proceeding so dangerous to themselves as well as to Christendom; or if it were much more then it is the fault is in them, not in us, that they have

¹ Charles, Viscount Dursley, envoy extraordinary at the Hague, afterwards 2nd Earl of Berkeley.

not had some reparation for the loss sustaind by the want of it, the calculation having been so long and often demanded, which could not be possibly for any other intent then to make them some satisfaction for it ; or if it had been refused their present methods would have appeard much more specious to the world. But since you say there is a possibility (tho' a very bare one) that this matter may yet be retrieved you must improve all opportunitys ('till I have orders to write to you more particularly, which I hope will be suddenly) of representing to them the respect shewd to the king of Sueden upon the publishing our treaty with Holland (as I have formerly writt you), the sincerity of our dealing with them in desiring them not so much to submit to the loss of this trade as to know their damage by it, that some compensation might be made them, and lastly the fatal consequences of this step, which must almost inevitably produce many more and be destructive to Sueden, let the success of this warr be on the side of the allies or of France. And in short you must use your utmost endeavors to recover or stop at least the execution of this resolution.

Whitehall, October 3, 1690.

. Since therefore we have done all that was expected or desir'd in Sweden (as your last 4 letters intimate) and solved those difficulties, into which they had plunged themselves, the next thing to be considerd is how to avoyd the like for the future, which can only be by that treaty at the Hague ; and their orders to Count Oxenstein¹ to perfect it would be a very good evidence of their desire to preserve a good correspondence between the 2 nations. His Majesty's proceedings with those ships may sufficiently convince them that as he would hinder the French from having materials to undo us so he is far from depriving the Swedes of those commodities, which they so much want, or indeed of any advantage that may consist with the safety of his kingdoms and of his allies. Upon this foundation this treaty stands and the very pressing it is an argument not of our needing it but of his Majesty's respect to the king of Sweden, that he may not be forc't in self-preservation to give any occasion of dissatisfaction to a prince whose friendship he highly values. This would extreamly facilitate the treaties of alliance and commerce, which you say they expect this winter, and

¹ Count Gabriel Turesson Oxentierna, Swedish envoy at the Hague.

the King is as ready to make them as they can wish, and they might have bin long since concluded had not this single point of their trade with France obstructed their proceedings. You must therefore take some opportunity of representing those matters to Count Oxensteine, that he may make such use of them as may promote the common advantage of both kings, and you must assure him of the great satisfaction the King has had in his proceedings ; and I think his Majesty is well pleased also with the accounts you give of affairs there.

Whitehall, October 10, 90.

I have received yours of September 17th and have laid it before the King, to whom the large account you give of the good intentions of Sweden is very wellcom, and particularly the resolution they have taken to adjust forthwith the rules of their commerce with France for the future, and if Count Oxinstiern at the Hague has received and will follow the orders you say are sent him my Lord Dursley, who has the like orders and powers, will quickly bring this affair to such an issue as will prevent all occasions of any misunderstanding between us, for our transactions with Denmark, which might give them some jealousy, are really such as they cannot be displeased with, as you will see by my letter of the third instant.

The Commissioners of the Admiralty tell me they have agreed for the navall stores in the Swedes ships at Shereness and they are going to deliver them at Chatham.

What you wrote of the intentions of Sweden to be mediators of a peace was very fitt for his Majesty to know, but you will not expect any answer to those preliminaries of it, which they propose, because the thing it selfe is not seasonable, matters being not yet ripe for a peace, and therefore the very overture of it would, as you rightly argue, more probably break the alliance than cement it. So that their interposition at this time must be avoided as decently as may be, thõ their design of advantage to us by it must be kindly taken.

But if you find them disposed to make such an alliance with his Majesty and the States for the present, as I have told you is now projected with Denmark, you may renew your negotiation of it, and if this should not produce any closer engagements, as probably it may, yet the mutual advantage of it, and of that of commerce, will be a sufficient motive to expedite them.

Hague, March 14/24, 90/1.

. I send you enclosed a copy of a project for regulating the trade with France delivered by the Danish commissioners to ours and the Dutch envoye at Copenhagen, with some remarques upon it made here and sent back to them, by which you may perceive how farre we are willing to go towards an accommodation with Denmark, and may serve in a manner as instructions to you in framing a project for Sweden. And you are jointly with Mons^r Amerongen¹ to consider of these remarques and the paper you sent me in yours of February 21, and concert a project as advantageous for us as you can bring Sweden to agree to, and thereupon to conclude with them.

¹ Godard Adriaan van Rheeде, Baron van Amerongen, Heer van Ginkel, the Dutch envoy at Copenhagen mentioned. He died in October of this year. He was the father of Gobert van Ginkel, created by William III Earl of Athlone.

DR. JOHN ROBINSON

1692-1709

DUNCOMBE while at Stockholm had the good fortune to be served as secretary by the Rev. John Robinson, chaplain to the embassy, who after the death in 1684 of Duncombe's predecessor, Philip Warwick, had been appointed "minister agens," his commission then recording his long residence in Sweden and experience in affairs.¹ On Duncombe's departure he was recommissioned in that quality and continued the envoy's work, for the same reasons, as set forth in the fragment of a report of his preserved,² with as little fruit. After a visit to England in 1696, when he received the degree of doctor of divinity, he returned to Stockholm with the character of minister resident, both the war with France and the reign of Charles XI being then nearly at an end. His chief business in the next years was to bring Sweden into definite relations with the sea-powers. Success was attained when treaties of defensive alliance were concluded, the one with Great Britain under date 6/16 January 1699/1700, the other with Great Britain and Holland just a week later. During the remainder of the reign of William III his chief concern was with matters resulting from those treaties, as the repression of Denmark in 1700 and performance of the stipulations for mutual succour.

Towards the end of 1702 it was decided to send Robinson as

¹ Duncombe found him indispensable. In reference to a Windsor prebend for him he wrote: "He well deserves such a thing for his owne merit as a clergy-man, but because of his zeale for the King and his service he deserves much more, so it be not a cure of souls, for then hee leave me the next moment and I cannot possibly yet part with him, no, nor in truth the King's affaires. But a prebendry will doe wonderous well, and therefore pray continue your good offices in that affaire, when there is occasion."

² Record Office, *State Papers Foreign*, Sweden 14.

envoy extraordinary to Charles XII in Poland, to endeavour to persuade him to make his own peace and to join, or at least to furnish troops to the allies against France in the war of the Spanish Succession. Landing at Stralsund at the end of January 1703 he went on by way of Warsaw to Lublin, near which place Charles had his camp, and despite dissuasion by the Swedish ministers determined to seek an interview with him. Driving out on 1/12 March he met Charles out riding and was accorded the singular favour of a conversation ; the king on horseback, bare-headed, he standing in the snow.¹ Moreover he was allowed the extraordinary privilege of leave to attend the army. Taking leave of Charles on 10/21 March he had other audiences of him at Warsaw in April, agreeable but to little purpose, stayed on in the Polish capital until December, and then repaired to Dantzic, where he occupied himself with the affairs of that city until in September 1706 ordered to rejoin Charles in Saxony. Arrived at Leipzig on 1/12 November he learnt of the conclusion of the treaty of Altranstädt and that Stanislaus Leszczyński was now king of Poland. His business now, in conjunction with the Dutch envoy, Van Haersolte, was to dissuade Charles from turning his arms against the emperor. Not, however, till September 1707 was he able to write : " the transaction between the Emperor and the King of Sweden was happily concluded the 1st inst." Charles then departed on his Russian expedition, Robinson to mediate in troubles that had supervened at Hamburg. After two years spent in that city he returned to England to be rewarded successively with the deanery of Windsor and the bishoprics of Bristol and London, and to be the senior British plenipotentiary at Utrecht.²

¹ Says Robinson : " On my part it was a very odd audience, for I had on a very large robe with the furs turn'd outwards, a great furr cap in my hand, and a very sorry periwig on my head." He repudiated as a malicious invention of his enemies an assertion that a cold, which Charles caught, had been the result, saying that the interview had lasted only four or five minutes.

² Writing from Hamburg on 7/18 June 1709 Robinson begged to be excused from accepting the bishopric of Chichester, saying, " I have been almost from the years of my childhood so great a stranger at home, that I do not practically know what it is to govern the smalles parish in England. My studys have also laid much another way, and I have many other reasons to apprehend that I am not duly qualified for so weighty a charge." Three weeks later he suggested Dr. Manningham having the bishopric and himself the deanery of Windsor, which would leave him free to go abroad or to remain at home.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR DR. JOHN ROBINSON, RETURNING TO STOCK-
HOLM WITH THE CHARACTER OF MINISTER RESIDENT,
31 DECEMBER 1696.

(Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 153, copy.)

Having thought fitt to appoint you to be Our resident in the court of Our good brother the king of Sweden (if you have not already) you shall, in the usuall form, give notice thereof and demand an audience, in which you shall deliver Our credentialls, accompanying the same with all fitting expressions of the esteem and friendship Wee have for the kings person, and assuring him of Our firm resolution not only to maintain and cultivate the friendship and good correspondance which is between us, but that We desire to improve the same by entring into common measures with him for carrying on the war against the French king, untill the quiet of Christendome can be secured against his attempts by a firm and usefull peace, and in order thereunto you are to endeavour to prevent any rupture between the crowns of Sweeden and Denmark, particularly in the matter now on foot, concerning the march of the duke of Holsteins troops, that We and Our allyes may gain (if it may be) the king of Swedens assistance against the common enemy.

The better to obtain this and all other advantages for the common good of Us and Our allies you are to concert with the ministers of the States Generall of the United Provinces, residing in that court, that such methods may be agreed on between you and pursued, as shall be most proper in this conjuncture.

Some advances being made by France towards a treaty of a generall peace in Europe under the mediation of Our good brother the king of Sweden, you shall let him know that We do for Our part accept him in quality of mediator, as soon as the minister of Our good freinds and allies the States Generall at that court shall be ready to joyn with you therein, and wish that by his good offices and prudent conduct so great and glorious a work may be speedily brought to perfection.

You shall protect and countenance on all occasions Our subjects trading etc.

And whereas the trade of Our subjects in Sweden has been of late greatly interrupted and many of them forct to leave that country, without having any time to bring away their effects, by

reason of the putting in execution an old law against merchants strangers trading in Sweden more than four months in a year, if you find any disposition in that court to release the rigour of that law and restore the freedom of trade as formerly you are to harken thereto and to give Us an account thereof, that We may give you such directions therein as We shall judge to be most for Our service, but without any particular direction you are not to enter into any measures of accomodation other then restoring of Our subjects in all respects to their former priviledges of trade there.

You shall entertain a good correspondance and friendship with the ambassadors, envoys, etc.

You shall constantly correspond with Our ambassadors etc.

You shall diligently observe the motions etc.

You shall from time to time observe and follow such further directions and instructions etc.

WILLIAM BLATHWAYT, SECRETARY AT WAR, TO DR. JOHN ROBINSON.

(*British Museum, Add. MS. 35106, rough drafts.*)

Loo the 5/15 August 1699.

. The Pentioner has been with us here and it is resolved on the part of his Majesty and the States to proceed on the treaty of alliance with Sueden notwithstanding Sir Joseph Williamson's absence,¹ provided that crown will enter into the guaranty of the treaty of Ryswick and of the peace of Europe. Upon this condition his Majesty and the States will go very farr to oblige the king of Sueden and admitt of some inequalities on our side for the ease and benefitt of that crown, which could not otherwise in reason be demanded of us. I cannot believe Mons^r Lilierote² is in earnest when he talks of his revocation and much less so when he goes about touching his successor. I will endeavor to give you satisfaction on all other points by the next.

Loo the 8 September 1699 S.N.

I have now receiv'd your letters of the 2d 5th and 9th past, giving an account of the intentions of the king of Sueden upon

¹ Sir Joseph Williamson, for whom see the *Dictionary of National Biography*, was engaged on affairs at the Hague in the years 1697 to 1699. In October 1698 he signed, with the earl of Portland, the first Partition Treaty.

² Nils Lillieroth, Swedish envoy at the Hague.

occasion of his sending troops into Holstein, which we find to be so farr true in the fact that they seem now, with those of the duke of Holstein, to be masters there and to go on very briskly with rebuilding of the forts and making new ones, of which the Danes seem only as yet to be spectators. And it is to be hoped that as the duke of Holstein will not do more then he gives out to be his present purpose, so the Danes in their disadvantageous circumstances will not for so much come to acts of hostility, which would bring the case of *aggressions* into the other controversy. His Majesty is well pleased with the accounts you give and will be glad to know from you from time to time the inclinations of the Suedes, which you may believe we wish here to be peaceable and that they will keep themselves within the bounds of moderation, as you may assure the ministers there of his Majesty desiring nothing more then the peace and tranquility of those parts.

I have already acquainted you with his Majesty having given orders at the Hague for the recomencing those treaties that were on foot between us and Holland and the king of Sweden, which it will not be our fault if they be not brought to a faire conclusion. I am sorry Sir Joseph Williamson did not remember to inform you of the reasons of the first negotiations not succeeding, and if Comte Polus¹ entertain you again upon that subject you may tell him there were two inequalities expected from us that would have been thought very strange in England, viz., that we should be oblig'd to assist the Swedes notwithstanding our being in a warr ourselves, but that the Suedes should not be oblig'd to assist us if they were otherwise in warr, and 2dly that the succours to be sent by them to his Majesty should be entirely paid by us, while the succours the Suedes were to expect from us were likewise to be maintain'd at our charge. These inequalities, I say, could not easily be digested, however, now upon further reflection and the good inclination of both parties it is not to be doubted but expedients may be found out and agreed on to satisfy both sides.

Loo the 2/12 September 1699.

I have since my last receiv'd your letter of the 19th past, which does not give occasion of sending you any new instructions from his Majesty in the business of Holstein, since the duke has assur'd you, and the King himself by a letter just now receiv'd, of his

¹ Thomas Polus, secretary of state.

designing nothing but peace and going no further then the building of the forts now in hand, in which disposition 'tis hop'd the Suedes are likewise. So that there lies nothing more on you then to continue to persuade those princes and their ministers against proceeding to any act of hostility or voye de fait, but to concur in the renewing of the congress and negotiations at Pinnenberg for the accomodating of the matters in difference in an amicable way, wherein you may assure his highness the duke of Holstein his Majesty will have particular regard for his interest and the preservation of his rights.

Loo 9/19 September 1699.

. The answer to the duke's letter will be sent by the next post to Mr Cresset,¹ from whom the letter itself was received. And I now signify to him his Majesties pleasure that he do not only endeavor to persuade the ministers of all parties to renew the congress of Pinnenberg but to form a new project of an accommodation between the king of Denmark and duke of Holstein and to agree on and appoint a limited time for the accepting it. This is the foundation on which we may hope to see an issue of this troublesome business, it being the interest, as 'tis supposed, of Sueden and the duke of Holstein to trust the mediators and guarands with the decision of it.

SIR CHARLES HEDGES, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO ROBINSON.

(*Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 153, copies.*)

Whitehall, 24 January 1700/1.

The Czar of Muscovy has sent the King an answer to a letter his Majesty writt to him in October last, exorting him to a peace with Sweden, which the Czar says he is willing to come to a treaty about and will give his Majestie notice of the place that shall be appointed to that purpose as soon as he has concerted it with the king of Poland, whose concurrence he is obliged to expect by virtue of the alliance between them. This I acquaint you with for your infor-

¹ James Cressett, at this time envoy extraordinary to the Hanse Towns (Hamburg, Lübeck and Bremen). In 1696 he had been sent to Hamburg, with the same character, to help to compose at Pinneberg the then renewed disputes between Denmark and Holstein-Gottorp. He was also envoy extraordinary to George Louis, elector of Hanover.

mation and because it may be of use to you in the enquiry the King would have you make, how the court of Sweden stands affected to an accomodation with Czar, and whether his Majesty's mediation to that purpose may be acceptable to them, which you will please to feel their pulse in, without discovering what is above relating to the Czar's letter, and give me an account of the disposition you find them in, as soon as may be.

Whitehall, 22d Aprill 1701.

I have received none from you since the last I sent you, which was of 18th inst., but I am now to acquaint you that you are to informe your selfe of the ministers of that court what is the lowest summ of money they expect in lieu of succours, since by an article of the alliance between the King and the king of Sweden it may be in other things besides men, and being enter'd upon this subject you will take occasion to let them know what our condition is at present, and how near wee lye to danger ourselves, but at the same time you will assure them of his Majesty's sincere friendship for that king and his reall intentions to make good the treaties between them, by degrees and in convenient time. You will further represent by way of discourse what wee have already done for their assistance in sending a squadron into the Baltick, which wholly broke the measures taken to the prejudice of the crown of Sweden on this side, and by now preparing for them a very seasonable supply of cloath for the use of their army, which is to the value, as I have already told you, of 5 or 26000 £ sterling,¹ and it is probable his Majestie may be induced to make up this succour 40^m £ sterling, the remainder to be in money; which I intimate to you, without order, partly for your information and partly that you may, as by the by, sound them how they would be contented with it. You will in consequence of all this insinuate to them how necessary it would be to give us the satisfaction of dispatching the treaty of commerce, and that care ought to be taken to redress the grievances of his Majestys subjects residing in Sweden and trading thither, whereof I lately sent you the heads as they were delivered to me by the Eastland merchants, besides other things that frequently occurre, wherein the Kings subjects do not think themselves well used by that king's officers.

¹ The same mode of expression, 5 for 25, occurs in a previous dispatch.

Whitehall, 17th June 1701.

. M^r Cressett gives us notice in his 10/21 inst. that Coll. Clinco, an officer of the elector of Hannover, had set out from thence for Livonia with some secret orders from the elector. This, we suppose, may be the envoy of Hannover you mention to have orders to feel the pulse of the court of Sweden about parting with some of their troops, on which subject I send you a project of a treaty which we have received from Holland, which you are to make the best use of you can and to promote the designe of it and assist Coll. Clinco, or any other who shall negotiate it, as much as possibly you can.

WILLIAM BLATHWAYT TO ROBINSON.

(*British Museum, Add. MS. 35106, copies or rough drafts.*)

Dieren the 16/27 August 1701 (*copy*).

I have just now received your letter of the 3d instant and att the same time read it to the King, who was going abroad.

For what you mention of his Majesty's mediation, which has been accepted of the Czar, we are to expect from you what answer the ministers att Stockholm will give you about it.

As to the new foot M^r Secretary Hedges writ you we intended to come upon with the Suedes, it is no other then you knew of before and has been propos'd by you in the severall conferences, touching which you will soon receive an answer from hence, if not sooner from my lord Marlborough, who is now att the Hague. In the mean time his Majesty commands me to acquaint you that it is a mistake to think that a stop is put to the furnishing of more cloath and of powder to the Suedes, and you are to assure the ministers to the contrary, if they desire to have it go forward, but that his Majesty did only intend the whole matter of the succors should have been agreed and accommodated together, which assurance nevertheless is not to alter the scheme you laid before them for our treaty, which is to include the consideration of the succors and cession of the troops together ; concerning which you are to expect his Majesty's further orders upon the offer you have made that court, his Majesty intending withall to give particular orders for the cloath and powder, if insisted on by Mons^r Leyoncrona.¹

¹ Kristofer Leyoncrona, the Swedish minister resident in England, from 1703 envoy extraordinary.

His Majesty has further taken notice of what you write about the loan that is endeavor'd to be made in Holland and would have you satisfy M^r Silbercrona and the ministers that his Majesty is not only well [inclin'd] to it but will forward it as much as he can [in any] manner that shall be proposed or agreed on.

Loo the 6th September 1701 S.N. (*rough draft*).

I have this day receiv'd your letter of the 14th past, which having laid before the King his Majesty is very sorry to find that the offer you made has been so little consider'd at the court of Sueden as not to have produced an answer from thence. It is true I told you in my former letters that the States were to be consulted upon the proposall you had so frankly made, and that you might expect to hear further from these parts. But I did also acquaint you that thò the offers were so high yet his Majesty would not disavow you but bid you assure the ministers of a due compliance. This was thought a sufficient answer for the present to deserve one from the court of Sweden, which you hardly seem to expect, thò it be absolutely necessary for the satisfaction of his Majesty and the States. You are therefore to insist upon such an answer and to continue the same offers you have already made to those ministers, urging the sufficiency of them, and as any thing shall occur here or at the Hague you may expect further orders.

Dieren, the 4th October 1701 [N.S.] (*rough draft*).

I have receiv'd your letter of the 7th past by which you give us hopes of an answer from the king of Sueden upon the proposall you had made, but I must now acquaint you that upon the continuall applications of M^r Lilienroot at the Hague his Majesty and the States are enclin'd to oblige, if it be possible, the court by the present payment of a summ of money in consideration of the succors due, viz. 200^m rix-dollars, for which a previous treaty will be entred into with assurances on the part of Sueden that no alliance shall be made by them prejudiciall to his Majesty and the States, the latter agreeing withall by the same convention to give their security for the loan of 300^m rixdollars in the manner desir'd by M^r Silbercrona. This is done to take away all sinister objection that may be made by those that favor the French and shews an intire confidence that is putt in the young king's generosity ;

which, therefore, it is fitt you should be appriz'd of, thô you are not to take any notice of it, unless an occasion after that shall seem to require it.

Loo the 8th October 1701 S.N. (*copy*).

I have the favour of your letter of the 14th past, and as I acquainted you in my last with a previous negotiation that was on foot at the Hague so now I may assure you that the treaty it self is concluded between the King the States and the king of Sweden and was sign'd yesterday by my lord Marlborough Mons^r Lilienroot and the deputies of the States according to the inclos'd project, which I do not send you by order, but think it necessary you should be appriz'd of what passes in these parts relating to your business, so as to make a proper use of it as occasion shall require but without taking any notice of the treaty it self, unless the ministers at Stockholm make the first mention of it to you. This treaty, you see, is not intended to be finall but only introductive of a more solid and substantiall alliance between the two crowns and the States.¹

As to the packs of cloth, I do not doubt you have taken the best course in relation to it, and when you shall have given an account of your proceedings to M^r J. Hedges you have perform'd your part.

I hardly believe the Suedes will get chapmen for their Saxons, for men so forc'd will be apt to desert when they have an opportunity. You see by the enclos'd we are hastning to England, which is in order for the sitting of the parliament, as soon as may be, which is necessary after what they have been doing in France.

Loo the 15 October 1701 [N.S.] (*rough draft*).

I have received your letter of the 21st past, but the state of negotiation with Sueden being now changed, as I acquainted you in my two last, I need not say any thing more to you on that subject. But there is another business, wherein I am now to signify to you his Majesties directions. You know very well the king of France has owned the P. Prince of Wales as king of England Scotland and Ireland upon the death of the late King James and has notified his doing so by his ministers in some forein courts, which is the present occasion of his Majesties commands that you do all that in you

¹ Accordingly this preliminary treaty does not appear to have been completed but to have merged in the defensive alliance concluded between Great Britain Holland and Sweden on 5/16 August 1703.

lyes to hinder the making any step in the court of Sueden, which might give any pretence or colour there to a recognition of the P. Prince of Wales or be in any ways interpreted so, this proceeding of the French being so great an affront to the King and the nation that it deserves by all ways and means to be resented in the highest manner and that a stop be putt to the progress or ill effects of it in every place. I have already acquainted you with his Majesties pleasure that you go into mourning immediately in your person and liveries for the late King James, which is to be as for a near relation to his Majesty and not otherwise.

JAMES VERNON, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO ROBINSON.

(*Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 202, copies.*)

Whitehall, 3 February 1701/2.

. His Majesty was not a little surprised at M^r Stanhope's¹ last letters, acquainting him with Monsieur Lillierotes disowning to have any powers to treat about their furnishing us with 10,000 men, but only to state accounts in order to the discharging old arrears and then to consider how either party might be assistant to the other, in case both were engaged in a warr. I forbear repeating particulars, supposing you have them directly from M^r Stanhope, to whom I have writ by the King's commands that all proceedings should be communicated to you. I shall only mention that we have relied upon having these troops, that his Majesty would prefer them to any other, out of the desire he has to preserve the friendship of that king [of Sweden] and to live in the strictest union with him. We have not been wanting on our part to give him the most effectual marks of our inclinations to serve their interest. If there be no return on their side, especially when the occasion for it is so evident, it will look as if the late treatys were very partially designed only to draw assistances from us without any thoughts of repaying them. What the demands are, he has to make, I know not, but if they should be excessive a speedy refusall of troops would be more obliging then a fruitless amusement about them, which would serve only to keep us in suspense to the neglect of what might be done elsewhere. His Majesty therefore would have you know from the chancellor what it is that we are to expect from this negociation and how soon we may hope to see an end of it. You will imagine

¹ Alexander Stanhope, envoy at the Hague.

we have no time to loose in making good our complement of 40,000 men, and if it be encumbered with other matters we cant know what length it will run us to.

Whitehall, 20 February 1701/2.

I have received your letter of the first inst., containing the copys of two letters sent to M^r Stanhope, which have been layd before his Majesty, and I write by this post to M^r Stanhope that he should communicate them to the Pensioner. It is very uncertain by this account what we can have to depend on from Sweden, and we have suspected Monsieur Lilienroot more than we ought to have done, when we thought he had powers to treat about troops. What you mention to have acquainted the ministers with, that the troops they should furnish us with would not be out of their call, in case they should have occasion of them for their own security, will meet with no difficulty on this side, it being already an article in the other treatys that I have seen of this nature.

I believe we should be glad of the Swedes troops though it were but for this summer, or as long as they could spare them, and as his Majesty is very moderate in this demand so I hope he will not be thought to have neglected the king of Sweden in his difficultys, but have contributed as farr to his assistance as we could do, considering our own circumstances. It might be expected on this occasion that some act of friendship should be shewn on that side, to make our good will appear reciprocally, and I hope it will still be done, tho it comes somewhat of the latest.

Whitehall, 24 February 1701/2.

. I am glad to find by your letters and those from the Hague that Mons^r Lilienroot is so well intentioned to make the negotiating part easy. It is a misfortune that the orders must be long expected, and we know not what other delays may arise from their circumstances. However, the king of Sweden writes so friendly of our master, and I suppose means it accordingly, that I shall always wish they may be brought to have a firm relyance one upon the other.

I need not say more than I have done to satisfy you that we must not think of a treaty at this time upon the foot of free ships making free goods; but the convention you mention for regulating navigation and commerce according to the present exigence of affairs

seems absolutely necessary, and I should be glad to see a scheme of your drawing up for that purpose, in which no time should be lost, since we have already a bill brought into parliament for the encouragement of privateers, and there is like to be more of them in case of a warr than was formerly.

These dispatches may be supplemented by one from Vernon to Alexander Stanhope at the Hague (*ibid.*, *copy*).

Whitehall, 10 February 1701/2.

. I enquired of my Lord Marlborough what were the proportions of horse and foot that we expected from the Swedes. He thought we might take between 4 and 500 horse and dragoons and the rest of our proportion in foot. If it may be any inducement to Mons^r Lilienroot to go roundly to worke with this treaty, the House of Commons shewed yesterday a great inclination to have a strict allyance with Sweden, and many gentlemen exprest the honour they had for that king and their esteem for that nation. The demands that were layd before them on account of the treatys with Sweden were all allowed without any abatement, and it was not the same in relation to other demands. The articles complied with are the 100,000 crowns stipulated by his Majesty in the late convention, as also 20000^l sterlin advanct by his Majesty for furnishing the Swedes with cloath, as part of the succours promist by the former treaty, and 7000 pounds for 2000 barrills of powder, which the king of Sweden has desired on the same account. I cant but say the good grace this was done with is much more valuable than the sums, and if there were near the same disposition towards us in the Suedes there would be no delay or stop to the treaty about the troops or any thing else that is to be transacted between us.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR DR. JOHN ROBINSON AS ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY
TO CHARLES XII OF SWEDEN AND AUGUSTUS II OF POLAND,
11 DECEMBER 1702.

(*Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 153, copy.*)

You shall immediately after the receipt of these your instructions and your other dispatches repair to Prussia, or such other place where you shall have notice that the king of Sweden is, and being

arrived there you shall as soon as possible you can ask an audience of him, at which you shall deliver Our letters of credence, whereof Wee have sent you two, one with the title of envoy extraordinary and the other without any character, that you may make use of either, as you find occasion, and accompany them with such expressions of Our friendship and the particular esteem Wee have for his Majesties person and allyance as you shall think most proper upon this occasion.

After Our compliments are made you shall declare to his Majestie that the intention of Our sending you to him is to give him assured marks of that friendship that is already between us, and of Our resolution to maintain all the treaties and guaranties We are engaged in to him, and particularly that of the treaty of Travendall, and will use Our best endeavours to prevent any disturbances that may be apprehended from Denmark, and to make if possible a stricter union and allyance for the preservation of the peace and liberty of Europe, which are at present in so great danger by the exorbitant power of France and its close conjuncture with Spain. And that Wee are persuaded a peace in the north, and consequently an accommodation between his Majestie and the king of Poland, would exceedingly contribute to that purpose, and that We therefore do not only exhort him to it, in a most earnest and friendly manner, but also offer him Our best offices and endeavours to that end, which Wee think his Majestie ought seriously to consider at this seasonable juncture, when his extraordinary successes, which Wee congratulate with him upon, have put him into such a condition as that he may reasonably expect a peace that will be very honorable and glorious for him and very advantageous to his people.

That as a further means to obtain the excellent ends aforesaid We do renew the invitation made him by Our late dear brother King William to enter into the Grand Allyance and to furnish Us and Our allys with such a number of his troops that shall be thought fitt and agreed upon.

If you shall find his Majestie disposed to hearken to these overtures you are to desire him to open himself in the matter and to lett you know what he thinks fitt to propose and what terms and conditions he will expect in relation to what may be transacted between Us and him, and the king of Poland and him.

You shall acquaint him that in case an accommodation be made between him and the king of Poland Our intention is, in conjunction

with Our allies, to take into Our service 12^m men of his troops.

If you find the king of Sueden unwilling to come into the Grand Alliance you are not to persist in urging him to it but to recede gently from that argument, endeavouring still to persuade him to continue in Our friendship and to support the interest of Us and Our allies.

You will likewise receive Our letters of credence to the king of Poland, which you will make use of as you shall find occasion, if you discover you are likely to do any good in the matters you are sent upon, and in that case you will proceed to such place, where that king shall be, and being arrived there you shall as soon as possible ask an audience of him, at which you shall deliver Our said letters of credence in like manner as to the king of Sueden, and if you succeed in your negotiation, and that an accommodation follows between the two kings, you are to acquaint the king of Poland that then Our intention is to take in conjunction with Our allies into Our pay 8000 men of his troops, and in case an accommodation succeeds you are to make agreements for the forces aforesaid, viz^t 12^m Suedes, and 8^m Saxons, who are to enter into the service of Us and Our allies upon the best and most reasonable terms you can, and that you may finish as occasion may be treaties on the matters aforesaid you will be furnished with a commission under Our Great Seal as plenipotentiary to those purposes.

You shall inform yourself as exactly as you can of the king of Sweden's forces and designs, and of what adherents he has in the republick of Poland, and what hopes of assistance he has from them. You shall likewise inform yourself who are his principall ministers and advisers and how they stand effected towards an accomodation or to the continuance of the warr, and whether any of them entertain any correspondence with France, and you shall do the like in relation to the king of Poland his forces and ministers.

If you find ministers there from the Emperor and the States Generall of the United Provinces you shall use a reasonable confidence and communication with them, and desire their assistance and give them yours for the better obtaining the ends of your negotiations, it being to be presumed that they are attending that king upon the same errant that you are, to offer their masters' good offices and friendly interposition with him for an accommodation between him and the king of Poland, and in case there be no such minister from the States and that you shall be authorized to

act in their name you are to pursue such instructions as you shall receive from them pursuant to this end and consistent with these Our instructions.

You shall from time to time observe such further instructions and directions etc.

ANNE R.

ROBERT HARLEY, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO ROBINSON.

(*Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 154, copies.*)

Whitehall, June 23/July 4, 1704.

. I heartily wish you would please to communicate your thoughts (which I know are so just and so zealous for her Majesty's service) which is the best way for her Majesty to preserve or acquire an interest in the king of Sweden and his ministers. The king's prevailing passion is the desire of glory and renown, and that heroical heat, no doubt, is applied by divers persons, as well those about him as by another princes agents, to their own purposes. I find by severall foreigne courts the resentments they have conceived, tho' at present they stifle them, yet I see three or four at least are sowing the seeds, which will spring up to much disturbance and require, as they hope in their turn, the disquiet he now gives them. I will not say any more upon this head but the well known caution, *multis terribilis caveto multos*. You see with what freedome I write to you, and it is to the end that you may find some way to give that gallant young prince good and just impressions of her Majesty's regard to him, and that all the hardships put upon us in our trade hath not altered her Majesty or inclined her to enter into measures which would not be very agreeable to him, and to which she doth not want an invitation. I suppose some of his ministers will need more substantial conviction than words, upon which I would be glad to receive your opinion as to the persons and the method of prevailing with them.

Whitehall, July 18/29, 1704.

. It is her Majesty's desire to preserve peace in the north, and it is owing to her influence and moderation that the provocations which have been given by the Swedish ministers in several courts have not produced a rupture. It looks as if there were some

who would be glad of a pretence for that young king to draw his troops out of Poland into Germany or the north. Is there no way to get an interest in that prince or his ministers?

Whitehall, Aug. 27/Sept. 7, 1706.

I received by the three packets the favor of two letters from you of August 14 and 21 and certainly your suspicion of the Swedes intending an invasion of some part of Germany is too well founded; and I will add this, that having exhausted his own country and wasted Poland, and not enclin'd to live peaceably, it is no wonder he is going to make an irruption into a fresh country too much prepar'd for a revolt, to which I cast in this, to make measure, that a French emissary, a Swede by nation, whose name I do not care now to write, has been for some time in the Swedes army and from thence is ordered to Prince Rakoczi,¹ where he will take upon him the character of a general officer. By the Queens command I have wrote to all our allies upon this subject. I believe it is gone too far for bare negotiations; Berlin will venture nothing, but I hope Hanover will seriously handle the matter and make a compromise between King Augustus and the Swede.

Whitehall, Oct. 1/12, 1706.

. I take it for granted that this will find you in Saxony, where you will use your utmost endeavours to incline the king of Sweden to retire out of that country. It is the Queen's dependance upon the honor and good intentions of his Swedish Majesty that makes her so readily joyn in those measures of persuasion and gentleness, and I hope you will meet with suitable returns from that king, for the Queen doth not regard the rumors, which are given out against several great men of that nation, as if they were inclined to France, but her Majesty's opinion of that king's truth and virtue, and that he will not give himself up to the conduct of the partisans of the French, determines her to in the first place endeavour to quiet this disturbance by all peaceable means. You will meet with Mons^r Oberg,² the elector of Hanover's minister at that court,

¹ The rebel prince Francis Rákóczy II of Transylvania.

² Privy councillor Baron Bodo d'Oberg, sent on a special mission to Charles XII in Saxony. He received assurance that Charles would disturb no other part of the empire (D'Alais, 5 October 1706, B.M. Add. MS. 7075).

and his master will employ all his credit to end this affair. The armistice for ten weeks is already agreed upon, and the best use to be made of that is to get those troops out of Germany without taking winter quarters there ; for should that once happen I cannot tell what may ensue, nor how far the Queen and the allies may be obliged to interest themselves in that matter after another manner.

Whitehall, Oct. 4/15, 1706.

I wrote to you by the last post, which I hope will find you arriv'd with the king of Sweden. You will see by that the Queen is resolv'd to try in the first place by fair means to prevent the inconvenience which may ensue by the Suedes coming into Saxony, and to that purpose you are to do your utmost in conjunction with the minister of the States¹ and the other allys that they may fairly remove out of that country. I have it hinted to me that Augustus king of Poland will be content to have the allys interpose and advise him to quit his pretensions to Poland upon certain conditions. If this be so, you will hear more of it from the minister of the elector of Brunswick. But because it is not possible to adapt instructions at this distance entirely suitable to the affair you are gone to negotiate, as well from the often changing of the circumstances of affairs there and the impossibility of sending to you in due time, you are therefore to act in conjunction with the minister of the States the best for attaining the end above mentioned, and you are to follow such further directions as you shall receive from the duke of Marlborough, with whom you may correspond with more certainty than with England, not being liable to the hazard of the passage by sea. And because the elector of Hanover hath so great personal interest with the king of Sweden, and his electoral Highness having expressed great desire to have these troubles specially pacified, and the Swedes got out of Germany, I must desire you to correspond not only with M^r Howe,² her Majesty's minister at that court, but also with M^r Robotham,³ who is entrusted by his electoral Highness in those affairs, from whom I am assured you will receive considerable lights.

¹ Johan van Haersolte, Heer van den Cranenburg, known by either name.

² Brig.-Gen. Emanuel Scrope Howe, see the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

³ Jean de Robethon, confidential secretary.

Whitehall, January 28/February 8, 1706/7.

I send you enclosed an extract of the resolutions of the States General of the 3d February N.S., whereby you will see they have given directions to their minister M^r Harsolt to desire the king of Sweden to renew the 3d article of the treaty of alliance concluded between England Sweden and Holland in August 1701,¹ by which those powers mutually oblige themselves not to assist each others enemies. But M^r Harsolt not being empower'd to make this step without your approbation M^r Vryberge,² the States envoy here, has, pursuant to his orders, mov'd her majesty to give directions to you to concur in this matter. Upon which I am to acquaint you that her Majesty is willing you should joyn with the States minister in any thing that may be for the common good, but this being a very nice point, the touching upon which will discover the greatest diffidence imaginable of his Swedish Majestie's intentions, it may possibly have very ill effects on the other side. If you are of opinion it would be agreeable to the king of Sweden to revive our treaties with him and to tie ourselves up from giving any assistance to Poland or Muscovy, it would be a great satisfaction to the allies that his Majesty should reciprocally declare he would not assist France nor her adherents. Her Majesty therefore leaves this whole matter entirely to your judgement to do in it what you think best, who are upon the spot and know the temper of the king and his ministers so well.

[Postscript.]

I need not add to a person of your sagacity that you must treat this affair with a great deal of delicacy, not only in respect to his Swedish Majesty but also to M^r Cranenburg, that so good allies as the States are may not have any ground for jealousy or discontent; and therefore you will endeavour to moderate their envoy so as not to let him give any just ground for displeasure to the king of Sweden, and at the same time let that king's ministers see the Queen is ready and resolved to stand by her allies.

Whitehall, March 7/18, 1706/7.

I received on Wednesday last the favor of your letters of February 26, March 1:2:5. By two memorials deliver'd this morning

¹ The preliminary treaty, see p. 23.

² Marinus van Vrybergen, Dutch envoy to queen Anne from 1702 till his death at Chelsea in 1711.

by M^r Vryberge, envoy of the States, it appears his masters are now perswaded to concur with the Queen in acknowledging Stanislaus, and in accepting the guaranty of the treaty between the king of Sweden and king Augustus. I hope they have sent their orders to M^r Cranenbergh to perform his part on their behalf without any hesitation, and it is her Majesty's pleasure that you do forthwith joyn with the ministers of the Emperor and of the States General in accepting the guaranty and in the acknowledging of king Stanislaus. And in case you should find any backwardness in those two ministers you are to express plainly her Majesty's resolution therein and exhort them to concur in the same. You know very well that the Queen has from the beginning very frankly declar'd herself upon that subject, without asking any terms of the king of Sweden, and I hope the Queen's declaration and the instances of her ministers have not been unsuccessfull in prevailing with the others to make this step, who, it may be else, would have thought of delaying time by asking terms. You will take care upon all due occasions to insinuate this advance of her Majesty to Count Piper¹ and others of the king of Sweden's ministers, as you shall think proper. The sooner that affair is despatch'd the more pleasing it will be to her Majesty. Therefore, I know, you will lose no time in it.

Whitehall, April 1/12, 1707.

. I am now to acquaint you directly with an affair which, notwithstanding any reports you may hear, you are to keep very secret until you receive my Lord Marlboroughs directions therein, and that is, that her Majesty has resolved to send the duke of Marlborough in person to the king of Sweden, who is intrusted with powers and particular instructions and credentials for that purpose ; but for fear that contrary winds which, God forbid, should detain his Grace too long on this side you are to lose no time in endeavouring to gain to her Majesty's interest the three persons you know of and whom you have formerly mentioned. You will be furnished with proper means for that end in case his Grace should not be able to come, but if he sends any officer from the Hague you will be assisting to him in all particulars, and it is her Majesty's pleasure that you follow such instructions as you shall receive from his Grace from time to time. I must repeat again that you are not

¹ Count Carl Piper, principal minister in attendance on Charles XII until taken prisoner at Poltava.

to take notice of this journey of the duke's till you hear from him, notwithstanding the secret has not been so well kept as it should have been ¹.

Whitehall, April 29/May 10, 1707.

. I return you hearty thanks for the particular account you give of his Grace's reception, and of what happened at the several conferences where you were interpreter. By the by, I must desire you to give me leave to mention to you, tho' I believe 'tis needless, that I hope you keep very full and distinct memorials of all that matter, which may be of use hereafter and not so proper to be transmitted hither in letters. This will be of service and reputation both to his Grace and your self

Whitehall, May 30/June 10, 1707.

I read to her Majestie the account you were pleas'd to send me by the last post of the conference you had with Count Piper concerning the matters which his Swedish Majesty takes ill of the Emperor. The Queen very much approves your conduct, and you have treated that matter with all the prudence and circumspection that is to be expected from your great probity and experience. It is very odd that the court of Vienna guides itself by such counsels as disoblige their friends and gratify none but the common enemy. You know how many occasions the Queen has to complain of their conduct, and particularly in the affair of the expedition to Naples, so contrary to the opinion of all the allies as well as dangerous to the common cause. But however this be the case, as you judge very well, should there be any open rupture between the Swede and the Emperor it would prove very fatal to the liberty of Europe. I need not expatiate upon that head; what you have said in your own letter shews how fully you comprehend that point, and it is not to be thought that the king of Prussia and several other potent princes will sit still upon such an occasion. So that not only the hope of settling a true ballance of power in Europe would be lost, but it is fitter for meditation than to explain what hazards even the

¹ Marlborough was detained by contrary winds at Margate for nearly a fortnight and when he got to the Hague, by 18 April N.S., was doubtful whether military requirements would allow him to proceed. However, he went on, reached Altranstädt on the 27th and had his long audience of Charles XII next day (*Dispatches*, III. 337 f.).

Swedes themselves will run upon such an attempt ; therefore all methods should be used to make up that matter amicably. The Queen's minister is by this time arriv'd at Vienna, where he will be instructed to negotiate satisfaction for his Swedish Majesty, when once you can settle what is reasonable to ask. The elector of Hanover has inform'd her Majesty that he has employ'd his utmost credit with your court to perswade them to an accommodation and to dissuade a rupture, and has desir'd her Majesty to make use of her interposition. To that end by this post I send a letter from the Queen to the king of Sweden to the duke of Marlborough, in order that he may transmit it to you with such further instructions as will be necessary upon this occasion. It is not possible at this distance to descend to particulars of what you should say, and your own great prudence makes it needless. I know it is a very nice court, and no body better understands it than your self. You see the point the Queen aims at, and I am sure you will not be wanting in your best endeavours to accomplish it. This will make your presence necessary while the king stays in those parts, and I suppose M^r Cranenberg will not leave him till his Majesty goes to Poland.

Whitehall, June 3/14, 1707.

. The court of Vienna, according to their usual custom of being behind hand, have this day made the first application for the Queen's interposition on that behalf, so that they must be always in debt to the foresight of their friends more than their own ease for their preservation. We have a little more reason to be concern'd to stop any resentment of the king of Sweden, because should that go any length the Emperor would recall Prince Eugene and all his troops out of Italy, and I need make no reflexion upon that, whether the king of Sweden is not concerned as well as we in that matter.

Whitehall, July 8/19, 1707.

. I could heartily wish that the ministers about the king of Sweden would find out some temper to prevent things coming to extremity between their master and the Emperor. The beginning of strife every body can see, but what will be the end and issue thereof is not to be foreseen, and tho' the pretence is personal injuries from the Emperor the situation of affairs, I am afraid, will make it be thought to be of common concern ; and though I do not believe

they are inclin'd to the interest of France, yet they will effectually do what will gratify that court.

Whitehall, July 11/22, 1707.

I received the favor of both your letters of the 13th. I am very glad to find that the difference between the Emperor and the king of Sweden is in so fair a way of being accommodated. I hope nothing will fall out on either side to blast these hopes, tho' after the answer sent to the Queen's letter I think there ought to be some other advances made from them before her Majesty can undertake a publick mediation, but it is likely that they will find ways of accommodating the whole without suffering the Queen or the States to intermeddle.

Whitehall, August 29/September 9, 1707.

Last post I received the favor of yours of August 27. I wish the next may bring us the confirmation of the final settlement of the affair between the Emperor and the king of Sweden, in which you have taken so much pains. I wish the disappointment of our attempt upon Toulon may not alter that matter, tho' indeed there is no reason for it; but that doth not always conduct affairs in every place. It is to be hoped that, if the king of Sweden be pacify'd, that Prince Eugene would go into Spain and command those forces, that the Queen is desirous should be transported thither, and towards the maintaining of which she is willing to contribute her share of subsidies. If those affairs be quieted with the Emperor, why should it not be for the king of Sweden's honour, as well as for his advantage, to come into the Grand Alliance, whereby he will have an opportunity of rendering his arms glorious in settling the balance of power in Europe, instead of making himself uneasy to his neighbours.

[Postscript.] I understand there are great disorders in Ham-
burgh, which may end very much to the prejudice of our merchants there. I shall say nothing of that till I hear you are gone thither: then I shall give you an account of what I know of it.

Whitehall, Sept. 2/13, 1707.

On Saturday I received the favor of yours of August 31, and last night that of September 3. I heartily congratulate with you your success in so far putting an end to those troublesome affairs. I

pray God that nothing else may be found out to make a rupture, or any other pretences to create uneasiness.

The Queen has had your letters laid before her, and she commands me to let you know that as she approves very well of what you have done, so she will confirm the guaranty you have made in her name. Lord Treasurer also bids me assure you that he will take care of your extraordinaries, and I will send to your friend M^r Hume to put him in mind of it while the thing is warm.

I am apt to believe that this letter will find you still in Saxony ; the good success that you have had in this affair, and the credit you are in with the king of Sweden, as also your being master of his language, would make it very desirable if you could be permitted to go along with him. It would be looked upon as a signal instance of his Swedish Majesty's friendship towards the Queen. I only give you this hint, your own prudence will enable you to make the best use of it and to judge whether it be proper to offer any such thing. I am sure, if there could be any hopes of his coming into the Grand Alliance, your being with him would be of most singular use therein. But as I said before I must entirely leave this to you to judge what is most proper to be done therein.

I wish the States do not continue averse to the agnition and guaranty of the treaty of Alt-Ranstat. I do not see what use there can be in the Swedes insisting upon it, as to the treaty it self, all the parts of it being now executed, and the great trade there is with the Czar's country will make it very hazardous for the subjects of both nations, that are concerned in that commerce.

I have seen the heads of a treaty in the German language between the king of Sweden and the house of Wolfenbuttle. There seems to be something very particular in it ; I wish you could give me any information to what purpose it is designed.

Whitehall, September 12/23, 1707.

Having not heard from you by the last post I am uncertain where this will find you. I should be glad you had encouragement enough to stay near the king of Sweden, as I mention'd to you in my former letter. The good work you have so happily brought to pass encourages me to hope for this success from your care and dexterity. Therefore I hope you will not think it strange if I give you the following hint. The king of Sweden has made a pacification with the Emperor ; the Queen and the States are guarantees by

the desire of both parties ; he cannot break in upon that without quarrelling with all three. Poland seems to be a wasted country and scarce capable of bearing the Muscovites, much less that the two armies can subsist there. The king of Sweden will not lessen his forces. Is not this therefore a seasonable opportunity to propose a way to support a considerable part of them during this war ? For instance, suppose the Queen and the States should be willing to entertain at their own charge (and consequently give subsidies for them) ten thousand men, or some such number of his forces, to serve upon the Rhine ? I think I have sufficiently explain'd to you what I mean and given you my reasons for mentioning it to you. I know it is a very tender point, tho' perhaps at long run it will appear to be the best method his Swedish Majesty can take ; yet, being only my own thoughts, what I have no orders for writing, you will receive it accordingly. However I am perswaded, if you would find it could have any ingression, you and I should do very good service as well to the king of Sweden as to our own mistress, by bringing it about.

ROBERT JACKSON. JAMES JEFFERYES

1709-1714

ROBERT JACKSON is one of the multitude of men whom long and faithful service has left unknown to fame. As commissary at Stockholm during Robinson's absence, and even as minister resident after that envoy's recall, he had little to do with political affairs; for Charles XII, even when in exile, kept the direction of them in his own hands. There was rupture of diplomatic relations in the years 1717 and 1718, and after the death of Charles Great Britain was again represented at Stockholm by envoys. Jackson's special concern was with matters of trade, in which he was an expert. He stayed at Stockholm as minister resident until recalled in 1729.

Captain James Jefferyes was a son of Sir James Jefferyes, a lieutenant-colonel transferred in 1690 from the service of Charles XI to that of William III and who in 1702 had the rank of brigadier-general and later appointments in Ireland. Robinson interested himself in obtaining satisfaction to him for monetary claims in Sweden, and when he went to Poland took the son with him as his secretary. When Charles XII left Saxony in 1707 leave was obtained for young Jefferyes to accompany the army.¹ He was taken prisoner at Poltava, but sent back to England in September 1709. In January 1711 he was dispatched to Bender to endeavour to persuade Charles to accept the proposals set out in his instructions. He had no success, but stayed on with the king in Tartary

¹ The duke of Marlborough wrote: "You know the king of Sweden will admit of no foreign minister to attend him in to the field, but as a particular mark of respect for the Queen the ministers are willing to connive at Mr Jeffries, Mr Robinson's secretary, making the campaign as a volunteer, whereby H.M. may be truly informed of what passes" (*Dispatches*, III. 359).

or Turkey and afterwards at Stralsund, his credentials being renewed under date 6/17 May 1715.¹ In October 1718 he was sent on a mission to Peter the Great, but in November 1719, in consequence of the adverse development of affairs, withdrew from Petersburg to Dantzig, where he waited on the watch until after the peace of Nystad.

In the circumstances of the time dispatches to Jackson and Jefferyes were not frequent. Principal information about the embarrassment of Queen Anne's last government in regard to northern affairs is to be found in those to ministers at other courts.

HENRY BOYLE, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO JACKSON.

(Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 154, copies.)

Whitehall, November 26th 1709.

I am ordered by the Queen to acquaint you that she has taken the following resolution, as the States had done before and which has been communicated to the minister of the Czar and to those of his confederates, that is, to declare that the assurances given by his Czarish Majesty, king Augustus, and the kings of Denmark and Prussia for preserving tranquility in the Empire, and the concern they express for the interest of the allies, are very agreeable to her, and her Majesty being very desirous to contribute all she can towards maintaining the peace of the Empire will employ her good offices with the regency and ministers of Sweden that the body of troops in Pomerania under General Crassaw shall not return into Poland nor commit any hostilities in the Empire, particularly in the territories of Denmark situated in Germany, nor make any invasion into Sleswig or Jutland, nor molest or disturb any of the provinces that depend upon Saxony, and her Majesty will likewise demand of the regency of Sweden a declaration to this purpose with this condition and assurance, that the provinces of the crown of Sweden in Germany shall remain exempt and secure from all hostilities. Upon the receipt of this you will attend the regency and represent to them that as the Czar and his allies have engaged not to commit hostilities in Germany, so 'tis very reasonable for her Majesty and her allies, who are so much concerned in that

¹ Strangely, he was still accredited to Charles XII at Bender or in the Ottoman dominions, although Charles had been at Stralsund since November 1714.

affair, to expect that the Swedes should enter in to the same engagements and make the declaration abovementioned, especially since nothing can be more for the service of his Swedish Majesty in the present juncture than that his provinces in Germany should be secured from the attempts and invasions of his neighbours ; but if Crassaw be permitted to act contrary to the declaration desired the crown of Sweden must not expect any assistance from her Majesty to extricate them out of their unfortunate circumstances.

Whitehall, November 29th O.S. 1709.

I sent you her Majesty's declaration by last post in relation to the Swedish troops in Pomerania, and there being great reason to apprehend that General Crassaw, notwithstanding the admonitions and representations made, may attempt to invade some part of Germany, which would be a step of such fatal consequence to the affairs of the allies, and not less destructive to the interest of Sweden, that her Majesty thinks such an enterprise ought to be prevented by all possible means and therefore would have you lay before the regency at Stockholm the concern her Majesty is under least the Swedes, by such an unadvised attempt, should bring their affairs into a more dangerous condition and lay their very friends under a necessity of opposing their progress, since her Majesty thinks it necessary to declare that in such case she would be obliged to joyn with the Emperour and the States Generall in taking the proper measures with the northern confederates to put a stop to the enterprises of the Swedes and thereby to prevent those princes from recalling any of their troops out of the service of the allies.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ROBERT JACKSON, ESQ., PROMOTED TO BE
MINISTER RESIDENT AT STOCKHOLM, 11 MAY 1710

(Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 214, copy.)

Having received these Our instructions with your other dispatches you shall with all convenient speed return to Stockholm, and as Our good brother the king of Sweden is at this time absent from his kingdom you are to acquaint those ministers, who are at present entrusted with the government there, with Our having conferr'd on you the character of Our resident at his Swedish Majesty's court, and deliver Our letters of credence into the hands of those, to whom it may properly appertain to receive them at this time.

You shall make Our compliments in the usuall manner to the queen grandmother and assure her of Our particular esteem and friendship for her, and Our great concern at the present ill-situation of the affairs of her grandson and the unhappy occasion of his absence.

You shall likewise deliver Our letter to the princess Ulrica Eleanora, in answer to that you brought Us from her, and you shall accompany the same with such expressions of Our affection and kindness as are fitting and usual on the like occasions.

You shall give all proper assurances to the regency at Stockholm of Our particular value and esteem for their persons, and that We have hitherto observed with great satisfaction their ready concurrence to facilitate such matters as We and Our allys have thought fit to desire of them. And as to the two letters you brought from them to Us, the one dated at Stockholm the 18th of February and the other the 7th of March last, you are to return Our thanks for them and assure the regents that we received them very graciously.

That as to the first letter, wherein they set forth the reasons that induced them to desire you to undertake this voyage and to represent the present danger of Sweden and the great need of some speedy assistance, you are to acquaint them that We have approved of your complying with their request and as a mark of Our affection towards them and favour to a person, in whom they putt so much confidence, We have given you a higher and more honourable character than you had before. And as We are very sensible of the pressing necessities, under which that kingdom lyes at this time, and have a great regard to the dignity and welfare of Our dearest nephew, the king their master, and to the interest and prosperity of the Swedish nation as well as to the good of Europe, by preserving a due balance in the north, so We shall endeavour to do all that depends on Us, in the present circumstances of Our affairs, in conjunction with the States General to divert those imminent dangers, which Our good friends and allys the Swedes seem to apprehend.

And as to the second letter, wherein they notify to Us the compleat victory the Swedish army had gained over the Danes near Helsingburg in Schonen on the 28th day of February last, you may assure the regency that Our particular affection for the king their sovereign engages Us to take great part in the success of his arms, especially in the preservation of his own dominions. And We hope

that the same good Providence, which has so signally favoured the Swedish nation in that affair, will continue to protect it in all its difficultys.

You shall give the regency to understand that We take very kindly the ready disposition they expressed to you to redress the grievances Our subjects lye under in respect to trade, and accordingly you are to inform yourself, as exactly as you can, of the severall hardships complained of by our merchants, in order to procure proper remedies to all abuses and render their commerce as favourable and advantagious as possible.

And as We have a continuall occasion for great quantitys of all sorts of naval stores for the use of Our fleets you are to endeavour to put that matter upon such a foot, that our navy may be constantly and sufficiently supply'd, and particularly you are to make application to obtain a free exportation of masts and all other naval stores from any port in Sweden.

Whereas during the present warr in the north the trade of Our subjects to the Baltick is likely to be exposed to many inconveniencies, you are to use your endeavours to make them as easy as you can in all particulars; and in order thereunto you are to obtain from Sweden that British ships laden with goods not contraband may be permitted to pass to any place or port in the Baltick Sea, though the same may be in the possession of their enemies, provided the same be not actually besieged.

And as We have given repeated directions to Our minister at Copenhaguen to make instances in Our name for obtaining a passage for letters to Sweden through the dominions of the king of Denmark, you shall acquaint the ministers at Stockholm with the same and desire that they would promote and facilitate on their part the resettling the posts as usuall for the correspondence of letters.

And whereas the dutys laid in Sweden upon the commoditys imported there from Our dominions are very excessive and lay great discouragement upon trade, even to the disadvantage of Sweden itself, you are to endeavour to get a just and due moderation of such high dutys upon British woollen and other manufactures and upon herrings and other merchandizes exported from Our kingdoms.

You shall protect and countenance on all proper occasions Our subject trading etc.

And whereas you have represented unto Us that you desire to have Our particular direction and authority, in this time of warr, to administer to Our subjects such oaths as are requisite in matters relating to their trade, and upon giving certificates of the property of their goods and effects that may be shipp'd from Sweden, We do therefore hereby authorize and empower you to administer such oaths to Our subjects in all cases, where the same are necessary.

You shall entertain a good correspondence and friendship with the ministers of all princes and states in allyance or amity with Us, who shall be at that court with you, and particularly you shall concert matters, which may be for our common interest and advantage, with the minister of the States General residing at that court and act in conjunction with him in pursuing the most proper methods at this juncture.

You shall constantly correspond with Our ambassadors, etc.

And whereas the necessary measures in relation to Sweden and the princes engaged in the northern warr will, in all likelihood, be chiefly agreed upon at the Hague, you are therefore to follow such directions as may be transmitted to you in Our name by the duke of Marlborough or the Lord Viscount Townshend, Our ambassadors there.

You shall diligently observe the motions etc.

During your residence in that court you shall make it your care to inform yourself etc.

You shall from time to time observe and follow such further directions and instructions, etc.

PRIVATE AND ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SAME, SAME DATE.

(Ibid., copy.)

Whereas the senate of Sweden have very earnestly represented unto Us by you the dangerous condition the kingdom of Sweden is in at present of being utterly ruined by their enemys, unless speedily succoured by a strong squadron of ships and a considerable sum of money, you are thereupon to give them all possible assurances of Our concern for the ill situation of their affairs and Our friendly inclinations towards them, and We are persuaded that they cannot but be sensible at the same time of the great and burthensome warr We have been so long and are still engaged in against France,

which employs Our fleets and Our treasure to the utmost extent of Our abilities already. That the sending of a squadron into the Baltick at this juncture is a matter of so high importance that [it] requires the maturist consideration, nor can it be undertaken by Us but in conjunction with Our good friends and allies the States General. That We have therefore given Our repeated commands to Our ambassador at the Hague to inform himself of their sentiments, with whom We are ready to concur in all affairs relating to the warr in the north, and you may give them to understand that it is not improbable but that the necessity of protecting the trade of Our subjects may soon oblige Us to send a squadron into those parts.

That as to supplying them with money at this time, you may represent to them that all the branches of Our revenues are so employed and even anticipated, that We have no fund for such an extraordinary service. That when Our good brother the Emperor of Germany pressed Us earnestly to lend him a considerable sum, which was to be employed in carrying on Our common cause, both formerly in Italy and now lately in Flanders, We were not able to supply so important a service with Our own money. And if they make mention to you of loans from Our subjects, you may give them to understand, from your self, that being not impowered from them to propose a sure and sufficient fund for the repayment of such money you did not think it at all adviseable to press that matter, lest by not being able to make any satisfactory offers of that kind at this time, when money is so scarce and so advantageously made use of in Our kingdom of Great Britain, you might bring the Swedish security into discredit and thereby make any future offers more difficult to be accepted. But that if they will provide a clear and secure fund for such a purpose you will write over about it and use all your interest and endeavours to serve them in that particular.

That, however, to do all that lyes in Our power at present towards procuring them a present and lasting security, We have proposed to the States General to offer Our joint mediation to all the partys concerned in the warr in the north, and not without expectation to obtain that point and by setting a negotiation on foot to procure a suspension of hostilities or some truce, in order to compose matters amicably by a safe and honourable peace.

A. R.

JAMES, DUKE OF QUEENSBERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO JACKSON.
(Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 154, copies.)

Whitehall, August 1, 1710.

. The neutrality for Germany is so firmly resolv'd upon, and the measures for preserving it have been so well concerted at the Hague between the severall powers concern'd, that there is no reason to apprehend any infraction of it. The mediation of a peace propos'd between Sweden and the other powers concern'd in the northern war has not taken so successfull a turn. That matter has been urg'd as far as it would well bear by the Queen's ambassador¹ and other neutrall ministers at the Hague, but the proposall was receiv'd with so much coldness by those other powers that it was thought fitter to drop the project for the present, rather than run the hazard of an absolute refusall. You will however assure the regency that the Queen will omitt no opportunity of demonstrating to the king in person, and the Swedish nation in generall, the friendship and good intentions she has towards them.

Whitehall, October 3, 1710.

I have this day receiv'd yours of the 17th of the last month and find that your account of the disposition of the regency at Stockholm in relation to the treaty for the 8000 men is much the same with what my Lord Townshend writes from the Hague. However you will not be discouraged but go on in concert with my Lord Townshend by all proper arguments to press the Swedes to a conclusion of the treaty, especially since the money, which the putting those troops into the service of the allies will bring into their coffers, may be of very great service and consequence to them in this juncture of affairs.

You will continue your instances likewise on the subject of the free trade in the Baltick. There is no need of repeating what advantage it will be to our merchants and how acceptable a service you will render to the Queen by obtaining it. Tho' the regency makes so much difficulty in granting it absolutely, yet methinks they might at least be induced to allow of it provishionally, till they could obtain fuller powers and authority from the king their master.

¹ Lord Townshend.

Whitehall, October 24, 1710.

This morning I received your favour of the 1st instant, by which I understand the treaty for taking the troops of Pomerania into the service of the allies is not so near a conclusion as I expected, since their insisting upon the clause of revocation in cases of necessity, and making themselves the sole judges of that necessity, seems to make the whole treaty ineffectual. But as the settling that matter one way or other is left entirely to the ministers at the Hague I will not trouble you with any further thoughts of my own upon it.

Whitehall, 12 June 1711.

I have received the favour of yours of the 3d and 10th past with the enclosed copy of the Swedish senates answer to the memorials delivered by yourself and the Dutch resident concerning our trade to those Swedish ports in the Baltick now in the Muscovites' possession. I have had the honour to lay them before the Queen and am commanded by her Majesty to signifie to you that it is her pleasure you should declare to the senate very plainly that she is resolved not to suffer any interruption of her subjects trade to the Baltick. This you will take care to do in concert with the Dutch minister, and in such a manner that they may perceive her Majesty is resolved to insist upon it.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR JAMES JEFFERYES, ESQ., SENT AS MINISTER TO
CHARLES XII AT BENDER, 11 JANUARY 1710/11.

(Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 215, copy.)

After the receipt of these Our instructions and your other dispatches you shall repair to the king of Sueden at Bender or wherever else he may be with all the expedition you conveniently can, and if he should remove at any time during your residence near his person you shall obtain leave to follow him, if possible, without waiting for orders from hence.

You shall make your journey by the Hague and Vienna to consult Our ministers there and advise with them about your further proceeding and whatever else may be thought necessary for Our service.

Upon your arrival at the place of the king of Sueden's residence you shall apply to the proper minister for obtaining an audience from his Majesty, in which you shall deliver him Our letters of

credence, which you will herewith receive, and shall accompany them with suitable expressions of Our friendship and esteem; particularly that We have now sent you on purpose to give him further and fuller assurances of the same and to carry on that good understanding and correspondence, which is so necessary for Our mutual interests in the present juncture and has been in some measure interrupted by his continueing so long at so great a distance; the expectation of his return and the uncertainty where he might be waited on having hindred Us from sending a minister sooner, as We had otherwise designed.

Since the preserving the peace of the Empire is of very great consequence to Us and Our allies during the present war with France, you shall use your utmost endeavours to obtain the king of Sueden's consent to and ratification of that act of neutrality, which We in concert with Our allies have passed for the security of Germany, and to which the regency of Sueden, as well as the other partys concerned in the northern war, have already agreed.

If you shall observe the king to be in any ways prejudiced against the conduct of the allies on this occasion, as if they had engaged too far without his participation, you are to endeavour to remove this distast by representing the impossibility of his being consulted at such a distance, which would not otherwise have been omitted, and the necessity of Our timely interposition, without which the province of Pomerania and his other dominions in the Empire, as well as the troops of General Crassau, wou'd have been exposed to apparent ruin and consequently the protestant interest in the Empire, of which his Majesty has been so zealous an asserter; that therefore this act should be taken by him, as it was at first designed, for the greatest mark which could then be given of Our particular friendship to him; and having entered into this measure for the reasons abovementioned We can no ways doubt of his concurrence. To these you shall add such other representations as will arise from the nature of the cause or, as you may find by the discourses and opinions of the officers about his person, may be most proper for gaining this point.

The Czar having by some overtures given Us to understand that he is not averse to a treaty of peace nor unwilling to make use of Our mediation in concert with some other of Our allies, you are to insinuate to the king of Sweden or his ministers, as occasion offers, Our great desires to prevent by a timely peace the utter ruin of

those provinces, which have so long suffered under the terrible judgements of the sword famine and pestilence, and Our readiness to employ Our good offices, if they may be usefull and agreeable to him, in this important work, which We hope may give Us some occasion of shewing Our real friendship and consideration for his interests.

If you find these proposalls are well received you may then proceed to sound his intentions as to the preliminaries for a negociation, but you are to be very cautious not to engage in any thing till you see Our mediation like to take effect ; though whether it be accepted or not you are, as dexterously and secretly as you can, to sound the inclinations of that prince and his ministers to a peace and the terms which they may expect on any negociation, whereof you shall give Us an account by every opportunity that offers ; and since no regular posts is settled from those parts you are to send expresses with your letters to Vienna or to the nearest place of safe correspondence, whenever anything of moment comes to your knowledge, particularly as to the king's return, his forces, designs, engagements or negociations with the Ottoman and French courts, and this being a point of the last importance you are to be very diligent in informing yourself and endeavouring to prevent any steps made by the French or other ministers, which may be prejudicial to Our interest or that of Our allies.

You shall also acquaint the king in the most convenient manner of Our desires that Our subjects may enjoy a free commerce for goods not contraband to all or any of the ports in the Baltick during the troubles in the north ; this you are to represent as agreeable to Our treatys, advantagious to all partys, and necessary for Us in the present juncture ; and therefore you are to desire orders may be sent to the regency of Stockholm for settling such regulations, that Our merchant men may not be stopp'd or molested in their passage by his ships of war.

For the better carrying on the severall parts of Our service you shall keep up a correspondence with Our ministers abroad, particularly those employ'd at Mosco, Constantinople, Vienna and the Hague, and send them from time to time such information as you shall think proper.

You shall as dexterously and with as little noise as you can endeavour to inform your self of the designs and intentions of that court, what treatys may be entertained by the king of Sueden,

what his condition is as to treasure or force, or any other matters of moment which may concern Our interest or may have any influence on Our affairs or those of the publick at this juncture.

You shall as far as you can inform yourself what matters the ministers of other princes and states are treating and negotiating there, and of all these matters, and all other occurrences, you shall constantly advise Us by one of Our principall secretaries of state.

You shall carefully maintain a good correspondence with the ministers, etc.

You shall protect and countenance on all occasions our subjects trading, etc.

You shall constantly correspond with Our ambassadors etc.

At your return we shall expect etc.

You shall from time to time observe such further instructions, etc.

A. R.

HENRY ST. JOHN, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO JEFFERYES
AND JACKSON.

(*Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 154, copies.*)

To Jefferyes.

Whitehall, 27th July 1711.

When your dispatch of the 18th of May N.S. arrived here the duke of Queensberry was dead, and her Majesty having been pleased since to reestablish the ancient division of the foreign provinces the northern kingdoms, which were allotted to his Grace, have been put under my care, and thereby I am to have the satisfaction of receiving your letters and transmitting the Queen's commands to you upon them.

Yours of the 18th has been laid before her Majesty, together with the memorial which you presented to the king of Sweden in the name of the Queen, the Emperor, and the States General, and his Swedish Majestys answer to the several heads contained in it.

The Queen very well approves of your conduct in this matter and of the representations you made both to his Majesty and Mo^r de Mullern¹ pursuant to your instructions, but her Majesty is very sorry to see by the king of Sweden's answer that her earnest and friendly endeavours, even in matters which so nearly concern his

¹ Baron Henrik Gustaf von Mullern, minister with Charles XII at Bender.

Majesty's welfare and the preservation of his dominions, should meet with so little success ; but as her Majesty will never grow weary nor be discouraged in representing what she and her allys think to be advantageous to Sweden in the present conjunctures you are to continue your instances in hopes of making some better impressions and bringing his Swedish Majesty to enter more favorably into our views and sentiments.

As the offers of the good offices of the allys towards making peace in the north are not unacceptable, you will be carefull to sound his Swedish Majesty more particularly upon what plan and what conditions he would be ready to enter into treaty with his several enemys, for as to the allys compelling them by force to equitable terms his Majesty will easily observe from the present circumstances of the northern confederates, and the state of the warr we are engaged in against France, that such a method is neither adviseable nor practicable, and his Swedish Majesty must needs have a juster sense of things than to expect more than our best amicable endeavours to bring the differences of the north to an accommodation. I send you the answers which have been given here to Count Gyllenborg,¹ upon his pressing to have the guarantys of the treatys of Travendahl and Alt-Ranstad executed, by which you will see her Majesty's sense and the impossibility we lye under of coming up to such proposals. It is hoped that the Swedish court may have thought of overtures towards Denmark and King Augustus not too strictly adhering to the treatys of Travendahl and Alt-Ranstad, since there is no likelihood that those princes will hearken to such a model of accommodation, and if they have anything to propose that may be agreeable in the present posture of affairs they shall find how zealously the Queen will contribute her utmost towards accomplishing so good a work. And as to the Czar of Muscovy, her Majesty has, I believe, given orders to use her good offices at the Ottoman Port, that the peace may be general and comprehend all the partys concerned in the warr.

You represented very justly the benefits Sweden has reaped by the act of neutrality, and we had reason to hope that those endeavours would have been favorably received by his Swedish Majesty, or if he had not liked some particular points in it he would have desired to have them softened or changed, wherein the allys would have done their utmost to have contented him ; but as he

¹ Count Karl Gyllenborg, Swedish minister in England 1710 to 1717.

had protested intirely against that act, and declared that he will not be tyed to the conditions of it but pursue his enemies wherever he shall think fit, he has put the allys under the greatest difficultys and rendered them incapable of doing him the service they might have done in this exigency. The northern confederates assure us that they would not meddle with the Swedes in Pomerania, provided we could secure them from being attack'd by those troops. This is the language used by all their ministers at present and which we cannot answer, but are reduced to the necessity of seeing the Swedish provinces in Germany ruined, or distressing our warr against France by the loss of such considerable bodys of troops as the Danes and Saxons. The Swedish ministers press us to save them, when at the same time they put it out of our power by rejecting the act of neutrality, which was the only means we had to do them service. They can furnish us with no answers to the objections made by the northern confederates, and I fear any expedients or proposals which may be sent from Bender will come too late to be made use of for the advantage of Sweden. Her Majesty is extremely concerned to see those affairs in such a dangerous crisis, and wishes that the consequences had been well weighed and foreseen before the act of neutrality had been rendered useless by his Swedish Majesty's protesting against it.

I think you may very justly insist on the present difficultys, which we labour under, as an evidence of our desire to support the king of Sweden and of our unwillingness to admit of any measures which may tend to his prejudice.

As to the answer you received from the king concerning the liberty of trading to the ports in the Baltick, which are in the hands of the Czar, the Queen cannot think it either agreeable to the true sense of the treatys of commerce or to the practice between friends and allys. If those towns were actually besieged, or blockaded, it would be allowed to be a just reason for prohibiting a trade with them, but the case is not the same in respect to a few ships of warr ordered to cruize before the ports and her Majesty does insist to have a free trade thither for her subjects. And as she understands the sense of the States General to be the same in this point, she hopes we shall not be obliged to send convoys sufficient to protect our merchant ships, since the trade is so necessary and so justly demanded that if we cannot have it by permission we must open it by force. I hope the Swedish court will consider more seriously

of this matter and not oppose with so little reason what is continually indulged them in respect to France, since we might have the same pretence of seizing all Swedish ships whenever we have a squadron lying before Dunkirk or any other port of France.

To Jackson.

Whitehall, 27th July 1711.

I have not received any letters from you since the last I acknowledged, but having writ to Mr Jefferyes upon the answer he received from the king of Sweden to the several points he proposed by order from her Majesty, I herewith send you an extract of my letter together with cypys of the memorial presented by Mr Jefferyes and his Swedish Majesty's answer, which will direct you in speaking the same language to the senate at Stockholm.

The conduct of the Swedes has brought us into great distress in respect to the neutrality and it behoves them to suggest to us some expedients to preserve their troops and their provinces in Germany from destruction. Whatever the event be, I am sure they ought to be sensible that her Majesty and the allys have their safety much at heart, since we run so great a risque as losing in the middle of the campagne a great part of our army rather than give way to measures prejudicial to Sweden. We do still represent that the protestation made against the neutrality is not an overt act in breach of it, tho they will please to consider at Stockholm how little satisfaction such an excuse will give the northern princes, their enemys, when we are able to undertake for nothing on the part of Sweden, not so much as to engage that the troops in Pomerania shall not attack them, provided they will lay aside the enterprize they are going upon. And as it is not to be expected that the northern confederates will sit still any longer under the uneasiness that corps gives them I do not see how it can be desired that we should abandon our warr against France to run to their assistance, who have render'd ineffectual the most proper expedient we had to protect them.

Her Majesty has all along put the direction of this affair into the hands of the States General and continues to leave the further management of it to the ministers at the Hague, from whence I hope you will not fail to have constant information of what passes, which may be of use to promote her Majesty's and the common interest at the place where you are.

As it appears by Mr Jefferyes's letter that the College of Com-

merce in Sweden have had the business of our free trade to the ports in the possession of the Muscovites in the Baltick referred to their examination, you will represent, where it may be proper, her Majesty's sentiments upon that matter. The Queen does insist positively on such a liberty for her subjects as she desires and will be very sorry to see herself forc'd to maintain it by the strength of her convoys. But unless the Swedes will yield in a point which is so unwarrantable her Majesty can by no means suffer her kingdoms to be deprived of so necessary a trade.

To Jackson.

Windsor Castle, July 31st, 1711.

. You will represent to the Swedish ministers with how little foundation they pretend to debar us from carrying on our trade to those towns, which the Czar has conquered, and to urge their cruising before them as a parallel case to a formal blockade. It will be very proper for you further to insinuate that such a proceeding as this would at any time appear extraordinary, but that it must do so in a very eminent manner at this time, when the Swedish minister at our court is daily asking the Queen's good offices to avert the mischief wherewith the northern confederates threaten his master, and when the Queen and the States of Holland have expos'd themselves to the danger of loosing in the middle of this campaign both the Danish and Saxon troops rather than take from his Swedish Majesty the benefit of that neutrality which he has however protested against.

To Jefferyes.

Whitehall, 21st August 1711.

. You will easily imagine we are not a little impatient to have a certain account of the situation of affairs in that part of the world where you are, particularly since we have had such repeated advices of the Muscovites having obtain'd an entire victory over the Turks, and of a peace being concluded in the field of battle with an exclusion of the king of Sweden.¹ The confirmation or contradiction of these reports will have no small influence upon the measures to be taken by the Queen and the States of Holland in the

¹ The reference is to the fighting on the Pruth. The Russian "victory" was not in the field, where they were hopelessly defeated, but in the terms of the peace, 1/12 August 1711.

present conjuncture ; for as it wou'd not be for our advantage entirely to disoblige the northern confederates, or that the king of Sweden should be in a condition of hurting the common cause of the allies by the invasion of Saxony, so on the other hand it is very far from being the general interest to have the ballance of power in the north entirely destroy'd and the protestant religion in Germany deprived of so great a support as it must necessarily be by an absolute conquest of the Swedish provinces.

To Jefferyes.

Whitehall, 1st February 1711/12.

I received lately your letter of the 10th November O.S. from Bender, by which I see that notwithstanding the arguments you use and the efforts you make from time to time the king of Sweden continues unmoveable upon the severall points which you were directed to solicit.

The discourse you had with Mons^r de Mullern shows plainly how little satisfied your court is with the conduct of her Majesty and the States Generall in respect to the invasion of Swedish Pomerania this last year. I know of no treaty made with King Augustus upon the points you mention, but I have seen a paper of minutes of a conference at the Hague the 14th of August last, wherein the Dutch consent to those particulars, which Mo^r de Mullern informed you of. This I understand to have been in the nature of a secret transaction, which was not put into the usual form of a resolution. And the three battalions which the States consented might be withdrawn, in hopes that they would be replaced by a like number of horse, were never sent from Flanders. But at the same time I must observe to you that the part which her Majesty acted in the whole matter was different from what the States did. The Queen's ambassador, the earl of Strafford, was during that time in England and her Majesty never gave any consent nor made any declaration in favour of those proceedings at the Hague, but kept steddily to an exact neutrality ; which, if the king of Sweden is inclined to make any allowance for the situation of affairs, was as much as her Majesty could do in her circumstances. Upon this subject I must not omit to inform you that when her Majesty received advice that the Danes had a design to take winter quarters in the dutchy of Bremen she immediately wrote to the king of Denmark in very pressing terms to dissuade him from it, and ordered her minister

at that court to make all possible instances for preventing that enterprize.

In respect to the trade in the Baltick the Queen is sorry that his Swedish Majesty will not hearken to those just and reasonable representations which have hitherto been made to him. Sir James Wishart, one of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, will be suddenly going over to Holland with full instructions to consult with the States upon that matter. It will certainly be a great concern to her Majesty if the sufferings and complaints of her subjects should force her to come to extremitys for redress, but she cannot quietly see that trade ruined, and even those extremitys she may be brought to cannot prove of worse consequence than that our commerce to the ports in the Baltick should be interrupted and cramped in the manner the Swedes pretend to do.

THE SAME, NOW VISCOUNT BOLINGBROKE.

To Jefferyes.

Whitehall, September the 23d 1712.

Having no particular commands from her Majesty to send you I have no materials for a letter of business. This comes chiefly to acquaint you that as we are in the utmost uncertainty what turn the affairs of the north are likely to take, as long as the king of Sweden continues at such a distance from his own dominions, we should be glad to hear from you what his Majesty's resolutions are and in what manner he desires the Queens assistance, which she is very sincerely disposed to give him. And I hope the time is not farr off when her Majesty, by having concluded a peace with France, will have her hands at liberty to restore tranquillity among the northern powers and to act a part which will be to her eternal honour and the advantage of Europe.

In the meantime we easily imagine that the steps, which her Majesty has taken towards finishing this ruinous warr, are the subject of general conversation even as far as Bender, and that you meet with people ready enough to find fault with the measures which the Queen, by the perverseness of her allys, has been obliged to pursue and to lay the blame, which is owing to their conduct, at her Majesty's door. But you are sufficiently apprized of the situation of her affairs and of the just grounds of her proceedings to be able to confute those false reasoners and will without doubt, as

a servant of the Queen, take all opportunitys to vindicate her honour, whenever any reflexion is aimed at it, since it would be as unbecoming a minister of hers to suffer any thing of that kind to pass with silence, as it would be injurious and affronting in any person who should offer to put him to the tryall.

To Jackson.

Whitehall, 30 May 1713.

The courier who brought the dispatches to Count Gyllenborg being upon his return, I take that opportunity of answering your letter of the 4th of Aprill last.

The account you gave of your conference with Count Horn, and of the great distress to which the Swedish affairs are reduced, contributed extreamely to make the Queen take the immediate resolution of using her utmost endeavours to save Sweden, and in order to that of struggling thrô the many difficultys, which lye in the way and which arise from the coldness of their friends and from the inveteracy of their enemys, but above all from the obstinacy of the king himself.

I received her Majesty's commands last Monday night to make representations in her name to the severall ministers of the north residing here, and accordingly on Tuesday morning I spoke to Count Gyllenborg to the following effect. That althô the weight of the late warr, in which the Queen was engaged, made it impossible for her to act in such a manner as her inclinations and the general interest would have guided her to do, and althô the conduct of the northern allys, each in their turn, has been such as to make it doubtfull for the most part, whether the cases implied by her Majesty's treatys exist or not, yet the Queen could not sit still on one hand to see Sweden subdued and the ballance of power in the north destroyed, and on the other hand she could not suffer the Swedes, by virtue of defensive obligations towards them, to draw her into the support of the warr and to be a partner in all the new designs grafted upon the original quarrel.

That therefore her Majesty was ready to enter into all reasonable measures to preserve Sweden from that ruin, which seems to hang over the kingdome, but that in order to render this practicable, and to capacitate the Queen and the rest of their friends to serve them, the Swedes must make the first step themselves ; which if

the king would have done some time ago his affairs would not have been reduced to the miserable circumstances they are now in. In short, I told him that the Queen expected they should declare themselves ready and willing to treat, that they should make this offer either directly or thro' her Majesty to their enemys, and that they should name Hambourg, Bremen, Lubec, or some one or two other commodious places to open a congress at; that this step being made by Sweden the northern allys could not, and her Majesty would declare she expected they should not, refuse to begin a treaty, since they have always pretended to be ready to enter into negociation and have thrown the blame of not doing it on the king of Sweden. I endeavoured in the best manner I was able to show this minister how irremediable their misfortunes were, unless they fell into the measures which those powers prescribed, from whom only they could expect assistance. I urged to him the little prospect there was of bringing the States General on any other foot to concern themselves for Sweden, and I gave him to understand that he might be assured France, from whom as guarantee of the treaty of Westphalia, and a natural friend and ally of Sweden they expected much, would be of the same opinion. I showed him on the other hand what they had to hope for, if once the treaty was begun, and insinuated to him that the Queen in that case would be of opinion, as I suppose the rest of their common friends would be also, to begin by agreeing a suspension of arms, leaving things on all sides in their present posture till by a treaty of peace they should be finally determined. After these several communications, in the reasonableness of which Count Gyllenborg very thankfully and decently acquiesced, I observed to him how necessary it was that the Swedish ministers, who shall be appointed to treat, should be furnished with absolute full powers, unclogged with those preliminary conditions contained in the powers given to the Count de Vellingk.¹ I convinced him that the producing of such as these would dissolve the congress as soon as it met, and that the giving of others would draw into no consequence, which the king needed to apprehend, since by private instructions to his ministers he might direct them to make what use he should think fit of the authority given to them. Upon the whole he promised me to write, as I doubt not but he does, by this courier, and I hope the answer will

¹ Count Mauritz Vellingk, governor of Bremen, in later times the bitterest adversary of Great Britain in Sweden.

be such and as speedy as the true interest and the pressing necessity of Sweden require.

The next person I spoke to, by her Majesty's order, was the Danish envoy, Mons^r de Rosenkrantz.¹ I let him know that I was commanded by the Queen to represent to him that the situation of affairs in the north is so much altered, and the defensive alliances, which her Majesty has with Sweden, are so hard pressed upon her, that she is reduced to a necessity of taking some part in these matters, and therefore thinks it the fairest and most friendly method she can pursue, in time to communicate to them what engagements she lyes under and to concert with them the proper means of putting an end to the northern warr. That hitherto the Swedes have been, notwithstanding all their misfortunes, averse to treating, but that her Majesty hopes they are at present in another temper of mind. That in this case she makes no doubt but that the northern allies will be equally ready to set a negociation on foot, as they have always pretended to be. I added pretty strong insinuations that as the Queen and the States General cannot, on many accounts, be tame spectators of the destruction of Sweden, so neither can France avoid to enter into some concert on this head, as a guarantee of the treaty of Westphalia, provided the Swedes will depart from that stiffness, which they have hitherto shown, and submit to treat.

Since my speaking to Mons^r de Rosenkrantz I have likewise, according to the Queens command, spoke pretty near to the same effect to the Baron de Schack, the Czar's envoy, and to Mons^r d'Elorme, the resident from king Augustus. Both these ministers promised to make report of what I had communicated to them, but the Muscovite, by the manner in which he expressed himself, seemed not to give hopes of much forwardness in his master to treat, of much easiness when he did treat, or any inclination to stop the progress of his arms till he had obtained from Sweden the cession of all those provinces which lye around the Gulph of Finland, most of which were, I believe, by Charles Gustavus taken from one of the Czars predecessors.

I have writ to the Queen's ambassadors at Utrecht to endeavour by all possible means to bring the States up to concurr in these

¹ Ivar Rosenkrantz, envoy extraordinary to Queen Anne 1702-5 and 1709-14.

measures with her Majesty. I have likewise informed M^r Pulteney¹ and M^r Scott,² and the rest of her Majesty's ministers where it may be usefull, of the Queens sense upon this matter.

I have likewise said what was proper to the duke d'Aumont,³ and by the things, which he has let drop at my desire to the ministers of Denmark, of Poland, and of Muscovy concerning his master's regard for and alliances with the crown of Sweden, and concerning the obligations which lye upon him as a guarantee of the treaty of Westphalia, I believe these ministers will have conceived some further apprehension, which they may communicate to their courts and thereby dispose them the more readily to accept the offer, which we propose Sweden should make of treating.

Upon the whole we hope that this first step may be brought to bear and that the Dutch may be induced to join with the Queen in it, and that afterwards further advances may be made, provided the Swedes do not frighten their friends with the apprehension of being drawn into a warr but make it practicable to assist them on the foot of coming into a treaty of peace.

The Queen would therefore have you represent to Count Horn and to the other ministers of the regency of Sweden the sense she has of the extremitys to which they are reduced and her proposal in order to extricate them from their misfortunes in the best manner she can. You are to press upon them the great necessity there is of beginning a negociation immediately ; you are to shew them the unavoidable ruin which hangs over their heads if they do not, and the fair prospect of coming off on terms tolerably easy if they do ; and whenever you speak of this step of entering into treaty you are to mention it as a thing demanded by the Queen, and which will be insisted on by all their friends, as the price at which they are to expect assistance from them.

As in cases of this nature it is always reasonable to suppose the worst, and as perhaps it is more necessary to do so in this case than in any other, because of the king of Sweden's unaccountable temper, so I cannot but mention to you that it would be requisite you should sound the ministers of Sweden in confidence, if any of them would open themselves to you on that head (which they may safely do, since the secret should pass into no hands but yours and mine)

¹ Daniel Pulteney, envoy extraordinary to Denmark, 1706 to 1715.

² James Scott, envoy extraordinary to the king of Poland, 1711 to 1715.

³ Louis, duc d'Aumont, envoy extraordinary from Louis XIV. 1712-13.

what they as good patriots and lovers of their country and as faithfull servants to their prince would wish that the friends of Sweden should do, in case the king's inflexible temper should carry him to refuse to set a treaty on foot, without such preliminary conditions as are unattainable, or in case he should refuse to give any other full powers than such as must dissolve the congress as soon as it meets ; in short, let them suppose the worst that can happen and then let them freely tell us, what should be done for their preservation by driving the king to rescue his kingdome in spite of himself. In order to this end you will please to endeavour to find out and to communicate to me what conditions of peace they, in the present ill posture of their affairs, might be willing to accept, and how far they could go, in order to deliver themselves out of this warr, in their concessions to the three allies engaged against them.

It is very necessary I should have an answer upon these heads as soon as possible, and I desire you would write to me by the first opportunity, which I suppose will offer itself in a little time, since it is probable that the senate of Sweden will without delay return an answer to the dispatches which Count Gyllenborg sends by this courier.

To Jefferyes.

Whitehall, 18th August 1713.

. The last letter I have from you is of the 12th of June O.S., from Constantinople. His Swedish Majestie's affairs were then in no good condition, and since that time we find by all our intelligence that they are grown more desperate. You can do little in those circumstances to serve him, but it will be very agreable to the Queen's intentions that you should be as assiduous as you can contrive to be in attending his person and in shewing her Majesty's concern for his present condition by your readiness to employ your self for his service.

The enclosed state will shew you how little any power, besides the Queen, seems yet inclined really to set about saving of Sweden and bringing the northern troubles to terms of accommodation.

(Enclosure.)

Her Majesty has all along, but more particularly and more strongly since the conclusion of her peace with France, made

instances with the powers concerned for bringing the troubles in the north to an accommodation.

The Queen's ministers have very frequently pressed the States General to enter into concert with her Majesty upon that head. They have urged the necessity of putting an end to that warr in general and in particular they have insisted on joining their endeavours to restore the neutrality of Holstein and to save Tonningén.

But as these instances by word of mouth received only general and evasive answers the Queen thought fit lately to order the earl of Strafford to present a memorial to the States upon the subject of the affairs of the north in very urgent terms, but the resolution which has been taken upon it does not at all come up to that spirit, which her Majesty desires to see exerted in these matters, and only terminates in a repetition of good offices, which we look upon to be a fruitless and ineffectual formality.

The king of Prussia does indeed, by the treaty which he made with the administrator of Holstein for the sequestration of that dutchy and Pomerania, enter into a measure which seemed very likely to give a new turn to the affairs of the north, and the Queen very readily encouraged that project and will contribute all she can to the improvement of it as appearing favourable to the Swedish interest. But the conduct of General Meyerfelt in refusing to admit the Prussians into Stetin has for the present disappointed that scheme.¹

France has been forward enough to exhort the Queen to take effectual measures for restoring the tranquillity of the north, but we have not yet seen anything more come from that quarter than bare exhortations ; unless they have any secret ways of supporting Sweden, with which we are not acquainted here.

The Queen is earnestly desirous to bring matters to a negotiation and to establish a congress in hopes of some favourable incidents for promoting the welfare of Sweden. On this occasion Count Gyllenborg has been amply discoursed with here, and Mr Jackson has been wrote to in order to get the senate of Stockholm to enter into such a kind of method for retrieving their affairs. But while there is no person here with sufficient full powers to begin a treaty, while such preliminary articles are insisted on by Sweden as give a

¹ For the conditions and failure of the treaty of 22 June N.S. 1713 for the sequestration of Stettin and Wismar during the war see briefly Chance, *George I and the Northern War*, pp. 36 f.

specious pretence to the northern confederates to avoid coming to a negociation, and while his Swedish Majesty continues immoveable in not hearkning to any proposals suitable to the present circumstances of his affairs, the Queen, thò she will never be wanting in her friendship and endeavours for his advantage, much fears the success of what she shall be able to do on her part.

His Swedish Majesty is therefore to be pressed seriously to examine the situation of his friends and enemys, to lay to heart the posture of his own dominions, and then readily to hearken to the counccills of those, who have no other aim but his good, and to joyn in such measures as are practicable.

WILLIAM BROMLEY, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO JACKSON.

(Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 154, copies.)

Whitehall, 15th September 1713.

I have laid before the Queen your letters of July the 21th and August the 6th, and am now to acquaint you that it is a matter of great concern to the Queen to find that notwithstanding the present miserable condition of the Swedish dominions there should not be any person vested with authority from the king to negotiate a peace, by which alone the ill state of his affairs can be retrieved. His minister here in his memorials insists on her Majesty's making good her guaranties of Travendahl and Alt-Ranstat (thò the latter was never given in form) and her sending the succours stipulated by the treaty in 1700, upon which I have it in command from her Majesty, after I have observed to him what her Majesty has done towards composing the distracted affairs of Sweden by her overtures of a peace and the answers from the senate to the same, to let him know that the Queen was inclined to have taken some steps pursuant to these treaties, thò she cannot allow them to be in that force and so extensive as he takes them to be ; for the guarantees are not only denied by the enemys to Sweden, but by the friends also, to subsist in the present case, and her Majesty cannot think herself under an obligation to send the succours promised by the treaty in 1700, for that is a defensive allyance and as such cannot oblige when a prince shall positively and obstinately refuse to preserve his country by a negociation of peace. You may assure the senate, as we shall the minister here, that her Majesty will readily perform whatever can with any foundation of justice be

said to be incumbent on her, and that when the king of Sweden shall think fit to declare himself willing to treat she will be very hearty in her endeavours to procure him reasonable conditions. Her treatys, as I have already explained to you, lay her under no further obligations, nor can his Swedish Majesty ask or expect more of her, since the States and the elector of Hanover, who are under the same engagements, have already declared they cannot send any troops on the present occasion. When the expresses that are expected from the king of Sweden arrive her Majesty hopes the senate will have more power and find themselves at liberty to take such measures as may at last save their country.

As to the dutchy of Holstein it is agreed on all sides that the only method now left to preserve it will be that of a sequestration into the hands of the king of Prussia, which the Queen will press his Majesty to take upon him.

Whitehall, 17th November 1713.

I have laid before the Queen your letter of the 5th of September last, wherein you give so melancholick an account of the situation of affairs in Sweden, that her Majesty could not but be sensibly affected with the great misfortunes that nation labours under, and the still greater calamitys it has reason to apprehend. It is very surprising the king of Sweden should still continue averse to a negotiation, the only visible means now left to preserve his country, and at the same time that he should give such ill treatment to his best friends and allies, her Majesty and the States General, by a most unjust seizure of their subjects ships for no other reason but that they would trade with the towns that have been lately taken from him. By the enclosed extract of my letter to the bishop of London¹ you'll see her Majesty has directed him to deliberate upon this matter with the ministers of the States as being equally concerned, and I make no doubt but such measures will soon be concerted as may incline his Swedish Majesty to take off those prohibitions, so contrary to common equity and the tenor of the treatys still subsisting between her Majesty and him.

Whitehall, 23rd April 1714.

In return to several of your letters, now lying before me, I am to acquaint you the Queen is truly concerned for the calamitous con-

¹ Dr. John Robinson.

dition of the affairs of Sweden. And her Majesty is concerned to find that, when they so much want the assistance of all their friends, the regency will think themselves obliged by an order they may have received from the king to go on seizing and confiscating the ships trading to those ports in the Baltick that have been taken by the Czar in the course of the war. This is a reason assigned by the States of Holland for not entering readily into concert with her Majesty, as she has desired, for restoring the peace of the north and preserving Sweden. However, her Majesty has pressed them, from considerations of our common interest and religion, that they will heartily joyn with her before it is too late in such measures as shall be thought proper for obtaining these ends, and when her Majesty knows their resolutions she will determine her own. . . .

JACKSON, JEFFERYES, AND OTHERS

1714-15

THE following documents illustrate the attitude of Great Britain towards Sweden at the end of Queen Anne's reign and in the first months of that of George I.

George Mackenzie had been from 1710 to 1712 secretary in charge of affairs at Warsaw. His present mission to Russia lasted only till February 1715. References in the dispatches to his ability are not complimentary, and he does not seem to have been employed again.

Captain Archibald Hamilton was perhaps the youngest brother of James, fourth duke of Hamilton, in later life governor of Greenwich Hospital and of Jamaica and a lord of the admiralty. His inglorious experience on the present occasion has been noticed in the introduction.

EXTRACT FROM INSTRUCTIONS FOR GEORGE MACKENZIE, ESQ.,
MINISTER RESIDENT WITH THE TSAR OF RUSSIA, 20 MAY 1714.

(Record Office, F.O. King's Letters 72, copy.)

. You shall privately inform yourself by all proper methods of the Czars real disposition to a peace, what terms may be to his satisfaction, and what regard he has to his allies and their pretensions, whereof you shall give Us the best and speediest accounts you can from time to time.

The kingdom of Sweden, which was once so great a bulwark of the protestant interest, being now reduced to those extremitys, that it is much to be feared one campaign more will entirely subject it to the power of the Czar and of the king of Denmark, We cannot see the total ruin and overthrow of a nation with whom We have such alliances and in the preservation of which the interests of Our people are so deeply concerned. You are therefore to take all

proper opportunitys to insinuate to the Czar and his ministers how agreeable it would be to Us to see a perfect friendship restored between his Czarish Majesty and the king of Sweden. That nothing could be more glorious for his Czarish Majesty than in the midst of his victorys to negotiate a treaty with his enemy so much reduced, and by such an advantageous peace, as he is sure to obtain, secure to himself the fruits of those successes he had in the war.

WILLIAM BROMLEY, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO JACKSON.

(Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 154, copy.)

Whitehall, 18th June 1714.

Her Majesty has received so many representations memorialis and petitions from the merchants trading to the Baltick Sea of the great hardships they suffer from the Swedish men of war and privateers, that she thought she could no longer refuse to furnish them with such convoys as might be deemed sufficient for their protection from those open and repeated violences. Accordingly two men of war, viz^t the Woolwich of 50 guns and the Dolphin of 36, are appointed for this service, but under this restriction, that they are to take no ships under their convoy but such as shall be furnished with proper passes, and those are not to be granted but upon certificates from the officers of the customs that the ships therein named are not laden with any contraband goods, and upon sufficient security given by the proprietors that they shall return home to Great Britain, danger of the sea excepted, as you'l see by the enclosed copys of my letters to the Swedish resident and to the merchants on that occasion.

You will find inclosed a petition of the Muscovia Company, upon which her Majesty has commanded me to signifie her pleasure to you that you immediately reclaim all the ships therein named with their cargoes, or any others taken from her subjects in the same violent and wrongful manner.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ARCHIBALD HAMILTON, ESQ., "COMMADORE OF OUR SHIPS OF WAR GOING TO THE BALTICKE," 22 JULY 1714.

(Record Office, F.O. King's Letters 72, copy.)

Whereas the ships of Our good subjects trading to the Baltick Sea have of late been much molested by the ships of war of Our good brother the king of Sweden and the privateers belonging

to his subjects, under pretence that Our said subjects supplied the enemies of his Suedish Majesty with ships provisions and ammunition, We have thought fit for the better security of the commerce ships and effects of Our said subjects to appoint you to be their convoy, in the performance of which service you are to govern yourself by these following instructions.

You shall take no vessel whatsoever under your care but those belonging to Our subjects and who shall be furnished with proper passes under Our sign manuel and privy signet, in which passes shall be specified that the said ships have been duly examined by the officers of Our customs and that the said officers have certified that they are not laden with any contraband goods.

It shall be further set forth in the said passes that security has been given to Us by the proprietors of the said ships that the said ships shall be brought back to Great Britain, hazards of the sea excepted.

If you meet with any of the ships of war of Our good brother the king of Sueden, or privateers belonging to his subjects, you may acquaint the commanders thereof that all the merchant-men under your care are furnished with passes as above mentioned and that We have not granted such passes til the said ships were strictly visited and certified that no contraband goods were on board and security given that the said ships should be brought back to Great Britain, hazards of the sea excepted.

And upon your meeting with any men of warr of the king of Sweden's, who shall scruple to let the merchant ships pass, you are, for the better satisfaction of the flag, or commanding officer, to collect from the masters of the several ships and vessells under your convoy the passes which they have received from Us and communicate the same to him. But you are to give instructions to the masters of the said merchant ships that in case of separation and their meeting with any Swedish ships of war they do produce the passes from Us to the commanders of the said ships.

To prevent any disputes that may arise concerning the several species of goods comprehended under the general denomination of contraband you will find hereunto annexed a list of goods agreed to be known and distinguished by that name by treaty made in the year 1661 between Our royal uncle, king Charles the Second of blessed memory, and Charles 11th, father of his Suedish Majesty ; as also a list containing the names of such ships and vessells and of

their masters which have received Our passe, as also an account which of them are to sayl out of this river, and which of them from the out ports, that so you may the better know when all shall be joyned you, which are to proceed to the Baltick under your convoy, and particularly those from the river of Thames.

A. R.

WILLIAM BROMLEY TO GEORGE I.

(*Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 217, copy.*)

Whitehall, 7th August 1714.

SIR,

By direction of the Lords Justices I have the honour to represent to your Majesty the unfortunate condition of your subjects of Great Britain trading to the Balticke Sea, whose ships and effects are daily seized by the Suedish men of war and privateers.

When these violences were first begun it was given out on the part of Sueden that nothing further was intended than barely to prevent our supplying her enemies with ships ammunition and provisions, but notwithstanding these specious pretences many vessels were confiscated without any proof of their being designed for the service of the Czar or their having any contraband goods on board, and it was afterwards declared his Suedish Majesty had sent positive orders not to suffer any nation whatsoever to trade to or from any ports that had been taken from him in the course of this war.

I beg leave with all submission to acquaint your Majesty that by treaties concluded in the years 1661 and 1700 between the crowns of Great Britain and Sueden (extracts whereof are hereunto annexed) it was agreed that neither part should furnish the enemies of the other with any of the goods therein specified. Accordingly all care had been taken, as far as the nature of the case would admit, to enforce a due observation of those treaties, but we know of no law or treaty which debars your Majesty's subjects from trading to or from any port taken from Sueden, and in the quiet possession of another prince, where such port is not besieged or block't up by land or by sea.

There are four men of war appointed to convoy the ships of your Majesty's subjects to the Baltick Sea, and the earl of Strafford, your Majesty's ambassador at the Hague, is instructed to press the States that their convoy may join your Majesty's for their mutual

security. He writes me the States have answered their convoy is not ready, but the season of the year for this trade being far advanced your Majesty's ships are commanded to proceed, tho' Captain Hamilton, the commadore of your Majesty's ships, is under orders to stop at Elsinore and inform himself of the strength and designs of the Suedes, since M^r Jackson, your Majesty's resident at Stockholme, has given his opinion that the Suedish squadron will attack that of your Majesty, if they happen to meet, and in case M^r Hamilton finds there is any danger he is to return to the river of Thames with as many of the merchant men as are willing to accompany him.

The Lords Justices have directed me to acquaint your Majesty that the interruption of your subjects trade to the Baltick will be particularly prejudicial to your Majesty's service and to all other the trade of Great Britain at this time, in regard of the want there will be of naval stores; and it is with all duty and humility submitted to your Majesty's great wisdom, what instances you shall think fit to make to the princess and senate of Sueden on this occasion. I am with all possible duty and respect

Sir

Your Majesty's most faithful and most obedient
subject and servant,

W. BROMLEY.

CHARLES, VISCOUNT TOWNSHEND, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO
JACKSON AND JEFFERYES.

(*Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 155, British Museum, Add. MS.
28154, copies.*)

To Jackson.

Whitehall, December 10th, 1714.

. I now send you inclosed by his Majesty's command an account of the valuation of the losses that the British Company trading to Muscovy has sustained from the Swedes having taken a great many of their ships going to the ports of the Baltick and having unjustly confiscated them with their whole cargo's. You have likewise a translation of the letter I have writ to Count Gyllenborg, the Swedish minister here, to desire he will represent this matter in such a manner to his court that his Majesty's subjects may obtain full reparation for the damages they have suffered,

and it is the King's pleasure you should make the most pressing instances and application to the ministry at Stockholm and to the king of Sweden, now returned into his dominions, in behalf of the British merchants, and that you take care to enter in the most regular and authentick manner an exact account of the number of the ships and value of the goods so taken and confiscated, and of your having reclaimed the same in due form ; and therefore you are to demand very earnestly in his Majesty's name that full restitution and satisfaction be made to his subjects according to the value of the losses which they have already or shall for the future sustain by this extraordinary treatment from the Swedes.

To Jackson.

11th February 1714/5.

I have laid your letter of the 15th January before the King together with the memorial you presented to the Swedish chancery about the ships of the British subjects which have been taken and unjustly confiscated by the Swedes. That proceeding is so arbitrary and unwarrantable, that his Majestie would have you continue your utmost instances for reparation and not be discouraged by the unreasonable obstinacy which appears in the Swedish court upon this matter.

To Jefferyes at Stralsund.

Whitehall, 1st March 1714/15.

. Mr Jackson has had repeated orders from the King relating to several British ships which the Swedes have most violently and unjustly taken and confiscated on pretence that they were trading to the ports in the Baltick, which belonged to Sweden and are now in possession of the Czar. No satisfaction has as yet been obtained from Stockholm, and the senate by their last answer refer the matter to his Swedish Majesty himself, as being now returned to his own territories. There is so much hardship in the case of the British subjects, and so manifest an infraction of the treaties between the two nations in the proceedings of the Swedes, that his Majesty cannot omit repeating his instances for due reparation and satisfaction, and it is accordingly the Kings pleasure that you should apply to his Swedish Majesty himself in this behalf and use your utmost endeavours to procure all the redress of these grievances you possibly can. I understand from Mr Jackson that

he has transmitted to you the papers relating to this affair, but least they should not have come to your hands I herewith enclose to you copies of his memorial to the chancery at Stockholm, of the specifick account of the losses and damages sustained by the subjects of Great Britain by reason of their ships being taken and confiscated in Sweden, and of the answer which has been returned by the senate to M^r Jacksons memorial. These papers I hope will give you a sufficient information of the affair and enable you fully and effectually to represent it to the king of Sweden and his ministers at Stralsund.

To Jefferyes.

Whitehall, 8th March 1714/15.

I am to acknowledge your letter of the 22d of last month O.S., which I have laid before the King and am more particularly to take notice to you of that article wherein you give an account of the ordinance lately issued by the king of Sweden for the encouragement of privateers. His Majesty is very much surprized to find that, instead of redress for the losses and damages which his subjects suffered last year by the unreasonable and unjustifiable confiscation of their ships, the Swedes continue to heap new hardships upon them by this late edict, which contains several innovations that no treaty law or reason can justify. We can look upon such proceedings as piratical only, and commissions founded upon such orders can be calculated for no other purpose but to set the neutral powers at defiance, who are concerned in the commerce of the Baltick. However, it is his Majesty's pleasure that you should in the best and most pressing manner you can not only demand satisfaction for the ships confiscated last year, according to your former instructions, but also lay before the king of Sweden and his ministers the unreasonableness of this present ordinance in several particulars and insist to have all matters relating to trade, during this time of warr in the north, regulated with Great Britain upon the foot of the treaties subsisting between the two crowns.

To Jackson.

Whitehall, 5th April 1715.

. I received yesterday your letter of the 19th of March together with the translation of the king of Sweden's placart for the encouragement of privateers. I have no particular commands from

his Majesty upon the contents of your letter, and indeed such violent and unpresented proceedings make all regular ways of application impracticable ; however we must not be discouraged but make use of every opportunity that offers to assist and protect, as much as in us lyes, his Majesty's subjects in their just and lawful pretensions.

THE BALTIC EXPEDITIONS 1715-1718

THE admirals who conducted British squadrons to the Baltic in the successive years 1715 to 1721 and in 1726 and 1727—Sir John Norris, Sir George Byng (afterwards Viscount Torrington), Sir Charles Wager—have their proper recognition in the *Dictionary of National Biography*. Details of the doings of the two former in the earlier period will be found in the editor's *George I and the Northern War*.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ADMIRAL SIR JOHN NORRIS, KNT., 6 MAY 1715.
(*British Museum, Add. MS. 28154, original, 28128 and Record Office, F.O. King's Letters 65, copies.*)

Having received these Our instructions you are to take under your convoy such ships belonging to the merchants Our subjects as are desirous of Our protection and are ready to sail, and you are to proceed directly with them to the Baltick Sea, and being arrived there you are to make such a disposition of the men of war under your command, and to give such orders and directions as you shall judge most proper and adviseable, as well for seeing the said ships belonging to the merchants Our subjects safe into the particular ports and harbours to which they are bound, in order to be loaden with the merchandises and effects of those places, as also for conducting them home with security after they have taken in their respective cargoes and loadings, and for that purpose you are not to suffer the men of war or privateers of any prince state or potentate to give the least impediment or interruption to the ships of the British merchants in going to or returning from the said ports of the Baltick on account of their commerce, but are to employ your utmost

diligence conduct and force to oppose any attempt or design that may be intended by any power whatsoever to molest the trade of Our subjects in those parts.

And whereas We are informed that the States Generall of the United Provinces have likewise fitted out a squadron of men of war for the security and protection of the ships belonging to the merchants their subjects in carrying on the trade to the ports of the Baltick, and whereas We are very willing to act in concert with them in a matter that so much concerns the mutuall interest and advantage of both nations, it is Our will and pleasure that in case the said squadron of the States Generall shall with the ships of the Dutch merchants under their convoy be in the Sound, the place of rendezvous, you should in concert with the admirall or commander in cheife of the Dutch squadron settle the operations of the two squadrons so far as is requisite to conduct with safety the ships belonging to the merchants of both nations to and from the respective ports and harbours of the Baltick, and that you should take jointly with him all measures that are proper for this service. But if you should arrive at the Sound before the Dutch squadron you are to stay three or four days for them, and in case they do not come in that time you are then to proceed pursuant to these your orders.

And whereas of late years great number of ships belonging to the British merchants Our subjects have in carrying on their lawfull traffick to the ports of the Baltick Sea been violently and unjustly taken by men of war or capers belonging to Our good brother the king of Sweden or to his subjects, and have without any good reason or pretence whatsoever with their cargo's of a considerable value been condemned and confiscated as lawfull prizes even by the direct commands of his Swedish Majesty, to the great and insupportable loss of Our British subjects, and notwithstanding that we have caused repeated instances to be made by Our ministers, as well to his said Majesty at Stralsund since his return into his dominions, as to the senate at Stockholm, in order to obtain restitution and satisfaction for the damages sustained by Our subjects from such unreasonable and unjustifiable proceedings of the Swedes, Our dear brother the king of Sweden, instead of granting any reparation or redress on that account, has lately thought fit to cause an edict or regulation to be published relating to prizes and privateers, which contains severall unheard of innovations that are directly contrary to

all law and reason and to the treaties subsisting between Us and him, and which will, if not provided against, render the just and lawfull commerce to the ports in the Baltick impracticable; in order therefore to obtain a sufficient recompense to Our subjects for the great damages they have unjustly suffered and to vindicate and protect their right of trading to those parts, you are to take the first opportunity after your arrival into the Baltick to dispatch expresses to our respective ministers residing at Stralsund and Stockholm with an account of your being come into those seas, transmitting to them at the same time proper representations requiring in Our name reparation to our merchants and an abrogation of the foresayd edict, that they may immediatly, pursuant to the orders they shall receive from us for that purpose, renew their application to Our dear brother the king of Sweden and to the senate at Stockholm, and demand in the most pressing manner satisfaction without any further delay for the ships and effects of Our subjects taken and confiscated, and also insist that the freedom of trade to the Baltick may be restored and preserved for the future without any interruption or molestation, pursuant to the treatys still in force between the two crowns. In the mean time, and without staying for an answer to those demands, you are to make such a disposition of the men of warr of your squadron as, being consistent with the security and protection of the merchantmen under your care, you shall think most convenient to intercept all ships that belong to the king of Sweden or to his subjects or that carry his commission, and you are to stop and detain those that you are able to meet with, until such time as you shall receive from Our respective ministers residing at Stockholm and Stralsund an answer to their demands made in Our name for reparation to Our merchants and for the future security of the commerce in the Baltick; and in case his Swedish Majesty shall continue to refuse satisfaction to Our said just and reasonable requests you shall then bring home all such Swedish ships, or ships carrying the king of Sweden's commission, as you shall have taken and detained, as reprisals for the damages sustained by Our subjects from the unjust capture and confiscation of their ships and goods by the Swedes.

G. R.

TOWNSHEND TO JEFFERYES.

(*Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 155, copy.*)

Whitehall, 31st May 1715.

Since I wrote last to you, which was on the 27th instant, I have received your letters of the 17th and 21st.

His Majesty was not surprized to find by the expostulations of Mons^r de Mullern, of which you give an account in yours of the 21st, that the Swedes, who have so long and so unjustly insulted the British subjects and have done them such great damages, should upon the sailing of his fleet be apprehensive of extraordinary designs against them. It is very natural that those who have given such severe provocations should frame to themselves strange schemes, such as their fears may suggest. However, our proceedings are upon a fair and honest foot. We have received repeated injurys contrary to all treatys, our commerce is interrupted, our merchants are ruined, and no redress can be obtained by all the representations which have been made. These circumstances obliged the King to send a fleet into the Baltick to secure trade, protect his subjects, and procure them a just reparation for their losses. You may therefore very properly renew your instances at this juncture, according to your former memorials, and let the king of Sweden know that if he will let our commerce be carried on in a free and undisturbed manner, as we are entitled to by treaty, and give satisfaction to the British subjects for the unjust seizure of their ships and goods he will soon find that his Majesty's fleet has no other pretensions to support, nor any such aims and designs to encourage and carry on, as Mons^r de Mullern insinuated to you.

I hope you will have received my letter of the 10th either by the post or by Sir John Norris and that upon your making such representations, as he is directed to send you, you will find the Swedish court more reasonable and consequently be able to remove the jealousys they have conceived at the King's sending a squadron into the Baltick.

TOWNSHEND TO SIR JOHN NORRIS.

*(British Museum, Add. MS. 28154, original, Record Office,
Foreign Entry Book 155, copy.)*

Whitehall, 14 June 1715.

Since my last to you I have received your letter of the 2nd instant with the papers inclosed, all which I laid before the King this morning, together with yours of the 31st of May.

According to the advices which his Majesty has received from Mr Jackson and others it does not appear that the Swedes are any way in a condition to put so great a number of ships to sea this summer as is mentioned in the account given by Mr White, and particularly Mr Jackson in his letter of the 4th of May was of opinion that even the defeat of the squadron under the command of rear admiral Count Wachtmeister¹ would render the Swedes unable to look the Danes in the face at sea this summer.

But as you will have in those parts more frequent opportunitys of knowing exactly and surely the strength of the Swedish force, so his Majesty judges you will be better able to take your measures pursuant to the advices you shall receive, and doubts not but that you will act for the best of his service accordingly.

The King does not yet certainly know whether the States have sent orders to their admiral to joyn with you in making reprisals on the Swedes, but his Majesty will lose no time in pressing them to do it. In the meanwhile his Majesty perswades himself that you will use your best endeavours to prevail on the Dutch admiral to act in concert with you as farr as possibly his orders will allow him, and to induce him to give you all the assistance he can in performing the services contained in your instructions.

You are perfectly acquainted with his Majesty's intentions, and in the situation you now are can best tell what measures to pursue for executing the King's commands. The protecting the trade and the convoying the merchantships safe into their several ports is to be your first and chief point of view. Whether you will think it necessary to go up the Baltick with your whole squadron in order to protect the trade, or whether you shall judge it more proper to divide your squadron, or whether it may be better to leave that to the care of the Dutch squadron alone, are points which the King

¹ General-Admiral Count Hans Wachtmeister, equally famous with his brother Field-Marshal Count Axel.

at this distance cannot take upon himself to determine, but must leave it to your prudence, according to the intelligences you shall receive and other circumstances, to act herein as you shall see fitting, not doubting but that you will always take those measures as shall be most conducing to his service.

But I am to acquaint you that it is his Majesty's pleasure that after you have taken the necessary care to see the merchant ships into the places they are bound to you should apply your self with all the diligence and earnestness you are able to execute that part of your instructions which relates to reprisals. You are fully apprized of his Majesty's intentions on this head, and he no ways doubts of your zeal in performing this important service. The king of Sweden is so farr from making reparation, that we find not only by the advices which you send, but by others, that he has sent orders to his admirals and other officers to attack any of his Majesty's ships who shall convoy merchant men to the places taken by the Czar. His Majesty is of opinion that the most effectual way to prevent the designs of the Swedes would be to hinder the squadron from Carlsron joyning with that of Stockholm ; but as the King is not thoroughly informed how far that may be practicable, his Majesty thinks it best to leave that point, as well as others, to your conduct and prudent management.

The King approves very well of your sending Captain Finbo with your dispatches to M^r Jefferyes ; but by what we learn from the last letters of that resident we are not to expect much success from the instances, which he is ordered to make.

TOWNSHEND TO JEFFERYES.

(*Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 155, copies.*)

Whitehall, 1st July 1715.

I have laid before the King your letter of the 14th of last month together with the memorial which you presented to his Swedish Majesty, pursuant to the instructions which you received in the letter sent you by Sir John Norris. His Majesty approves of the memorial and hopes the Swedish court will think it for their interest to give a more satisfactory answer to it then you seem to expect, especially as to the point of revoking that unreasonable and unjustifiable edict relating to privateers. As to what the chancellor Mullern was pleased to observe to you upon your memorial, that

it looked like a declaration of warr, it is certain their edict was such ; but you may let him know that if his master will give us satisfaction in our just demands he will soon see the King's fleet return quietly home, and only convoy and protect the merchants without giving any disturbance to the Swedes or their affairs.

Whitehall, 19th July 1715.

. His Majesty is very much concerned to see that after three weeks sollicitation you find your self as far from an answer to your memorial as you were the first moment. The King is well satisfied with your diligence in pressing the Swedish ministers on this matter and would have you not be discouraged but go on in your sollicitations, in hopes that his Swedish Majesty will at last be moved to consider his own interest, as well as ours, in giving you a satisfactory answer. However in the mean time you were much in the right to dispatch Captain Finbo to acquaint Sir John Norris with what had hitherto passed at Stralsund.

TOWNSHEND TO SIR JOHN NORRIS.

(*British Museum, Add. MS. 28154, original.*)

Whitehall, 2 August 1715.

I was favoured the 29th past with yours of the 24th June and 13th July, and the 31st past with that of the 16th July, and have laid them all with the enclosed papers before the King, and am surprised you had not yet received my dispatches of the 10th, 14th, 21st, 24th June and of the 5th July.

His Majesty is very much concerned that the Dutch admiral altered his resolution of joyning with you in the cruise you mention in your letter of the 24th June ; however, as your separating from the Dutch squadron might have exposed the merchant men to the insults of the Swedes, who, we have certain advice, would upon the least prospect of advantage have immediately attack'd them, and as you having with you at that time but 14 of his Majesty's ships would have been in no condition when separated from the Dutch to oppose the Swedish fleet consisting of a force superiour to yours, the King does upon these considerations entirely approve your conduct ; and now the season is so far advanced, and it being of the last consequence to the nation that the fleet of merchant men, who are now upon their return from the Baltick, should be conducted

home in safety (since if they should miscarry such a scarcity of navall stores must ensue as would disable his Majesty from fitting out a fleet next spring upon any event), it is therefore his Majesty's pleasure that you should in concert with the Dutch squadron gett together the trade and conduct them home with all convenient speed.

But as you cannot but be sensible that one part only of the necessary and important services which you was instructed to perform will by this means be executed, the king of Sweden not having as yet returned any answer to the representations that you sent by his Majesty's order both to Stockholm and Stralsund for obtaining reparation for the losses sustained by his subjects and a revocation of the unjustifiable edict published by the Swedes, in so far as it relates to his Majesty's subjects, together with a promise or engagement from the king of Sweden that the commerce in the Baltick shall be inviolably preserved for the future; and his Majesty having considered that by returning home with your whole squadron and the merchant men under your convoy you will in all probability have no opportunity of making reprisals upon the Swedes pursuant to your instructions, but on the contrary the Swedes would by that means become masters of those seas and the commerce of the British subjects be exposed to the same violences and interruption which it has suffered these last two years; the King having therefore thoroughly weighed this whole affair is of opinion that it would be for his and the nation's honour and service that some part of your squadron should be left in the Baltick in order to support the right of his people and the just demands he has made in their behalf; but it being impossible for you to leave a number of ships that may be alone sufficient to oppose the Swedes, the officer you shall appoint to command the ships that are to continue in those seas must have orders to joyn the Danish fleet, acting in concert with them to compell the Swedes to make reparation for the damages done to his Majesty's subjects and to revoke the unjustifiable edict lately published. And since the king of Denmark did upon your going with your squadron into the Baltick engage that your ships should during their stay there be supplied for their money with provisions stores and all necessarys, and that the officers and seamen should be treated as favourably both at sea and in the harbor as the subjects of Denmark, and as the King does not doubt that his Danish Majesty will make these assurances good in relation

to the ships you shall leave, since care is now taken to write to him on that head, and since the English and Dutch squadron together consist of above thirty ships, and his Majesty taking it for granted that the Dutch admiral will, upon any occasion that may arise, joyn with you in defending and protecting our trade homewards ; upon all these considerations the King thinks that you may without exposing the commerce immediately detach eight ships for the purposes aforesaid to joyn the Danish fleet, under the command of some discreet officer that is not a flagg, unless the season be so far advanced before these orders reach you as to admit of no farther operations, or that some engagement has already happened, which may make it impossible for the Danes to continue any longer this season in those seas.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ADMIRAL SIR JOHN NORRIS, KNT., 10 MAY 1716.

(*Record Office, F.O. King's Letters 65, British Museum, Add. MS. 28145, copies.*)

1. [After recital of the instructions and occurrences of the previous year]:

But whereas the said king hath hitherto been so far from giving us such satisfaction as We were willing to hope for, both from the goodness of Our cause and his disposition to entertain a strict friendship with Us and Our kingdomes, that on the contrary he, or his subjects under colour of his authority, have continued to seize and confiscate the ships and effects of Our people in the same manner as formerly ; and furthermore, as by good advices We have great reason to suspect that the said king is entering into measures with Our enemys highly injurious to Our crown and kingdomes, and in order to secure to himself more effectually the means of accomplishing these designs he is now endeavouring to make himself master of Norway, the reduction of which kingdome We look upon, besides the loss of the trade of Great Britain thither, to be the most ready way both to enable him to cut off entirely the commerce of Our subjects to the Baltick and to afford him greater opportunitys of carrying on those projects, which from good grounds We cannot but apprehend he is forming against the peace and safety of Our kingdomes ;

2. Wherefore and in order to free the commerce of Our subjects

to the Baltick from the interruptions it meets with on the part of the Swedes, as likewise to rescue it from that total obstruction and ruin, wherewith it is threatned from the progress of the Swedish arms in Norway, and also to deliver Our kingdomes from that imminent danger to which they will lye exposed, in case the said king of Sweden should make himself master of the ports of Norway or of any of the islands belonging to the king of Denmark, especially at a time when, as is above said, We are informed that he is entering into measures of dangerous consequence to the quiet and welfare of Our subjects, it is Our will and pleasure and you are hereby directed upon the receipt of these Our instructions forthwith to proceed to the Sound with the squadron of Our ships of war under your command; where being arrived you are with all possible diligence to dispatch an express to the said king of Sweden to demand of him again reparation for the damages already sustained by Our subjects (whereof you have herewith an account as far as we have hitherto learnt), the revocation of the above mentioned edict, and security against the like proceedings for the future.

3. You are likewise to insist on a solemn promise and engagement that Our said brother, the king of Sweden, will not directly or indirectly give any assistance countenance or reception to the Pretender to Our crown nor any refuge or protection to the Lord Duffus¹ and those who lately fled from Scotland with him, nor to any others who have been engaged in the late rebellion against Us.

4. You are likewise by the said express farther to acquaint the king of Sweden that as We have the preservation of the commerce and the securing the repose of Our kingdom extremely at heart We cannot but look upon his making himself master of the kingdom of Norway, or of any of the islands belonging to Denmark, as of the utmost ill consequence to Us and to Our people in that respect, and that therefore We shall be obliged to use all possible means to prevent the same.

5. You are, however, at the same time to acquaint Our said brother, the king of Sweden, that if he is content on his part to give Us the satisfaction and assurances in the several respects as above specified We likewise on Our part shall be most ready and desirous not only to preserve and maintain that good understanding, which has so long subsisted between Our predecessors and the crown of Sweden, and which is so desirable and necessary between pro-

¹ For whom see the *English Historical Review*, XVIII (1903), p. 692, note.

testant princes, but also, as a farther instance of Our friendly disposition towards him, We shall willingly and heartily employ Our best offices for composing the differences between him and the other northern potentates and for procuring him as good a peace as the present situation of affairs will possibly admit of.

6. As soon as you have dispatched the express to the king of Sweden it is Our will and pleasure that, while you are waiting for the said king's answer, you should not act in any respect offensively against Sweden, unless there appears an absolute necessity of joining with the Danes in order to defend the kingdoms of Norway and Denmark against the attempts of the Swedes.

7. And if, during the said interval, the king of Denmark and the Czar should offer to undertake a descent upon Schonen, you are to use the strongest instances with them to dissuade them from the said enterprize, till you shall have received an answer from the king of Sweden. And if after all the arguments which you shall in the most friendly manner use to prevent their making the said descent you shall still find them resolutely bent to undertake it, you shall then at last declare to them that if they persist in carrying on the said enterprize before the answer is received you shall be obliged to leave the Sound with Our squadron and to let the fleet of Sweden act freely in their own defence.

8. As soon as you shall receive the answer of the king of Sweden you shall immediately transmit the same unto Us and shall conduct yourself in the manner above specified untill you receive Our further orders thereupon. And if you shall judge the said answer to be full and satisfactory you shall then use all possible instances to divert the Danes from making an invasion upon Schonen and from carrying on any hostile attempt against any other the territories of Sweden. And if, notwithstanding the most pressing representations you can urge, you are not able to prevail to have them desist from such enterprize, you shall then also, as above said, declare to them that you shall be obliged to leave the Sound with Our squadron and to let the fleet of Sweden act freely in their own defence.

9. As to the merchant ships belonging to Our subjects, which go along with the squadron under your command, you are to take them under your care as far as is consistent with the principal service above mentioned upon which you are now sent.

G. R.

TOWNSHEND TO SIR JOHN NORRIS.

(British Museum, Add. MS. 28145, copies.)

Whitehall, 15 June 1716.

In my last I sent you word that your letters were before the King, and that I had at that time no other commands from his Majesty but only to acquaint you that he approved of your having kept strictly to your instructions.

The King has since more particularly considered the contents of your two letters, especially what relates to the protection of the trade of his subjects, and his Majesty thinks that on the one hand the Dutch squadron, consisting but of six men of war, will not be sufficient to secure the merchants to their several ports, if the Swedes should endeavour to interrupt them; so that it will be too hazardous either for the Dutch to undertake the convoying them, or for the merchants to expose themselves under so slender a guard; on the other hand some parts of the services contained in your instructions will not permit you either to go up the Baltique with your whole fleet, or to detach a squadron strong enough to protect the merchants, since in either case you will be unable to pursue his Majesty's commands upon the return of your courier from the king of Sweden. Wherefore to obviate these difficulties his Majesty is of opinion that if you could take a proper station at Bornholm or some other place near Carlsrone, so as to have a watchful eye on the Swedish fleet, you might at the same time prevent their falling on our merchant ships, and thereby enable the Dutch squadron to proceed securely up the Baltick with the trade and likewise be so near within reach of the Sound as to execute such orders as you may receive from his Majesty upon the return of the king of Sweden's answer.

You must concert this affair with the Dutch commadore, who cannot make any difficulty of taking our trade under his care and protection upon the terms above mention'd.

Whitehall, 3 July 1716.

Since my last to you, which was of the 15th of June, I have received your letters of the 9th, 12th, 16th, 19th and 20th of the same, and having laid them from time to time before the King I am now to tell you from his Majesty that he approves very much

of your steady conduct in not being prevailed upon by any plausible insinuations to deviate in the least from your instructions.

You will have seen by mine of the 15th that upon advice of the Swedish fleet's being return'd to Carlsron his Majesty had thought it proper, in order to secure the trade, to direct you to take some convenient station near Carlsron, whereby you might hinder the Suedes from interrupting our commerce, whilst the Dutch went up the Baltick with the merchant ships, and be at the same time at hand to receive the king of Sweden's answer to your memorial. But if the Suedish fleet is again at sea, as by several late advices it is likely it may be, then his Majesty thinks those orders may not be now so seasonable, nor have the effect design'd, since it could be no ways safe or adviseable to venture the merchant men under the guard of only six Dutch men of war, while the Suedes are cruising in the Baltick. Wherefore the King has order'd me to let you know that in case the Suedish fleet be out of port, or in such a station as may endanger the trade, then you are to join such a detachment of your squadron with the Dutch as you shall judge sufficient to oppose any attempt of the Suedes upon our merchant men. And since upon detaching a squadron of such a force as may be requisite to protect our commerce you will be so much weakened that your lying longer in the Sound may expose you to insults from the Suedes, the King thinks it best that you should go with the rest of his fleet to the Bay of Kiog, or to such other station as you shall judge convenient and secure to wait for the king of Sweden's answer in. And in case you have any apprehension of danger to the squadron remaining with you from the superior strength of the Suedes, it is his Majesty's pleasure that you should join the fleet of Denmark for your better security. And as the king of Sueden has hitherto protracted his returning an answer, and probably will not give any, his Majesty therefore directs that you should not give any hindrance to the Danes in their descent upon Schonen, either by representations, or otherwise.

Whitehall, same date.

Besides what is contained in my publick dispatch of this day I have received his Majesty's commands to acquaint you that by several advices from France, and particularly by letters received yesterday from Lord Stair,¹ his Majesty is well assured that the

¹ British ambassador at Paris.

Suedish minister at Paris has concluded a treaty with the rebels in France, by which they are to be admitted into the king of Sueden's service in the same rank and station as they enjoyed respectively under the Pretender. And since the king of Sueden has not only thought fit to neglect returning an answer to you, but even to detain your messengers and to seize the ships of his Majesty's subjects bound for Stockholm, and has given this farther indication by his minister in France of the disposition he is in towards his Majesty, the King thinks that the interest of his subjects and the safety and honour of his crown require that he should express a suitable resentment of this usage and employ more vigorous endeavours to prevent the king of Sweden from making such acquisitions in Norway as may enable him to give more effectual proofs of his enmity towards his Majesty. To this purpose it is the King's pleasure that you should not only forbear to hinder the intended descent in Schonen but (as that seems the only expedient left for obliging the king of Sweden to retire out of Norway) that you should make such movements with that part of your squadron which shall remain with you, after you have made the necessary detachments for the security of the trade, as may best facilitate and cover that attempt. And as the success of this descent appears now to be of more immediate concern to the safety of his Majesty's dominions, it is his pleasure that in case the fleet of Sweden should advance to attack that of Denmark or otherwise to defeat the descent on Schonen, you should join with the Danes in giving them battle and in opposing their designs by all means possible. His Majesty's intentions being that you should observe no measures towards Sweden where the assistance of his fleet shall be necessary to deprive them of any signal advantage; or where your joining the Danes may procure them some signal advantage. But without one or the other of these two cases you are not to give the Danes such a degree of assistance as may be interpreted to amount to an open rupture with Sueden.

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR ADMIRAL SIR JOHN NORRIS,
KNT., OSNABURG, 13/24 JULY 1716.

(British Museum, Add. MSS., 28145, 22510, copies.)

Whereas We are inform'd that Our dear brother the king of Sweden has thought fit, instead of answering the memorial which you had transmitted to him by Our order, not to receive the same

but to send back your packetts unopened by the *Sieur Stampke*,¹ who had brought it back, in so much that We have no room left to hope that his said Majesty will lend an ear to the amicable remonstrances which have been made to him in Our name; and whereas his said Swedish Majesty has likewise renewed his orders for seizing and confiscating all ships belonging to Our subjects, as well as to the subjects of the States Generall, and for that purpose has caus'd a numerous fleet to be fitted out and to take the most proper station for intercepting the commerce of the two nations; you are therefore hereby directed for the better security and protection of the merchants ships under your convoy, having first concerted with the commander in chief of the Dutch squadron, to saile with the whole fleet so far in the Baltick to the eastward of the Swedish fleet as that you may safely lead forward the trade to the respective ports, to which they are bound, under a convoy sufficient to protect them from capers and other frigatts, which may be detached from the said Swedish fleet; having thus first secured the trade under your care, you are with the main body of the joint fleet under your command to observe the Swedish fleet in those seas; and whereas this unheard of proceeding of his Swedish Majesty in rejecting after such an extraordinary manner Our friendly instances so often repeated to no purpose; and in renewing his orders for seizing the ships belonging to Our subjects, leave us no grounds to hope that he is in the least dispos'd to give satisfaction to our just and reasonable demands; and whereas by the former instructions you were directed to make reprisals upon the ships belonging to the king of Sweden or to his subjects, unless you found him more favourably disposed to redress the grievances our merchants have already suffered, and to prevent the like for the future, you are hereby directed to put the said orders at present in execution; and to the end you may be the better able to perform the two services recommended to you of securing the trade of Our subjects, and of making reprisals upon the Swedes, you are to represent to Our dear brother the king of Denmark or his ministers or admiralls, to whom you can most conveniently address yourself,

¹ A man employed by Norris, and furnished for the service by Count Gyllenborg, the Swedish minister in London, to carry the memorial to Charles XII. As he returned from Sweden in the company of Baron Goertz it is probable that he was the *Stampke* who became Goertz' secretary and was arrested with him in Holland in February 1717.

how agreeable it would be if his Danish Majesty would consent to join a squadron of his ships, as strong as may be, to accompany you with the merchant men under your convoy so far to the eastward of the Swedish fleet as that you may safely forward the trade to the respective ports in the manner as above directed ; in consideration of which service being performed you may give his Danish Majesty, his ministers or admiralls, assurances of your being ready to act in concert with the Danish squadron to oblige the Swedish fleet to retire into their ports, and thereby or by such other methods as shall be judged practicable to secure a free passage and navigation in those seas to all ships belonging to his Danish Majesty or to his allys, and you will accordingly use your best endeavours so to do, and will continue and act with Our squadron in such manner and place as shall most effectually answer these ends untill the season of the year shall require your attendance upon the trade homewards.

G. R.

GENERAL JAMES STANHOPE, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO SIR JOHN NORRIS.

(*British Museum, Add. MS. 28145, copies.*)

Hanover, 26 September 1716 N.S.

I have received the favour of your letter of the 8th inst. O.S. and have laid it before the King, who is concerned to find by it as well as by advices from Lord Polwarth¹ and other hands that the intended descent upon Scanie is laid aside. But that which more sensibly affects his Majesty is that there is great reason to apprehend a misunderstanding between the Czar, the king of Denmark, and the Empire, and that the Muscovites intend by force to take winter quarters in Denmark Mecklenburgh and other territories of the Empire.

As this will be a very unjust and grievous way of treatment for the Czar to use to his allies, his Majesty thinks himself obliged to use his endeavours with the Czar to persuade him to desist from thoughts of such a nature, and accordingly a strong representation to this purpose will be presented to the Czar by his Majesty's German ministers. The immediate interest of his Majesty, as a prince of the Empire, makes it necessary that such a representation should be

¹ British envoy at Copenhagen.

tendered by them. But his Majesty does likewise direct that in such discourses as you may have either with the Czar or his ministers you shall take occasion to insinuate that his Majesty by his own interest as well as by his friendship with Denmark will think himself obliged, in case this misunderstanding breaks out, to favour the Danes; and you are likewise directed on all occasions to take the properest measures to prevent the breach which must inevitably be the consequences of such a proceeding of the Czar. 'Tis to be hoped these representations will have their weight and that we shall have time to receive advices from you before any thing can happen which should make it necessary for you to act. But if, contrary to the King's hopes and expectations, the Czar should push matters to extremitys and offer by force to bring troops into Zeland or otherwise to molest the king of Denmark, his Majesty directs that you should in the best manner you can be aiding and assisting to the king of Denmark.

Hanover, 3 October 1716 N.S.

Your last dispatch to me of September 15th O.S. has been laid before the King, who commands me to thank you for the pains you have taken with the Czar to persuade him to go on with the descent upon Schonen.

His Majesty is sorry your endeavours have not met with success in a business wherein, as the present juncture of affairs is, a greater service to him and your country could not be perform'd than to have it effected. And therefore, if there be any hopes yet left of prevailing, his Majesty would have you continue to use your utmost application and skill with the Czar to overcome the difficulties that are rais'd, and to persuade him still to proceed. But if this be found impracticable for you to do your next endeavour is to determine the Czar to take winter quarters for the bulk of his army either in his own country or about Poland, leaving only behind him ten or fifteen battallions as the king of Denmark shall think proper for his own defence, who might otherwise be too much exposed to the attempts of the Suedes by the retreat of the Muscovite troops.

His Majesty is also apprehensive, that if the Muscovites should resolve to quit Denmark and shall for that purpose embark their army on board their fleet, the Czar may then resolve to attempt to take quarters for them in Mecklenburgh or Holstein. In which case, as well as that of taking quarters in Denmark, his Majesty directs

you to pursue the instructions given you in my letter of September 26 N.S., and even to declare very plainly to the Czar that his Majesty cannot suffer that either of them should be done. And you are to join your best endeavours with those of the king of Denmark to determine the Czar from taking any such measures, in which you may be fully assured of having his Majesty's countenance and protection in whatever you shall think necessary for you to do for obtaining these desirable ends.

As the Czar's abandoning the thoughts of the descent upon Schonen for the present seems to proceed from the difficulties rais'd by his generals from the good posture of the king of Sweden to receive them there, you may, as might be thought, easily make him sensible that these difficulties must necessarily encrease every day and be much greater by the next spring than they can be now, and that therefore they should resolve at present to proceed. But if they are bent upon laying the design upon Schonen aside, you may then suggest to them to think of attacking Sueden by next spring on the side of Finland, where Sueden is much more open and exposed, and where the Czar can have very little reason to doubt of success.

The minute all thoughts upon Schonen are laid aside an attempt upon Sueden on the side of Finland is the most likely, if not indeed the only way of forcing Sueden to such a peace as will be agreeable to the Czar, in which case also it will be most convenient for the Czar to quarter his troops in his own country thereabouts, or in his late conquests upon Sueden. This would certainly be best, and best answer even the ends which the Czar ought to propose to himself; but our present and immediate care is and ought to be to divert him from kindling a flame in the Empire, which would certainly be the consequences of his taking quarters anywhere in Germany.

Having thus exposed naturally to you what the King wishes and what is most for the interest of England, as likewise what we fear, if the Czar should take a wrong turn, his Majesty is confident you will use your best skill and endeavours to lead the Czar into such measures as are right.

His Majesty having received accounts from England of the great hopes the Jacobite party have at present of assistance from abroad, and particularly from Sueden, I send you inclos'd an extract of my letters upon that subject, by which you will perceive it were to be wished the present posture of affairs would permit your proceed-

ing with the squadron under your command to block up Gottenburg. Till that can be done I must earnestly recommend to you to use all possible endeavours, even by detaching some men of war thither, if you shall judge it necessary, to procure advices what naval strength the Suedes have or can have there in any readiness. You will likewise endeavour to get the best information you can of what condition their fleet is in at Carls crone, and whether they continue to keep their ships arm'd. In short, since from the advices we have received from many places 'tis certain that our Jacobites both in England and every where else do expect succours from Sweden, you will turn your thoughts to consider which way 'tis possible for them to annoy us, and send the King your sentiments, what measures may be best taken to defeat any such designs.

(Enclosure.)

"EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN ENGLAND,
SEPTEMBER 15th, 1716, O.S."

The Jacobites both at St. Germain's and Avignon never appeared so sanguine as at present and the same is true with respect to the party in England, who, according to concurrent and unquestionable accounts from all parts of the kingdom, are strangely elated with the expectation of some sudden attempt in their favour, in which they are confident of being supported by a body of foreign forces. Considering the present temper of the Regent it is impossible these forces should come from France, and to any reasonable man it seems fully as improbable that the king of Sweden in his present circumstances should think of assisting them. But as the behaviour of that prince has ever been most unaccountable, and as the dilatory proceedings of the northern allies may protract the descent upon Schonen to such a season of the year as will render it impracticable, it is not possible in such a case to answer how far his passion may carry him towards pouring a body of forces into Scotland or the north of England from Gottenburg, especially considering that he may hope by such a diversion to put it out of his Majesty's power to interpose any longer in the affairs of the north &c^a. From all that goes before his Royal Highness thinks thus much at least may be inferr'd, that it is necessary to be upon our guard and to put the nation in the best posture of defense against attempts both at home and abroad. What we are most defective in is shipping; the

slender provision made by parliament for that service, the great demand of ships for the Baltique expedition, and the necessity there has been in granting convoys since the Suedish privateers infesting the Channel, have left the nation naked and unprovided to such a degree, that we have not above four ships of any strength ready for service. His Royal Highness has given directions to have one of these paid off with all expedition in order to the fitting out three or four small ones in its place, which will be properest for the coasting service. And as our only apprehensions are from Gottenburg his Royal Highness thinks that, the King having so large a squadron in the Baltique, the discontent which is fomented on that head would be very much encreased if Sir John Norris should not receive orders immediately to block up that port. His Royal Highness is sensible that this may somewhat disconcert the measures of the Czar and the king of Denmark, and for this reason he would not press it, if the kingdom were not in so defenseless a situation, that 10 or 12 men of war from the port of Gottenburg might without such a precaution come up the river, destroy our docks and naval stores, and land forces in the very heart of the kingdom without our being in a condition to hinder them. However, His Royal Highness submits this matter entirely to his Majesty's judgement and determination.

Hanover, 4 October 1716 N.S.

I am persuaded that upon what I writ you last night, as well as in my former letters, you will continue to press the Czar in the best manner you are able to make an immediate descent upon Schonen, since, notwithstanding the difficulties raised by his generals from the king of Sueden's having drawn down almmost all his forces that way to oppose them, it is certain he can scarce have half the number of regular troops there as the Czar and the king of Denmark have now in readiness to make the attack. It is further to be consider'd that the king of Denmark, having very much exhausted himself this year by his naval preparations for this business, will not be in a condition to continue them the next in order to go on in the spring with this affair, which therefore, if now dropp'd, must be look'd upon for the future as impracticable and never more to be thought on. Since what I writ to you last night, concerning the proposal of an attempt upon Sueden by the way of Finland, another which seems more feasible has been suggested for one upon Carls-

crone, where a great part of the Suedish fleet now lies ; the destroying of which would at this juncture be of very great service to his Majesty, as well as to the Czar. The town is indeed fortify'd to the sea, but is very defenceless towards the land ; so that a well conducted attempt of this nature is very likely to meet with good success, even tho' the Czar should employ about it but half the number of troops he has now in a readiness to act, and which otherwise can be of no use to him till the next year.

That some attempt of this nature against Sueden should at present be undertaken by the Czar seems very reasonable to be expected from him, and indeed necessary to convince his allys of the sincerity of his intentions against the common enemy, and which in all probability will be the likeliest means to divert him from his other designs of taking quarters in Denmark or Germany, from which course of proceedings he must expect to involve himself inevitably in an open rupture with both.

Gohrde, 16 October N.S. 1716.

I am to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 18th, 22nd, 25th, and 29th past O.S., the last of which I received this morning ; they have all been laid as they came in before the King, and I have his Majesty's commands to acquaint you that he is intirely satisfied with every part of your behaviour in this critical juncture. You were extremely in the right in signifying to the king of Denmark, by your letter of the 28th September O.S. to his secretary, that you could not join in escorting the Muscovites to Rostock, and I am commanded by his Majesty to acquaint you that your principal or indeed only care at present must be so to post yourself as to be able most effectually to cover and secure the junction of our trade, with which, as soon as joyn'd you, you will lose no time in proceeding homewards. I am likewise commanded by his Majesty to acquaint you that he very much approves your proposal for leaving Captain Cleveland with a small squadron (when you shall return) upon the coast of Norway. You are therefore directed to make the necessary dispositions immediately, to the end that you may lose no time in proceeding homewards as soon as the trade shall have joyned you. And if by the advices his Majesty shall receive from England and other places it should be thought not necessary to leave this squadron, there will be time more than sufficient betwixt this and

the merchants joyning you for his Majesty to signifye his pleasure upon it. His Majesty is very well pleased that you avoided entring into any negociation with the Czar and the Danes touching any operations for the next campaign. The behaviour of both those princes towards his Majesty is such as will not make him forward to contract any new engagements with either, and for this reason alone his Majesty cannot consent that at present you should receive from the Czar any publick and distinguishing mark of honour.¹ Your behaviour on this occasion hath given the King so much satisfaction that I may with truth and in confidence assure you that you will never want the favour of any other potentate whatsoever.

[STANHOPE] TO JACKSON.

(*Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 155, copy.*)

Whitehall, 30 January 1716/17.

His Majesty having had repeated and unquestionable advices of many dangerous and treasonable practices, which have for some time been managed and carried on by Count Gyllenbourg, the king of Sweden's minister here, tending to foment in his Majesty's dominions a rebellion of his own subjects, which was to be supported by foreign forces, did judge it indispensably necessary to cause the said count to be seized and all his papers to be secured, which has been accordingly done, and he is under a guard in his own house.

I give you the first intimation of this measure, that I possibly could, and should be glad that it reaches you before it is known at the court of Sweden, that you may consult your own security, which you are left at liberty to do in the way you shall think best, though care shall be taken to convey by the surest channel such an account of all this matter, and to set it in such a light before the king of Sweden, as to convince him that his Majesty could do no less than he has done, and we hope to engage him not to proceed to any violence against you. Count Gyllenbourg will be kept in custody till we know that you are in safety ; perhaps then his Majesty may think fit to order him to be released.

¹ Peter the Great had offered Norris a Russian decoration.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR VICE-ADMIRAL SIR GEORGE BYNG, KNT.
AND BART., 11 MARCH 1716/17.

(Record Office, F.O. King's Letters 65, copy.)

You are, as soon as you have received these Our instructions, to proceed without loss of time with the squadron under your command to Gottenburg, where you are to inform your self in the best manner you can what ships of war and what transports are in that port.

If upon your arrival before Gottenburg you find that the fleet from CarelsCroon had joyned that of Gottenburg you are then to endeavour to attack them, if you think you have sufficient force for that purpose and that the thing is practicable, otherwise you are to block them up and to press the court of Denmark that their fleet may joyn you with all possible dispatch.

If before your arrival at Gottenburg the Swedes have passed the Sound, and have left Gottenburg, and that you have missed sight of them but have intelligence that they are in their passage for Brittain, you are to return with the squadron under your command to the first port of Great Britain you can fetch and endeavour to get intelligence of the Swedes and to come up with them.

And in case the Swedish fleet shall not have passed the Sound you are then, according to the information you have of the number of the men of war and transports in Gottenburg, to leave such a number of the squadron under your command as you shall judge sufficient to block up that port.

You shall give directions to those who are left before Gottenburg to seize all vessels which shall come out of that port and all other Swedish ships they meet with, as well ships of war as transports and merchant men, and to take all ships of other nations which would go into the port of Gottenburg or any other port of Sweden, and whatever ships are so seized you are to give directions for carrying them to Copenhagen, there to be kept without any embezelment till you shall receive further orders.

Having given these directions to that part of the squadron, which you shall judge necessary to leave before Gottenburg, you are with the rest to make the best of your way to Copenhagen and acquaint the king of Denmark that you have orders to joyn his Danish Majesty's squadron, which, tis hoped, you will find in a readiness, and you will further declare to the king of Denmark that unless he hath a squadron very soon ready, and such as may be sufficient,

when joyned to you, to enable you to attack the Swedes, that in such case you must withdraw with your squadron to Gottenburg to keep your whole force together, which you are likewise to execute in case you should have advice that the Swedes may put to sea and proceed to the Sound with a force superior to your's, before the Danes be ready to joyn you. As soon as you shall be joyned by the Danes you are to use your best endeavours to prevent the Swedish fleet, which is at CarelsCroon, from passing the Sound, which is the great and principal service you are to have in your view at this juncture. And for this end you are to proceed together to CarelsCroon and act in conjunction for the publick service by attacking the Swedish fleet, if you have opportunity, and by taking such stations as shall be thought necessary for preventing the Swedish fleet from passing the Sound. And you are to joyn in all such operations with the Danes as may most effectually annoy the Swedish fleet and prevent their country from being supplied with provisions.

You are to favour and protect the ships of all nations in amity with Great Britain, which shall not be bound to any port of Sweden.

G. R.

STANHOPE TO BYNG.

(*Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 155, copy.*)

Whitehall, 11 March 1716/17

You will receive herewith his Majesty's instructions, whereby you are to regulate and manage yourself in pursuance of the trust his Majesty reposes in you.

I am also directed to acquaint you that if the Muscovites shall desire the assistance of the squadron under your command you must let them know that the strict friendship which has always been between the crown of Great Britain and the Emperor and Empire, and which was lately confirmed and strengthened by an alliance concluded last year between the King and the Emperor,¹ cannot permit his Majesty to give such directions to his fleet as may be construed to be an aiding and abetting the proceedings of the Muscovites, whilst they forcibly continue to take quarters for their troops in the Empire, notwithstanding the many and repeated

The treaty of Westminster, 25 May/5 June 1716.

instances which have been made to his Czarish Majesty by the Emperor and Empire for their removal from thence.

And if the Czar has actually withdrawn his troops and shall solicit the assistance of the squadron under your command, or of a convoy, to secure a passage for his gallies from Rostock to the coasts of Poland and Livonia, you are to observe to those who solicit you on this head that your orders being precisely either to destroy or block up the Suedish fleet the execution of these orders will secure a passage for the Muscovite gallies as effectually as if you lent them a convoy, which cannot be done without weakening your squadron and giving the Suedes thereby an opportunity of putting to sea.

I am further by his Majesty's command to acquaint you that as by your instructions you are directed to attack the Swedish ships, you are to understand this in such a manner as that you are to endeavour to burn sink destroy or take all such ships belonging to Sueden as may come in your way.

CHARLES, EARL OF SUNDERLAND, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO
BYNG.

(*Ibid*, copies.)

Whitehall, 1 May 1717.

I received yesterday morning by the express which brought my Lord Polwarth's dispatches the favour of your letter of the 20th of last month O.S., and having laid it before the King I am ordered to acquaint you that his Majesty is extreemely well pleased with your conduct and with the great zeal and diligence you shew in concerting every thing that is proper for carrying on the publick service.

The King thinks the design projected upon Carlsroon to be of the most importance, and as it would be of the greatest use and advantage to have it vigorously and successfully executed his Majesty desires that nothing should be wanting or omitted that may tend to make it practicable. His Majesty is sorry to see that the preparations only of what is required will take up six weeks time, and I have writ to my Lord Polwarth to use his utmost application for hastening what is necessary ; in the mean time his Majesty will expect with great impatience the report of the soundings about the islands in the port of Carlsroon, on which the feasibleness of this whole project seems to turn.

As to the intimation you had concerning Wismar, the King thinks it very probable that there is such a design on foot, and as it is of the last consequence that the success of such an enterprize should be prevented, since the possession of that town would render the Czar intirely master of the Baltick, you must be very attentive to every thing that may hinder it's being wrested out of the hands, wherein it is at present. The King is very sensible that you could not return a positive answer to that matter, since it was not within your instructions, and therefore I am now commanded to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure, that in case you judge that the ships under your command are alone sufficient to prevent any thing being attempted on the part of Sueden you should persuade the Danes to send their frigats towards Wismar, in order to cover that place from the enterprizes of the Czar's galleys and to secure it in the hands of the present possessors. This his Majesty desires may be endeavoured in the first place, since it were to be wished that the Danes would appear singly in the preservation of Wismar, but rather than it should be surprized or seized by any other power it is his Majesty's express pleasure that you should with the ships under your command, jointly with those of Denmark or in any other manner you shall judge most proper and effectual, by all means hinder Wismar's falling into the hands of any other but those who are now masters of it.¹

Whitehall, 11 June 1717.

My Lord Stair has writ to acquaint his Majesty that he had received notice from the Czar that he had sent positive orders for all his troops in the dutchy of Mecklenberg to evacuate the Empire ; and as it is probable that they will make use of the Russian galleys to transport them into Livonia, and carry them to Revel, it is his Majesty's pleasure that, if application should be made to you by any of the Czar's ministers or commanders, you should facilitate the return of these troops and galleys by any ships of your squadron, which you may be able conveniently to spare for that purpose, it being of the greatest consequence imaginable that no delay or pretence of staying longer on this account should be given to the Muscovite forces in the Empire.

¹ Wismar had been reduced by the confederates against Sweden in April 1716 and occupied by Danish with exclusion of the Russian troops. Report now ran that Peter the Great designed to seize the place.

EXTRACT FROM INSTRUCTIONS FOR ADMIRAL SIR JOHN NORRIS, KNT.,
 ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY TO THE TSAR AT
 AMSTERDAM, 2 JULY 1717.

(Record Office, F.O. King's Letters 57, copy.)

. You shall let the Czar know that We are of opinion that the king of Sueden will not be brought to have any thoughts of peace, but by pushing on the war against him with the utmost vigour and with a perfect harmony among the powers that compose the northern confederacy, and that his Suedish Majesty appears at present very far from thinking of peace from the persuasion, which these two last fruitless campaigns have given him, that his enemies cannot attack him in his own kingdom and that they are so much divided among themselves that they can form no common project against him. Wherefore you are to acquaint his Czarish Majesty that We desire to know whether he is in a condition to make any enterprize upon Sueden this summer, that We on our part may be able to take our measures accordingly. And if the lateness of the season, or other reasons, make the Czar incapable of undertaking anything this year, you shall then endeavour to know of him what efforts he thinks he can make against Sueden next campaign, that all the northern allies may be early in concerting the necessary measures for that purpose.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ADMIRAL SIR JOHN NORRIS, KNT.,
 14 APRIL 1718.

(Record Office, F.O. King's Letters 65, copy.)

Whereas the violent conduct of the king of Sueden in giving an unjustifiable interruption to the commerce of Our subjects and in seizing and confiscating all their ships that can be met with, to the insupportable loss and damage of Our kingdoms, hath obliged Us for these several years past to send strong squadrons of Our ships of war to the Baltick, in order to protect the lawful trade of Our people, to put a stop to the depredations committed upon them, and to procure reparation, if possible, for the losses sustained; and whereas all Our instances and applications on these heads have been hitherto intirely fruitless, the Swedes being so far from entring into any amicable agreement about commerce, or giving satisfaction on Our just demands, that they continue with greater violence, and

with less regard than ever to the tenour of the treaty of commerce of 1661 still subsisting between the two crowns, not only to attack bring up and condemn such ships as may be suspected to act contrary to their edict concerning prizes and privateers but also to infest Our coasts and to seize all ships whatsoever belonging to Our subjects wheresoever they can come up with them ; and whereas at the same time the dangerous designs against the peace and safety of Our kingdoms, which were discovered by the correspondence of Count Gyllenborg and which were laid before Our two houses of parliament, are not yet discontinued but rather, as We have good reason to apprehend, are still carried on in order to disturb the quiet of Our realms ; and whereas since We sent home the said Count Gyllenborg to the king his master we have not seen any disavowal of his proceedings, nor any examination into his conduct, pursuant to the declaration We had received from France ; We therefore for the protection of the commerce of Our subjects and the procuring redress to their grievances, for the security of Our kingdoms from the pernicious designs of Our enemies, and for vindicating Our honour and royal dignity, which have been affronted by the behaviour of the said Count Gyllenborg and others, have thought fit again to send a squadron of Our ships of war into the Baltick ; and accordingly Our will and pleasure is that upon the receipt of these Our instructions you should with all convenient diligence proceed to the Sound with Our ships of war under your command, where being arrived you are to give notice to the court of Denmark of your being come into those parts and get what intelligence you can from them and Our minister at Copenhagen concerning the strength of the Swedish fleet and their motions, and you are to concert measures with the Danish admirals for the most useful operations in order to annoy the Suedes, to hinder their fleet from passing the Sound into these seas, and reduce them to such a temper as may make them comply with Our just demands of a free commerce and due reparation to Our subjects.

2. You shall take the merchant ships belonging to Our subjects, which go along with the squadron under your command, and such as may joyn you hereafter, into your care and protection, as far as is consistent with the principal service of hindring the Suedish fleet from coming into these seas, and you will take the proper stations accordingly both for covering the trade and preventing the designs of the Suedes above mention'd, which We hope you will be

able effectually to do in conjunction with the Danish squadron.

3. As the earnest and repeated instances We have caused to be made in the most friendly manner to the king of Sweden have had no effect for freeing the commerce of Our subjects from the unjust interruptions and depredations it lies under, for abrogating the unreasonable edict about prizes and privateers so often complained of, and for obtaining a due reparation and satisfaction for the damages sustained; you shall therefore by way of reprisal intercept and seize all ships and vessels belonging to Sweden, or carrying the king of Sweden's commission, and you shall bring them up to Copenhagen, there to be kept without any embezzlement whatsoever until Our farther pleasure be known.

4. And whereas We are informed that Our good friends the States-General of the United Provinces intend likewise to send a squadron of their ships of war into the Baltick, and it being for the mutual interest and advantage of both nations that these two squadrons should act in concert, you will inform yourself of the admiral or commander-in-chief of the said squadron, whether he has orders from his masters the States-General to concert measures with you, and in such case, as We are very willing and desirous to act jointly with them, you shall accordingly consult with their admiral concerning such measures as may be proper both for the protection of trade and the annoying of Sweden, if they think fit.

5. You shall favour and protect the ships and vessels belonging to the subjects of all princes and states in amity with us, which shall not be bound to any port of Sweden.

G. R.

JAMES CRAGGS, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO NORRIS.

(Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 155, copy.)

Whitehall, July 8th, 1718.

. His Majesty has commanded me to acquaint you that as by your instructions you are directed to hinder the Swedes from passing the Sound so you are likewise to oppose any others that shall joyn with them, and in all cases you are to act against those whom you shall meet in conjunction with the Swedes in the same manner as you are ordered to do against the Swedes themselves.

FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FOR NORRIS, 19 AUGUST 1718.

(Record Office, F.O. King's Letters 65, British Museum, Add.
MS. 28145, copies.)

Whereas you are directed by Our former instructions to you to oppose the Suedish fleet with all your force in case they should endeavour to pass the Sound ; and whereas it may happen that the negociations in the island of Aland between the Suedes and Muscovites may terminate in a peace between the said powers, whereby it is likely that the latter will be engaged to joyn their fleet to the former in order to carry on operations against Us and Our interests ; to the end therefore that you may be sufficiently instructed how to behave your self with Our ships of war under your command on such an occasion We do hereby signify Our pleasure to you that in case you meet the Suedish and Muscovite fleets joyned and endeavouring to pass the Sound and put in execution such projects as will be prejudicial to Us and Our kingdoms you shall in conjunction with the Danes, or otherwise if you are able, endeavour to put a stop to their proceedings and hinder their passing the Sound by attacking the Muscovite fleet in the same manner as you was formerly directed to do that of Sueden.

And if you shall be assured that the peace is made between the Suedes and the Muscovites, and that the latter do thereupon come to joyn the former in order to execute the projects above mentioned, in such case, if you find your self in a condition to do it, you shall endeavour, even by force, to prevent such junction and thereby disappoint more easily and successfully the dangerous attempts that We are persuaded will be formed against Us and the safety of Our realms.

As this is a point of great nicety We do direct that you keep this instruction private, so that in case there be no occasion to make use of it the contents thereof may never be known but may be buried in silence, as if it had not been given to you.

And whereas Our ministers at the Hague have lately informed Us that they having frequently represented to the States General the great dangers, to which the trade in the Baltick was exposed by the Dutch squadron's not joining our's in that sea, the deputies of Amsterdam and Admiral Wassenaer ¹ had proposed to them in a

¹ Presumably Jan Gerrit, Baron van Wassenaer van Duvencoorde, lieutenant-admiral.

private conference that in case the Danes could not be ready to return to Bornholm in a little time you might have orders to proceed with Our squadron to Dantzic, where you should be joined by that of the States, which is appointed to rendezvous there the 1st of September next with all the merchant ships that could then be ready ; that the two squadrons, being thus joined, should conduct the said merchant ships so far on their way to the Sound that they might without danger be sent on to England and Holland under the convoy of the frigates ; and that the two admirals should then have discretionary orders to concert such measures as they should think most proper for the safety of the rest of the merchant ships, which are to be at Dantzic the 1st of October next N.S. ; and whereas Our said ministers do believe that in case this proposition be agreeable to Us they may be able to procure the necessary orders for it ; We, having the welfare of Our subjects and the protection of their trade extremely at heart and finding that the Danish fleet is ordered to return to the Bay of Kiög without any certainty when they will go back to the station at Bornholm, whereby the trade of Our subjects may be exposed to very great hazards, have thought fit to approve of the said proposition, and We do therefore direct you that in case the Danes will not soon return to Bornholme and there continue to joyn in observing the motions of the Suedes and in covering the trade of Our subjects, and you have notice from Our ministers at the Hague that the commander of the squadron of the States General has orders to joyn you, according to the proposition above mentioned, then you are to proceed to Dantzic and act as above said in such manner as shall be most conducing to the security of the merchant ships and the preventing any loss or inconvenience to the trade of Our subjects.

G. R.

LORD CARTERET

1719-20

NOTHING need be said in this place about John Carteret, Lord Carteret, himself, nor more about his work in Sweden than to set down the sequence of its successes. He procured the signature of a preliminary convention, by which the Swedes consented to give up Bremen and Verden to Hanover, on 11/22 July 1719, when he had been at Stockholm but eleven days. A second preliminary convention, with Great Britain, followed on 18/29 August, when Sir John Norris had at last been allowed to take his squadron forward into Swedish waters. The first separate article of this guaranteed the Hanoverian convention, the second obliged Sweden to sell Stettin and its district to Prussia. Final treaties were signed with Hanover on 9/20 November 1719 and with Great Britain on 21 January/1 February 1720, on which date also Carteret and his French colleague, Jacques de Campredon, signed as mediators a treaty with Prussia, the Prussian envoy, Knyphausen, declining to commit his master to pay for his acquisitions twice as much as George I was to pay for Bremen and Verden. However Frederick William I, caught in a good temper, accepted the treaty three weeks later. Last, and most difficult of all, came the treaty with Denmark, accomplished on 22 June/3 July 1720.

Detained on guard in the Channel against a possible Spanish invasion Sir John Norris failed to appear with his squadron at Copenhagen until 22 June/3 July 1719. There, in spite of urgent appeals from Carteret, fear of what the Danes might do kept him till 15/26 August. Sailing then, he shortly effected junction with the Swedish fleet. The Russian, however, the destruction of which he was ordered to attempt as the best service that he could render to his country, retired to safe quarters at Reval. He stayed

two months in Stockholm waters, without opportunity for action, and then returned home.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOHN LORD CARTERET, AMBASSADOR EXTRA-ORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY TO THE QUEEN OF SWEDEN,
6 MAY 1719.

(Record Office, F.O. King's Letters 65, copy.)

Having received these Our instructions to you with such other dispatches as shall be put into your hands by Our order you shall repair with all convenient speed to Stockholm or such other place where you shall be inform'd that the queen of Sweden resides.

Being arrived there you shall ask an audience of her Majesty in the usual manner, at which you shall deliver Our letters of credence, which you will receive herewith, accompanying the same with suitable expressions of Our sincere friendship and esteem for her person and with assurances of Our readiness on all proper occasions to promote and advance her interest.

You shall likewise ask an audience of her consort, the prince of Hesse, and deliver Our letter to him, giving him like assurances in Our name of Our friendship and regard for him and of Our desire of contributing to whatever may tend to his advantage.

Whereas during the troubles in the north Our subjects have greatly suffered by the Swedish privateers, as the several petitions, memorials and other papers, which will be put into your hands by these presents, will more particularly inform you, you shall assist them with your best offices in the obtaining satisfaction for such their losses and damages and shall use your utmost endeavours to procure redress of the grievances of which they complain.

You shall also upon all other occasions protect and countenance Our subjects trading etc.

You shall carefully maintain a good correspondance etc.

Whereas Our royal predecessor King Charles the Second, etc.

You shall constantly correspond with Our several ministers etc.

At your return We shall expect a full and exact account of the affairs that have passed through your hands, together with your observations upon the present state of the dominions of the queen of Sweden and the several interests and alliances of that crown, particularly as they may concern Our affairs, with other such like

remarks on the policy government and ministry there as you may be able to collect for Our use and information.

You shall observe from time to time such further instructions and directions, etc.

Whereas We have determined with the blessing of God to pass beyond the seas, you shall during Our absence correspond with the Earl Stanhope, one of Our principal secretaries of state, who will attend Us at Hanover, and you shall send duplicates of your dispatches to James Craggs, Esq., another of Our secretaries of state who is to remain here, to be by him laid before the Guardians and Justices of this Our realm, to whom We shall entrust the government thereof during Our absence.

G. R.

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SAME, SAME DATE.

(*Ibid.*, copy.)

After the dissatisfaction and the troubles that for some years past had unhappily subsisted between this Our realm and the kingdom of Sweden it was no small pleasure to Us upon the accession of Our good sister, the present queen of Sweden, to the throne to receive from her and from her consort, the prince of Hesse, such letters as seem to manifest an inclination towards restoring the ancient friendship and good correspondence between the two crowns, wherein the welfare of Our dominions and the commerce of Our subjects are so nearly concerned; which good disposition in them We are desirous to cultivate by giving them the greatest proofs of a. corresponding good will and inclination towards them and by doing whatever in Us lyes to promote their welfare and advance their interest.

We have therefore appointed you to repair to the court of Sweden to declare to the queen and the prince this Our purpose, which you are to do in such strong and lively expressions as may best convince them of the sincerity of Our intentions, and as an undeniable mark of it you shall give them to understand that whereas We are informed the kingdom of Sweden is unfortunately divided into factions, and that a powerfull one is formed to oppose the queen's desire that the prince her husband may be elected king and sovereign jointly with her, they need but propose how We might contribute to this design and may depend upon Our promoting it

with the greatest zeal and activity and employing all Our credit and influence for that purpose.

You shall represent to them how suitable a strict union with the crown of Great Britain would be to the interest of Sweden and how necessary for the support of the protestant religion ; what assistance the Swedes have formerly, in times of the greatest danger, received from this Our realm ; the care that was taken by Great Britain to form an alliance for maintaining the neutrality of the Empire during the troubles in the north, which would have protected the Swedish possessions in Germany, if the late king had not wilfully prevented it ; and that the like endeavour on Our side for the preservation of Sweden should never have ceased, if the very unfriendly treatment We receiv'd from that crown and the hardships put upon Our British subjects by ruining their commerce and seizing their ships and effects against all manner of reason and justice had not made it impossible for Us to continue those Our good offices. But that We are now willing to renew them, being encouraged thereto by the friendly temper that appears in the queen and prince ; particularly, since as king of Great Britain We are not engaged in the northern warr, We shall willingly contribute Our best endeavours towards restoring the peace and tranquillity of those countrys, of which Sweden especially stands in the greatest need ; for which purpose you shall offer Our mediation and may assure the queen and prince Our best offices shall not be wanting wherever they may be necessary to procure for Sweden, in the several treatys of peace to be made with the respective powers now in warr with that crown, conditions as advantageous as the situation of affairs will admit.

We having, as elector, appointed Colonel Bassewitz¹ to transact Our affairs at the court of Sweden, you shall give him all the assistance you can towards composing the differences between that kingdom and Our dominions, as elector. We have directed him to acquaint you from time to time with the state of that affair and of his negociation.

You shall likewise take care that Denmark be included in this intended pacification, encouraging and promoting by all the means you can the overtures that shall be made to that end ; and that you may be the better enabled so to do the Lord Polwarth, Our envoy extraordinary at the court of Denmark, will be particularly

¹ Colonel Adolf Friedrich Bassewitz.

charged to correspond with you and inform you of his transactions on that subject.

As We hope the propositions which M^r Whitworth,¹ who will also from time to time inform you of his transactions, is to make in Our name to the king of Prussia, will bring him to a true sense of his own interest and to desire a peace with Sweden upon such a foot as may be consistent therewith and with the general welfare of Europe, you shall in such case do all you are able to forward any negotiations for that purpose.

You will find by a memorial of Count de la Marcq² and some other papers, whereof cypys will be given you, that even the late king of Sweden expected to retain but a very small portion of his territorys in Germany; and as We cannot think that the present queen will be more sanguine in her hopes, but must believe she would readily make such concessions as he would have agreed to, you shall endeavour to convince her, as it is most true, that what might remain to Sweden after such concessions would be a burthen and an expence and no manner of advantage to that crown, and that the recovering of their losses towards Finland and Livonia is the only thing every true Swede should have at heart. This you may inculcate by representing that it is absolutely necessary for Sweden to have the friendship of the neighbouring powers of Denmark Poland and Germany to strengthen her hands against the Czar, which friendship can probably be obtain'd upon no other terms than their being allowed to retain what they have taken from that crown; that the dominions which the Swedes have lost on the side of Finland and Livonia being a rich and fertile country and situated towards those of the Czar of Muscovy, a powerful and dangerous neighbour, are necessary both for their subsistence and safety, for should the Czar remain possesst of those acquisitions, whose ambitious views are manifest, the opportunity they give him of increasing his shipping and navigation and fitting out considerable fleets would not only enable him, whensoever he should please, to land an army at the very doors of Stockholm, but would undoubtedly at one time or other tempt him to extend his conquest even over the whole kingdom of Sweden, whereby he might become

¹ Charles Whitworth, afterwards Lord Whitworth, now envoy extraordinary at Berlin.

² Count Louis-Pierre-Engelbert de la Marek, French envoy to Sweden 1717. His instructions, *Recueil des instructions*, II. 278 f.

entire master of the Baltick Sea. This is a consideration of such importance to the commerce of Our subjects and even to their safety, which could not be so well provided for without the naval stores we draw from those parts, that you are to labour this point with the utmost dexterity and application.

If your negotiation proves so successfull that agreeably to Our earnest desire and to the power We have given you the alliances between Our crown and that of Sweden may be happily renewed, you are in framing a treaty for that purpose to take for a model the defensive allyance concluded between the two crowns in the year 1700, making such alterations as you shall judge to be requisite for adapting the same to the present conjuncture.

And whereas it may possibly be objected to you that Our crown has been wanting to comply with the said treaty, whereby Great Britain was engaged to furnish yearly to the crown of Sweden 6000 men or money and ships in lieu thereof, according to the valuation therein expressed, you will to such objection reply that till the year 1713 the crown of Great Britain was engaged in a very burthensome and expensive war against France, and consequently by the very letter of that treaty was not obliged for so long to give the succours stipulated ; that as soon as Our crown was freed from that war, and when a disposition was actually making here to have complied religiously with the engagements of the said treaty, the Swedish privateers to the great surprize of Our good subjects and of all Europe did in a most violent and unjustifiable manner not only interrupt Our trade in the Baltick, to which We were entituled by many solemn treatys, but likewise made seizures of many ships and merchandizes belonging to Great Britain, amounting to a very great value, and notwithstanding the repeated applications that were made in Our name and the many memorials presented by the ministry of Our crown, praying satisfaction for the same, no redress could hitherto be had from that court. Such a proceeding will certainly justify to all mankind the non-execution of any former treatys, which might in the strictest justice be thereby deemed to be absolutely cancelled and annulled ; however, to shew the sincere desire We have not only for the time to come to live in perfect good amity with that crown but even most religiously to comply with whatever can with any colour of justice be demanded of Us on account of former engagements, you are hereby empowered and directed, in case you shall find that court disposed to amicable

and sincere measures for the future, to offer in Our name that all pretensions and demands whatsoever of either crown, and the subjects of either crown upon the other, shall be fairly stated and liquidated, and if upon such liquidation it shall appear that the demands of subsidys by the crown of Sweden upon Us by virtue of the forementioned treaty shall exceed the sums of money which in right We are entituled to demand of Sweden for the captures unjustly made upon Our subjects, you are empowered to offer and promise in Our name that such balance or overplus, if any there be, shall be *bonâ fide* paid by Us to that crown at such terms and in such portions as shall be agreed betwixt you and them.

And whereas the interruption occasioned to Our commerce by this northern war, which still subsists, has made it necessary for Us to send a squadron of Our ships of war into the Baltick Sea, you will acquaint Our sister the queen of Sweden that the said squadron is only designed for the protection of Our trade, and if the court of Sweden is disposed to proceed in the measures, which We have reason to expect by the steps already made, to prohibit their privateers and ships of war from molesting Our commerce, that crown will have no reason to conceive any umbrage or jealousy at the appearance of Our said squadron in the Baltick Sea, but on the contrary you are hereby empowered to offer and promise in Our name that if her Swedish Majesty will hearken to such propositions as you are empowered to make and jointly concert measures with us for pacifying the north the said squadron shall be employed for the security and interest of the crown of Sweden, and We shall accordingly give order to the admiral commanding the said squadron to regulate his conduct by the advices he shall from time to time receive from you.

And whereas We have received information that Cardinal Alberoni is endeavouring by emissarys in Sweden to stir up and animate that court against the interest of Our kingdoms and in favour of the pretender to Our crown, you will endeavour to obtain the best informations possible what propositions of that kind have been made and how received, of which you will give Us a particular account and use your utmost endeavours to defeat and discourage any thing of that kind.

Whereas We have appointed you to be Our ambassador extraordinary to Our good sister the queen of Sweden, yet as the ceremonial and other forms attending that character may prove an

obstruction to your negociation you shall defer taking the same upon you till such time as you shall judge your negociation to be so far advanced as that you may do it without any inconveniency, and then you shall present to the queen and to the prince of Hesse the letters of credence, which you will receive herewith as ambassador, and in the meantime you will make use of the credentials that will be given you as minister plenipotentiary.

G. R.

PRIVATE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SAME, SAME DATE.

(*Ibid.*, copy.)

We judge it to be of so great consequence to the trade and security of Our British dominions, as well as to the peace and tranquillity of Christendom, that the Czar should not grow too powerfull in the Baltick, that if you find the queen of Sweden and the prince of Hesse listen to Our proposals of their making peace and entring into a friendship and good correspondence with the kings of Denmark and Poland the king of Prussia and other neighbouring potentates of Germany you shall make them an offer in Our name that if the Czar refuses to conclude a peace with Sweden upon the foot of making such restrictions to that crown as are necessary for it's security and for preserving the trade in the Baltick upon the same foot as it was before the present troubles began, besides the assistance which shall be agreed upon to be given them by Us towards recovering the same by force of arms We will employ Our utmost credit and interest with the powers before-mentioned and with Our other allys to procure supplys from them for enabling the Swedes to bring the Czar to reason.

G. R.

JAMES, EARL STANHOPE TO LORD CARTERET.

(*Record Office, S.P. Domestic, Regencies 2, copy.*)

Hanover, 10th July 1719 N.S.

I received both yours dated at Gottembourg of 18th and 20th past O.S. and laid them before his Majesty, who was very glad to hear how civilly you were used by the Danish admiral and the good treatment you met with at Gottembourg by the queen's express order. We cannot but infer from thence that your

negotiation will be successfull. M^r Whitworth's negotiation, whereof the success would very much facilitate yours, has been already as good as broken off, but the court of Berlin having renewed it M^r Whitworth is preparing to return thither tomorrow or the next day and we are not without hopes that he will conclude the same. Let the success be how it will you shall have early notice of it, that you may regulate your self accordingly. You will avoid in the mean time mentioning any thing relating to the interests of the king of Prussia, but if the queen and her ministers continue in a good disposition towards his Majesty the best advice you can give them will be their fitting out at Carlsroon a considerable number of ships, that, if need be, they may somewhat help themselves at sea ; for if the Czar, by landing an army in Sweden, should be obliged to support it by sea no body knows what occasions might offer, during the course of a campaign, for destroying his fleet. I desire you will give my most humble service to the prince of Hesse, and if I may presume to give his Highness another advice it is, not to venture a battle with the Russians, in case of a descent, unless he is sure of beating them. Those people will not be able to subsist without the assistance of their ships to bring them necessaries, and if one is in a condition to molest their convoys they will be forced either to reimbarque or to starve without striking a blow. Let me know as soon as possible how you find the court of Sweden disposed, but above all, what number of ships you think they may be able to fitt out, and when they may be ready.

THE SAME TO THE SAME.

(*Record Office, Sweden 24, copy.*)

Hanover, 22 July 1719 O.S.

I am to acknowledge the favour of your letters of the 3d and 4th inst^t, since which I have also received from Sir John Norris the inclosed copy of a letter he received from the Swedish admiral at Carelsron and advice that the Muscovite fleet had been some time in the river of Stockholm, as likewise that the Danes are proceeding with an obstinate resolution on the side of Norway. This behaviour of the Danes puts us under unspeakable difficulties and gives us too much reason to apprehend they will joyn what ships they have in the Sound to the Muscovite fleet, in case we should joyn the Suedes. Your Lordship knows the strength of the King's squadron

at present, it will indeed be very soon reinforced with four ships of the line of battle, besides the Worcester, which is already joyned. Your Lordship must be better informed than we can be of the strength of the Russians, to which the Danes may, if they please, joyn at least eight good ships, and I do not find that Sweden can joyn to Sir John Norris above four ships of the line ; under these circumstances, and with a force so little proportioned to that which our adversaries may have, your Lordship will easily apprehend that it behoves us to be very wary how we make any motion, which might expose the King's arms to receive an affront, which would only serve to raise the courage and heighten the demands of the Muscovites and Danes without procuring any real relief to Sueden. I cannot better express to your Lordship the real disposition his Majesty was in to run the greatest risque for the sake of preserving Sueden, while there appeared a possibility of attempting it with success, than by sending you a copy of a letter I writ by the King's command to the Abbé Dubois. And if we could have any security that the Danish ships would not joyn the Russians and that the Suedes could, to save their kingdom, joyn eight good ships to Sir John Norris, his Majesty is still inclined to give Sir John Norris orders to proceed to Carlsron so soon as the 4 ships expected from England shall have joyned him. But the pressures of Sueden being so urgent at this time his Majesty can scarce hope that it will be practicable to relieve them by his squadron so soon as their necessity's would require it. What he can, he will do, and the directions I am now to give you in his Majesty's name will afford the strongest proof imaginable of his sincere affection to the crown of Sueden. 'Tis therefore his Majesty's pleasure that after having represented to that court the several considerations I have touched upon you do likewise make them sensible that the chief and greatest cause of their present distress is their unwillingness to satisfy Denmark. His Majesty has all along wished that Denmark might have been made easy by the cession of Rugen and Stralsund, having ever been apprehensive of what now comes to pass, that being disappointed of that expectation they would joyn with the Czar. The event now justifies that his Majesty's fears were too well grounded, and it were still to be wished that Sueden would prevent the total ruin of their country by making peace with Denmark, in which case care should be taken to make it an article of the treaty of peace to be made that Denmark should for this

campaign at least joyn some ships to Sir John Norris, and you may confidently promise that the minute they shall have secured Denmark Sir John Norris shall act with the utmost vigour for their service. Your Lordship will enforce this advice to them in the strongest manner you are able, and it is to be hoped that their animosity against the Danes will in a time of such exigency give way to considerations of so much weight for the preserving their country. Whatever resolution they shall take you may assure them the King will do everything in his power to support and assist them ; he offers this advice to them as a sincere friend, who is persuaded it is really the wisest step they can take for their own interest. They cannot but feel that 'tis absolutely necessary for their preservation to break the union which appears at present betwixt the Czar and Denmark and to make peace with one of those two powers upon the best terms they can. His Majesty judges that it is most for their interest to chuse Denmark ; we confess, it would be more agreeable to our's. But since the chief thing proposed by his Majesty in sending your Lordship to Sueden, and the only motive of bringing this summer a British squadron into those seas, was to support assist and preserve Sweden, his Majesty thinks it very reasonable they should judge for themselves ; and averse as we are to the Czar, if the present and immediate fear of his great force so near their capital, their animosity to Denmark, or a certain way of reasoning which I have often heard from them, as if they think it much more probable to recover in time what they shall part with to the Czar than what they shall give up in Germany, if, I say, any or all of these motives shall determine them to prefer a peace with Muscovy to one with Denmark his Majesty will equally contribute his best offices to save them that way. Your chief application, my Lord, if this resolution should prevail must be to endeavour that such a treaty of peace with the Czar be so managed as to lay a foundation of enmity and jealousy betwixt the Czar and Denmark. For this purpose you ought to insinuate to them that they strenuously insist to stipulate an article in their treaty obliging the Czar to give them some assistance, either by sea or land, against Denmark. If the negotiation should be of any continuance you should offer them your good offices, and really contribute by any offices in your power to make their conditions with the Czar as tolerable as may be, and when you see matters brought to such a pass, as you may judge they will make peace

with the Czar, you must affect to let it be known, even to the Czar's ministers, that you have orders to promote such a treaty. If, as I think it most probable, things take this turn, your Lordship will nevertheless inculcate into the queen, the prince of Hesse and all the ministers there how necessary it is for the crown of Sweden to secure a lasting friendship with Great Britain by a good defensive alliance. It is certainly true that, excepting France, there is no other power in Europe whose interest and inclination lead them to be fast friends with Sweden, and even France will, I believe, for the future abate so much of their former friendship with Sweden, as Sweden is become a less useful ally to France. However, your Lordship will have observed by the enclosed copy of my letter to the Abbé Du Bois that we are earnest sollicitors at the court of France for the interest of Sweden, and I think I may venture to promise your Lordship that we shall obtain from France considerable subsidys for their behalf. The miserable condition that country is in at present must certainly incline them to strengthen themselves with alliances, which may not only enable them to put an end to this war and to preserve what shall be left to them by their treatys of peace but even to recover, as occasion may offer, what they shall have lost on the side of Muscovy. Against the Czar they will ever be secure in us of an active and vigorous ally. The subsidys of England and France will help them to put their affairs in some order. In the defensive alliance to be made betwixt the crown of Great Britain and Sweden your Lordship must endeavour to limit the succours to be given by us in such manner as it be left to the King's choice to furnish either ships or money, especially if they chuse to treat with the Czar; we should not in that case be willing to come to a rupture with Denmark, nor do we judge that Sweden would want any other assistance from us against Denmark than money. We know not as yet upon what terms we are like to be with Prussia. Your Lordship will therefore avoid as much as you can making any mention of that prince, without doing anything which might give a just handle to complaint.

I am not acquainted with the detail of Mons. Basewitz's instructions relating to the interests of the King as elector. I can therefore only recommend to you in general to give him all the assistance and support you can, and you will endeavour that both treatys, both of king and elector, do so keep pace and go hand in hand, they may be signed at the same time. Your Lordship will observe that

in the treaty of 1700 the garanty of England extended not only to the provinces possessed by Sweden in Germany but even to the dutchy of Sleswick, all which being now out of the question our garanty in the treaty now to be made can only extend to such dominions as Sweden shall remain possessed of at the time of their making a general peace. Till when they will be intitled to subsidys equivalent to the succours stipulated.

Mr Smith, captain of his Majesty's ship the Port Mahon, carrys from Lubec to Ysted the express that brings you this dispatch, from whence he is to go to Sir John Norris with a letter I have written to him signifying his Majesty's orders and is afterwards to return to Ysted to wait there for your Lordship's answer. This is, I think, the surest way of conveying your letters from Stockholm hither; if you find any other you may make use of it to send duplicates.

THE SAME TO SIR JOHN NORRIS.

(*British Museum, Add. MS. 28146, copies.*)

Hanover, 31st July 1719 O.S.

I have receiv'd your favour of the 21st and this morning that of the 25th with the inclos'd copy of Baron Sparr's¹ letter to you of the 21st and the list of the ships which that admiral says will be ready to go to sea with him. The King is very well pleas'd to observe that between the 12th and the 24th so much dispatch has been made at Carlescrone as to add six ships of the line besides two frigates to the four ships of the line and two frigats, which the said admiral acquainted you were then ready. I hope that before now you will have receiv'd by Captain Smith, commander of the Port-Mahone, my dispatch of the 23rd instant, which will have given you all the light I possibly could. I have reason to beleive by letters of the 24th, which I received yesterday from England, that two of the four ships designed to reinforce you may have joyn'd you before this letter reaches you, and I hope the other two will not be many days behind. You may acquaint Baron Sparre that it was no ways adviseable nor indeed practicable for you to proceed forwards untill you had been join'd by the whole force you expected, especially considering the present temper of the Danes, who might possibly intercept anything that were to

¹ Admiral "Claes" (Niklas) Sparre.

follow you ; that as soon as you are joined by your whole force you expect to receive instructions which may be agreeable to her Suedish Majesty. In the meantime you will earnestly recommend to him to quicken their naval preparations and to put their squadron in the best condition possible. It would be of very great service to his Majesty, and not a little influence the resolutions he shall take, upon the orders he shall send you, to be truly apprized what strength the Danes may bring together and what part it is likely they will venture to act, in case we should join the Suedes. It is likewise of consequence to know how long their ships are provided to keep the sea. We ought likewise to be informed touching the Suedes, not only in relation to their force, which we take for granted to be as they represent, since you make no observations upon it, but likewise how long their ships can keep the sea. I submit it to you, whether you might not send some understanding officer to Carlescrone who might possibly return to you, before the four ships from England may have joined you, with a full account of their condition. In short, whatsoever light you can give us upon these points will be most welcome. Your thought of stopping the Gosport man of war is entirely approved by his Majesty, as likewise all such other merchant ships as might be bound to the Czar's territorys. You will best judge whether it may not likewise deserve your attention how to secure that convoy, and all other merchant ships at Copenhagen, when you go from thence, touching which you will also please to communicate your thought to me. Give me leave to offer one hint to you, considering the present temper of the Danes, that you will be cautious of giving them opportunity to secure your person, which they are very capable of attempting, and which is the greatest blow that could happen at present to the King's service.

Hanover, 17/6 August 1719.

[Enjoining Norris, as soon as his reinforcement had arrived and he heard from Carteret that the British treaty was actually signed (Norris did not, in fact, wait for this), to advance to Hanö, near Carlskrona, and thence inform himself of the strength and condition of the Swedish fleet. The dispatch continues :]

You will upon your arrival there concert matters so with the Suedes as not to join with them nor to come to an anchor in one body unless upon your approach the Russes should come down upon you and render your immediate junction necessary. But if

that does not happen you will, having got the best information you can of the real strength of the Suedes, as likewise of the Czar's fleet, be best able to judge whether being join'd by the Suedes you may venture to come to an action with the Russes with prospect of success, and if, having weighed all circumstances and particularly consider'd whether, by the knowledge you will attain of the strength disposition and stations of the Danish ships, it is probable they may join the Muscovites, if, I say, all these circumstances considered you judge that with the assistance the Suedes can give you you shall be a match for the Muscovites, it is then his Majesty's pleasure that you do from Hano send an officer with a letter to the Czar to the purpose following.¹

You will, after sending such a letter by an officer, wait at Hano such a competent time as you may judge sufficient to receive an answer. If the answer be to your satisfaction the King will obtain his end in the manner he likes best of saving a brave people without any loss of his own subjects, but if either an insolent or a captious answer be sent, or none at all, you will then join the Suedes and act together in the manner you shall judge most effectual to destroy the Czar's fleet, than which a greater service cannot be done to your country. 'Tis impossible under the circumstances we are for the King to give you more positive and unconditional orders ; he judges it a happiness to have at the head of his fleet at this juncture a man so able to help out the lameness or imperfections of any orders. You know his Majesty's view, which is to save Sweden, if possible, and to destroy the Czar's fleet. You are the only judge whether the means you have are sufficient ; if you think not, you must not attempt and consequently not send the letter to the Czar ; if you think you are likely to succeed attempt in the name of God and be sure of all the support the King can give you, even thô the event should not answer your expectation.

THE SAME TO CARTERET, SAME DATE.

(*Record Office, Sweden 24, copies.*)

No. 1.

If the queen and prince have credit enough to decide upon the fate of your negotiation you may repeat to them from the King,

¹ What Norris was to say in his letter is set out at length ; a summary in the third dispatch to Carteret of this date (below).

in his Majesty's name, the strongest assurances of the King's utmost support and assistance in whatever shall regard them personally.

The King does likewise authorize your Lordship to make presents to the value of ten thousand pounds. I don't mean that his Majesty stints you so exactly to that summ, but that he will allow some thousands more if you can finish and get the treaty signed as tis sent you.

No. 2.

J'ai reçu les lettres que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire du 12 et 14 Juillet V.S. avec le traité préliminaire de paix, la ratification de la reine de Suède, vos deux promissoires et les autres pièces qui y étoient incluses. J'ay mis toutes ces dépêches devant le Roy, qui m'ordonne de vous marquer son approbation de toute votre conduite dans cette négociation. Elle a surtout observé avec satisfaction que vous n'avez pas promis l'approche immédiate de notre escadre comme une condition *sine quâ non* du traité préliminaire. Les Suédois ayant consenti aux proposition que vous aviez à leur faire devoient s'attendre par contre à toute l'assistance que sa Majesté pourroit leur donner pour les tirer de leur présente détresse, comme vous étiez aussi autorisé à le leur promettre ; mais il n'auroit pas esté juste ni prudent à la Suède de s'attendre que notre escadre s'avancât, lorsque cette démarche ne feroit que l'exposer à un affront, après quoy il ne resteroit plus de ressource à ce royaume. Le chevalier Norris n'a encore avec luy qu'onze vaisseaux de guerre ; il en attend encore quatre d'Angleterre, dont deux doivent l'avoir joint actuellement, mais il auroit risqué de les faire intercepter par les Danois, s'il s'étoit éloigné de Copenhague. Même quand ils seront arrivez auprès de luy, et quand les Suédois auroient réellement le nombre de vaisseaux dont ils vous ont donné la liste, toujours les deux escadres jointes ensemble ne seroient elles pas proportionnées aux vaisseaux Moscovites et Danois, si ceux cy venoient à se joindre. Car depuis que Mastrand est pris les 8 vaisseaux Danois qui étoient sur les côtes de Norwège peuvent avoir joint les 6 qui étoient dans le Sund, et ces quatorze vaisseaux avec ceux du Czar feroient une flotte à laquelle nos vaisseaux avec ceux des Suédois n'oseroient se montrer.

Tel étant l'état de la marine dans la Baltique, je vous ay déjà

mandé par ma lettre du 3e de ce mois que nous ne pouvions conseiller à la Suède que de s'accommoder avec l'un des deux ennemis qui l'attaquent, ni lui prêter le secours de notre escadre contre les Russes, qu'en cas qu'elle se fut assurée du Danemarc.

Je ne sais quel parti aura pris la Suède sur cet avis, mais si elle ne s'étoit pas encore déterminée vous ne devrez rien omettre pour la porter à faire sa paix avec le roy de Danemarc. À la vérité elle ne pourra l'obtenir qu'en luy cédant Stralsund et l'isle de Rugen, mais elle doit considérer qu'en laissant Revel entre les mains du Czar elle laisseroit non seulement la Livonie mais le royaume de Suède même à la mercy des Russes, au lieu qu'en faisant la dite cession au Danemarc elle seroit seure de pouvoir détruire encore cet esté la puissance maritime du Czar, qui sans cela luy seroit toujours si formidable.

Si nonobstant ces raisons si essentielles à sa seureté et à sa conservation la Suède aimoit mieux traiter avec le Czar, pour pouvoir tourner ses forces contre le Danemarc, notre escadre lui deviendroit alors inutile ; mais notre alliance ne luy en seroit pas moins nécessaire pour la mettre en état de pousser cette guerre avec vigueur et avec succez. Outre que la réputation de cette alliance n'aidera pas peu à améliorer ses conditions avec le Czar.

Je ne m'étendray pas davantage sur ces alternatives, vous en ayant assez amplement parlé dans ma précédente dépêche, mais pour faire sentir à la Suède que, quel parti qu'elle prenne, le Roy est bien sincèrement intentionné à luy fournir un secours présent, je vous envoie ci joint un projet de traité préliminaire, que sa Majesté vous autorize d'offrir à la reine et de le signer précédemment au renouvellement de l'alliance, dont la discussion pourroit trop long tems en suspendre l'effet. La reine de Suède verra bien par la teneur de cette convention, et par mon autre lettre ci jointe avec les ordres que j'envoie à l'Amiral Norris, que le Roy ne luy laisse rien désirer de son amitié.

Mais le Roy vous ordonne de ne signer cette convention qu'en cas que la reine fasse signer de son côté l'article qui en fait partie concernant le roy de Prusse. Le Roy est obligé d'y insister en conséquence du traité quil a conclu avec ce prince en 1715. Nous l'avons jusqu'à présent passé sous silence, son activité ayant esté comme suspendue par la non exécution de la part du roy de Prusse ; mais comme il vient de donner une pleine satisfaction à sa Majesté ce traité reprend toute sa vigueur, et sa Majesté peut d'autant

moins se dispenser d'y satisfaire que le concours du roy de Prusse luy est d'une nécessité absolue dans ces conjonctures. Il n'est pas moins nécessaire à la Suède, quel partie qu'elle puisse prendre. En cas qu'elle s'accommode avec le Danemarc non seulement elle aura besoin de l'amitié du roy de Prusse pour pouvoir attaquer le Czar dans la Livonie, mais nous ne pourrions pas en même tems rompre avec le Czar et avec le roy de Prusse ; ce seroit les unir entièrement de mesures, et les états du Roy en Allemagne seroient exposés par là à des dangers trop évidens, et auxquels nous ne serions nullement en état de résister. Et en cas que la Suède s'accommode avec le Czar, si elle refusoit de céder Stettin au roy de Prusse, celui cy ne manqueroit pas de se joindre au Danemarc, qui en luy remettant l'isle de Rugen et Stralsund s'assureroit vraysemblablement de toute son assistance, et alors la Suède ne pourroit guère espérer de pousser avec succez la guerre contre le Danemarc si puissamment appuyé ; du moins elle ne pourroit plus se flatter d'obtenir la restitution de Stralsund, et de ce côté ci les états de sa Majesté demeureroient également exposez. A plus forte raison la paix avec le roy de Prusse seroit indispensable à la Suède, si elle ne pouvoit s'accommoder ni avec le Czar ni avec le Danemarc ; puisqu'en ce cas elle ne trouveroit pas d'allié assez hardy qui voulût entreprendre de la sauver en s'attirant tout ensemble l'inimitié de ces trois puissances. Cela est si vray, que très certainement je n'aurais jamais hazardé d'écrire à l'admiral Norris la lettre que vous voyez, si préalablement nous ne nous étions assurés de la Prusse. Et l'incertitude où nous étions par rapport à ce prince, qui vient d'être levée par la signature d'une convention avec luy, a esté le seul motif qui nous a empêché de répondre plutôt à vos dernières dépêches.

Vous solliciterez incessamment un passeport pour un ministre prussien, dont le nom soit laissé en blanc, sa majesté prussienne n'ayant pas encore fait le choix du ministre, qu'elle enverra en Suède ; et vous enverrez ce passeport par un exprès au chevalier Norris, pour qu'il nous le fasse tenir au plutôt. Comme l'on n'est pas encore convenu en détail avec le roy de Prusse de la somme qu'il devra payer à la Suède vous tâcherez qu'elle soit laissée en blanc dans le second article séparé, jusqu' à ce qu'on l'ait réglée et arrêtée avec le ministre prussien qui doit aller à Stockholm, mais si les Suédois insistoient absolument sur ce que cette somme fût déterminée, et qu'à moins de cela ils ne voulussent pas consentir à

céder Stettin et à signer le dit article second, en ce cas vous pourrez insérer dans cet article la somme que vous y verrez écrite à la marge.

[Postscript by Stanhope's secretary, Luke Schaub.]

My lord m'ordonne d'ajouter que la France étant garant de Stettin au roy de Prusse, comme aussi du traité que nous venons de conclurre avec ce roy, ce seroit une pure impossibilité à la Suède d'en rentrer jamais en possession ; qu'ainsy il luy convient bien plus de prendre les 2 millions d'écus de sa majesté prussienne que de conserver une prétension qui n'auroit jamais d'effet ; on prie votre excellence de bien faire valoir en Suède cette considération.

No. 3, secret.

Pour faciliter d'autant plus votre négociation, et pour rendre à la Suède tout le service qu'il est humainement possible de luy rendre, bien que nous puissions nous exposer par le mouvement de notre escadre à une guerre certaine et immédiate contre le Czar et le Danemarc, sa Majesté vous permet encore de promettre qu'aussitôt que le chevalier Norris aura reçu le renfort des quatre vaisseaux qu'il attend d'Angleterre, lesquels pourront l'avoir joint avant que vous recevrez cette lettre, le Roy vous permet, dis je, de promettre à la cour de Suède qu'incessamment après qu'elle aura signé la convention préliminaire avec la Grande Bretagne, telle que je vous l'envoie, l'admiral Norris en étant informé par votre excellence s'avancera avec son escadre jusqu'à Hanoe, où il sera le maître de se joindre, dès qu'on le voudra, aux vaisseaux Suédois qui seront prêts. De là le dit admiral aura ordre d'envoyer déclarer au Czar que le Roy l'a envoyé dans ces mers pour appuyer la médiation que sa Majesté a fait offrir au Czar pour la paix avec la Suède ; que pour pouvoir traiter de cette paix le Czar doit retirer ses forces de la Suède ; que les intérêts de la couronne de la Grande Bretagne et ceux de la religion protestante ne permettent point à sa Majesté de souffrir que ce royaume soit subjugué par le Czar ; et que si le Czar refuse ce parti le dit admiral a ordre conjointement avec l'escadre Suédoise de s'opposer à ses progres. Cette déclaration produira vraisemblablement l'un de ces deux effets, ou que le Czar acceptira la médiation du Roy et se retirera, auquel cas la Suède sera délivrée du danger présent et aura gagné une année de tems pour concerter de nouvelles mesures, ou bien le Czar fera une

réponse à Mr. l'admiral qui servira à justifier devant tout le monde tout ce que nous entreprendrions pour la défense de la Suède. Dans ce dernier cas vous verrez, my lord, par la copie cy jointe, que Mr. l'admiral a ordre d'agir en homme de guerre et selon que la force des Suédois, la disposition et la situation des Danois, et les avis qu'il aura de la force des Russes luy dicteront ; c'est à dire, enfin, qu'il a ordre, s'il voit jour à pouvoir réussir, de faire tout ce qu'il faut pour sauver la Suède. S'il ne voyoit point d'espérance de faire un coup décisif nous ne rendrions aucun service à la Suède en faisant des démonstrations inutiles pour son salut et qui pourroient nous engager mal à propos. Voila, my lord, de quoy vous pouvez assurer la cour où vous êtes, et il nous est, comme vous savez, beaucoup plus facile en Angleterre de faire de certaines choses que de prendre des engagements formels dans les traittez que nous les ferons.

Sa Majesté vous ayant ainsi autorisé à aller tout aussy loin qu'il luy est possible pour assister et soutenir la Suède, et plus loin peut-être que la prudence n'auroit voulu, elle se persuade que la cour de Suède embrassera avec satisfaction et même avec reconnaissance le traitté que vous êtes chargé de luy offrir, et qu'elle le signera au plustôt sans vouloir y apporter aucun changement. Si, contre notre attente et contre ses véritables intérêts, elle refusoit le parti que nous luy offrons, le colonel Bassewitz pourroit bien remettre la ratification allemande du traitté qu'il a conclu, mais quant à vous vous devrez laisser tomber la négociation, déclarer aux Suédois que la couronne de la Grande Bretagne ne pourra plus rien faire dans leurs affaires, que le Roy renvoyera incessamment son escadre en Angleterre, qui n'a d'autre affaire dans ces mers-cy et n'y a été envoyée à autre dessein que de contribuer autant qu'il seroit humainement possible à sauver la Suède ; qu'elle y devient tout à fait inutile au Roy, dès que la Suède ne voudra point concourir avec sa Majesté aux seules mesures qui peuvent la sauver du danger présent et rétablir ses affaires pour l'avenir.

Vous nous donnerez en toute diligence avis de tout ce qui se passera, et en ce dernier cas, lequel cependant je ne veux point appréhender, je crois que le Roy vous enverra ordre de vous en revenir. Le pis qui pourroit arriver à sa Majesté du refus que feroit la couronne de Suède d'accepter les conditions, qu'on luy propose, seroit d'épargner un million d'écus pour le présent et de jouir cependant tranquillement de ses nouvelles acquisitions sous la

garantie de la France et du roy de Prusse, auxquelles garanties il ne tiendra qu'à sa Majesté d'ajouter celles du Czar et du roy de Danemarc, dès qu'il ne voudra plus se mêler des affaires de la Suède. A propos du million d'écus, vous remarquez que dans le 1^{er} article séparé de la convention que vous devez signer l'on a eu attention de tourner la chose plus avantageusement pour la Suède qu'elle n'étoit couchée auparavant dans le 5 article du traité préliminaire, dans la croyance que dans le besoin pressant où est la Suède il luy conviendra d'avoir cette somme en entier le plustôt que faire se pourra. Je viens d'apprendre par une lettre de my Lord Stair, que je reçois en ce moment, que la mission de Mr. Campredon¹ en France y produira vraysemblablement un très bon effet. Je pourray peut-être vous en dire davantage par le premier courier.

THE SAME TO SIR JOHN NORRIS.

(*British Museum, Add. MS. 28146, copies.*)

Hanover, 10th August 1719, O.S.

I hope Major Finboe will have got safe to you with my dispatches of the 17th. I am now farther commanded by his Majesty to signifie his pleasure to you that so soon as you can possibly after the receipt of this you do proceed with your whole squadron to Hano near Carlescrone, and that you forthwith give notice to the court of Sueden of these orders and that you have the King's commands to offer to her Swedish Majesty the service of his fleet under your command, and that you are ready to obey such commands as you shall receive from her Majesty so soon as the treaty sent to my Lord Carteret shall be sign'd; and his Majesty doth accordingly direct you that so soon as you shall receive notice thereof from my Lord Carteret you do in concert with the Swedish admiral go and look for the Russ fleet and do your best to destroy them. These orders are sent to you upon the supposition that the Suedes have not yet made their peace with the Czar.

You will likewise acquaint the government of Denmark that you have his Majesty's commands to live in strict amity with them and that you doubt not of a suitable and friendly return from them,

¹ Jacques de Campredon, French resident at Stockholm since 1701. He returned after his visit to France with the character of envoy and in 1721 was sent in the same character to Petersburg.

and you are accordingly to live in friendship with them unless (which his Majesty cannot expect) they should give you just occasion to do otherwise. You may likewise with truth inform them that every dispatch which hath been sent to Lord Carteret hath carry'd him orders to do every thing in his power to incline the court of Sueden to make peace with Denmark, and that his Lordship will continue to do them all the good offices he can. You may at the same time let them know how little regardful the Czar hath shew'd himself of their concerns, and that he offers even to act against them. I heartily wish you good success and am persuaded nothing will be wanting on your side to procure it. I am informed by letters of the fourth from England that another seventy gun ship and a fire ship were order'd that evening to sail to join you, and we have reason to hope that your whole reinforcement, consisting of two seventy gun ships, two of sixty, and two of fifty, will have join'd you by the time you receive this.

Hanover, August the 24th, 1719, N.S.

I submit it to your judgement whether the most effectual way to draw the Russes from the coast of Sueden, and likewise to have a fair chance to destroy their fleet of men of war, would not be, when you are joyned to the Suedes, to sail directly to the mouth of the Gulph of Finland and either to cruise there or take such station as you shall judge most likely to intercept them on their return. You'l forgive my hinting any thing to you, which occurs to my thoughts for the service, and will make such use of it as you, who are the only judge, shall think fitting. The inclosed is a duplicate of the orders I sent you two days ago by the King's command, which I send by this occasion lest the Danes should have stopped our messenger. I heartily wish you good success.

THE SAME TO CARTERET.

(Record Office, Sweden 24, 25, copies.)

à Hanovre, le 24e Août 1719 [N. S.].

No. 1.

Comme il a esté trouvé plus expédient de finir incessamment le traitté solennel de paix entre le Roy comme électeur et la couronne

de Suède que de le renvoyer au longueurs du traité de Brunswic,¹ principalement enfin d'avancer, autant qu'il se peut, le payement des sommes que la Suède doit toucher, l'instrument solennel de cette paix sera porté au colonel Bassewitz par cette même occasion pour estre signé à Stockholm sans plus de perte de tems. Sa Majesté a ordonné aussi que dans le preambule de cet instrument il soit exprimé que les offices et la médiation du Roy Très Chrétien ont avancé et facilité cette paix, et Mr. de Bernsdorff m'assure que Mr. de Bassewitz est instruit en conformité.

No. 2.

Je charge de cette lettre Mr. de Campredon, qui a résidé plusieurs années en Suède comme ministre de France et qui y retourne pour vous aider à la relever.² . . .

Si nous sommes à tems pour la sauver [la Suède] nous voulons aussy luy aider à se rétablir, mais nous n'y voyons d'autre moyen que la paix avec le Danemarc ; vous tâcherez de la luy faire obtenir pour une somme d'argent, s'il est possible, sinon Mr. de Campredon se joindra à vous pour disposer la Suède à la cession de Stralsund et de l'isle de Rugen, qui très certainement luy sont infiniment moins importans et plus difficiles à recouvrer que la Livonie et l'Estonie.

Si la Suède ne s'accommodoit pas avec le Danemarc il ne resteroit d'autre party à prendre à celui cy que de se jeter dans toutes les mesures du Czar contre ceux qui assisteroient la Suède. Or Stralsund ni l'isle de Rugen ne peuvent entrer en nulle compensation des dangers et des désolations qui résulteroient pour elle de la continuation d'une pareille guerre.

Vous trouverez à la marge de la copie ci jointe des articles séparez l'addition que nous avons faite au commencement du premier et à la fin du second, pour y comprendre la médiation et la garantie

¹ A congress summoned by the emperor to settle the affairs of the north had opened at Brunswick as far back as December 1712. Adjourned after a few months, continued endeavours to get it to work were made during the following years, without success. That George I made his own terms with Sweden in regard to her German provinces in the end, without reference to the imperial authority, was one of the counts of complaint against him at Vienna. Investiture of Bremen and Verden was persistently refused him.

² There follows highest encomium of Campredon's experience ability and fidelity, in strong contrast to the later vituperation of him, when in Russia.

de la France. Vous aurez soin d'insérer ces additions dans les dits articles, si Mr. de Campredon arrivoit avant qu'ils fussent signez ; et s'il n'arrive qu'après la signature vous dresserez avec luy un acte à part, où la médiation et la garantie de la France soit énoncée pour tout ce que vous aurez conclu avec la Suède. A quoy celle cy sera sans doute prête à concourir et à y prendre l'engagement que vous et Mr. de Campredon lui proposerez, de n'écouter aucune proposition de la part de l'Espagne.

Vous vous employerez aussi à faire consentir la Suède à la reconnaissance du roy de Pologne Auguste 2d pour préliminaire de la paix avec ce prince et à insérer soit dans votre convention soit dans le traité que signera Mr. de Bassewitz l'article ci joint, que le ministre de Pologne m'a remis pour cet effet ; il n'y a pas lieu de croire que cela admette de la difficulté, cependant s'il en arrivoit, ce que nous ne pouvons prévoir, ce point ne devra pas arrêter la signature.

Si la Suède consent, comme nous devons nous y attendre, à la cession de Stettin, vous aurez soin de leur suggérer qu'ils ne le fassent qu'à condition que le roy de Prusse ne fournisse au Czar aucun secours contre eux ni directement ni indirectement. Vous verrez par l'extrait ci joint de ma lettre à my Lord Stair du 20e de ce mois la nécessité de cette précaution. Mr. de Campredon porte aussy avec luy copie des traittez conclus en dernier lieu avec le roy de Prusse.

à Hanovre, ce 24 Septembre 1719 [N. S.].

Je fais accompagner Mr. le baron de Kniphausen ¹ d'un messenger que je charge de duplicatas des lettres et papiers, que je ay dépêchés avant hier à V.E. par la voye de Copenhague, dans l'incertitude s'ils vous parviendront avant l'arrivée de ce ministre.

Mr. de Kniphausen va se rendre à Stockholm pour y réduire dans un instrument formel, pareil à celui qui a été envoyé au colonel de Bassewitz par Mr. de Campredon, la paix entre le roy de Prusse et la Suède sur le pied de l'article que vous avez conclu à cet égard. Il s'agira principalement dans ce traité des formalitez des cessions stipulées en faveur du roy de Prusse et des termes de la somme à payer par ce prince à la Suède. Comme les cessions sont accordées je ne crois pas que les formes requises par le roy de Prusse puissent souffrir de la difficulté, mais j'en appréhende par rapport au paye-

¹ Baron Friedrich Ernst von Kniphausen, the Prussian minister.

ment de la somme, le roy de Prusse témoignant ne vouloir l'acquitter entièrement que dans le terme de deux ans, quoiqu'à cet égard il offre un expédient, dont il semble que la Suède devoit être satisfaite, sçavoir, qu'il fournira des assignations sur lesquelles la Suède pourra d'abord emprunter dans les états de Prusse jusqu'à la concurrence des deux millions à un intérêt de cinq pour cent ; de sorte qu'elle pourroit en fort peu de tems toucher toute la somme avec une déduction assez modique.

Quant à la conduite que V.E. aura à tenir dans ce qui reste à régler entre Mor. de Kniphausen et les ministres Suédois, le Roy ne peut vous donner d'autre ordre positif que de tenir la main à ce que des deux côtés l'on se conforme exactement au préliminaire qui a déjà été arrêté avec vous. Dans toutes les autres choses vous agirez comme médiateur impartial entre les ministres des deux couronnes conjointement avec Mr. de Campredon, et vous employerez vos offices et votre entremise pour lever les difficultez qui pourroient naître entre eux, et pour finir au plutôt possible le traité auquel Mr. Kniphausen va travailler sur le modèle de celui qu'aura signé Mr. de Bassewitz.

Vous prendrez soin aussy que dans ce traité il y ait un article inséré par lequel il soit pourvu expressément que le commerce dans la mer Baltique soit rétabli et maintenu par la paix générale du nord sur le même pied qu'il étoit avant la rupture, en quelques mains que restent les ports de la dite mer, conformément à l'article 2 de notre dernier traité avec le roy de Prusse, dont Mr. de Campredon vous aura remis la copie. À cette occasion Mr. de Kniphausen insistera qu'il soit pareillement pourvu qu'en quelques mains que reste la partie de la Pomeranie, que le roy de Danemarc possède à l'heure qu'il est, le commerce de Stettin et de son district jusqu'à la Pehne demeure sur le même pied qu'il étoit avant la rupture, et que l'on ne mette point de nouvelle douane ni autre nouvelle charge à Wolgast, Ruden ou autre embouchure par où les vaisseaux et le commerce de la Pomeranie prussienne passe. Comme cette demande nous paroît très raisonnable et avantageuse à tous ceux qui commercent dans la Baltique V.E. l'appuyera de son mieux ; et les Suédois doivent y estre d'autant plus disposez que Mor. de Kniphausen ne fera pas difficulté de promettre le réciproque de la part de sa majesté prussienne ; c'est à dire que dans le district qui luy est cédé elle n'imposera aussy ni sur l'Oder ni sur la Pehne aucun nouveau droit ou péage.

Si la cour de Suède n'avoit pas encore envoyé une personne à Londres pour y toucher les 288^m dollars de subside que nous devons leur payer selon l'article 4^e de notre convention préliminaire, l'on pourrait y faire passer pour cet effet Mor Skutenhielm,¹ et vous en ferez mention pour leur faire voir combien nous sommes prêts à accomplir ponctuellement ce que vous leur avez promis.

Comme nous apprenons que trois frégattes Moscovites se tiennent dans le port de Dantzig, vous concerterez avec la cour de Suède ce qu'il y aura à faire, soit pour les en faire sortir, soit pour empêcher qu'elles ne mettent obstacle au commerce entre Dantzig et les ports de Suède.

Il est tems, my lord, que vous songiez à nous faire envoyer un ministre Suédois de poids et de confiance, avec qui nous puissions concerter ce qui concernera les intérêts de la Suède, car vous jugerez bien que le service du Roy ne pourra pas permettre que vous restiez hors d'Angleterre pendant la prochaine séance de notre parlement.

Göhr[de] ce 29^e Septembre 1719 N. S.

Depuis ma lettre du 24^e écrite j'apprens que Mr. de Bassewitz mande que les Suédois se pressent si peu de finir avec luy le traité en forme qu'on luy a envoyé, qu'ils n'avoient pas encore commencé à y travailler. Cela me surprend d'autant plus, qu'en retardant la conclusion de ce traité ils réculent aussi le payement du million d'écus que sa Majesté doit leur faire, et je ne puis imputer ce rétarde ment qu'aux embarras où la cour de Suède doit s'être trouvée avant et après la retraite des Russes. Mais si, contre notre attente, elle affectoit d'apporter des delays volontaires à la conclusion finale du dit traité, ou de celui avec le roy de Prusse que Mr. le baron de Knyphausen est chargé de couclurre en conséquence de l'article préliminaire signé pour cet effet avec votre excellence, en ce cas vous ferez sentir à la cour de Suède qu'elle ne peut ni ne doit compter sur notre assistance pendant cet hyver et pour le printems prochain, qu'autant qu'elle se dépêchera à mettre la dernière main aux dits traittez de paix et aux cessions déjà stipulées. Et si Mr. de Knyphausen arrivoit à Stockholm avant que le traité formel fût signé avec Mr. de Bassewitz, vous ferez en sorte que les deux traittez s'avancent d'un pas égal, et vous presserez avec la même vigueur la perfection de l'un et de l'autre.

¹ Anders Skutenhielm, secretary of embassy in London from 1720.

30e Septembre 1719 [N. S.].

Je viens de recevoir vos dépêches du 2e, 4e, et 9e de ce mois. Je les ay mises incessamment devant le Roy, qui a une satisfaction extrême de toutes les parties de votre conduite et de vos relations. La frégate qui portera Mr. de Knyphausen à Ystedt a ordre de revenir à Lubec aussitôt qu'elle l'aura débarqué.

Et je compte de recevoir avant ce tems les ratifications de ce que vous avez signé, lesquelles ont esté envoyées en Angleterre pour y faire mettre le grand sceau. Et je pourray aussy alors vous signifier les ordres ultérieurs de sa Majesté sur vos dernières dépêches. En attendant vous verrez que par l'acte de ratification nous avons déjà pourvu à l'inclusion de la médiation et garantie de la France plus convenablement même pour cette couronne, que Mr. de Campredon ne le propose, car il luy sera plus honorable que sa médiation paroisse dans le corps même des actes qui contiennent les conditions de paix, que d'y estre ajoutée par un acte postérieur. Il seroit aussi offensant pour l'Empereur de luy réserver seulement la liberté d'accéder à cet acte de médiation. Il n'y a pas d'exemple qu'on ait jamais accédé à une médiation après coup, et celle de l'Empereur a esté acceptée dès le commencement de toutes les parties belligérentes pour la pacification du nord. Ainsi il faut absolument que la médiation de l'Empereur soit énoncée de la même manière que celle de la France, et supposer de même qu'elle ait coopéré à ce qui s'est fait. Au reste nous n'avons pas laissé de mettre une notable différence entre l'Empereur et la France, en ne parlant que de médiation lorsqu'il s'agit de l'Empereur, et en ajoutant la garantie à la médiation de la France, ce qui marque assez que c'est celle cy qui a eu le plus de part à notre confiance, et le plus d'influence sur les traittez conclus. Outre que l'Empereur pourra accéder en suite à la garantie et qu'il ne pourroit plus accéder à la médiation dès qu'il paroîtroit qu'on eût tout finy sans luy. Mr. de Campredon doit goûter notre expédient encore par un autre endroit ; c'est qu'en insérant la médiation nous avons par contre omis par la même attention pour la France l'article 4e des séparez, afin qu'il ne paroisse point que les Suédois doivent à notre intercession les subsides de cette couronne.

Mais pour satisfaire d'autant plus la cour de Suède et Mr. de Campredon en convenant de la substance et de tout l'essentiel de l'article séparé, que celui ci a dressé et qui n'est point admissible tel qu'il est couché, et pour ôter aux Suédois tout prétexte de

différer la conclusion finale des traittez sollennels, votre excellence pourra promettre que dans le traité de renouvellement d'alliance à faire entre les deux couronnes de la Grande Bretagne et de Suède non seulement on reconnoitra formellement les bons offices, la médiation et la garantie de la France, mais qu'aussy, par rapport à ce que l'on souhaite pour maintenir en force les traittez de Westphalie pour l'engagement que l'on requiert de la Suède par rapport à l'Espagne, vous signerez deux articles dont vous trouverez les projets ci joints. Quant à la manière de reconnoître la médiation et la garantie de la France dans le dit traité de renouvellement d'alliance, on s'en rapporte à vous et à Mr. de Campredon, et vous pourrez l'énoncer soit dans le preambule, soit dans un article à part que vous dresserez ensemble pour cet effet.

Nous aurions fort souhaitté que pendant tout ce tems ci la Suède eût pu estre disposée à la cession de Ruguen et de Stralsund, puisque par là elle se seroit assurée d'une paix prompte et aisée avec le Danemarc, ce qui auroit beaucoup facilité les mesures à prendre contre le Czar, qui doit dorénavant estre regardé comme l'ennemi commun ; et vous devez aussi faire une dernière tentative à cet égard par un mémoire que vous donnerez à la reine, lequel vous aurez soin de coucher de manière que la cour de Danemarc puisse voir avec quelle vivacité nous nous sommes employez pour ses intérêts.

Au Göhre ce 30e Septembre 1719 [N. S.].

Secrète et particulière.

Si votre excellence trouvoit à la cour de Suède une répugnance invincible à céder Stralsund et Ruguen au Danemarc, vous donnerez confidemment à entendre à la reine, au prince de Hesse, et aux sénateurs en qui vous pouvez vous fier, que par le mémoire qu'on vous ordonne de présenter pour cet effet nous avons moins en vue d'obtenir d'eux ce qu'ils sont déterminez à ne jamais accorder, que de faire voir au Danemarc que nous ne nous sommes relâchez sur ce point qu'après avoir épuisé tous nos efforts pour le leur procurer. Après que la cour de Suède aura répondu à votre mémoire par écrit, en refusant absolument la dite cession, alors vous pourrez leur promettre de passer l'article ci joint qui devra faire partie du traité de renouvellement d'alliance, mais vous ne vous y engagerez qu'à condition que les Suédois achèvent incessamment, et sans aucun delay, les traittez solemnels à conclurre avec Messrs. de

Bassewitz et de Cnyphausen. Vous devez tâcher de faire ensorte que la cour de Suède et Mr. de Campredon se contentent d'une promesse verbale pour cet effet, que vous leur donnerez en présence de tels témoins qu'il désireront, et vous ne manquerez pas de faire valoir auprès d'eux la disposition où est le Roy d'aller beaucoup au delà de ce que porte l'article que Monsr. de Campredon avoit dressé, qui se bornoit uniquement à laisser aux traittez de Westphalie toute la force qu'ils pouvoient avoir entant qu'il n'y seroit point dérogé par nos présents traittez ; au lieu que par l'article dont on vous envoie le projet, et que vous estes autorisé à insérer dans le traité d'alliance à faire avec la Suède, la couronne de la Grande Bretagne, qui jusqu'à présent n'avoit jamais garanti les traittez de Westphalie, veut en devenir garante, et se mettra par conséquent dans l'engagement de soutenir même les prétentions de la Suède par rapport à Stralsund et Ruguen. D'ailleurs la couronne de Suède, qui a en tout tems témoigné tant de zèle et a travaillé avec tant de succez et de gloire pour l'intérêt protestant, doit estre bien aise de s'associer la couronne de la Grande Bretagne par la garantie des traittez de Westphalie, qui font la base, et pour ainsi dire la *Magna Carta* de la cause protestante, aussi bien que des libertez Germaniques.

Comme l'article qu'on vous autorise de promettre à la cour de Suède doit la convaincre pleinement des intentions sincères du Roy pour leurs intérêts, il est juste aussi que pour faciliter la conclusion d'une paix, à laquelle ils sont intéressez le plus, ils vous déclarent par contre qu'ils seront prêts à négocier avec le Danemarc sur une somme d'argent pour la restitution de Ruguen et de Stralsund. Vous les entretiendrez aussy dans la disposition, où ils vous ont paru estre, de renoncer à l'exemption des péages du Sund, pour ravoir Mastrand. Quant au duché de Sleswic la chose parle d'elle même, et il faudroit renoncer à toute espérance de faire la paix avec le Danemarc, si l'on n'étoit en état de luy laisser et de luy assurer ce duché. Et je vous prie, my lord, de faire sentir en Suède combien il leur importe, aussi bien qu'à nous, que cette paix se fasse, si tant est qu'ils veuillent pousser la guerre contre le Czar. Pendant que nous aurions à faire la guerre au Czar et au Danemarc ensemble il faudroit deux escadres, l'une pour agir sur les côtes de la Livonie et un autre au Sund, sans quoy la Suède resteroit bloquée et courroit risque de mourir de faim. Mr. de Campredon m'a paru tres convaincu des embarras que la guerre du Danemarc

nous causeroit à nous et à la Suède ; et je compte qu'il vous aidera de bon cœur à les éviter, sur tout après que le Roy notre maître aura bien voulu franchir le grand obstacle de Ruguen et de Stralsund.

Au reste, my lord, ce qui j'ay le plus fortement à vous recommander, c'est de finir les traittez de Messrs. de Bassewitz et Cnyp-hausen, et si pour cet effet vous étiez réduit à la nécessité de donner par écrit la promesse que vous passerez l'article ci joint, tel que je vous l'envoie, comptez que vous ne serez point désavoué. Il vaudroit mieux s'en dispenser, si bon pouvoit, et par un reste de ménagement pour le Danemarc on ne voudroit point signer un tel engagement à son préjudice, tant qu'il y a la moindre lueur d'espérance qu'il pourroit s'accommoder. Mais si vous ne pouviez finir autrement, donnez leur la promesse par écrit. Vous avez risqué de vous commettre pendant le cours de votre négociation pour le service du public, et le Bon Dieu vous a béni. Je me commets peut être en vous écrivant ceci, mais je feray de mon mieux pour soutenir tout ce que vous ferez en conséquence.

THE SAME TO THE SAME.

(*Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 221, copy.*)

Whitehall, 19th January 1719/20.

. I cannot sufficiently express to your Excellency with how much satisfaction his Majesty receives the full and instructive accounts of your dextrous and successfull negociations. For my own part I return your Excellency my most hearty thanks for them and wish every part of business under your care may meet with as much success at last as what you have done so happily in the King's own concern.

I shall not pretend to enter into the several details at this distance but shall only acquaint your Excellency that his Majesty thinks it of absolute necessity that the Prussian treaty should be finished as soon as possible. The system of affairs may happen soon to receive a great change by a peace in the south, which in all likelihood will throw many new difficultys in our ways. Your Excellency's great application to get it concluded out of hand appears in every one of your letters, and t'was with much pleasure we observed by your last that a few days would decide the whole. As the article concerning the licent was accepted by Mo^r Knyphausen we hope the senate was likewise brought to consent to it, and then the only

remaining difficulty will be got over, of which there have been very many in this negociation by reason of the unseasonable pretensions of the Prussian minister and his grasping at advantages beyond the preliminaries, which we cannot but the more wonder at in him, who very well knows that his master was ready to offer more money even for procuring lesser concessions than we frankly and generously obtained for him almost with the risk of our own interests in Sweden. It would have been very usefull if this treaty had been brought to a conclusion soon after that of his Majesty, that there might not have been so great a delay in the demand of the investitures,¹ which undoubtedly will meet with more difficulty and opposition at Vienna the more the Spanish peace approaches, which is a point that deserves great attention from the Prussian court.

The King was sorry to see by your Excellency's letter of the 7th December that there appeared so much reluctance against closing with the proposal for settling the succession to the crown of Sweden. You will have seen by my letter, which I wrote since, that his Majesty continued of the same opinion and annexed the loan of the money for the prince of Hesse's use to that condition. We intended the promoting of that scheme for advancing the prince's interest at the same time, and it is of so apparent benefit for the kingdom to establish their happiness and to make them usefull and valuable to their friends, that if the proper insinuations were made all unreasonable jealousys must vanish before them. But if the prince cannot bring himself to relish the proposal we must not press it against his will, and all I can say to your Excellency at present upon that head is, that we cannot take upon us here to make such a loan as is desired, unless it be upon so weighty and solid a consideration as that of settling the succession.

By my Lord Polwarth's last letters to us it seems as if Denmark were grown more reasonable, and therefore I should be heartily glad if before your Excellency leaves Stockholm you could put the treaty with that crown in a good forward way, if it be not possible to push it to a conclusion. However, if that can't be before you come away, as you have leave, I wish you would at your departure use your utmost efforts to get the Swedes to release their exemption from the Sound dutys; it is the point his Majesty thinks might facilitate all other matters with the Danes. And if the Swedes are inclined to do it at last, would they but open their intention to your

¹ Of Bremen and Verden and Stettin.

Excellency and trust us with the secret we would manage it with advantage for them, and make the most of that concession for beating down the other high demands of the Danish court; they seem to be alarm'd and to grow more plying upon the coming of the imperial letters for reinstating the duke of Holstein in his territories, and your Excellency would do well to get orders sent to Count Bielke,¹ if he has not them already, for making instances at Vienna for the like letters to have Rugen and Stralsund restored to Sweden. These mandates from the Emperor may intimidate the Danes, which is certainly the surest way to bring them to more reason. And the getting again as soon as possible into possession of Rugen and Stralsund must be a principal view of the Swedes, which they ought never to depart from for very many reasons, but I must acquaint your Excellency with one, which I met with at Paris and which deserves the utmost attention. Talking with the Regent about Poland and pressing him to contribute towards the animating the dyet against the Muscovites, as the King had done, which he at last consented to purely in consideration of his Majesty, and then speaking of the Swedes, that unless they were well assisted they might be in danger of parting with Rugen and Stralsund to procure powerfull succours against the Czar, his Royal Highness replied very seriously, *J'aimerais mieux alors les Moscovites que les Suédois*. This expression carries a great deal with it and ought to excite the greatest caution among the Swedes not to forfeit by any such like measure the friendship and esteem of France.

I must add to what I have said above, relating to my discourse with the Regent, that Mo^r Schleinitz, the Muscovite minister at Paris, being ordered to make instances in the Czar's name that the subsidys might not be paid by France to Sweden, I got notice of what he was to do and prepared both his Royal Highness and the Abbé Dubois as to the answer which should be given him, and upon his application the Regent told him plainly that they were engaged to pay those subsidys to Sweden and that therefore they would continue to do so; and at the same time desired the minister to put his master in mind not to bear too hard upon Sweden, for that in such case France would not only pay what they do now but would double and treble their subsidys, and if there were need increase them still farther till a safe and honourable peace should be obtained for Sweden from Muscovy. The same answer was

¹ Count Thure Gabriel Bielke, sent on a mission to Vienna.

likewise given Mons^r Schleinitz by the Abbé Dubois upon the representations which he made to him.

FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FOR LORD CARTERET, 27 FEBRUARY
1719/20.

(*British Museum, Add. MS. 15867, original, Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 221 and F.O. King's Letters 65, copies.*)

Whereas Our good friends and allys the States General of the United Netherlands by their resolution of the 31st day of January 1719 N.S. for their coming into the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, signed at London the 22th day of July foregoing, did annex to such their intended accession this condition among others, that whenever We should make a treaty with Sweden We should stipulate for the subjects of the said States the same advantages of commerce and navigation as for Our own subjects ; and whereas the said States, being now ready to sign their accession to the treaty before mentioned, have again proposed the said condition, which cannot at this time be complied with, Our treaty with the crown of Sweden being finally concluded and signed ; We being desirous, however, to shew Our readiness to promote the interest and advantage of the said States and their subjects in whatever may be reasonable have thought fit hereby to direct and authorize you, whenever you shall have received notice from the earl of Cadogan, Our ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary at the Hague, or in his absence from James Dayrolle Esq^{re}, Our resident there, that the States have actually signed their accession to the Quadruple Alliance aforesaid, to use your most earnest instances with the queen of Sweden and her ministers and to assist the minister of the said States General, who shall reside there, with your best offices, in order to the obtaining from that crown the same advantages of commerce and navigation for the subjects of the said States as have been obtained for Our own subjects.

In case you should depart from that court on your return home (pursuant to the leave We have granted you) before such negotiation in favour of the States General be concluded, you shall leave this Our instruction with William Finch Esq^{re}, whom we have appointed to be Our envoy extraordinary at the said court and whom We do in your absence hereby authorize and direct to act in pursuance of this Our instruction.

G. R.

STANHOPE TO CARTERET.

(Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 155, copy.)

Whitehall, 8 March 1719/20.

. Your Excellency's memorial relating to the exemption of the dutys of the Sound had his Majesty's entire approbation, who sees with great pleasure that you have met with the success you expected on that point in the Estates of Sweden, and hopes it will determine the Danes to accept of peace on the conditions explained by your Excellency. His Majesty does all he can, and my lord Polwarth employs his utmost efforts to make the Danish court sensible of the advantage of those terms which his Majesty is able and desirous to procure for them, and we hope, as craving and unreasonable as they are, they will be convinced that your Excellency acts in the best and most usefull manner for them and neglects nothing that may really contribute to fix their peace upon a just and equitable foot. The King, I assure your Excellency, is extremely well satisfied with your proceedings and is pleased that upon the prospect of finishing at least a preliminary for Denmark you intended to prolong your stay at Stockholm for some time farther; indeed, the concluding that part of the negotiation with the same spirit and success, as your Excellency has overcome all the difficultys of those other which have passed through your hands, will be so much for the publick service that we are perswaded that neither your Excellency's adress nor application will be wanting, nor will you think much of spending a little more time to put the last hand to so important a business. The King wrote lately a letter to his Danish Majesty concerning his demands and I send your Excellency a copy of it for your information, that you may see in what terms his Majesty thinks fit to explain himself to that court with respect to their pretensions.

As his Majesty places the greatest confidence in your Excellency's good management he readily agrees to your disposing of twenty thousand crowns banco, according to your proposal in yours of the 13th February.

STANHOPE TO LORDS CARTERET AND POLWARTH.

(Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 221, copy.)

Whitehall, 1st May 1720.

I write this letter to you jointly as believing that the messenger may find you, my lord Carteret, arrived at Copenhagen. The 26th past I enclosed to you, my lord Polwarth, a copy of the letter from the king of Denmark to his Majesty, which Mons^r Solenthal¹ delivered here. His Majesty has returned an answer to it, and the original is put into the Danish ministers hands, but I send your Lordships a copy herewith, that you may see by both letters as well what the king of Denmark insists upon as what his Majesty has thought fit to say in reply.

The King cannot but conceive hopes that the Danes, rather than lose the advantages of the preliminaries by letting the armistice expire without coming to any conclusion, will either have accepted the offers of Sweden or have fallen upon some expedient not to let them entirely slip out of their hands, and his Majesty is the more enclined to entertain such hopes because he has observed that the address and good management of your Lordships have overcome very great difficultys already and brought this peace to so near a view as we see it. If therefore your Lordships should have been so happy as to have adjusted all, before this messenger reaches you, I shall be very glad that what I write may prove unnecessary. But the conclusion of this peace between Sweden and Denmark is of so great importance, that his Majesty cannot leave it to the uncertainty of the good humour or good judgment of either of the two courts; and as his Majesty observes that the quantum of the summ of money in compensation for Rugen and Stralsund is the essential point that hinders Denmark from accepting the Swedish preliminaries, he has with great generosity as well as compassion for the miserys this long war in the north has brought upon both kingdoms resolved to make a last effort himself to unite these two protestant crowns in a happy peace, and I am commanded to acquaint your Lordships that in case the conclusion of the preliminaries should appear desperate to you upon the foot of terms insisted on by either party at the time you shall receive this letter, and in case that either Denmark shall have abated so much of her

¹ Baron Henrik Frederik von Söhlenthal, Danish envoy extraordinary to England, 1713 to 1731.

demands, or Sweden have far increased her offer, that you find the business may be finally accommodated by a farther summ of money, you may offer in his Majesty's name as far as two hundred thousand crowns to be paid as king of Great Britain and two other hundred thousand as elector ; but his Majesty would, before such offer be made, have you be secure that Denmark shall positively accept and conclude the preliminarys with Sweden and that the Swedish court shall engage by a formal declaration to dispose of Wismar as the King shall desire, and no otherwise.

Your Lordships see what a length the King goes for the sake of peace, and as you know his Majesty's intentions I doubt not but you will manage the whole to the best advantage for obtaining the end proposed. If the armistice should be expired, or on the point of ending, and nothing done, the King would have your Lordships endeavour to have it prolonged for as many weeks as you shall judge necessary to finish your work in ; and you may let Denmark know that his Majesty is willing that the assurance of his guaranty of the dutchy of Sleswick should accompany the new armistice but that it should last no longer than the prolongation, for this your Lordships will please to make the Danish ministers very sensible of, that the King's guaranty of Sleswick is conditional and that if the armistice do not end in a pacification his Majesty is no ways obliged to give his guaranty, so that at the expiration of the armistice without the conclusion of a peace his Majesty's engagement for the said guaranty ceases and is void.

In case Lord Carteret be not come to Copenhagen you, Lord Polwarth, will judge according to the situation of affairs how far it may be adviseable or necessary to make use of this new power and govern yourself accordingly, giving as early notice as possible to Lord Carteret of your proceeding.

If your Lordships are so happy as to get the preliminary convention fixed, I believe you will both agree with me in opinion that it will be most adviseable to get their solemn treaty likewise settled, it being evidently for the interest of all partys and of our master that as little as possible, if any thing at all, be left to be adjusted at Brunswick.

WILLIAM FINCH

1720-1724

ON Carteret's departure from Stockholm his secretary William Finch, second son of that man of weight in home politics, Daniel Earl of Nottingham, replaced him with the character of envoy extraordinary. His principal business in the years 1720 and 1721 was to bring the Swedes to accept from Peter the Great any terms that he would grant. For again in these years Sir John Norris failed in his mission to destroy the Russian naval power; as in 1719 he could neither reach the tsar's fleet in its harbours nor prevent the landing of troops on galleys to ravage the Swedish coasts. George I had to realise that his enemy could not be coerced.

Disappointed of that inclusion in the treaty of Nystad, on which he had insisted and of which he had been assured, George professed to take little further interest in Swedish affairs until in 1723 negotiation opened for a new treaty between Sweden and Russia. In this again Peter refused to associate him. When in February 1724 it was concluded without him and apparently in hostility towards him, and when there followed report of intention on the part of Frederick I to abdicate, it was decided to replace Finch, who had failed to prevent these developments, by a stronger man. To avoid offence to his father he was transferred to the Hague, a post more honourable, but which the intimate personal relations of Lord Townshend with the leading Dutch ministers rendered less onerous.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR WILLIAM FINCH, ESQ., ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY
TO THE QUEEN OF SWEDEN, 8 MARCH 1719/20.

(*Record Office, F.O. King's Letters 65, copy.*)

(Purely formal.)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ROBERT JACKSON, ESQ., MINISTER RESIDENT
AT STOCKHOLM, SAME DATE.*(Ibid., copy.)*

(Purely formal.)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ADMIRAL SIR JOHN NORRIS, KNT., 6 APRIL
1720.*(Ibid., copy.)*

1. Whereas by the eleventh article of the treaty concluded between Us and Our good sister, the queen of Sweden, at Stockholm the 21st of January last past We are particularly obliged to send a strong squadron of Our ships of warr this spring to the assistance of the kingdome of Sweden to act in conjunction with the ships of warr of her Swedish Majesty, you are therefore upon the receipt of these Our instructions to you to proceed with Our fleet under your command with all the expedition possible to the Baltick Sea, and you are to joyn the fleet of Our said sister, the queen of Sweden, at Carlsroon, or at such other place or station where you shall learn they are or where it shall be most proper to make the conjunction, in order to the better carrying on the operations of the campaign.

2. As We have not yet found any effects of Our endeavours to promote an accommodation between the crown of Sweden and the Czar of Muscovy, and as We have declared by the aforesaid treaty that if such amicable applications should prove fruitless We would not suffer any longer time to be lost to no purpose, you are therefore upon your junction with the Swedish fleet to know the orders and designs of her Swedish Majesty and to concert such operations as shall be judged proper for repelling any invasion or attempt on the part of the Muscovites upon the kingdome and territorys of Sweden, and for obtaining from the Czar as soon as possible the conditions of a just and reasonable peace.

3. You are to take under your convoy and care such merchant ships going to the Baltick, as are ready to sail with you, and you are to protect and assist them as farr as you can without prejudice to the service you are principally sent upon, and to the due performance of which We are specially engaged by treaty.

4. You are to give Us regular accounts of your proceedings by one of Our principal secretaries of state, and you shall likewise

correspond, as the service may require, with Our ambassador extraordinary or other minister residing at the court at Stockholm.

5. You shall follow and observe such further orders and instructions as We shall from time to time think fit to give you by one of Our principal secretaries of state.

G. R.

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTION FOR THE SAME, 7 APRIL 1720.

(Ibid., copy.)

Whereas by Our instructions to you bearing date the 6th day of this ins^t April you are directed to join the fleet of Our good sister the queen of Sweden and to act in concert with the said fleet not only for the protection and defence of the coasts of the kingdom of Sweden but also in order to procure a just and reasonable peace between the said crown and the Czar of Muscovy; and whereas both the good of Our own subjects and the welfare of other nations in amity with Us do make Us most earnestly desire to have that Christian work of peace happily and speedily brought about, We do therefore hereby further command you either on your arrival in the Sound by a message to the Muscovite minister at Copenhagen, or as you advance farther up the Baltick by some proper notification to the ministers generals or admirals of his Czarish Majesty, to renew Our offers of Our mediation and of Our best offices for procuring peace between the crown of Sueden and that of Muscovy. But you must observe at the same time that Our intention is that your making such offers should not hinder your junction with the Suedish fleet nor divert you from entring into concert with them, pursuant to Our former instructions, by waiting for answers to the messages you may send. And whereas it may happen that his Czarish Majesty upon recollecting seriously the state of affairs may be disposed to hearken to equitable terms of accommodation, to the end that such good dispositions may not be ineffectual for want of sufficient authority given to proper ministers on Our part We do hereby fully empower you and Our envoy extraordinary at the court of Sweden, jointly or separately as occasion shall require, to act as Our plenipotentiary and in Our name to mediate between the partys concerned, in order to bring matters to as speedy a conclusion as possible.

G. R.

STANHOPE TO NORRIS.

(Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 155, copy.)

Whitehall, May 31st 1720.

. I heartily congratulate your safe arrival at Stockholm, where I am persuaded you were extremely welcome, and since the Czar still continues averse to proposals of peace and neglects the kind offers of his Majesty's mediation there is nothing more to be wisht than that his ships and gallies may fall in your way, there being no doubt of your giving a very good account of them. I heartily wish you success.

THE SAME TO THE SAME.

(Record Office, S.P. Domestic Regencies 3, copy.)

Hanover, July 27th 1720.

I write you this by Major Finboe to acquaint you that we have had some advices as if the Czar was willing to enter in to a negotiation of peace with Sweden under his Majesty's mediation, in which case, if true, the first thing that is to be done must be to obtain an armistice till the end of May next, that his Majesty's fleet may return by that time in case of any accident.

M^r Finch will communicate to you his Majesty's answer to a letter he has received from the king of Sweden, as also a paper of proposals from that king to his Majesty, for your information. You will see by the latter that his Swedish Majesty desires the British fleet may stay in the Baltick till autumn, which his Majesty readily consents to so long as the season will permit, but as to the six frigates, which his Swedish Majesty likewise desires may winter in Sweden, if you think it is practicable you may acquaint the king that his Majesty has desired your opinion thereupon, before he comes to a resolution in it, and that accordingly you will send forthwith your thoughts upon this matter, in order to receive his Majesty's further directions. One convenience that would arise from leaving some of the smallest ships, in case a cessation of arms be not agreed to, would be that the court of Sweden would consent the more readily to your returning home with the main squadron in good time.

STANHOPE TO FINCH.

(Ibid., copy.)

Hanover, 4th September 1720 O.S.

. I received your dispatches of the 21st and 30th past and of the 6th instant O.S. and laid them before his Majesty, who is very glad to see that the senate are so well satisfied with his Majesty's proceedings in relation to Swedish affairs, upon the account Baron Sparr¹ gave of them, and that they are sensible of his Majesty's hearty endeavours in doing all that lies in his power for the advantage of Sweden, which his Majesty is fully resolved to continue. We are still pressing the court of Vienna to come to a speedy resolution, whether they will enter into our concerts in behalf of his Swedish Majesty, and as soon as we are apprized of it I shall not fail to acquaint you with it and give you what further lights I can about the measures to be taken.

His Majesty read with pleasure the translation of that part of the act of conclusion relating to the treatys made between Great Britain and Sweden, and with the courts of Prussia and Denmark by his Majesty's mediation, and is very glad to find that the States of the kingdom have approved the same.

His Majesty is very sensible of the frankness with which the king of Sweden has formerly communicated to us what was transacting at Paris between Count Sparr² and Count Schleiniz, and last of all the ouverture made by Prince Kurakin³ to Mons^r Preis.⁴ His Majesty relies as much upon the confidence of the king of Sweden as that prince ought to do upon his Majesty's friendship, and to give him a new proof of it his Majesty desires you should explain to him the true and only motive which has induced his Majesty to offer his mediation between him and the Czar. His Majesty thought all along, and is still of the same mind, that of all the mediators that have offered themselves none would interest himself more heartily than his Majesty for every thing that might be convenient and advantageous to the king of Sweden and his kingdom,

¹ Baron Karl Gustaf Sparre, Swedish envoy to George I.

² Count Erik Axelsson Sparre, now at Paris as ambassador from Frederick I. For his negotiations with Schleinitz, the Russian minister, see the *Recueil des instructions*, VIII. 204.

³ Prince Boris Ivanovich Kurakin, Russian ambassador at the Hague.

⁴ Joakim Fredrik Preis, Swedish minister at the Hague.

and that by his mediation a secure peace might be more speedily obtained ; but if, on the contrary, it should prove an obstacle, or if his Swedish Majesty could obtain a more advantageous peace with the Czar without his Majesty's interposition, he would the rather desist from it, that it would free him from the guaranty which must indispensably be given to the Czar for what should be yielded to him by a treaty under his Majesty's mediation. It is not at all our interest to tie ourselves either with respect to the acquisitions which the Czar may keep in the Baltick, or to the design he may have of extending his trade. We only determined ourselves to enter into engagements with the Czar, by virtue of his Majesty's mediation, meerly upon the king of Sweden's account and for his sake, and therefore he is to judge whether our mediation will make things easier or more difficult for him towards the Czar, and according to what he shall judge he may either continue to offer our mediation or treat without it, without fearing we should take it amiss. The only thing which we absolutely insist upon is that his Swedish Majesty do not conclude a peace with the Czar exclusive of us, and he may always depend upon his Majesty in every thing that may contribute towards it, whether he be a mediator or not. This you will explain ingenuously to the king of Sweden by repeating to him the strongest assurances that whatever resolution he takes thereupon, if he should not succeed with the Czar, we will not only continue to perform faithfully what we owe to him and use our best offices wherever it is necessary to procure him succours, but that if to concert effectual measures it was necessary to make further efforts we will even go beyond our engagements.

We hope that the difficultys, which have retarded the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty with Denmark, and consequently the evacuation of Mastrand and Pomerania, are removed before now, and that the treaty is engrossed and sent back according to the very words agreed upon with the court of Denmark ; but if it was not done, which we can hardly believe, you will hasten the same.

STANHOPE TO NORRIS.

(*British Museum, Add. MS. 28146, copy.*)

Hanover, 1st October 1720 O.S.

You will have received before now my last of the 12th September O.S., whereby you will have found that his Majesty left it to you to

return home with the squadron under your command, when you thought proper with regard to the season. I received since by Major Finboe yours of the 11th September O.S. with the king of Sueden's letter of the 10th for his Majesty, desiring him that he would order some ships to winter in Sueden, wherein his Majesty would readily comply with his Suedish Majesty's desire, if he did not think that it would rather be more hurtful than serviceable to his Majesty. For the ships cannot be of any use when the ice comes in and while it lasts, and though we should be glad that a peace could be concluded this winter yet, as it is doubtful, it will therefore be necessary that a squadron of his Majesty's ships do return next spring to the Baltick, and it would be extreemly difficult to fit out one by reason of the backwardness of seamen to list themselves, if they feared they must winter in Sueden. These reasons together with those mentioned in my former have been represented here to the prince of Hess¹ and Baron Sparr, who found them so solid that they acquiesced to them. But his Majesty, to give the king of Sueden all possible proofs of his friendship, commands you that when you sail for England with the main of your squadron you leave behind five or six frigates in Sueden, to continue there so long as the sea is open and that 'tis probable they may get away before the ice comes in. You will repeat at the same time to his Majesty the assurances that a squadron of his Majesty's ships will return at least as soon next year as they did this, and that a detachment of them will sail by the latter end of February for Gottenborough.

As to other affairs, which occasion Baron Sparr's returning to Sueden, I must refer you to M^r Finch, to whom I write upon that subject, and you will continue to concur with him to the ends proposed by his Majesty. I wish you a safe voyage home.

STANHOPE TO FINCH.

(*Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 221, copies.*)

à Hanovre le 1re Octobre 1720.

Vous aurez vu par mon autre lettre et par mes précédentes, et par celles que Mr. Schaub vous a écrites, que nous croyons que le principal but du roy de Suède doit être à présent d'accélérer autant qu'il peut sa paix avec le Czar et d'établir dans sa maison la succes-

¹ Prince William of Hesse-Cassel, brother of Frederick I of Sweden.

sion à son royaume. Et je ne vous fais cette lettre particulière que pour vous dire que si le roy de Suède voyoit jour à réussir dans ces deux points, et que moyennant sa paix il nous épargnât l'envoy d'une escadre pour l'année prochaine, le Roy seroit disposé à luy fournir encore jusqu'à 100^m livres sterling, outre la somme pour laquelle il vous autorise maintenant de tirer sur M^r Lowndes.¹ Mais vous ménagerez cecy de manière à n'offrir au roy de Suède qu'autant qu'il sera nécessaire pour porter coup. Il ne seroit pas de la bienséance d'entrer avec le roy de Suède dans aucun engagement formel touchant la succession, avant qu'elle soit établie ; mais vous pouvez l'assurer qu'aussy tôt qu'elle le sera sa Majesté prendra avec luy tous les engagements les plus forts pour la soutenir. Nous ne saurions assez nous louer du Baron de Sparre. Il paroît être entièrement de notre opinion à tous égards, de même que le prince Guillaume de Hesse, et vous devez user envers luy d'une entière confiance. Vous devez agir avec Mr. de Campredon de manière qu'il ne puisse ni se plaindre que vous luy couvriez vos démarches ni vous en diminuer le mérite auprès du roy de Suède.

à Hanovre ce 5e Novembre 1720.

No. 1.

Les nouvelles que je vous apprends aujourd'huy doivent achever de convaincre le roy de Suède que non seulement il persisteroit inutilement à vouloir former quelque concert contre le Czar, mais qu'en continuant la guerre il s'exposeroit à un autre concert, auquel il ne pourroit guère espérer de résister avec toute l'assistance de ses amis. L'Empereur s'étant une fois déclaré contre la succession de Hesse en Suède, il n'y a qu'une paix précipitée qui puisse prévenir qu'il n'entre là dessus en des engagements formels avec le Czar et la Pologne. Dans lesquels ces trois puissances trouveroient bien moyen de faire entrer d'autres. La cession du Sleswick et de tout le Holstein pour le roy de Danemarc, et l'acquisition de toute la Pomeranie pour le roy de Prusse, seroient de terribles tentations ; au lieu que si en faisant promptement la paix le roy de Suède établisoit sa succession dans sa maison non seulement nous luy en donnerions notre garantie, mais nous nous ferions forts de luy procurer aussy celles de la Prusse et du Danemarc, conjointement

¹ William Lowndes, Secretary to the Treasury, see the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

avec celle de la France. Alors je doute qu'il prenne envie à l'Empereur de débusquer la maison de Hesse, et la Suède pourra s'évertuer quand ses intérêts et ceux de la cause publique demanderont.

No. 2.

. Le prince Guillaume de Hesse et le comte Taube,¹ pénétrez de la solidité de nos pensées et de la nécessité de les mettre au plus tôt en œuvre, écrivent là dessus de longues et de fortes lettres au roy de Suède, à qui celle de Mr. de Taube parle comme si l'établissement de la succession devoit distinctement précéder la paix. Et il me paroît plus sûr et plus praticable de travailler en même tems à la paix et à la succession dans les états de Suède. L'un facilitera l'autre ; car je crois que sa Majesté Suédoise ne sauroit mieux faire sa cour aux Suédois, lassez de la guerre, qu'en leur proposant la paix. D'ailleurs nous ne nous sommes portez à offrir au roy de Suède une somme si considérable pour disposer les esprits dans le sénat et dans les états que dans la supposition que cela suffiroit pour l'une et l'autre de nos deux fins, et que par là nous serions dispensez de renvoyer une escadre dans la Baltique l'année prochaine. Aussi le prince de Hesse et Mr. de Taube conviennent que si nous fournissons à sa Majesté Suédoise 100 livres sterling, outre les 20^m livres pour lesquelles vous avez déjà été autorisé à tirer, elle aura suffisamment de quoy se rendre maître des délibérations du sénat et des états. Je partiray d'icy en trois ou quatre jours, et dès mon arrivée à Londres je feray les dispositions pour que la dite somme des 100^m livres sterling puisse en divers payemens être delivrée au roy de Suède, si vous voyez que moyennant cet argent les choses s'acheminent selon nos souhaits, et que sa Majesté Suédoise s'y adonne tout de bon. Au reste si, cette somme employée, le roy de Suède ne pouvoit pas parvenir cet hyver à sa paix avec les Russes, quoyqu'il eût tout fait de son côté pour l'obtenir, comme en ce cas il seroit injuste de l'abandonner à leur fureur, sa Majesté Suédoise pourroit toujours faire fond sur le retour de notre flotte dans le tems marqué par nos dernières lettres au chevalier Norris.

N° 3 (*Record Office, S.P. Foreign, Sweden 28*).

[Arguments at length on the absolute necessity of Sweden concluding peace with Russia as speedily as possible. An accompany-

¹ Count Gustaf Adam Taube, governor of Stockholm, of the king's party.

ing letter from George I to Frederick I contained the words : " Je conjure votre Majesté, en sincère ami et allié, de ne point perdre de tems à conclure votre paix avec le Czar et à pourvoir, autant qu'en vous est, aux inconvéniens et aux dangers auxquels votre situation présente vous expose et votre royaume."]

TOWNSHEND (AGAIN SECRETARY OF STATE ON STANHOPE'S DEATH)
TO FINCH.

(*Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 155, copies.*)

Whitehall, 1 March 1720/1.

Randall the messenger brought me on Monday your publick and private letters to the late Earl Stanhope of the 8th of last month O.S., which I have laid before the King and am to acquaint you that his Majesty was very glad to find by them that the Swedes were so earnest and intent on making their peace with the Czar. Provided it be done to the satisfaction of Sweden the King is very little concerned whether it be carry'd on with or without Mons^r Campredon's interposition. I make no question but you know enough of the situation of his Majesty's affairs in particular, as well as of those in the north, in the Empire, and elsewhere in general, to judge nothing can be more welcome to the King than to hear that the Swedes carry on their negotiations at Neustadt with success and that they are likely to bring them soon to a happy conclusion.

If they find themselves disappointed in Sweden of any expectations they might have justly founded on the court of France I am perswaded the most partial cannot in any wise impute the same to any want of endeavour or to any slackness in solicitation on the King's part, and you may again assure his Swedish Majesty and the senate of this truth, as you have already very rightly done and I doubt not to their satisfaction with regard to us. As to his Majestys engagements you may very readily renew your assurances, where it shall be necessary, that they shall be punctually performed ; the King's fleet will infallibly be sent to the Baltick in good time, the subsidys which are due shall be paid this week, and every thing his Majesty has promised by his treatys to the crown of Sweden shall be done in the fullest extent.

Before I conclude this letter I cannot help expressing to you my joy to find upon my return to this employment that the king of Sweden has placed Count Horn at the head of his affairs. I have

not indeed the honour personally to know him, but I remember very well, when I was her late Majesty's ambassador at the Hague, the very prudent and honorable part he acted then at the head of the regency at Stockholm, and particularly in that great and important business of the neutrality. The King, I assure you, is very well pleased, as are all his ministers, to see this gentleman in the post he so worthily fills, and indeed all who wish well to Sweden or to the common good of the northern affairs must be extremely glad to find that a minister of so much honour, and of so consummate knowledge and experience, is so wisely entrusted with the management of the chief business of that kingdom.

Whitehall, 21st March 1720/1.

. The melancholy description you gave of the great streights the kingdom of Sweden is reduced to affected the King with a very sensible concern, and as his Majesty has great compassion for their wants he has done his utmost to relieve them in so lamentable a condition by paying a considerable sum of money to the Swedish minister here, which was a great effort in his Majesty, considering the scarcity we also lye under here for money upon the disorders the failure of the South Sea scheme has occasion'd in credit and trade, and the summ, I assure you, was not raised without a good deal of difficulty.

We are going on with the equipment of the Baltick squadron with all the expedition possible and it is very near ready. We have likewise had great difficultys to struggle through in that matter, but the king of Sweden may depend upon it that the fleet will be as early on his coasts as they can be of use to him. And his Majesty, who has the interests of that king extremely at heart, will feel a particular joy and satisfaction if the countenance of his fleet can contribute to better the conditions of Sweden with the Czar and help to procure a peace on such terms as they may be contented with.

Whitehall, 31st March 1721.

. I have now in my hands three letters which the King has received from the king of Sweden since I had the honour to return to this post. The two first relate to the payment of the subsidys and to the advancing a sum of 200^m crowns towards the building of fifty galleys, and by the third his Majesty is requested to lend four battallions towards reinforcing the garrison of Stralsund

and to advance 100^m crowns on the subsidys towards erecting magazins and putting that place in a condition to keep the numerous garrison that is necessary for it's defence. As to the part which relates to subsidys I have already informed you that it has been complied with by payments which have actually been made. And as to what concerns the summ of money for the building of galleys the present circumstances of the King's money-affairs here are such that it is absolutely impossible for his Majesty to assist the king of Sweden with the summ desired for that purpose, but as to the troops which his Swedish Majesty presses should be lent on account of the apprehensions concerning Stralsund the King, to show how seriously he lays to heart that prince's interests, did immediately send to the king of Prussia to know whether he would not joyn two of his battalions with as many of his Majesty's for the above-mentioned service. This the King did with a view to engage the king of Prussia in a step, which in his Majesty's opinion may be of farther use to Sweden during their negotiations in Finland than barely the defence of Stralsund; since the Czar, seeing such a measure entred into by the king of Prussia, will undoubtedly judge that this prince has been awakened into a true sense of his great progresses and ambitious designs, which thought must make him more circumspect in his proceedings and consequently incline him to grant more reasonable conditions to the crown of Sweden than he might otherwise intend to do. On the other hand the joyning the Prussians in the garrisoning of Stralsund cannot bring any inconveniencys upon the Swedes, for the troops already in the town, with those from the King and what we find the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel has promised to lend, will be strong enough to take away all apprehensions of danger from only two Prussian battalions. The king of Prussia has taken this overture from hence just as his Majesty intended it, as a mark of his Majesty's great confidence in him, and has sent word that his two battalions shall be ready to march whenever his Majesty and the king of Sweden shall think it proper to call for them. His Majesty is further of opinion that these Prussian troops will be of a more particular use for the security of Stralsund, because while they are in the town it will not be in the power of the Czar to attack it without breaking at the same time with Prussia, whereas on the contrary, if his Majesty's troops only were there, the great animosity the Czar has against the King might be a strong inducement to him to attack the place and break openly

with the King the first fair opportunity he had of doing it. Wherefore his Majesty is firmly resolved not to send any of his troops thither unless they be joyned by those of the king of Prussia, as he very plainly and expressly declared to Baron Sparre here yesterday morning.

As the King is most heartily desirous to support the king of Sweden as farr as he is able in this critical juncture his Majesty, as a further instance of these his most friendly and sincere inclinations, has resolved to make another effort in respect to the matters of money. And therefore, as there will be thirty thousand pound due on the subsidys by the latter end of May next, the King gives his consent that his Swedish Majesty may draw bills for that summ payable on the last day of the said month of May and then they will be very punctually answered. But I am to observe to you that all this will be done and paid only on this express condition, that the pay of the four battalions of the King's and the Prussian troops, which are to be employed as above said, shall be deducted out of the moneys that shall become due and be payable to Sweden after the end of May next.

By all these instances the king of Sweden will have the most convincing proofs of his Majesty's very particular care of his interests in all respects. Such a squadron of ships of war sent to the Baltick as his Majesty's will be, and such punctual payments of a large subsidy under the great difficultys we have at present here in raising money, are not only the most evident marks of the King's true zeal and friendship for his Swedish Majesty and of his tender concern for the safety of his kingdom but are such as could not flow from any heart but one that was warmed with the most strong and affectionate inclinations towards him.

You may assure the ministers in Sweden that the Baltick squadron will be now with them very soon and that Sir John Norris will command it again, as he has done before, his last instructions being now ordered to be prepared.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SIR JOHN NORRIS, 4 AND 5 APRIL, 1721.

(*Record Office, F.O. King's Letters 65, copies.*)

[Identical with those of the previous year, save for substitution of "king" for "queen" of Sweden and additional orders to bring the fleet home at the earliest opportunity of wind and weather in September.]

TOWNSHEND TO FINCH.

(Record Office, Foreign Entry Book, 155, copies.)

Whitehall, 7th April 1721.

You are without doubt sufficiently informed of Mons^r Campredon's negotiations at Petersburg; by the accounts we have of them the King looks upon Livonia as in a manner lost to the Swedes. The firmness of the Czar on the one hand, and on the other the easiness Mons^r Campredon has shewn in giving in to the expedient of a sum of money to be paid in lieu of Livonia, has given the Czar such an advantage in the negotiation that it is certain in his present situation he will never be brought to depart from this demand.

Besides, it will be no small encouragement to him to observe so great a facility in a minister of France, from whence he knows the king of Sweden might so justly have expected a great part of his support.

It is true that the engagements the Czar farther offers to enter into, not to trouble Sweden in their domestick affairs nor to support the duke of Holstein in his pretensions, are of great consequence to that nation and to the king of Sweden in particular, who in that case may depend upon the supply of which he has already had repeated promises from the King our master.

Upon the whole his Majesty is sorry to see that Sweden is brought to such extremitys, but there is but little hopes of their bettering the conditions of peace by continuing the war and he laments that so great a prince and so brave a kingdom should be obliged to undergo such hard conditions. His Majesty, however, is determined, in order to avoid all reproach for the future, not to offer his opinion on so tender and important a point. He comforts himself with not only having above measure perform'd all the engagements he was under to the king of Sweden but likewise with having endeavoured to form such a concert among the neighbouring powers as might have saved Sweden from the necessity of submitting to such hard terms.¹ You are therefore to look upon all that has been written to you of his Majesty's sentiments in relation to the peace as written only for your own private information, and are to make no use of it in the King's name but as from yourself. In discoursing

¹ George I had endeavoured, without success, to form against Russia a league of all the powers interested in northern affairs.

on this subject you may employ those arguments to induce the king of Sweden to accept of the terms proposed by the Czar without giving the least reason to suspect that you have had any instructions from the King on that head. For the situation of his Majesty's affairs here is such as will by no means allow of the constant annual expence which this squadron and the subsidys oblige him to, especially since there is no probability of reaping the fruit which the king of Sweden proposed to himself from his Majesty's support. And seeing that nobody else will engage in the quarrel we ought as good Englishmen and good Swedes to wish for the peace even on the terms proposed.

Whitehall, 28 April 1721.

. By the advices the King has received of M^r Campredon's negotiation with the Czar his conduct has been most unaccountable in yielding so easily to the Czar's keeping Livonia ; the offer, however, we are told that the Czar makes of a good sum of money for it and an absolute engagement never to intermeddle with the domestick affairs of Sweden and not to assist the duke of Holstein in any manner in his pretensions ought to be of the greatest weight with the king of Sweden in his present circumstances. These two articles, can they be obtained, will at once, in a manner, put an end to the Holstein faction and defeat all that duke claims and designs. It is not, therefore, to be doubted but that his party will venture every thing to prevent the peace's being made upon those terms and in order to that will use their utmost efforts for the rendering the treaty at Neustadt fruitless ; seeing plainly by driving the king to continue the war, or transferring the negotiations to Brunswick, they must in the end equally in either event carry their point ; it being scarce to be imagined that the Emperor will ever be prevailed upon to favour the settling the succession of Sweden in the present king of Sweden's family, as you rightly observe. I did in truth believe that the thoughts of settling that succession in the family of Hesse, antecedent to a peace, had been quite vanished, for on the one hand the pressure of the warr must in general very much alienate the minds of the Suedes from the king, and on the other the countenance and support that the Czar gives the duke of Holstein cannot fail to encourage and strengthen the faction in Sweden. But if by a peace that duke should be deprived of all hopes of succour and assistance from the Czar it is very evident

that his Swedish Majesty would have much more room and ease to get the succession to that crown settled in his own family. And I suppose by this time every reasonable man in Sweden must have lost all manner of hopes of the possibility of forming a concert sufficient to drive the Czar out of the conquer'd provinces, and consequently no one will make any objection to the hastning the peace upon such a vain expectation.

As to what you mention of the promise which the King made by the late Earl Stanhope to supply his Swedish Majesty with 100^m ^{lb} to help him to conclude his peace with the Czar this year, and likewise towards obtaining the consent of the States of Sweden for settling the succession to that crown in the family of Hesse Cassel, you know very well that it appears by that very letter, which you mention, that the chief consideration for making that offer was the hopes of having thereby the peace so farr advanced last winter that his Majesty might have saved the expence of fitting out his fleet which is now actually sailed to the Baltick, and therefore for certain the king of Sweden is not well founded to insist on any demand of this kind at present, since we have been at the charge of equipping and sending to his assistance a very strong squadron. Were the peace concluded and consequently the squadron recalled his Swedish Majesty need not doubt but the King will perform his engagements in this particular as well as in all others.

Whitehall, 12 May 1721.

I am now to acknowledge the favour of your letters to me of the 22th and 26th of last month, which I received this morning and have laid them before the King. His Majesty is extremely well pleased and satisfied with the wise and seasonable resolution the king and senate of Sweden are come to of concluding their peace out of hand with the Czar, and with the share you had in bringing them to so necessary a determination by cutting off the delays which were industriously sought by some there. The King is of opinion that the resolution which they have now unanimously taken cannot fail of being justified not only by every honest Suede but also by every one else that wishes well to the safety and true interest of that poor kingdom, since it is evident to all the world that in the present circumstances there is nothing to be expected from the continuance of the war but the aggrandizing of the Czar

at the further expence, if not to the utter ruin and desolation of that exhausted country.

As the first fruits we expect from the conclusion of this peace will be the speedy return of our fleet from the Baltick his Majesty thinks fit that you should take some opportunity of insinuating to the king of Sweden that the sooner the fleet returns home the better will his Majesty be able to pay that summ of money, which he has promised to give after the peace is made. But thô this is a very desirable thing, yet you must take your time and employ your address so as not to give the king of Sweden any uneasiness, as if we intended only to save our own expences, although it might incommode his affairs, which the King has not the least design to do and therefore will not send his orders to his admiral to return as long as the king of Sweden has any use or service for him there.

Whitehall, 17th June 1721.

. You may assure the king of Sweden that if he desires his Majesty's guaranty of the peace to be concluded with the Muscovites it will be very readily granted him, and you need not be in the least pain upon that head, if you should have taken upon you to have made the same declaration Mons^r Campredon had done before this comes to your hands. But I must observe to you that as the King will be required to give his guaranty of the treaty now to be made between Sweden and the Czar it is become still more necessary for his Majesty to have the article I formerly sent you inserted in that treaty so to be guarantied.¹ We are not, it is true, in open warr with the Czar, yet the sending our squadrons every year into the Baltick to protect Sweden may be construed to amount to little less and consequently afford the Czar a specious pretence to give his Majesty disturbance after the peace of Sweden is finished, unless timely precaution is taken to prevent it by some article in that very treaty; and it would be pretty extraordinary that the King should give his guaranty to the peace made between the crown of Sweden and the Czar and at the same time lye exposed to his Czarish Majesty's resentment for what he had done in defence of that kingdom; and further the King will be under great if not insurmountable difficulties in complying with his engagements to the king of Sweden as to the hundred thousand pounds he is to pay

¹ The article, namely, including George I in the treaty both as king and as elector.

him after the peace if, when the said peace is made, he is still left exposed and obliged to be at a great expence to protect his subjects against the Czar ; and therefore in these views you will see that it is of the greatest necessity that the insertion of the article I mentioned should not miscarry.

The King was very much moved when he saw in your private letter the account you give of the ill condition of the king of Sweden's private affairs. His Majesty wishes it were in his power to furnish him with a considerable assistance at present, but the state of the King's own money matters is such that he cannot exert himself as he would otherwise willingly do. However, as much straitned as his Majesty is for money, he is resolved to give the king of Sweden as great a supply as he is able ; and therefore [if] his Swedish Majesty will order bills to be drawn for the summ of ten thousand pounds sterling, in part of the summ formerly promised, payable at two usance from the time you shall receive this letter, they shall be punctually answered. This, you see, is a new mark of the Kings great affection for his Swedish Majesty and of his concern for his interests, and no doubt it will add a new weight to your instances with respect to the article which you are directed by all means to procure to be inserted in the treaty with the Czar.

Whitehall, 4 July 1721.

Last Saturday yours of the 14th of June came to my hands and I have since laid it before the King. His Majesty took particular notice of the restriction made in Mons^r Romanoff's¹ declaration concerning the interests of the duke of Holstein, which the Czar would abandon as farr only as they regard Sweden. This seems a very evident mark of his Czarish Majesty's intentions to support his pretensions elsewhere and that in his favour he has still thoughts of bringing disturbances into Germany and turning his efforts towards Sleswick and Holstein. These views which the Czar seems to reserve to himself give the King great reason to be more and more solicitous to have the article I have so often mentioned inserted without fail, and his Majesty hopes that the most effectual care has been taken by all the methods I have suggested to you to have that important point secured. And his Majesty

¹ Presumably Adjutant-General Aleksandr Rumyantsev, employed by Peter the Great in his negotiation with Sweden.

would have you, upon the just suspicions which this limited declaration furnishes, renew your instances with the utmost vigour and let the king of Sweden see among other arguments that his own interest will be particularly concerned in that affair, since it can scarce be expected that his Majesty should pay that considerable summ of money, which he promised, in case new troubles should arise in Germany and consequently great expences ensue upon the Czar's making any attempts towards Sleswick or Holstein or any of those parts of the Empire on pretence of favouring the interests and demands of the duke of Holstein.

Whitehall, 9th August 1721.

Since my last to you of the 27th of July which I sent by Capt. Brimmer I have received your's of the 19th of the same month and have laid it before the King, who is sorry, as you will easily believe, to see that new difficultys daily arise at Neustadt in the affair of that long and here at least eagerly wisht for peace. We have had a tedious though successfull session of parliament, which we are to end to morrow, and a happy conclusion of the conferences at Neustadt would have furnished his Majesty with a paragraph in his speech, that would have given vast satisfaction to the whole nation, which is grown to the last degree weary of this northern war. The length to which the conferences at Neustadt have been protracted, beyond what was at first expected, has given room and occasion to doubts and fears with regard to the success of them, and the advices the King receives from Berlin and other places would give him great uneasiness as to this particular, were it not for the letters which come from you, upon whose ability and diligence he very much depends. A demand the Swedish minister has made has not a little contributed to alarm us. He has desired in his master's name that the King would assist him immediately with 20,000^{lb} to be employed amongst the Russ ministry in order to induce them to drop the demands made in favour of the duke of Holstein. His Majesty has complied with the king of Sweden's desires in this particular, and Baron Sparre has already had credit given him for that sum. The King has likewise given this further instance of his friendship and concern for his Swedish Majesty's interest and service, that he has agreed, in case the peace is made by next October and that he is included in it both as king and elector, he will then give bills for the remainder of the 100,000^l at

such times of payment that the whole shall be paid by April next. When once these last bills are given his Swedish Majesty may at a little expense in negociating them be master of the money as soon as he pleases. Thus you see our master does every thing that is asked of him towards the support of the king of Sweden, and he in return ought to do every thing on his part towards freeing this kingdom from the intolerable burthens and expence we lye under upon his account, especially since all we have done or can do will be in no degree sufficient to support him or even to protect him, should the war be continued, be the reasons for continuing it never so strong or justifiable. If ever, therefore, you find reason to apprehend that the court of Sweden has the least inclinations to break up the conferences and to go on with the war you must then remember the orders I sent you when Sir John Norris went from hence, and do everything (as you were then directed), as from yourself and not in the King's name, to induce them to submit to any terms rather than to pursue the war, which can end in nothing but the king and the kingdom of Sweden's entire destruction. I must here by the King's particular command take notice of an engagement his Majesty has some time since entered into jointly with France, which you very well remember, to give for his share 20,000*l* to induce the Czar's court to make peace with Sweden. His Majesty, having now furnished the king of Sweden with this sum for the same purposes, thinks it would be very unreasonnable for him to pay it twice. The King would therefore have you give Mo^r Campredon a hint of this, that he, knowing what the King has already done, may not put his Majesty to any further expence on this head. You will take care to do this in such a manner as not to give any offence to Mons^r Campredon, for whom his Majesty has all manner of esteem and regard.

Whitehall, 22d August 1721.

On Saturday last I received by the post your letter of the 2d inst. and yester night Camara the messenger brought me that of the 6th, with cōpys of Mons^r Osterman's ¹ letter to M^r Campredon and of his answer to it enclosed.

The King was very well pleased to find by your last dispatch that

¹ The famous Russian minister Heinrich Johann Friedrich (Andrei Ivanovich) Osterman, one of the Russian plenipotentiaries at Nystad and who had conducted the former negotiations with Goertz.

the chief points in dispute between the Czar and the crown of Sweden were entirely adjusted; that the article relating to the tranquility of the Circle of Lower Saxony was inserted in the very terms which I sent to you; and that Count Lillienstedt¹ had by his letter explained the Czar's meaning as to Sweden's sending an ambassadour into Poland in such a manner as makes it appear rather a matter of form than any thing that will in its consequence affect the king of Sweden or the affairs of that kingdom.

The King thinks that it is not much to be wonder'd at that those of the duke of Holstein's faction appear now less inclined to the peace than they did before. Since the Czar has wholly abandon'd that duke's interests they will no doubt stir heaven and earth to hinder the conclusion of the treaty at Neustadt in order to remove the negociation to Brunswick, where they may hope for more favour and better success under the mediation and countenance of the Emperor. This therefore ought to be the strongest argument with the king of Sweden for finishing every thing at Neustadt, by getting the principal treaty signed and all matters in dispute adjusted there, and that he likewise press the doing all this with the utmost expedition, that the Imperialists the Danes and the Prussians joyn'd with the Holsteyn faction may have less time and opportunity to work their ends and embarrass the conclusion of the peace. If therefore the treaty is not signed before this dispatch comes to your hands you will represent what I now write in the clearest and strongest light to the king of Sweden and show him that he is now in one of the greatest crises of his reign and that he has not only the Czar to struggle with but also the whole strength of the duke of Holsteyn's party, which, were his peace once made with the Czar, he might afterwards deal with on much easier terms. I need not repeat what I have so often inculcated to you concerning the necessity of the peace in the north's being made at this juncture and that you are to spare no pains with the king or the senators, as you find occasion to apply to them, in making the most vigorous instances on this head, which you will do either in the King's name or as from your self, as you shall judge most proper to attain this end and as I have suggested to you in my former letters. . . .

I must not conclude without adding again that if the king of Sweden does not take upon him to go through with this congress and to finish all he has to do at Neustadt I look upon his affairs in

¹ Count Johan Lillienstedt, one of the Swedish plenipotentiaries at Nystad.

Sweden as ruined and lost, and his Majesty is so farr of this opinion, that if you see any ground to apprehend that the negociation will be removed to Brunswick you have his commands to make the strongest representations you possibly can against it, as I have formerly wrote to you upon this subject.

Whitehall, 26th September 1721.

You will see by my dispatch of this day the King's sentiments upon the treatment he has met with at Neustadt. I write it by his Majesty's order in French that you may read it to the king of Sweden and such of his ministers as he shall direct, which you are to take the first opportunity of doing. They will find by it that this behaviour has not made any abatement in his Majesty's affection for the king of Sweden or the Swedish nation, and how much the King is mortified at this incident having put it out of his power to continue that assistance he intended them.

I have by his Majesty's order acquainted in Baron Sparre's absence, who is at Bath, his secretary with his Majesty's resolution on this head and have let him know that the King cannot advance any more money to Sweden; and notice has likewise been given to the Swedish merchants here, who have hitherto been employed in the remittances, to accept no more bills.

My veneration for the king of Sweden has put me under the greatest uneasiness ever since I received the news of the King our master's being so neglected in the transaction at Neustadt, and the more because I cannot see how this matter can be redrest in the body of the treaty. I can think but of one thing that perhaps might be of service in this case, which is that the king of Sweden and the Czar should joyn in a declaration that his Majesty shall, notwithstanding the reservation, be deemed to be included in the treaty without any condition and as fully and effectually as if that reservation had never been inserted. If this could be brought about so soon, that we might receive such a declaration soon after the opening of the session, it might possibly be a means of having this affair set right; but as this is only a private thought of my own, unless you believe there is something in it I desire you would not so much as mention it, and if you do, suggest it as from your self.

I do not write to Sir John Norris because we expect he will be here with his squadron before this can come to your hands.

Whitehall, 10th November 1721.

I could do little more in my last than acknowledge yours of the 18th of October. I now send you by his Majesty's order a copy of my Lord Carterets letter to Sir Luke Schaub,¹ which will give you a full and compleat view of his Majesty's sentiments as well in relation to what has passed at Neustadt as to any future negotiations with the Czar. You will see what it is his Majesty desires should be done for him and the manner in which he expects it should be transacted. This letter must therefore serve you as instructions for your conduct at the court where you are, and you must endeavour to prevail with the king of Sweden to give the necessary orders to his minister with the Czar to joyn heartily in the instances Mo^r Campredon is to make for the obtaining the several points mention'd in the enclosed dispatch. Baron Sparr has been very pressing and very importunate in his solicitations for getting the 14000^{lb} paid which is part of the 20000^{lb} the king of Sweden was to have received, but his Majesty has been already so punctual and generous in his payments hitherto that his former liberality, joyn'd with the treatment he has received at Neustadt, has, I fear, put it out of his power to comply with what the king of Sweden desires. His Swedish Majesty has the less reason to complain, if he should fail of this summ of money, the chief difficultys that obstruct his having it having arisen from the Swedes themselves, as I explained to you in my dispatch of the 26th of September last. However, his Majesty has the king of Sweden's interest so much at heart that he is using his utmost endeavours to find out an expedient for preventing his being totally disappointed of this summ.

[Postscript.] You will take care not to communicate the enclosed letter to any body, but only make use of the contents of it.

Whitehall, 30th November 1722.

The King having received some advices as if several of the senators threw the blame of the bad peace with the Czar upon his Majesty, and talk as if his ministers were the chief occasion that Sweden submitted to such hard terms, his Majesty is not a little surprized at such unjust assertions among people of distinction in that country, who ought to be convinced that his Majesty was the

¹ Now in charge of affairs at Paris.

only ally who really and effectually supported Sweden and by the countenance of his fleets and the punctual payment of the subsidys endeavoured to enable that crown to procure better conditions. It would be too long and needless with you to enter into a detail of the circumstances of Sweden, of the Czar, and of the rest of Europe at that time to show what were the cogent motives that induced the king and senate to come to an unanimous resolution in April 1721 of concluding a peace immediately with the Czar. You know by the orders you received how tender his Majesty always was of offering his opinion on that nice and important point, that you were not allowed to make use of his name but only to speak as from your self, whenever you had occasion to discourse upon that subject. You saw plainly the unfortunate situation which obliged Sweden, to his Majestys great sorrow and regret, to yield to what the Czar was pleased to offer, and you knew that as they had not been pressed by any one to take that resolution they had not any one to blame for it. In short, as you are thoroughly master of the whole proceedings, and know with how little ground such a calumny is thrown upon the King, his Majesty would have you inform yourself particularly of the persons who hold such discourses and endeavour to silence their malice by showing the falsity and injustice of such an imputation. And it is his Majesty's pleasure likewise that you should in this whole affair act in concert with Mons^r Bassewitz.

Whitehall, 5th February 1722/3.

. The King continues to receive advices that Count Welling¹ does not desist from threatening to throw upon his Majesty in the dyet the whole blame of the late peace with the Czar, and those accounts add that Count Horn intends likewise to support the same accusation and to charge all that matter upon his Majesty's perswasions. I am therefore to renew the orders I sent you formerly upon that head and to desire that you would not only be watchful of any proceedings of that nature but also from time to time give me full accounts of all you can learn upon this and the like subjects and particularly what are the infractions Count Welling alledges to have been made in the late treaty with Sweden by the King as elector ; that I may shew his Majesty how very attentive you are to discover every thing relating to his service.

¹ Vellingk.

THE SAME TO THE SAME.

(Record Office, S.P. Domestic Regencies 4, copies.)

Hanover, 15/26 August 1723.

No. 1, private.

The enclosed is writ in French, that you may communicate it to Count Horn and let him see by that the confidence the King reposes in him and with what openness his Majesty acts in regard to him. You will easily imagine that his Majesty was much surprized at the overture which has been made, at a time when he expected nothing less than such a proposal. It is the more difficult to come at the true spring of this step, since you don't let me know in your letter whether the king of Sweden was led to it by his own inclination or whether he was forced into it by the Holstein faction. It would be very much for the King's service if his Majesty were thoroughly informed of this point and knew exactly from what quarter it came. But yet, notwithstanding the uncertainty his Majesty is under upon this head, he thinks there is nothing in the inclosed letter which may not very safely be communicated to Count Horn. You will not fail to let the count, as likewise the other ministers, who assisted at the conference, know how sensible the King is of the zeal they have shown for his service on this occasion.

The King directs that you should let Count Horn very clearly and explicitly understand that his Majesty will on no account enter into any negociation whatsoever, unless the Czar shall declare beforehand that he is willing to settle a perfect good correspondence and friendship with his Majesty and to remember no more those incidents, which have hitherto hindered a friendly union between the two crowns.

You will take care to communicate the letter inclosed to Mons^r Bassewitz, who has orders from the King to act in concert with you and to conform himself in every thing to the instructions which I send you from his Majesty.

No. 2.

J'ay bien reçu votre lettre du 31^e du mois passé V.S. et je l'ay mise sans perte de tems devant le Roy, comme le sujet de la conférence y mentionnée étoit d'une très grande importance. Sa Majesté y a vu avec beaucoup de satisfaction les assurances, que le comte de Horn a données, de l'attention très sincère que la

Suède aura, selon les promesses cy-devant faites, de ne conclure l'alliance, que le Czar recherche, sans que le Roy n'y soit compris comme une partie principale. C'est une preuve de l'amitié de la Suède, que sa Majesté prise beaucoup, et elle y répondra de son côté avec les témoignages d'amitié les plus cordiaux, comme elle est entièrement persuadée que les intérêts des deux nations doivent être toujours inséparables. Le Roy vous ordonne donc là dessus de faire ses remercimens de la manière la plus forte au comte de Horn et aux autres ministres, qui ont eu part à la conférence, des ouvertures de grande confiance que le dit comte vous avoit faites, et des expressions pleines d'affection pour les intérêts de sa Majesté, dont il s'est servi en vous communiquant la proposition faite de la part du Czar. Et vous pouvés les assurer au nom du Roy que sa Majesté est tout prête à entrer dans la négociation pour une telle alliance, comme partie principale, et à concourir à toutes les mesures pour avancer les véritables intérêts de la Suède. Le Roy a esté bien aise de remarquer que le comte de Horn croyoit que le Czar estoit dans une si bonne disposition, que l'admission de sa Majesté dans cette négociation pour une alliance comme partie principale ne souffriroit aucune difficulté. Et sa Majesté est fort obligée au dit comte pour la délicatesse qu'il a montré à son égard en voulant que les différens, qu'il y auroient peut être entre elle et le Czar, soient accommodés avant que d'entamer cette alliance. Le Roy ne s'imagine pas qu'il y en ait aucun qui a besoin d'être applani par négociation. Le seul dont le Roy a entendu parler c'est qu'on prétend de la part du Czar que son honneur a esté blessé par le renvoy de son ministre hors de l'Angleterre, à cause d'un mémoire qu'il avoit présenté,¹ mais tout le monde qui connoit cette affaire au fond jugera que s'il y a encore quelque réparation à demander, c'est le Roy au quel on devoit donner une satisfaction ultérieure : le Roy est fâché de ce qui est arrivé à ce ministre, pour le quel d'ailleurs il avoit toute l'estime possible et dont la conduite et le mérite personnel luy auroient fait beaucoup de plaisir, sans cet incident extraordinaire. Car à dire le tout en peu de mots, ce mémoire, qui a esté dressé en réponse à quelques feuilles volantes, qui ont esté publiées en Angleterre sans aveu et sans autorité, a esté rempli des réflexions si énormes et si violentes contre le Roy et contre son gouvernement, en veue d'animer une faction des mé-

¹ The reference is to the expulsion of Mikhail Bestuzhev from London in 1720, see *Chance, George I and the Northern War*, p. 450.

contens dans le royaume, qu' il n'y avoit nul moyen d'éviter ce qui s'en est ensuivi et de faire sortir d'Angleterre un ministre qui avoit fait un affront si criant contre l'honneur et la dignité de la couronne de la Grande Bretagne. On pourroit citer plusieurs exemples, tant en Angleterre qu'en France et ailleurs, de cette sorte de renvoys des ministres, sans que les cours qui les avoient envoyés en demandassent aucune satisfaction. Et le Roy ayant fait éclater cette juste marque de son ressentiment n'en garde pas d'avantage, et si le Czar est disposé à nouer une amitié et bonne correspondance sans se ressouvenir de ce qui s'est passé, où le tort est évidemment de son côté, le Roy y donnera les mains très volontiers. Et aussitost que le comte de Horn vous fera sçavoir que le Czar consent d'admettre le Roy dans cette négociation, de la manière que je viens de vous marquer, sa Majesté vous enverra ses pleinpouvoirs et ses instructions afin que vous y entriés en son nom comme une des parties principales. Et comme le Roy n'a rien à demander du Czar pour soy même que son amitié, il fera tout son possible et emploiera tout son crédit et tous ses offices pour avancer le bien et la prospérité de la Suède, qui luy tiennent fort à cœur.

THE SAME TO THE SAME.

(*Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 155, copies.*)

Whitehall, 24th March 1723/4.

On Friday last Spear the messenger brought me your dispatch of the 4th with the copys of the defensive allyance lately signed between Sweden and Muscovy, and of the separate and secret articles and the act relating to the duke of Holstein's succession, all which I have laid before the King. His Majesty takes notice that in the secret article the Swedes have gone no further hitherto in positive and express terms than to promise the employing of good offices with Denmark and elsewhere for procuring the restitution of Sleswick to the duke of Holstein, but the latter part of the article carrys such strong intimations of further more effectual measures to be used for that purpose, in case the former fail, that undoubtedly the Danes will construe those expressions to mean nothing less than the intention of levying war and attacking them in order to compleat this restitution. His Majesty has no particular orders to give you at present upon these matters, only I observed a desire in his Majesty to be more circumstantially informed of all that passed

relating to this treaty than what you had writ in your last dispatch, wherefore as a friend I advise you to be more full and minute than you usually are and to give exact and ample accounts of what passes at Stockholm, particularly with respect to this new allyance.

The King would not have you say anything in his name to the Swedish ministers concerning this transaction, and if they or the Muscovites or Holstein ministers should speak to you upon it you may take what they offer ad referendum and give an account of it to his Majesty.

Whitehall, 6 July, 1724.

His Majesty has commanded me to dispatch this messenger to inform you of some particulars with regard to the court where you reside of great importance to his Majesty's service.

We have had it hinted from several quarters for some months past that the king of Sweden, tired with the confusion and disorders in which that country has for some time been involved and with the low and miserable state to which they have reduced his authority, has entertained thoughts of abdicating the crown and retiring. This would be acting so mean a part with respect to himself, and so injuriously to the honour and peace of his family, that his Majesty cannot think the king of Sweden can ever have such an intention. But we have reports, something indeed of a different nature but all tending to the same end, with which, I must tell you in confidence, his Majesty is a little more disturbed. It is positively affirmed, and that from people who by their stations are in a capacity for knowing that kingdom, that the king's enemies are grown so powerful, and he has so far lost all authority there, that it will be impossible for him to support himself against the duke of Holstein; and I need not spend much time in explaining to you of how fatal consequence such a change would be to his Majesty's affairs at this juncture and how necessary it is that his Majesty should be thoroughly informed of the present state of that kingdom, in order to be able to take proper measures in a case of so much difficulty and importance. In order, therefore, to give you the clearest and most distinct view of his Majesty's sentiments with regard to your conduct upon the particulars of this dispatch I must begin with telling you that they must remain an absolute secret, and so far from letting it be known that you have received orders to make any inquiry into the particulars above mentioned and into

the present state of Sweden, you must not even give any room to suspect that the King our master is under any concern or anxiety with relation to their affairs ; for should you let the king of Sweden or his ministers see that his Majesty is under any apprehensions upon their account, whatever may be the true state of their affairs, they would not fail of making dismal representations of their wants and necessities and of magnifying their distress, in hopes of extorting unreasonable terms and conditions from the King in their favour. You will therefore make your inquiries in the most private manner and in such a way as if they arose from your self and were meant only for your own information. You will examine into the truth of the reports abovementioned, particularly into the strength of the king's party and how far he may be able to support himself, even if the Czar should venture to assist the duke of Holstein towards getting immediate possession of the crown. You will likewise send the best account you can of the weight of the party called patriots and how they stand inclined towards the king. You will be as particular as you can as to the strength of the duke of Holstein's faction and the ground they have gained since the conclusion of the late defensive alliance with the Czar. And that you may the better conceal the true reason for sending you this express you may acquaint the king of Sweden that upon some uneasiness that his minister has shown here, as if the King had entered into new alliances with Denmark and Prussia, in which there were some conditions prejudicial to Sweden, the King our master, not content with expressing his surprize to Baron Sparre at such an uneasiness and assuring him that he had concluded no new alliance with Denmark, had sent you orders to satisfy his Swedish Majesty that those reports are groundless and to give the same assurances of his having made no new alliance with Denmarke.

STEPHEN POYNTZ

1724-1727

THE man chosen to replace William Finch at Stockholm was a trusted henchman of Lord Townshend, Stephen Poyntz, of whom there is due notice in the *Dictionary of National Biography*. He reached his post in October 1724. During the first year his task was to re-establish British as against Russian influence in Sweden and to deal with the new situation created by the death of Peter the Great in February 1725. Afterwards his efforts concentrated on obtaining the accession of Sweden—the first, with that of Holland, sought—to the treaty of Hanover, concluded between Great Britain France and Prussia on 23 August/3 September 1725. For eighteen months he and his young French colleague, the count de Brancas-Céreste, strove with the partisans of Russia and Holstein, obliged to humour the tenderesses of the constitutionalists, hampered instead of helped by their Prussian coadjutors, and unable to bring Count Horn to declare himself until in the end the riksdag of 1726 made him the master and the longer purse prevailed. The accession was signed at last on 14/25 March 1726/7. In reward for his success Poyntz was promoted ambassador and named to represent Great Britain at the congress proposed for assembly at Aix-la-Chapelle.

British squadrons sailed for the Baltic again in 1726 and 1727. In the former year Sir Charles Wager made directly for Stockholm waters, as ordered, to meet on his arrival not with the welcome expected, but with storms of angry protest, for the objects of his coming were suspect. This put the British government in the difficulty noticed in the dispatches. It must either be disclosed in Sweden that the "friends" there had solicited the coming of the fleet, to their damage, or left to be supposed in England that no

invitation had been given, with awkward results in parliament. After lying for three weeks at Elsnabben Wager sailed for the Gulf of Finland, remaining on guard off Reval till the end of September. There were no hostilities; on the contrary, convivial intercourse with the Russian officers. The main Russian fleet stayed in security at Cronslot.

The expedition of 1727, as said in the introduction, had for its primary purpose the defence of Denmark.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR STEPHEN POYNTZ, ESQ., ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY
AND PLENIPOTENTIARY TO FREDERICK I OF SWEDEN, 7 SEP-
TEMBER 1724.

(Record Office, Sweden 35, F.O. King's Letters 65, copies.)

1. Having received these Our instructions etc.
2. Upon your coming to his Swedish Majesty's court etc.
3. You will likewise have a letter from Us to Our good sister the queen of Sweden, which you are to deliver to her the first convenient time after you have had your audience of the king, adding to what We say in Our said letter such further compliments touching Our brotherly and friendly inclinations towards her Majesty as are usual and fitting on the like occasions.
4. You shall apply yourself with particular care and attention to discover the tempers and inclinations of the several senators and the party they are chiefly disposed to advance, whether that of the king or that of the duke of Holstein, and especially you shall endeavour to cultivate a strict friendship and intimacy with Count Horn, who appears to have great weight in the management of the affairs of Sweden and to have in view the general good and interest of that kingdom, which We desire likewise to promote.
5. In paying your court to the king you shall be carefull to be very well with the Sieur Diemer, who is minister there from the langrave of Hesse Cassel and who has a very great share in the favour and confidence of his Suedish Majesty.¹

¹ Major-General Ernst Hartman Diemar. His fidelity to the king had brought about his expulsion from Sweden before Poyntz came there, but that his debts incurred on Frederick's account detained him. Poyntz found him the money to get away, and he rendered good service to George I at Cassel and in London. It was evidence supplied by him, at the instigation of the British government, that brought Poyntz his first clear success, the arrest and impeachment of his chief adversary, old Count Vellingk, in November 1726.

6. You will watch and observe with your utmost diligence all the motions intrigues and negociations of the minister residing there from the Czar of Muscovy and give constant and exact accounts of what you shall discover relating to the views and designs of the Muscovite court, it being of the greatest importance to Our service to be well informed of all the Czar is carrying on in Sweden, that We may be the better enabled to prevent any new disturbances breaking out in the north.

7. You shall on all occasions protect and countenance Our subjects trading etc.

8. Whereas a representation from the Commissioners of Trade, dated the 1st of April 1715, has been laid before Us, proposing a method to be set on foot for giving regular accounts of the state of the commerce of Our subjects in foreign parts and of the increase and decrease of the same, We, having approved of the said proposal, have ordered it to be put into your hands ; and Our will and pleasure is that pursuant thereunto you do use your best care and diligence that accounts of trade be transmitted from time to time from such factorys of British merchants as are settled in any part of the king of Sweden's dominions.

9. You shall carefully maintain a good correspondence etc.

10. Whereas Our royal predecessor King Charles the 2nd etc.

11. You shall constantly correspond with our several ministers, etc.

12. At your return We shall expect a full and exact account etc.

13. You shall observe from time to time such further instructions and directions etc.

G. R.

PRIVATE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SAME, SAME DATE.

(Record Office, Sweden 35, copy.)

It having been hinted to Us from several quarters for some months past that the king of Sweden, tired with the confusion and disorder in which that country has for some time been involved and with the low and miserable state to which they have reduced his authority, has entertained thoughts of abdicating the crown and retiring, which would be acting so mean a part with respect to himself, and so injurious to the honour and peace of his family,

that We cannot think he can ever have such an intention ; but it being positively affirmed, and that by persons who by their stations are in a capacity of knowing the state of that kingdom, that his enemies are grown so powerfull, and he has so far lost all authority there, that it will be impossible for him to support himself against the duke of Holstein, even if at present the Czar should venture to assist that duke towards getting immediate possession of the crown ; We, having duly weighed the fatal consequences which such a change would bring with it to Us and Our dominions at this juncture, and being sensible of how great importance it is to Our service and the welfare of Our subjects that We should be truly informed of the state of that kingdom and give timely assistance towards preventing so pernicious an event ; and also considering with what caution and secrecy We ought to set about this inquiry, not to create jealousies abroad or give unnecessary alarms at home, nor to let the king of Sweden see how much We are concern'd for his preservation, lest he should from thence take an occasion to extort unreasonable conditions and sums of money from Us ; have made choice of you, whose fidelity capacity zeal and diligence in Our service We have with great satisfaction experienc'd upon divers occasions, to be by Us employed in the transaction of this weighty and difficult affair.

1. We do in the first place recommend it to you not to speak to any person whatsoever of the business hereby committed to your trust and care except Our principal secretary of state, from whom you will receive your dispatches, and such other person or persons with whom you are to confer upon it in pursuance of these Our instructions, which having received, together with your other dispatches, you are with all convenient speed to set forward on your way to Stockholm.

2. Being arrived there you shall take the first opportunity you can find of seeing Count Horn alone, to whom you shall in Our name give the strongest assurances of Our particular regard and kindness for him, and you shall tell him that, looking upon him to be the man of the greatest capacity and integrity at that court, the best disposed towards Us and Our nation, and who by keeping free from engagements with any of the several cabals there has preserved his credit and interest in his country, and in whom We can repose an entire trust, We have thought fit to address you to him preferable to all others, with particular directions to you to open your self

most freely to him and to communicate to him Our thoughts with relation to Sweden with the utmost confidence.

3. You shall acquaint him that although We have not been treated by their government with that regard We had reason to expect in their concluding an alliance with the Czar of Muscovy without Our being admitted into it, yet Our kindness and affection for the Swedish nation, of which, at a considerable expense to Us and Our people, We have heretofore given such signal proofs, is not thereby lessen'd, but that we have imputed this their conduct to the unsteadiness of their councils, occasioned by the ill state and disorder of their affairs and the prevalence of the faction that adheres to the Czar, from whose attempts We are desirous to see their country defended and preserved from the imminent danger, in which it seems to be at present, of falling a sacrifice to his ambition and of becoming in effect a province to Muscovy. You may represent to him that this is most plainly the Czar's only view, that his ambition is boundless, that he aims at no less than being master of all the Baltick, that he sees it is impossible for him to be considerable at sea without it, that fortune has, most happily for the Czar, thrown the duke of Holstein into his hands, with whom he plays as he sees best for his own interest, that the duke's pretensions are great and may give the Czar an opportunity of pushing his own designs in different quarters, and that it is apparent even from the manner in which he treats the said duke, whose credit with him ebbs and flows, according as the circumstances of affairs make him appear of more or less use to the immediate views of the Czar, that the Czar plainly intends no more than to keep him as an instrument towards giving him an easy inlet into countrys, where he could have no pretence without him.

4. If you find he enters freely into your way of reasoning upon this subject you may then venture to insinuate to him that the present king of Sweden, instead of being formidable to them upon account of endangering their liberties or their present form of government, does with difficulty support himself, and therefore they have nothing to apprehend from him ; but We cannot without the greatest concern reflect upon the danger Sweden and all the neighbouring parts of Europe must be in, should the duke of Holstein, after having married the Czar's daughter and during the life of the Czar, either upon any misfortune happening to the king of Sweden, or upon his death, get possession of that crown ; for besides the

influence the Czar must in such a case in reason be supposed to have over the duke, he will of himself be naturally inclined to desire his assistance towards getting rid of the present form of government. So that it is next to impossible to suppose that the Czar can fail, by the help of his daughter and his son in law, of reducing Sweden to the same state of subjection, to which he has brought Courland and would have reduced Mecklenburg, had not the neighbouring powers interposed ; that We should be very glad to know his thoughts upon these important points ; that he may open himself to Us with the greatest security ; that as We have nothing but the publick interest at heart he may be assured We shall make no other use of what he shall say to you but only for Our own direction and in order to enable Us to be more usefull in concurring in whatever the count shall think to be most for the service of Sweden.

5. You may also inform him that We have not enter'd into any new alliance with any power but Prussia, and that is purely a renewal of the old defensive alliances between the crown of Great Britain and the house of Brandenburg ; that the king of Denmark has indeed solicited Us to enter into stricter engagements with him but We have hitherto declined doing it, not out of any view of not assisting his Danish Majesty in case he should be attacked by the Czar (We being fully resolved to support him in that event) but because We are determined not to give any umbrage to Sweden, where those, who are devoted to the Czar, would not have failed to have made the strongest insinuations as if such an alliance had been intended against that kingdom, which by that means would have been brought into a still greater dependance upon the Czar, the preventing of which We have most at heart ; that this is the single reason which has hitherto hindered Our entring into any new alliance with Denmark ; that as to the reports of a Quadruple Alliance, they are without the least foundation, and it cannot be believed that We, who act in perfect concert with the court of France, would sollicite them to enter into an engagement with Denmark into which We have not thought fit to enter Ourselves for the reasons above mentioned.

6. You shall likewise let him, Count Horn, know that We have commanded you to govern your self entirely by his advice and direction and to keep private what shall pass between you, even from the king of Sweden himself as well as from Mons^r Diemer, who is the chief in his favour and confidence, except such matters

as he, Count Horn, shall direct you to communicate to them or any other person, the manner of doing which you are to concert with him ; and you will let him know that We are sensible from the management of his Swedish Majesty, the persons above named, and the other ministers he employs, that they are not capable of conducting an affair of consequence. That we therefore hope he will freely impart to you his sentiments upon the present juncture of affairs and what he thinks may be the most probable means of providing for the safety of Sweden, assuring him that We have no other intentions than what are for the welfare and prosperity of that nation and for securing and maintaining their liberties and constitution upon such a foot as he, Count Horn, and every other true Swede would desire ; and that in this We have no particular view for Our self and Our dominions, and are acted by no other motive than Our tender regard for a nation to whom We, as well as Our predecessors, have ever been closely united, both for the sake of our most holy religion and of our civil interest ; that We are already by the late defensive alliance under the strictest engagements to Sweden, all which We will most punctually perform in their defense, whenever there shall be occasion ; that We have it always in Our power to give them the succours stipulated upon the shortest warning, those at sea being by a new regulation put upon such a foot that we can in a fortnight or three weeks time have twenty large ships at sea, besides those constantly employed in protecting the trade.

7. You shall open yourself more or less upon all the particulars above mentioned, according as you find his behaviour to you, and if he enters cordially and as a friend into Our views and way of reasoning you will be the more explicit to him and moreover tell him that you shall give the king and Mons^r Diemer general assurances of Our friendship and assistance according to Our engagements, but shall not go any further with them, avoiding to enter into particulars and being content to hear only what they will say or propose, of all which you will give him a faithfull report and follow in all things his advice and direction, and this not only with regard to the king and his ministers but likewise to the senators and all other persons, who are any ways concerned in transacting publick business.

8. But in case, in discoursing with Count Horne, you shall find him cold and reserved and not affected with the compliments and

assurances you shall at the first entrance give him on Our part, you must then act with him with caution and be upon your guard and content your self with keeping within general assurances of friendship and support, in case Sweden should be attacked, and endeavour from other hands, and the best helps you can find out, to get into a perfect knowledge of the present situation and disposition of that country, pursuant to an order sent to M^r Finch by a letter of July 6th, of which you have herewith a copy.

9. After you have executed what is enjoined you in your general instructions in relation to the compliments and assurances you are to give the king and Monsieur Diemer (which you shall do in the warmest and most affectionate manner) you will content your self with hearing what they shall propose, of which you will give Us a particular account, taking care however not to give them reason to suspect their not being in your confidence.

10. Whereas the main end of our sending you to Stockholm is to prevent the success of any attempt the Czar may make this summer for placing the duke of Holstein on the throne of Sweden, if therefore you should, upon your arrival there, find the advices we have received with regard to the designs of the Czar founded, and the king and the country under great alarms and apprehensions, and if upon talking with Count Horne, or such others of the knowing and honest men of the country as you shall think proper to converse with, you find that a summ of fifty or one hundred thousand pounds would enable them to put the kingdom into such a posture of defense as would defeat the Czar's attempt, you may then let them know you have orders and even a credit from Us to advance that summ to the king of Sweden, in case the Czar should actually make any attempt upon them, but upon this condition, that you your self may see the uses to which the said money is employ'd, that it may be sure to go towards the defense of the kingdom, which is the only purpose for which We design it; and you may concert with them the manner in which you shall communicate these Our kind and generous intentions to his Swedish Majesty, taking however care not to enter into any engagement for advancing the least part of the above mention'd summ, unless the Czar makes an actual attack upon Sweden.

11. And whereas We are credibly informed that the Czar has by gratifications in money drawn over several of the senators and people of credit and quality to his interest, which may be of fatal

consequence not only to Sweden but even to Us and Our dominions, considering the present form of government in that country, We therefore expect that you would use your utmost endeavours to get access to such as you shall find reason to suspect are engaged with the Czar and with the utmost caution and dexterity try to insinuate yourself into their confidence, so far as to get an opportunity to lay before them the fatal consequences that such their dependence may bring upon their country, and you may (if you find it necessary), in order to prevail with them to abandon an attachment so contrary to the interest of their country, promise them gratifications from Us, provided the engagements you enter into upon account of the said gratifications do not amount to more than the summ of £15,000, or at most £20,000.

12. And whereas you are commanded in the former part of these instructions not to engage to advance any part of the summs mention'd for the assistance of Sweden unless the Czar should actually make an attempt upon them, so you will be cautious not to dispose of any of the money intended for gratifications to private persons, except you find that the Czar has gained such a strong footing in the senate and among the people of credit and quality that such gratifications will be absolutely necessary to draw them from their dependance upon him; and you will do well not to dispose of the whole summ at once but at different and distant payments, in order to keep them in a greater dependance upon Us and prevent them from falling again under the influence of the Czar. And We have the greater reason to hope that you may find means, without such gratifications, to engage the principal persons at Stockholm to enter into Our way of reasoning, because they must be sensible, from what you will say to them, that We have no view but what tends immediately to the interest and preservation of Sweden, nor any design of proposing anything that may occasion a rupture between them and the Czar.

13. As Count Horn is strongly inclined to favour the duke of Holstein with regard to the succession of the crown of Sweden, and as we have no reason to be against the said duke, but what arises from his relation to and dependance upon the Czar, you may, in confidence, let not only the said count but all such other persons of credit as are favourably inclined to the said duke, and to whom you think you may open yourself with safety, know that We have no objection to him or to his succeeding their present Majesties

but the reasons above mention'd ; that if either the Czar were dead and his Highness consequently at liberty to act as a Swede, or if he could be any ways got from under the influence of the Czar, We should be glad to do him all friendly offices upon that occasion ; and this must convince the count and such others as you shall think fit to talk to upon that subject that We have no designs but what are for the good and advantage of Sweden.

14. You must drop or hint whatever you say upon this subject with the greatest caution, lest his Swedish Majesty should come to know these Our sentiments ; you will do well likewise to try if you can discover, in talking with the said count, his real sentiments as to the duke of Holstein and the succession, and what methods he proposes to take to prevent the mischiefs that must attend the said duke's succeeding during the life of the Czar and after having married his daughter.

15. You will likewise take care to insinuate yourself as much as possible into the confidence of the party who are called the patriots, from their being zealously attached to the present form of government, by giving them the strongest assurances of Our good intentions to see the present form of government supported and continued to them.

16. You must likewise endeavour to make yourself as agreeable as you can to General Diemer, who has the chief share in the king's confidence ; but you must take great care not to let him discover, either by your behaviour or by any thing that may drop from you, any of the contents of your private instructions, and if Count Horn enters cordially into what you shall say to him in Our name and treats you with confidence you will, in that case, advise with him as to your behaviour and as to your manner of talking with the said General Diemer.

17. You will likewise take care to live well with Our minister, Mr Bassewitz, and get all the lights you can, both as to persons and things, out of him, without however imparting to him any of the particulars of these your private instructions.

18. You will not fail upon your first arrival at Stockholm to be most eagerly pressed by the king himself, as well as by General Diemer, for an immediate supply of money, without which they will tell you that it is impossible to support his Swedish Majesty's affairs there any longer. In answer to these instances you will shew them how impracticable it is to obtain any summ from the

parliament for their assistance, unless some of the cases mentioned in the defensive alliance were existing, and how little it is to be expected that the King should furnish any moneys for these purposes out of the Civil List. You will, however, before you give them these answers, endeavour to find out what summ they would have and to what uses they would apply it. And afterwards you will take care, in shewing them the difficultys the King lyes under as to furnishing such summs, to word what you say in so soft and gentle a manner as not to drive them into an absolute despair as to this particular.

19. If you can by your conduct gain any share of the king's or of Mon^r Diemer's confidence you will then take all opportunities of exhorting them to avoid any projects or schemes, which may tend to make the king's government unpopular to the nation, and above all to avoid giving the least umbrage or jealousy, as if the king had a design to change the present settlement there, but on the contrary to pursue all such measures as will contribute to the softening the minds of the people and reconciling them to his administration, this being the only method by which he can gain any solid influence in that country, by attaching and fixing to his interest the party, who are called patriots, and by that means overbalancing those who are of the Holstein faction and those who are the creatures of the Czar. By talking in this manner to the king and to Mon^r Diemer, by professing everywhere that We have no other views but the true interest and preservation of Sweden and the support of the government, as it is at present established, and by endeavouring to dissuade those of the duke of Holstein's party, with whom you have an intimacy, from entertaining any thoughts or attempting any thing that may occasion convulsions in Sweden and endanger the present constitution, out of an eagerness for securing the succession to the said duke; by this frank and honest way of proceeding it is to be hoped that you will gain a confidence among the best people of all partys and establish to your self the reputation of a man of sound principles and good intentions for the advantage of that kingdome, and you will particularly secure so much credit with the party, called the patriots, that you may be of use to the king in perswading them not to make any further attempt against the prerogative of the crown, by shewing them that it is already so much weakned that the king has scarce power to carry on the business of the government and that the reducing

his authority any lower can end in nothing but bringing the whole kingdome into a state of confusion and anarchy. By carrying your self in this manner you may in time gain so much confidence with all the parties, except that of the Czar, as to be in some measure a mediator amongst them.

20. We have ordered herewith to be put into your hands an extract of a letter of the 2d of August, N.S., wherein Our ambassadeur at the court of France gives an account of a conversation he had had with the Sieur Gedda, the Swedish minister there, by which you will find several lights relating to the affairs of Sweden, according to the knowledge that minister has of them ; and particularly a list of the senators with an account of the party they are chiefly inclined to, either for the king, or the duke of Holstein, or for a neutrality and the good of their country in general, from whence you may observe that those for the king of Sweden, joyn'd with the neuters, will make a considerable majority in the senate.

21. As to Count Welling, who is in the list, We look upon him as a person who on all occasions has shewn so great an animosity against Us and Our interests that it would be in vain to pay any court to him or to strive to gain his good will or to keep any sort of measures with him. But as to the other senators of that faction you will endeavour to sift into their prevailing passions and tempers and acquaint Us with your observations thereupon, that We may think of applying such means as are most proper towards gaining them to concur in Our views.

22. As to the Sieur Höpken, who is secretary of state there, he is a man of a very good understanding and capable of doing service ; but he is addicted to no party so strongly as to his own interest and is therefore likely to be biassed or brought over by arguments of that nature. This is such a character, that you will see that you ought not to trust him ; however, if you can gain his confidence he will be of great use to you, and if a sum to the value of one thousand pounds will work upon him for that purpose you should not spare to give it.

23. We would have you take all opportunitys, without giving any umbrage to the king, of making your court to the queen by assuring her frequently of Our particular esteem for her person and of Our high sense of her royal virtues and princely qualifications ; and We are the more desirous that you should cultivate the favour and good will of her Swedish Majesty because We have observed

and have been informed that in all the late intrigues of faction and disorder in Sweden she has shewn the most steady courage and resolution for the true interest of that kingdom, and appears in all things more likely by her firmness to maintain her dignity and authority as queen than the king her husband.

24. Whereas the Sieur Bestuchef,¹ minister from the czar of Muscovy to the crown of Sweden, upon his coming to Stockholm did omit to notify his arrival, as usual, to the Sieur Bassewitz, who is the minister there from Us as elector, altho' he had done it to Our British minister at that court; and We having approved the conduct of our envoy extraordinary William Finch, Esq., in not paying a visit to the said Bestuchef, since We could not in honour pass by such a distinction or allow Our electoral ministers to be slighted, as if they had no relation to Us as king of Great Britain; Our will and pleasure therefore is that when you arrive at the court of Sweden you should forbear notifying your coming to the said Sieur Bestuchef, but the first opportunity you have of seeing him you should freely let him know the reason of it; that We are indeed very desirous of living in friendship and good understanding with the Czar, his master, and shall on all occasions be ready to show our inclinations that way by the behaviour of Our ministers, but as he had neglected to notify his arrival to Our electoral minister We could not allow any of Our servants to pay the usual compliments of ceremony to him, until he had set that point right with respect to Us, as elector. That it therefore now depended upon him to make amends for such his omission and that whensoever he shall have paid those respects that are due to Our said minister, the Sieur Bassewitz, you will be ready to do the same towards him and to live in the like good correspondence as you do with the other foreign ministers there.

G. R.

TOWNSHEND TO POYNTZ.

(*Record Office, S.P. Foreign, Sweden 35 to 39, 42, copies.*)

Whitehall, October 9, 1724.

. You will make the King's compliment, contained in my letter to Baron Sparre, to the king of Sweden and his ministers, taking care to keep strictly to the words of my said letter. You

¹ The Mikhail Bestuzher noticed previously.

will likewise observe the same conduct towards the Muscovite minister as is mentioned in my letter to M^r Finch, and as the scene of affairs is intirely changed with relation to the Czar since you left this place, the King having all the reason in the world to think his reconciliation with that prince as good as concluded, you will not enter into any of the particular private instructions given you till you hear further from me, but will content yourself with carrying your self as easily and civilly as you can to every body without giving any person or party any occasion of offence, in doing which I am persuaded you will succeed as effectually as you have already done with Admiral Sparre.

5 February 1724/5.

. His Majesty takes notice that you frequently point out the dangerous situation Sweden is in ; the weakness of the king and his low and distressed condition, with the great likelihood that a revolution may soon happen in that countrey and the Czar and the duke of Holstein become masters of it. You will have already seen the King's sentiments upon that state of affairs by my letters of the 12th of January, which Spear brought you ; to which I have nothing more to add, but to desire that if you know any means, or have thought of any method, by which that kingdom may be extricated from its present difficultys, you would suggest your notions to the King and send a messenger with the explanation of those thoughts, which your conversation with the people and your daily observations upon the spot may have furnished you with, for we here are at a loss what remedys to apply to the evils you describe, being fully convinced that neither the king nor Diemar are to be trusted with any money, having neither credit firmness resolution nor any other abilitys requisite to conduct or carry on any concert for their own or the kingdom's safety.

23 February 1724/5.

. The great event we have lately learnt here of the death of the Czar and the mighty changes it will in all likelihood produce, with respect to all affairs in the north particularly, will no doubt have a strong influence on the partys which are now in Sweden and may be improved to put that kingdome in a state of less subjection to and dependance on the dictates of Muscovy. We know only yet that the Czarina has been acknowledged at Petersburg

as Empress, and till the King can see further what turn things will take in that countrey, and what effect this great change at Petersburg will have at Stockholm, his Majesty cannot, as you will easily agree, send you his sentiments upon several very important points mentioned in your great dispatch, or give you particular instructions how you should at this juncture conduct your self, nor what scheme you should promote in Sweden. You will, I am perswaded, take care not to appear elated at this great event and continue to behave your self in the same manner in all respects as you have hitherto done both to the Russian and Holstein ministers and factions, and be sure not to discourage any advances that either of them may now make to you, continuing however privately and with caution to pursue in general the principal view of keeping that kingdom upon the foot of government it is and encouraging them to maintain their libertys as independant of the Russ as possible, since that awe and those apprehensions they were under before from the Czar must abate extremely, in whose hands soever that empire subsists, or even cease entirely, if divisions and distractions should arise there and destroy the vast projects of the late Czar.

As to the summ of 12000^{lb} which the king of Sweden desires may be given him between England and France, his Majesty will have the court of France sounded on that head, and when we have an answer from thence about their disposition to gratify the king of Sweden in this matter I will take care to let you know his Majesty's further sentiments.

de Whitehall le 6 Avril, 1725.

Quoique je vous aye déjà marqué de tems en tems, en réponse aux divers points contenus dans vos dépêches, les sentimens du Roy sur la situation présente des affaires dans le nord, cependant sa Majesté trouve à propos, par rapport à ce grand évènement de la mort du Czar, de rassembler ses veues sous un coup d'œil, et de former vos instructions de manière qu'en voyant les ordres de sa Majesté ensemble vous puissiez être mieux en état de les poursuivre uniformément dans cette conjoncture délicate.

Vous vous imaginerez aisément que le premier et principal but que le Roy se propose est de conserver la tranquillité qui est maintenant établie dans le nord, et de prévenir aucun trouble ou brouillerie de quel côté que ce soit qu'ils puissent y arriver. L'état incertain et chancelant des affaires dans le sud oblige le Roy

nécessairement à souhaitter avec ardeur que la paix présente dans les païs où vous êtes ne soit point troublée ou enfreinée ; puisque quelque differend que pourroit survenir dans ces quartiers là brouilleroit tellement les affaires même de ce côté icy que le Roy ne sçauroit donner l'attention qu'il faudra absolument faire à ce qui se passe à Cambray ; et l'Empereur en tireroit de si grands avantages, ou dans le commencement ou par les suites qui en resulteroient, que cè seroit une folie extrême de ne pas y prévenir autant qu'il sera possible toute dispute, et d'ôter par là les moyens à la cour de Vienne d'en profiter à leur grande joye et utilité.

Vous vous appliquerez donc avec un soin particulier à détourner le roy de Suède et ceux de son partie d'aucun dessein qu'ils pourroient avoir de rompre avec la Muscovie, ou aucun de leurs voisins. Sa Majesté Suédoise sans doute et ses amis reprennent du courage, et s'enhardissent sur la mort du Czar. Et on ne doit pas s'étonner s'ils se laissent repaître des espérances des grands avantages qui doivent leur en revenir, et s'ils regardent cette occasion comme très favorable pour recouvrer au moins les provinces qu'ils avoient perdues et cédées aux Muscovites pendant la dernière guerre. Et sur ce principe ils se flatteront des désordres qui doivent s'élever en Russie, et ne croiront qu'avec peine que la Czarine sera jamais en état de se soutenir ; on ne sçauroit être seur à la vérité pour combien de temps elle le fera, mais il faut avouer que les commencemens sont heureux pour elle et fort favorables à son règne. Elle s'est gagné beaucoup d'estime et d'affection dans ces païs et a fait paroître qu'elle a de grand talens, et un génie supérieur. Et quoiqu'il puisse naître des divisions en Muscovie, et que le parti pour le fils, du Czarowitz devienne puissant, elle a pourtant le bonheur à présent que les deux puissances voisines, c'est à dire la Prusse et la Pologne, qui sont à portée de luy faire le plus de mal, au lieu de profiter de cette occasion pour la contrecarrer luy font la cour, et paroissent disposées à l'aider et à l'affermir sur le throne.

Je ne sçaurois mieux vous représenter ce qu'on pense là dessus à Berlin qu'en vous faisant tenir l'extrait cy joint de la lettre du 13/24 Mars que j'ay reçu du Colonel Dubourgay,¹ et je vous assure que la ministère prussienne icy me parle toujours aussi fortement en faveur de la Czarine que cette lettre. Pour la cour de Pologne, ils y ont borné tous leurs desseins à faire réussir la succession du prince électoral à ce royaume, et pourvu que la Czarine veuille les

¹ Envoy extraordinary at Berlin.

assister à y emporter ce point, il n'y a rien que cette princesse pourra demander au roy de Pologne qu'il ne fasse volontiers pour faciliter son projet favori.

Comme celle cy est la situation présente de ces deux puissances, si le roy de Suède y veut faire l'attention qu'il faut, il verra bien que cette conjoncture est très mal propre pour commencer quelque querelle contre la Muscovie et faire brèche à la paix établie par le traité de Nystadt, à quoy, comme vous avés souvent très bien remarqué à sa Majesté Suédoise, ni le Roy ni la France ne peuvent jamais donner les mains ; car, outre l'injustice d'un tel procédé, il est plus que vraisemblable qu'un tel pas attireroit les suites fâcheuses de la perte de la partie de la Poméranie qui reste à la Suède, dont le roy de Prusse ne manqueroit pas de se saisir à la première occasion favorable, et de l'élévation du prince électoral de Saxe sur la throne de la Pologne.

Toutes les fois donc que le roy de Suède et ses amis vous parleront de cette conjoncture, comme leur étant très favorable pour tâcher de reconquérir sur la Muscovie leurs provinces perdues, vous leur représenterés de la manière la plus vive le peu de fondement qu'il y a de se flatter de telles espérances, et vous vous servirez des raisons qui je viens de vous suggérer ; vous leur ferés voir les risques qu'ils courront, et qu'un pas si précipité à l'heure qu'il est mettra tout le royaume dans le plus grand danger d'être abîmé pour jamais ; et qu'il faudra agir avec d'autant plus de précaution que leurs affaires sont dans un état fort bas ; il est évident qu'ils ne sçauroient rien entreprendre sans s'exposer à des périls extrêmes, à moins que d'avoir fait un concert avec la Prusse et la Pologne et avoir eu la concurrence des deux couronnes de la Grande Bretagne et de France ; vous leur mettrés donc devant les yeux les difficultés qu'il y aura à former un tel concert, vous leur ferés souvenir des embarras où les deux couronnes se trouveront, et vous vous évertuerés enfin avec toute l'adresse possible à empêcher qu'on ne se trompe pas à Stockholm en formant des projets dangereux et en s'encourageant mal à propos à venir à une rupture avec la Russe.

Vous tâcherés de convaincre le roy de Suède que cet avis que les deux couronnes luy donnent est cordial et sincère, et n'a point d'autre but que l'avancement de ses véritables intérêts, et qu'elles sont persuadées que s'il prend d'autres mesures il se ruinera de fond en comble et perdra entièrement le peu de pouvoir et d'autorité qui luy reste dans ce royaume.

Vous continuerez de poursuivre les instructions que vous ont déjà été données avec la précaution convenable et tâcherés de maintenir le gouvernement dans la Suède sur le pied où il est, et vous vous servirez de toutes les occasions propres à leur inspirer les sentimens nécessaires pour conserver leur liberté et pour se rendre le moins dépendant qu'il se pourra du pouvoir et de l'influence des Russes, et sa Majesté se persuade que vous aurés moins de difficulté à y réussir, puisque ces craintes et ces terreurs qui les ont tellement abatus pendant la vie du feu Czar sont diminuées sans doute par sa mort.

Vous aurés soin de vous conduire de la même manière que vous avés fait jusques icy envers les ministres de la Russie et de Holstein. Et vous ne les rebuterés point en aucune manière s'ils vous font des avances dans cette conjoncture, mais vous vous contenterés de leur répondre en termes généraux et fort honêtement, et vous donnerés compte à sa Majesté de ce qu'ils proposent, et tout ce qui se passera avec eux.

Ce que je viens de vous marquer peut bien servir de règle générale pour votre conduite envers ces messieurs les ministres de la Russie et de Holstein, cependant vous ne manquerez pas de prendre les occasions convenables de leur faire voir combien l'amitié des deux couronnes sera nécessaire au dit duc, et combien il importe à ses intérêts de ne rien faire qui puisse leur déplaire. Qu'en premier lieu la conduite de ceux qui ont manié alors les affaires du dit duc, et ensuite la nécessité des conjonctures, ont obligé le Roy et la France d'entrer dans des engagemens touchant le Sleswick, qui sont contraires à ses intérêts. Qu'à la vérité les mêmes raisons de conserver la tranquillité du nord subsistent encore à présent ; et les deux couronnes ne peuvent jamais permettre qu'on donne la moindre atteinte aux engagemens qu'elles ont pris à cet égard. Mais que cette situation par rapport au Schleswic ne doit pas porter le duc à s'attirer par les oppositions la mauvaise volonté de ces deux puissances, dont le soutien pourra dans la suite luy être beaucoup plus avantageux que la possession même de ce duché, puisque leur amitié et leur protection luy pourront être infiniment utiles dans tout ce qu'il aura à espérer à l'avenir. Qu'on a lieu de croire que toutes les delays et les accroches dans l'accommodement et l'alliance projetée avec feu sa Majesté Czarienne sont provenus des intrigues de ce duc et de ses ministres. Qu'on laisse à penser à ces messieurs si de telles démarches contre les deux couronnes

ne seront pas fort nuisibles au duc même et à ses intérêts et si, lorsque ces deux puissances seront persuadées que le duc s'est résolu de contrecarrer toutes leurs veues dans le nord, à moins qu'elles n'abandonnent pour luy plaire les engagemens qu'elles ont pris avec d'autres princes, elles ne se trouvent obligées de regarder ce duc comme leur ennemi déclaré. Mais au contraire, si le duc se conduit d'une manière à donner des preuves de la confiance qu'il met dans les deux couronnes, il s'attirera leur amitié et leur concours à luy favoriser dans des occasions infiniment plus importantes qui pourront survenir pour avancer ses intérêts. Car dans le fond ses intérêts s'accordent bien avec leurs veues, et elles auront raison de les soutenir dans toute autre rencontre qu'à renverser leurs engagemens solennels. Vous pourrés en même tems leur insinuer sur le pied d'une confiance particulière que s'ils continuent à s'y opposer aux veues des deux couronnes et à pousser des projets, qui pourront troubler le repos du nord, ils les mettront dans la nécessité de penser dès à cette heure aux moyens de les empêcher de se joindre à ceux qui ne leur veulent point du bien, et de les mettre hors d'état de poursuivre des manœuvres si dangereuses.

Que les moyens les plus efficaces ne manquent pas à ces deux grandes puissances, et qu'elles seroient responsables devant Dieu et à leurs peuples si elles ne s'en servoient pas pour se mettre à l'abri d'un dérangement si considérable qu'une guerre suscitée dans le nord leur causeroit. Vous leur laisserés entrevoir de tems en tems que vous leur faites ces représentations en ami et en bon serviteur du duc leur maître, et qu'au reste vous leur recommandés d'y penser meurement.

[The remainder of this long dispatch is concerned with prospective relations with the new government in Russia and with the conduct which Poyntz should pursue towards Osterman or any other minister whom Catherine I might send to Sweden.]

Same date, private.

. You will see by my long dispatch of this date containing your farther instructions that his Majesty can scarce believe that the Czarina will send Osterman at this juncture to Sweden, but in case this news, contrary to our expectation, should prove true, you are ordered to use your utmost endeavours to find out what he is sent upon, and you are authorised to give money in case that

will procure you an exact information of what passes between him and the Swedish ministers.

For it is of the last consequence that Sweden should not enter into any measures with the Muscovites, unknown to the King, nor till we see the fate of our treaty at Petersbourg. You will therefore spare neither pains nor money, in case Osterman or any other person come from the Czarina, first to discover what they have to propose and then to prevent the Swedes from coming into any measures with them. The King knows your abilities and is very well convinced of your integrity, and therefore gives you this unlimited commission, knowing you will not make use of it unless there be a necessity for it and his service absolutely requires it.

I am amazed how Count Horn could talk to you of the great influence the Swedes have had upon the late Czar's councils. He must think us very blind and very ignorant as to what passes in the world to imagine you could be so grossly imposed upon, but what amazes me most is that he of all men living can talk so, who two years ago of his own head drew our master into a negotiation with the Czar for a reconciliation, which six months after the count shamefully dropt, not being able to make good any one article of what he at first proposed.

However, from the character I have heard of the count I heartily wish he and the king of Sweden were reconciled, for he has certainly better abilities and more credit in his country than any of those employed by the king, and as M^r Finch has told me, if he had his master's entire confidence he would then serve him with zeal and fidelity; but I am persuaded you know his character much better by this time and therefore shall send you no orders or instructions on this head.

Whitehall, 27 April 1725.

. The King extremely applauds the method you propose of damping the duke of Holstein's expectations and bringing him to reason by endeavouring to raise secretly such a spirit against him in Sweden as may draw off from his party all but the most corrupt and abandon'd, and in this you will go as far as you can safely, without exasperating the Czarina or giving the Holsteiners any just cause of complaint. You have already begun this good work with so much dexterity and success by the communication

you made to Count Horn of the advices sent by Mr Walpole,¹ that his Majesty has no reason to doubt but that the same prudence and ability, which led you to take this wise step, will suggest to you the properest methods for compleating what you have so happily begun.

I come now to that part of your dispatch which gives the King very great satisfaction, I mean that which relates to the conversion of some of the senators, who have hitherto been look'd upon as entirely devoted to Muscovy, and where you mention the secret instructions left by the dyett for managing the Czar in such a manner as not to give offence to their ancient friends and allys, and particularly to Great Britain. The King would have you do all in your power towards improving and encouraging these notions in the senators, and is mightily pleased with the conference you have had with Count Cederhielm² and with the manner in which you talked to him. The character you give of him is agreeable to what I have had from other hands, and therefore, tho' his sincerity and integrity are not much to be relyed on, yet, being pitched upon to be the person to be sent to the Czarina, all possible methods ought to be taken to gain him, the only way of doing which effectually is by making it his interest to attach himself to the King. I have already empowered you to draw by the King's order what money you shall find necessary for gaining such senators as you may think of consequence to the King's service. I am now, for the enabling you to perfect the necessary work, to acquaint you that his Majesty authorises you to draw for any summ not exceeding ten thousand pounds for the uses above mentioned, as well as towards disentangling Diemar from the incumbrances he lyes under for want of money, which, as you represent, have hitherto hindred him from setting out for Cassell. I must, however, as to this last particular give you this express caution, that you take care that whatever summ you pay towards the discharging Mr Diemar's debts may not fall into the king of Sweden's hands nor be diverted to any other uses than the enabling Diemar to leave that country, and that you be well assured that he will go, before you

¹ Horatio Walpole, ambassador at Paris.

² Count Josias Cederhielm, about to go as ambassador to Russia. Poyntz was completely deceived in his expectations from him; on his return he helped to lead the opposition and in 1727 shared the fate of the irreconcilable Count Vellingk.

advance any money. As to what you may think proper to give the senators, it had better be done by annual private pensions than by any great sum given at first ; so that though the King gives you authority to draw for 10,000^{lb}, yet his Majesty confides in your management and frugality and is perswaded that you will draw for no more at present than what you see is absolutely necessary for the carrying on his service. The King thinks it unnecessary to give you any caution with relation to the secret, which ought to be observed in the disposal of this money, that his Majesty's enemys may not get the least notice of it ; who will not fail to revive their old clamours, as if his Majesty were furnishing the king of Sweden with money in order to make him absolute in that country.

Hanover, 18/29 June 1725.

. Tho' I am not able now to write full answers to all your dispatches, yet I would not omit sending you the King's sentiments on that part of your letter of the 2d of June, where you desire to know whether, in case Sweden should come to be attacked by the Czarina or the duke of Holstein, you were not still at liberty to follow that part of your instructions, which enables you to draw for money to assist the king of Sweden in case of an invasion upon that kingdom. The King is perswaded from the experience he has had of your prudence and conduct that you will not make use of that power unless you find that there is an absolute necessity for it, in order to preserve the king of Sweden and to do that kingdom service in a pressing exigency, and that you can bring it within the terms of our treaty with that crown ; as, for instance, if the duke of Holstein should come on the coast of Sweden and land forces the case of the treaty would exist, and if the king and Count Horn should then demand of you the assistance stipulated by the treaty, you may assure them not only of the King's resolution to assist them effectually but you may likewise draw for 50,000^{lb} or even for 100,000^{lb}, taking care to do it in such a manner as to make it the most easy to have your bills answered in England ; and you may farther assure them that the King will punctually make good all his engagements to the utmost of his power. In case, likewise, that the duke of Holstein should only appear with the Muscovite fleet on the coast and demand the convoking of an extraordinary dyet, in order to settle the succession upon him, threatening to land forces if this demand

be refused him, if the king and senate shall however refuse th said demand and think their honour and dignity and even their sovereignty so much concerned as to look upon themselves to be attacked and to demand assistance, you may even in that case draw for such a summ of money as you shall judge their necessities may absolutely require towards drawing their army together and putting themselves in a posture of defence, accompanying the same with the strongest assurances of further assistance from the King.

I don't believe myself, neither do I find that anyone here thinks, that the Czarina will make such use, as has been feared, of her fleet this summer, however his Majesty thought it proper that I should write this only to set your mind at ease and that you might be prepared in all events, tho' there seems no likelihood of any occasion of that nature happening.

[Dispatches of July 1725, which follow, are concerned with the reports, alternately alarming and reassuring, of impending attempt by Catherine I to place her son-in-law on the throne of Sweden, or to recover Sleswick for him, by force of arms. A particular apprehension was that she might obtain the use of Swedish harbours to facilitate a descent on Denmark. Poyntz was ordered to exert himself to the utmost against such permission, whether by argument or by the promise of large sums of money.]

Hanover, 22 July/2 August 1725.

I am to acknowledge your letter of the 10th July O.S., which I received the 20/31 by Captain Deane and laid before the King, who was extremely pleased with the contents of it and highly commended your conduct in every particular; by your frugal and useful management of the money entrusted to you his Majesty finds he may leave it to your prudence to make such a further distribution as you shall judge necessary for his service.

The King was very glad to see that Count Horn was so zealous against the imperial scheme,¹ and his Majesty recommends it to you to do all you can to confirm him in those sentiments, for it would be of the utmost ill consequence if at this juncture the Emperor should be admitted to accede to the article concerning the duke of Holstein's pretensions to Sleswick, and therefore you may let the count know how much confidence the King puts in

¹ The emperor's accession to the Russo-Swedish treaty of February 1724.

him that he will baffle the projects of the court of Vienna at Stockholm, which tend to nothing but throwing the north, and Sweden in particular, into the greatest confusion; besides, it would in truth be the greatest folly in Sweden to prefer the Emperor's friendship to that of his Majesty, for the first has neither money nor ships, which Sweden by it's situation and circumstances stands most in need of with regard either to it's present or even future views. Sweden, therefore, ought to fall entirely into the King's measures, who both as king and as elector must be ever their true friend. They should therefore throw their whole weight towards preventing the Czarina's being seduced by the Emperor, which by their influence with the duke of Holstein they may the more easily do, by shewing him how much it is his interest to be reconciled to the King, who is the only power that can effectually, upon a proper occasion, help him.

I cannot think it will be an easy matter to fix any friendship between the Emperor and the Czarina; his Imperial Majesty must always have so strong a bias towards promoting the interests of the young son of the late Czarowitz, and the Czarina is so firmly bent to advance those of the duke of Holstein, her son in law. Sweden will have it always in their hands, I believe, to prevent such an union, if they should find a tendency towards it, and it is their interest to keep those two powers from joining for several good reasons, but especially because by such a junction they must certainly lose all confidence with us.

As to Count Horn's strong inclinations for procuring a satisfaction for Sleswick his Majesty, as I have often said, has no enmity to the duke of Holstein, on the contrary, he wishes him well and would do all for him that is consistent with his engagements, the quiet of the north and the welfare of Sweden, as Count Horn will have seen by what his Majesty offers in the project of the separate articles of our intended alliance with Muscovy. But in the manner the court of Petersburg pushes that point, by all that appears to his Majesty he must either oblige himself to act contrary to his engagements, and a new war must be begun in the north by using force to wrest that dutchy from Denmark, or, if the powers concerned should take upon themselves to adjust and give a satisfaction in money, Count Horn will easily see which way that will be employed and what danger will threaten the present government of Sweden, when the duke shall be enabled by such large sums, as that

bargain must produce, to spread his bribes more effectually in that kingdom. These are the insuperable difficulties we fear, and therefore the King hopes the count will think that the duke ought to acquiesce in what has been offered by him and France for the present, and leave the rest to be worked out hereafter by more favourable conjunctures. But if, after our alliance with Russia is signed, where you see there is room enough for expedients, the count has anything to suggest not liable to the objection above mentioned his Majesty will be glad to hear it, being willing to embrace the count's sentiments for the publick good ; and if Sweden would order their minister at Petersburg to press earnestly the Czarina's complying with the terms offered by the two crowns I am perswaded this great affair would meet with little difficulty or delay, and this treaty, once finished, would put it infinitely more in the King's power and set him more at liberty to be useful to Sweden.

You will certainly encourage what you mention as the count's plan for the next dyet, nothing could do the duke of Holstein himself a more real service than to get Monsieur Bassewitz¹ removed. Such a wild-headed man, with a set of frantick schemes, insulting everybody and alienating them from his master, ought to be mortified and made incapable of doing more mischief, and I hope matter enough will be found to ruin his credit both with his master and in Sweden.

It will be curious to have M^r Cederhielm's account of the state of affairs in Russia. My friend, whom you know at Paris, told me in his last that he had advice from Petersburg that not only the chief persons in Muscovy were in confusion and discontented, but that even the new married couple had fallen out with one another.

His Majesty likes very well what Count Horn says about the king of Sweden's being to be kept still a little in awe and in the dark, and was glad that you readily fell into his way of thinking upon that head. You will find it of use, no doubt, to adopt his sentiments and seem to be governed by him, whilst he pursues the King's general view.

Hanover, 24 August/4 September 1725.

I send you enclosed by the King's order a copy of the alliance signed between his Majesty, the most Christian King and the king

¹ Count Henning Friedrich Bassewitz, first minister to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp

of Prussia¹; and I am perswaded you will agree with me in thinking that nothing can be better calculated at this juncture towards preserving the present and future peace and tranquility of the north as well as the south.

The King flatters himself, not without reason, that it will give an immediate check to the views of Spain and the Emperor, that it will be no small mortification to the Czarina to find the king of Prussia so closely united to the two crowns, and that the 5th article of the treaty and the 1st separate article will be a very good foundation for getting the civil and religious grievances in the Empire and Poland redressed. The said articles are worded, if I judged right of your last dispatch, pretty much according to the sentiments and notions in which Count Horn talked to you upon those subjects. Our having signed a defensive alliance with France and Prussia will be publickly known before this comes to your hand, though the particulars of the treaty are, and I hope will be for some time kept secret. We may however most undoubtedly assure our selves that as soon as the news of this alliance being signed reaches Stockholm the Holstein and Russian faction, taking advantage from the thorough aversion the Swedes have to the Prussians, will not fail to be inventing malicious insinuations as if Sweden had reason to apprehend great prejudice from this alliance. To obviate therefore any attempts of this kind his Majesty would have you, in conjunction with M^r Brancas² (in case he be arrived when this comes to your hands), privately and in the greatest confidence communicate this treaty and the separate articles to Count Horn. You will let him know how great a mark this is of the King our master's and his most Christian Majesty's confidence in him, and make him sensible of their regard and attention for him upon this occasion, he being the first person to whom they (relying entirely upon his discretion and secrecy) have ordered this communication to be made, and that you have orders not to shew the treaty to the king of Sweden himself, unless Count Horn thinks it absolutely necessary; and in case Count Horn should advise the communicating of the treaty to

¹ The treaty of Hanover.

² Bouphile-Hyacynte-Toussaint de Brancas, Comte de Céreste (in the dispatches usually "Count Brancas"), now on his way to Sweden as envoy from Louis XV. Having made his acquaintance at Hanover Townshend (in another dispatch) extolled his fitness and desired Poyntz to cultivate most friendly relations with him. He was a nephew of Marshal Villars.

the king of Sweden you must take all possible precautions that his Swedish Majesty may keep it secret.

It will be no difficult matter for you to shew Count Horn that there is nothing in this treaty that can possibly hurt Sweden, but on the contrary it will be of very great advantage to them, as it may be a means of detaching the king of Prussia from the Czarina, which is one of the main points that the Swedes ought to have in view. You will, however, take care as yet to say nothing to him that may look as if you were desirous of bringing Sweden to accede to this treaty, contenting yourself with endeavouring to find out his sentiments in relation to every particular of it.

You will communicate this letter to Monsieur de Brancas, if he is with you, whom (if I may judge by the small acquaintance I had with him here) you will find a very honest good natured man and willing to act in concert with you upon every occasion.

Private.

Hanover, September 21/October 2, 1725.

. You may observe that France has a great notion of the duke of Holstein's influence in Sweden and therefore shews an inclination towards proposing some equivalent for him. This so dangerous a topick at this juncture will turn the whole power and influence in the north so absolutely into the hands of the Czarina and Bassewitz, and will inevitably run us into so many difficultys with respect to Denmark and all our affairs in the north, that the King hopes and is persuaded that Count Horn himself will see the hazard of bringing such an intricacy upon the anvil now; it will putt a stop to, if not overturn, all we are doing and consequently throw the north into a new flame. Wherefore Count Brancas should by no means be encouraged to make the least mention of any equivalent now, as the most dangerous point which can be started and the most likely to ruin all our work in the nice situation we are in at present. Wherefore you will do what you can to keep off such a proposal and get Count Horn to joyn with you; not that the King is against having a due consideration of the duke of Holstein's case, but his Majesty fears, as I have said, that the mixing it with our other negotiations at this juncture will infallibly undo all.

Our new alliance is very well relished in Holland, and I am persuaded the States will accede to it. This ought to encourage our friends the Swedes to follow their example. You will likewise

see that our reconciliation with the Czarina is at a greater distance than ever, and the extract I send you of my letter from Berlin will shew you that the king of Prussia begins to think he must act in concert with the King our master in the north as well as in other parts. Count Brancas is put absolutely into Count Horn's hands, and if he will direct him right all will go well. The money that is to be left by the project in your and Count Brancas's hands shall be entirely under Count Horn's direction.

You see by what I say of our expenses in Sweden that I assert you have laid out twelve thousand pounds. You must always aver before Count Brancas that the same sum has been disburs'd, though it is not at all necessary that you should let him into the particulars. You will have observed that my word is concern'd in that point, and I hope you will have had no occasion to say the contrary to Count Brancas before my first hint about it came to you by my order from M^r Tilson.¹

Göhrde 14th/25th October 1725.

I received this minute your letters of the 5th October O.S. by Camara the messenger, which, you will give me leave to tell you, put me under the greatest concern to find that you had in my opinion not understood perfectly the orders which have been sent you with relation to the communicating the treaty to the court where you are; which, I perceive, has brought you under the greatest difficultys in not knowing how to comply with Count Horn's desire so farr as to empower him to own that he had seen the treaty.

In my first dispatch to you upon this subject, which was of the 24 August/4 September, you was ordered to communicate the treaty to him, and to the king of Sweden if the count approved of it, and the whole tenour of what I have wrote since running upon the great advantage and even necessity of securing the accession of Sweden I cant well conceive why you should make any difficulty to give Count Horn a copy of the treaty, if he desired it, much less could there be any reason not to allow him to say he had seen it, when he thought it of use to own his having had a sight of it.

You will, therefore, upon the receipt of this immediately give Count Horn a copy of the treaty and of the three separate articles, making the strongest compliments to him upon this occasion on the part of the King; letting him know that you have his Majesty's

¹ George Tilson, under-secretary of state.

orders to follow his advice and directions not only in this affair but in all things you have to transact at the court of Sweden, acquainting him at the same time that this is not a compliment made to himself only from the King on this occasion but that it proceeds from the regard and confidence his Majesty has in him, and that I had by the King's order said the same thing to Prince William of Hesse and Major General Diemar while at Hanover, in the plainest terms I could express it.

You must endeavour to get Count Brancas to joyn with you in making this communication ; he may depend upon the court of France's being in the same sentiments as to this affair with his Majesty, thò perhaps he may not have received his orders ; and the necessity of this step will justify his doing it. But were the reasons not so strong, even the intimacy that is at present between the two crowns would justify his complying at this juncture with a measure the King has so much at heart. But if you can't with all your reasonings bring Count Brancas to joyn with you you must, however, do it alone.

You may assure Count Horn that the story about an engagement to any of the king of Sweden's brothers is as false as that other you lately mentioned of his Majesty's promising to guaranty the succession to the duke of Holstein ; neither of the brothers, nor any one of them, having mentioned any such thing to the King or his ministers ; and you will find some way to make the king of Sweden feel that if he withdraws his confidence from Count Horn the King's towards him will abate in proportion. This is the language I have constantly held to the landgrave, Diemar, and the whole family, as Sparre is my witness.

As to the future steps to be taken towards bringing Sweden to accede you and Count Brancas will take Count Horn's opinion in all you do and move in it as he advises, without expecting any further orders from the King.

I shall conclude with telling you that the bringing about the accession of Sweden to this treaty is the most acceptable and most important service you can do the King at this juncture, and therefore I most heartily wish you success.

I must not omit letting you know that neither Sparre nor Diemar have been told anything of the contents of my letter of the 22th September, and you may be sure it shall be an absolute secret to them.

Göhrde, 25 October/5 November 1725.

. The cordiality with which the Czarina has come into the schemes of the Holstein faction has produced the desired effect at Vienna, for that court is going in all haste to strike up a great intimacy with that of Petersbourg. Count Rabutin¹ is recalled from Berlin with the design of being sent immediately to Muscovy, so that there is no doubt to be made but that we shall soon see the strictest union between the Emperor and the Czarina, and you at Stockholm will not be long before you feel the weight of their joint endeavours. They are sensible that in the nature of things Sweden must in a few months be brought to declare either for the King our master or for them. They cannot stand long alone in Sweden; they must either accede to our treaty or join with the Muscovites and Imperialists; and consequently they must declare either for or against us. If they chuse the latter, you will see that the Jacobites scheme² is not so ill laid, and you will find that that kingdom will soon be made too hot for you, in spite of all the countenance the king or Count Horn can show you; nay, the Holsteiners, when once they have got so farr, will not stop there, their resentment will still go on against the king himself the count and all the true patriots, and will end in nothing less than the total subversion of the present establishment in that country. Bassewitz's and Cederhielm's letters, which I formerly sent you, plainly hinted at that matter, and if they were obscure, and wanted explanation, what I had last from you make it evident that this is their way of thinking at Petersbourg.

You must therefore state this whole affair clearly and openly to Count Horn and let him see how much their safety is concerned in bringing the king and senate to accede to our treaty; and you must spare neither pains nor money, if it be wanted, towards

¹ General Count Amadeus von Rabutin, a distinguished soldier, son of one yet more distinguished. He was at Berlin as envoy from the emperor from April to October 1725, and went to Petersburg in April 1726.

² The reference is to intercepted letters from Jacobites at Petersburg to merchants or bankers at Paris Bordeaux and Madrid which, taken in conjunction with a voyage of three Russian ships to Spain, which were believed to have landed arms on their way in Scotland and Ireland, had lately raised the most profound alarm. Poyntz, and Cyril Wich at Hamburg also, had orders to investigate Swedish complicity in the supposed plot, but neither could find proof of any. Cf. on the subject the letters printed by Cox. *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, II. 480. f.

compassing this point, it being of so much importance to the future peace and tranquillity of Great Britain. You must likewise continue your utmost attention to discover the designs of the Jacobites at Stockholm and the preparations they are making there and at other places in Sweden. Count Brancas will, I doubt not, by this time have received full instructions from his court to enable him to act in conjunction with you, and I hope he will execute them with that vigour and firmness he ought to do. Count Horn will have now in his hands a fine opportunity of doing the greatest and most signal service to his country and of being at the head of an affair supported by princes who, he may depend upon it, will constantly and effectually support him; the pride, the treachery and the insolence of the Muscovites will, I believe, put the King under the necessity of sending a strong squadron next spring into the Baltick, as soon as the season is proper.

Helvoet Sluys, 1/12 January 1725/6.

Since I left Hanover I have received your letters of the 1st, 8th and 15th December, which have been all laid before the King with the minutes that came enclosed of your conferences with the Swedish commissarys. His Majesty approved very well of all you did, and particularly that you communicated to Count Horn beforehand what you intended to say, and what steps you took in the great affair under your management.

The King is very glad to see that things in general in Sweden have so favorable a prospect and that our friends are in no pain about the opposition which the Holsteiners design to make.

We had heard from Berlin before that the Czarina intended to offer subsidys to Sweden, but his Majesty was very well pleased to find by your last that the Swedes had taken that matter so right and were against accepting subsidys from her, which undoubtedly were proposed with no other view than to hinder their accession to our treaty and without any intention of making good what should have been promised; for it is very sure that the Czarina is in no condition at all of furnishing subsidys, or indeed of giving any real assistance to Sweden.

As to what you mention in your's of the 15th about our friends desiring a secret article from the three crowns for assisting Sweden at a proper juncture to recover Livonia etc*, you will easily imagine that the King is not sorry to see a spirit of that kind rising where

you are, tho it will be, as his Majesty conceives, very hard to reconcile any article of that nature to our treaty, which you know is purely defensive. The king of Prussia's fears in general, and the particular dread he is under with relation to the Muscovites, will never permit him to come into such a measure, and I believe France will likewise have her difficultys. It is to his Majesty alone that the Swedes owe the steps that that crown has lately taken in their favour; the French have for some years past seen with pleasure the rising power and influence of the Muscovites in the Baltick, proposing to themselves greater advantages from a close union with them than they ever had from their former engagements with Sweden. And they never departed from this view till his Majesty drove them to the necessity of declaring whether they would place their confidence in him or in the Czar, and since in the Czarina. In the present state of affairs they wisely thought that point could bear no debate and consequently came into his Majesty's measures and resolved to cultivate the friendship of Sweden. But whether they will go so farr as to stipulate any thing that may be looked upon by the Muscovites as an offensive engagement against them is more than I can tell. I am inclined to think they will not be prevailed upon to do it at present. Neither can I comprehend how the article you mention can be drawn so as not to offend the old Russes.

You will therefore in confidence state these difficultys to Count Horn and such of our friends as you shall think proper, that they may be apprized of the danger they run of defeating the accession of Sweden to our treaty by insisting upon the secret article above mentioned. .

If we may judge of the present prospect of affairs in Europe there is no great occasion for any such article. For from the measures and way of acting of both the Imperial and Spanish courts they certainly intend a warr. Our last advices from Vienna assure us that the project of the treaty between the Emperor and Czarina is returned to Vienna, and the Czarina's minister residing at that court authorized to sign it, so that the work may be look'd upon as done. And his Imperial Majesty cant have any other motive for entring into engagements with the court of Petersbourg but the view of strengthening himself against us. And by all our advices from Spain that court, which at present acts in perfect subordination to that of Vienna, intends to begin the dance and is

resolved to push things to extremitys, and if the Empêrour and Spain refuse us justice upon the points of trade, of which we complain, things may soon come to the extremitys. The Czarina must therefore in consequence be involved in the quarrel, and we have an opportunity, in case Sweden has acceded to our treaty, of exerting our utmost, and in that case without doubt, in conjunction with France and Prussia towards recovering to Sweden the provinces the Russes have taken from them. I can with great truth say that the Swedes cannot be more eagerly bent upon regaining Livonia than his Majesty is to assist them in the doing it. They must be convinced by our behaviour of late that the King is sensible that he has no measures to keep with the Muscovites, so that the Swedes must see that as to the regaining Livonia, thô we may differ as to the manner of bringing it about, we do not differ in the proposition itself. His Majesty apprehends that inserting a secret article on that head and making it a condition of their accession may defeat the whole, for the reasons I have already suggested. Whereas in the present situation of affairs in Europe, if the Swedes can be prevailed upon to accede to our treaty without any conditions, they will naturally in all human probability have the whole strength of the powers concerned in this alliance engaged in measures for the recovery of Livonia much stronger than any they themselves dare venture to prescribe at this juncture in any secret article even of their own wording.

You will acquaint Count Horn, as likewise such others as you shall think proper, with these his Majesty's sentiments, making them feel that his Majesty has no difficulty as to his own part in engaging any lengths against the Czarina and that his objections to any secret article of the nature of that you mention arise from its not being a proper means for attaining the end proposed.

Very private.

Whitehall, 1 March 1725/6.

I have received your letter of the 9th of February, and you will easily imagine with what satisfaction I laid it before the King. His Majesty was extremely pleased with the agreeable advices it brought, and your application and endeavours in bringing matters in Sweden to so successfull an issue were highly approved and extolled. His Majesty, as a mark of his being very well satisfied with your whole conduct and with the services you have rendred

him in your post at Stockholm, has resolved when the parliament rises to free you from your companion in your office here and to give you the enjoyment of the entire place. I congratulate you both on your success and in this new instance of his Majesty's approbation.

I shall be glad to have your next by a messenger, or by the post, to know the particulars of what passed upon the senate's taking this right resolution in favour of acceding to our treaty, which shews that they have some true courage still left, and which will be the best means of freeing that kingdom from the dependance they have so long layn under.

We now perswade ourselves from these your last advices that it will not be very long before the accession be perfected. And the repeated vigorous addresses of our parliament, with what passes in Holland, will, we doubt not, have much contributed to strengthen and invigorate the good dispositions in Sweden.

The squadron for the Baltick being arming with all expedition, the King thinks it high time to be considering of the particular uses and services this fleet may be of to Sweden during the summer. And in order to enable his Majesty to frame his instructions to his admiral he would have you talk to Count Horn, and to him alone, on this subject ; that the orders the King gives to him, that will command this fleet, may be agreeable to the count's views and notions.

His Majesty sees that in general the first advantage that Sweden will receive from this squadron will be protection from any insults from the Muscovites and the duke of Holstein during this year, and consequently not only so much time will be gained but likewise an opportunity will be put into their hands (provided they go on and finish their accession to our treaty) of laying down a plan for freeing themselves for ever from the bondage they have been under to the Russ and Holsteiners.

The hint you gave in your letter of the 2d of February, as if Count Horn designed to make this use of the succours his Majesty intends them, pleases the King extremely. Sweden by their accession to our treaty will and must have the lead in the affairs of the north ; the interest as well as the inclination of this country will make us always give them the preference in point of friendship. And the Czarina and her government have so farr lost all credit in France, that if they see that Sweden begins to take courage and is

resolved to act independently from Muscovy that court will return to their old maxims and replace their confidence in Sweden.

The present state of affairs in Muscovy will not admit of their undertaking any considerable design against their neighbours. The Turks, their intestine divisions, and the Czarina's having lost her character with the nation, will make them absolutely incapable of carrying any great views abroad. And the Czarina, seeing it impossible for her to dispose of the succession to Muscovy in favour of any of her children, will not care what becomes of Russia and will apply herself entirely to favour the duke of Holstein and to direct all her measures with that single view.

The duke of Holstein's fate is entirely in the hands of Sweden, and if they have the honesty and courage to talk to him as they ought he must submit and be subservient to them and follow their advice, otherwise he will see that he must lose all his expectations to that crown. So that it will be now in the power of Sweden, with the help of their allies, to influence the Czarina in all her measures, provided they have spirit and conduct.

The first care of Sweden ought to be to shew the duke of Holstein that nothing can be thought of in his favour till he thinks fit to submit himself entirely to Sweden and to govern himself and direct his measures in perfect conformity to the interests of that kingdom. The helping him to Sleswick or to any satisfaction for it, till he is perfectly reduced to this way of thinking and acting, will be putting arms into his hands for the destruction of Sweden and it's libertys. It would be setting the north in a flame, weakening the hands of the allies to Sweden, and making the Muscovites once more masters in those parts.

If the Holstein faction is so strong and numerous, that these measures cannot be carryed so far as they ought to be in reason and good sense, the next thing to be done is to try if Sweden and Denmark cannot be brought to terms of agreement for their mutual defence; without meddling with the affair of Sleswick but leaving that upon the foot of the late treaty of peace between those crowns. Such a treaty or agreement would give great strength to Sweden in the Baltick and lay a foundation, as time and opportunity should offer, to act against the Muscovites, and might lead to the recovering the provinces the Swedes have been obliged to yield to Russia, which ought ever to be their first point in view.

These are the King's present thoughts upon these heads, which

I send as hints to you to talk to Count Horn in confidence, that his Majesty may learn his views and sentiments, in order to form the instructions to be given to his admiral, who is to go to the Baltick. You will know how to manage the communication of what I write in such manner as to make it a particular compliment to the count and a fresh mark of the King's great opinion and esteem of his superior sense and judgment. And you will send me as soon as you can the result of what you shall learn from the count upon your opening to him with so much freedom his Majesty's notions with respect to the advantage Sweden may draw from the present situation of affairs.

Whitehall, 22th March 1725/6.

. The method proposed by Count Horn for gaining time towards ripening matters would have rendered this a most tedious and almost endless negociation. The count must see the hazards to which we have been already exposed by the caprice of the king of Prussia, and as the count owns himself to be eager for the accession the King cannot but think that he must at the same time see the necessity of finishing it as soon as possible, to obviate the daily dangers to which we may be otherwise exposed. The King has taken care on his part to put it in the power of Sweden to conclude this necessary work by providing a sufficient security for them against all the designs or attempts of the Muscovites. A squadron of twenty stout men of warr, compleatly manned and provided in all respects, will be ready to sail to the Baltick in a fortnight, or three weeks at farthest ; so that they will be in the Sound before it is possible that the ice should permit any thing to stirr out of Petersburg. After making so great an expence for the protection of Sweden surely the King might in return expect to have the accession finished all at one stroke, for since the Swedes themselves don't dare to own publickly their fears and apprehensions of the Muscovites, and consequently cannot pretend to demand our assistance by virtue of the defensive allyance, I do not well see how we can in strictness justify our being at the charge of sending such a squadron, unasked for by the crown to which it is sent, were it not in the view of their accession to our treaty. However, as the King knows and is perswaded of Count Horn's good intentions, and as you have mentioned the right use he designs to make of this squadron's being sent for the benefit and security of Sweden,

his Majesty, notwithstanding the many difficultys that lye in his way, and which hereafter may arise upon account of having put the nation to so great an expence before the accession was concluded, would not omit doing all he could to put it into the count's power to serve his country in that manner, and with that effect, he hopes to do by the coming of the King's fleet into those seas.

What the King has at present most at heart is to have the point of the accession speedily finished, that he may be the better authorized in all he shall do against the Muscovites. His Majesty has no defensive alliance with Denmark, his only engagement with that crown being the guaranty given by him and France for Sleswick, for which he cannot properly be called upon till that country is actually attacked. However, the fleet will be in the Baltick, as I have already told you, time enough to prevent the Muscovites putting to sea or to beat them if they shall think fit to appear. What his Majesty expects from Sweden at present is their accession to our treaty, in order to justify what he does in their defence, at a time when they themselves dare not openly ask it of him.

His Majesty hopes Count Horn will prevent the Emperor's accession to the treaty concluded between Sweden and Muscovy, for such an event at this juncture would turn all we are doing for Sweden into ridicule.

The fleet we shall send will cost the nation above £350,000.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR VICE-ADMIRAL SIR CHARLES WAGER, KNT.,

11 April 1726.

(*Record Office, F.O. King's Letters 65, copy.*)

Whereas We are assured by certain and repeated advices from Petersburg that the Czarina is making great warlike preparations, that besides a considerable fleet of ships of war that princess is likewise fitting out great numbers of galleys and other vessels proper for transporting troops, and that her Czarish Majesty has ordered a large body of her forces to be drawn together in and near Petersburgh, that they may be ready to be put on board her said fleet and galleys, which, as it is said, are to be put to sea in May, and that Monsieur Osterman, under pretence of going ambassadour to Sweden, is by the assistance of this fleet to put in execution the design that was formed and intended to be executed last spring

against the king and the established government of Sweden and to exact from that crown the use of it's ports and the assistance of its troops against Denmark ; and as this extraordinary armament on the part of Muscovy must, without doubt, very much alarm all the powers in those parts and particularly Our good brother the king of Denmark, who has therefore made the most pressing and reiterated instances that We would send timely assistance into those seas to protect his dominions from the attempts of the Russian armament ; and as We have likewise great reason to think that the good disposition which appears in the king and senate of Sweden to accede to the defensive alliance made at Hanover in September last may incite the Muscovites to endeavour also to awe and terrify the Swedes by the fears of another invasion, and thereby discourage them from acceding to the said alliance, which it highly imports Us to forward and perfect to the utmost of Our power ; We, being always attentive to preserve the publick peace and tranquility in all parts of Europe, and being more particularly solicitous in this time of danger to prevent the breaking out of a new war in the north, which might easily spread to other countries and set the rest of Christendome in a flame in the present critical situation of affairs ; and We being moreover very desirous to encourage and further the good dispositions of Sweden towards the accession aforesaid and to prevent the ill designs, which may in all likelyhood be formed against them on that account ; and above all being sensible of how fatal consequence any increase of the present power and influence of the Muscovites in the Baltick may be to the commerce and even to the peace and security of this Our kingdom, having some time since received undoubted intelligence of the court of Petersburg having entered into measures in favour of the Pretender and his adherents ; have thought it highly necessary to fit out a sufficient squadron of Our men of war and to send them to the Baltick Sea, in order to protect and support Our friends and allies, preserve the quiet of those parts, and prevent any hostile enterprize that may be intended by the Muscovites. And as We, reposing great trust and confidence in your skill ability and zeal for Our service, have appointed you to command Our said squadron in chief, We have thought fit to give you the instructions following for your better conduct in the execution of Our commands.

1. You shall immediately upon the receipt of these Our instructions take under your care all Our ships of the line and others that

compose the said squadron, and you are to sail with them as soon as possible up to the heighth of Stockholm.

2. When you pass the Sound you shall send a messenger on shore with a letter to the Lord Glenorchy, Our envoy extraordinary at Copenhagen, advising him of your being come and of your being directed to proceed without loss of time up the Baltick to the heighth of Stockholm, and from thence to some station towards the Gulph of Finland, which shall be judged the most proper to hinder the Russ fleet and galleys, if possible, from stirring out of their harbours ; this being the best method to secure the coasts of all Our friends and allys. And you shall desire Our said envoy to inform the king of Denmark thereof, as he has Our orders already so to do, and to get such ships of war, as his Danish Majesty intends to send to join Our squadron under your command, to be ordered to follow you immediately and to do in conjunction with you what may be found necessary or proper for the purposes aforesaid.

3. As soon therefore as you have sent your letter you shall without loss of time proceed with Our fleet up the Baltick Sea to some proper station near the river of Stockholm, and in case you shall have intelligence that the Muscovite fleet is not come out, and that you may have time to go your self to Stockholm, you shall repair thither and apply to Our trusty and welbeloved Stephen Poyntz Esq^r, Our envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary at the court of Sweden, and communicate to him all your instructions and dispatches and concert with him and by his means the measures you are to take for the most effectual performance of the service you are sent upon.

4. You shall jointly with Our envoy ask an audience of Our good brother, the king of Sweden, and deliver to him Our letter herewith put into your hands, acquainting him that as We have received repeated advices of the great warlike preparations of the Muscovites, and being apprehensive that their designs may be directed against his dominions on several accounts and particularly with respect to the good disposition his Swedish Majesty and the senate of Sweden have shewn towards acceding to the treaty concluded at Hanover between Us the most Christian King and the king of Prussia, We, not to be wanting in so important a juncture to shew Our friendship to his Swedish Majesty and Our readiness to defend the kingdom of Sweden, have sent you with a strong fleet of Our ships of war for the security of their coasts and to protect and encourage them in their design of joining with Us in Our defensive alliance

aforesaid for the advantage of Our antient friends and allies, the Swedes, and for the general good of Europe. But that you may see more particularly what We write to his Swedish Majesty upon this occasion you have herewith a copy of Our said letter.

5. As soon as you have had your audience of the king of Sweden and shall with Our envoy have settled and adjusted with Count Horn all such matters as he and you shall think of use to Us or necessary for the service you are sent upon, you shall without loss of time proceed with Our fleet and take such a station as may be most convenient and proper to hinder the Muscovite fleet and gallies from coming out.

6. But if upon your coming up the Baltick to the height of Stockholm you shall be certainly informed that the Muscovites are come out and under sail to execute their designs, which We hope they will not, then you shall not leave Our fleet nor make any stay but proceed immediately with the whole squadron, upon the first sure notice you receive of the Muscovite fleet being at sea, and endeavour to come up with them and if possible to destroy them.

7. If the Muscovite fleet and gallies shall be still lying in harbour, when you arrive in the seas going up to Petersbourg, you shall send a proper person up thither with a letter to Admiral Apraxin, or to one of the Czarina's chief ministers, as you shall agree upon with Our envoy before you leave Stockholm, desiring him to acquaint her Imperial Majesty in Our name that she will easily beleive that We and Our allies have just reason to be alarmed at the extraordinary armament which she has made in time of peace, that on Our parts We have ever been desirous to preserve the publick tranquillity of Europe and to live in amity with Russia, and as an instance of Our sincere disposition to that end We did some time since signify Our good will to enter jointly with France into a defensive alliance with the late Czar of Muscovy on such terms as might be consistent with the peace of Europe and the interest dignity and honour of the three crowns reciprocally, by which means not only the differences between Us and his Czarish Majesty might have been intirely forgotten by a sincere reconciliation and a perfect friendship and harmony established between the two nations, to their mutual advantage, and also the tranquility of the north might have been established upon a sure and lasting foundation; and that for these good ends and purposes a plan of a treaty had in concert with Us been framed at the court of France upon the

advices and informations sent by Mon^r Campredon from Petersburg for that purpose and had been transmitted to his Czarish Majesty for his final approbation and consent, but the perfecting of so good a work was prevented by his sudden death. That We nevertheless, since his departure of this world still retaining the same good intentions for preserving the peace of the north and for renewing Our antient friendship with the crown of Muscovy, did jointly with his most Christian Majesty signify Our readiness to enter into the aforesaid treaty with the Czarina upon her first accession to the throne, not doubting but she would willingly have embraced a proposition of such advantage to Our subjects, as well as to the publick peace ; yet, contrary to all expectations, instead of making a suitable return to such friendly offers on Our part, after many unnecessary and tedious delays her ministers insisted upon such alterations in the said projected treaty as were entirely foreign to the interest of Muscovy and not only contrary to the solemn obligations which We and his most Christian Majesty were under to other powers, but also such as must have inevitably involved the northern crowns in new troubles and confusion ; and also during this negociation We received undoubted intelligence that without the least provocation on Our part measures had been entered into at the court of Petersburg in favour of the Pretender to Our crown, and great encouragement given to his adherents. After such treatment her Imperial Majesty will not wonder if We, being indispensably obliged to provide for the security of Our dominions, to make good Our engagements to Our allys, and to maintain the public tranquility in the north, which seem to be greatly threatned by such warlike preparations, have thought it necessary to send a strong fleet of Our ships of war into those seas under your command to preserve the publick peace there, with orders to declare that in case her said Imperial Majesty should persist in her resolution of sending her fleet to sea We shall be obliged to endeavour to hinder its coming out. You will at the same time let her Imperial Majesty know that We do most earnestly desire to live in peace and amity with Russia and therefore do most heartily wish that she, reflecting seriously upon the true interest of her people, would permit them to enjoy the blessings of that peace, which they have purchased at the expense of so much blood and treasure under the conduct of his late Imperial Majesty, and that rather than think of entering into measures, which must inevitably plunge the whole north into war

and confusion, she would give the world instances of her inclination to peace and of her good disposition to live in friendship with her neighbours.

8. You will receive herewith a draught of a letter in French to the purport abovementioned, to be wrote by you as is before directed. And you have also a letter from Us to the Czarina to the same effect, as you will see by the copy of it herewith put into your hands. You shall consult Our envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary at Stockholm upon these two letters, and according to his opinion and advice, or as it shall be agreed between you, you shall dispatch either Our letter to the Czarina herself or that which you are to write to one of her chief ministers, in the manner above specified, as shall be thought most expedient for the service or most suitable to the situation of affairs upon your arrival at Stockholm.

9. When you have sent up to Petersburg one of the letters above mentioned you shall lie with Our fleet in the station that shall be judged most proper to observing that of Muscovy, and if the Russian fleet shall be quiet in their harbours and not come out to execute the designs which have been in agitation, and the Muscovites shall at the same time neither interrupt the trade of Our subjects nor seize their persons or effects, then you shall continue in your station without doing the least damage or offering any trouble or molestation to the subjects of the Czarina. But in case the Muscovite fleet should attempt to put to sea, then you shall pursuant to these Our orders attack them and use your utmost endeavours to destroy them, and if the Muscovites shall molest Our subjects in their commerce or seize their persons or effects, then you shall do what hurt you can to the Czarina and her subjects and stop all ships whatsoever going up to Petersburg or sailing to any other of the Russ ports, and seize those belonging to Muscovy and detain both their persons and effects.

10. As Our negotiations with the court of Petersburg have hitherto passed through the hands of the most Christian King, and as We are determined to keep them in the same channel and to do nothing but in concert with the crown of France and through their means, in case therefore that it should happen that whilst you lie in the seas near the Russian coast the Czarina should send to you and offer to enter into a negociation you must then let her know that as We have hitherto transacted all Our affairs with her court

in conjunction with France and by the means of that crown you have no orders nor any power to treat with her Imperial Majesty or with any of her ministers.

11. You have herewith Our full power to you to act in conjunction with Our envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary at the court of Sweden and to do and perform with the ministers of his Swedish Majesty such matters and things as may occur to be transacted relating to your commission, as Our admiral in the Baltick Sea. But as Our said envoy is particularly charged with a negotiation for the accession of the king and kingdom of Sweden to Our defensive alliance concluded last year at Hanover, Our will and intention is that you should not interfere in that negociation ; which being already begun and carryed on pretty farr jointly with the ministers of the most Christian King and of the king of Prussia would be rather impeded than forwarded by the formality of admitting a new plenipotentiary.

12. During your stay in those seas you shall protect and assist all the merchant ships of Our subjects and of Our friends and allies, who shall want the same, as farr as the service you are principally sent upon will permit.

13. You are to give Us constant and regular accounts of your proceedings from time to time by one of Our principal secretaries of state, and you shall particularly correspond with Our envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary at Stockholm and with others Our ministers abroad as Our service shall require.

14. You shall observe and follow such further orders and instructions as We shall think fit to give you by one of Our principal secretaries of state.

G. R.

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SAME, SAME DATE.

(*Ibid.*, copy.)

Whereas by the 2d and 3d articles of Our instructions to you We have directed you in passing the Sound not to stay there but only to write to Our envoy extraordinary at Copenhagen to advise him of your arrival and to desire him to get the Danish ships of war, which are design'd to joyn you, to be ordered to follow you immediately, We have now thought fit to give you a letter likewise for Our good brother, the king of Denmarke, and We would have you

go on shore and present it to his Danish Majesty at an audience you will ask of him, in which, after the usual compliments and having given him strong assurances of Our friendship and esteem for his person, whereof the sending Our fleet to his assistance is a most evident proof, you shall only desire that his Danish Majesty will hold that squadron of his ships of war, which he intends shou'd joyn Our fleet, in a readiness to sail, and that he will please to order them to come to you upon the first notice that shall be sent by you. You are not to make any stay at Copenhagen, and you will take care that the delivery of this letter be of as little hindrance as possible to your proceeding with Our fleet up to the height of Stockholm.

G. R.

PRIVATE AND ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SAME, SAME DATE.

(*Ibid.*, copy.)

Whereas by Our other instructions to you you are directed to go up to Stockholm your self, if you possibly can without detriment to the service of Our fleet, and to communicate to Our envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary there all the commands you have received from Us, it is Our will and pleasure that you govern your self in every thing, whilst you are at Stockholm, by the advice of Our said envoy, that you even communicate to his Swedish Majesty the whole or such parts only of Our instructions to you, as he and you shall judge proper, and you may even add what he and you shall think may be for Our service, in what you shall say to the king or to his ministers. And whereas you are required by Our said other instructions to ask an audience of his Swedish Majesty and deliver to him a letter therein mentioned, now as that letter contains only general expressions of Our intentions in sending Our fleet into those seas We have thought fit to write another letter to Our said good brother, intimating more particularly the reasons and motives of Our sending him the assistance of Our ships of war, as you will find by the copy thereof herewith put into your hands.

2. You shall therefore consult with Our said envoy extraordinary, whom you shall inform of the orders you have received from Us, and take his sentiments and advice upon them, and you shall ask his opinion which of Our said letters it will be most proper for you to deliver to the king of Sweden at your audience, and you shall

accordingly present to his Majesty that which Our said envoy shall most approve.

3. We having sent Our orders to Our said envoy extraordinary in a letter written to him¹ by the Lord Viscount Townshend, one of Our principal secretaries of state, whereof you have herewith a copy, directing him to consult with Count Horn and know his thoughts how Our fleet may most usefully be employed this summer for the advantage of Sweden, you, together with Our said envoy, shall consider what shall be most fit to be done in pursuance of the said orders, and what shall be agreed upon between you you shall execute to the utmost of your power.

4. You shall, in case Our said envoy approves of your doing it, represent to his Swedish Majesty, or to such of his ministers as Our said envoy shall think most proper, that as one of the motives of the coming of Our fleet is the protecting Sweden in order to the bringing the accession to a speedy end, We do expect that that necessary work be concluded out of hand, which will enable Us to go greater lengths in the defence of Our new ally, and you will acquaint his Swedish Majesty, or such of his ministers as you and Our said envoy shall confer with upon this occasion, that unless the accession be perfected you shall find your self under a great incapacity to act with that vigour you might otherwise do ; but We can make no question but that, in return for Our readiness to assist Sweden, for the great and heavy expences We have been at in equipping so large a squadron for that purpose, and for Our particular attention to enable them to put the affairs of Sweden upon a better and more independent foot with respect to Russia, they will employ all their credit and application to finish the accession out of hand.

5. You will take the advice of Our said envoy how farr you shall admit the French minister, the count de Brancas, into your consultations or communicate your orders to him, it being Our intention always that the greatest union and confidence should appear between Our ministers and those of his Most Christian Majesty.

6. As We are not very certain what part the king of Prussia may act, and how far he may be inclined to favour or make his court to the Muscovites, you will behave yourself with such caution or openness to the Prussian minister as Our envoy shall inform you to be necessary.

7. Whereas stormy and tempestuous weather begins to set in

¹ Noted in margin as of 1 March.

towards the latter season of the year and the Baltick Sea is usually dangerous by reason of frequent high winds at that time Our will and pleasure is that with the first fair wind in the month of September you should return to England with Our fleet under your command. We hope that the service of the year will be performed before that season, that you may come home without any detriment to Our affairs there, and unless the highest necessity requires your stay, or that you have Our orders to the contrary, you shall return and not endanger Our fleet by lying out too long in those seas.

G. R.

TOWNSHEND TO POYNTZ.

(*Record Office, S.P. Foreign, Sweden 42 to 47, copies.*)

Whitehall, 26th April 1726.

Since my acknowledging yours of the 2d which came by Brighter I have received that of the 6th by the post and have laid it before the King, who will be very glad to hear, by the express you promise to send, those vigorous resolutions which it was expected would soon be taken in the senate ; and his Majesty hopes that the good beginnings in Sweden towards their accession will be brought to effect without further loss of time ; which step is become more necessary than ever, since the advices we have from Vienna of that court's having acceded to the treaty of Stockholm and to the secret article in favour of the duke of Holstein. This news at first surprised us a good deal both here and in France, and we were concerned that such a step should be taken as could never be to the advantage. of that kingdom, or for the interest of the present government there ; since it cannot be imagin'd that the Emperor's accession to that treaty is owing to any friendship or regard for Sweden, but to his desire of gratifying the Muscovites by his engaging to secure to them the conquests they made during the late war upon Sweden and of being more closely united to the Czarina, who, having obtained this mark of his Imperial Majesty's complaisance to her, will flatter herself that upon her entering in return into the treaties concluded between the courts of Vienna and Spain she shall have the Emperor's support in all her ambitious views in favour of the duke of Holstein, one of which will certainly be to crush the patriot party and to overturn the present form of government in Sweden ; so that this accession, instead of bringing any

addition of strength to Sweden, will probably have such consequences as it highly concerns them to guard against.

The most certain means of avoiding the dangers which may accrue to them from this formidable union between the Emperor and the Czarina will be for the king and senate to make without loss of time the same declaration at Vienna which they have lately made at Petersburg, viz. that they do not look upon themselves as engaged by the secret article of the abovemention'd treaty to use force at any time for obtaining satisfaction to the duke of Holstein for Sleswig. This Count Brancas has orders from his court to press most strenuously, and you will not fail to join most earnestly with him. The next point is to hasten their accession to our treaty as much as possible. When that step is made they may depend upon the utmost support and assistance that can be given them by the two crowns, and they need not apprehend any backwardness on the part of France, since the Czarina and the duke of Holstein, by throwing themselves into the arms of the Emperor, must certainly have forfeited any favourable inclinations that France may have heretofore had towards them.

Whitehall, 3d May 1726.

[Further on the dangers threatened by the emperor's accession to the treaty of Stockholm, and on the necessity of the Swedes refusing to ratify unless with restrictions against employment of force on behalf of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp and against demand for succours "in the case of the Ostend Company or on account of any troubles that should arise in Spain or Italy, or out of Europe." The dispatch continues:]

Your description of Count Horn is excellent, and the colours in which you paint his way of thinking and acting most lively. His Majesty was indeed glad to find upon the whole that he was so sincerely disposed to finish the accession to our treaty, but was at the same time concerned to see he was for driving it off to a dyet. We feel what inconveniencys his former dilatoriness has brought upon our business by giving the Emperor time to play the game he has done; and if he still continues cold and slow his enemys, who are neither so scrupulous nor so cautious, will strike some other bold stroke to break all his measures; and therefore we heartily wish that his passion of anger and resentment for what has lately passed may get the better of his caution and reservedness and make

him exert his utmost without loss of time to retrieve the false step with the court of Vienna in the best manner possible.

His Majesty, who has all the respect in the world for Count Horn and for his judgement, has come into what you mention towards the latter end of your despatch concerning an expedient in favour of the duke of Holstein. The behaviour of that prince towards the King and France has indeed been such as not to deserve any regard from the 2 crowns, not to mention his disrespectfull conduct towards the king and senate of Sweden, with those ungrateful returns to the Swedish nation and the many ill consequences of giving the least encouragement to that duke's dangerous and ambitious views. However, his Majesty is willing to pay that deference to the opinion of our friends at Stockholm and to facilitate the accession in their own way, and therefore you may, in conjunction with Count Brancas, promise that when the accession is finished the King will consent to the forming of a separate article in favour of the duke of Holstein upon the foot of that offered in his behalf by the treaty projected to be made with the Czarina; but this article must be founded on this express condition, that the duke do previously change his conduct both towards the two crowns and towards Sweden and act entirely conformable to their interests. In such case and not otherwise, and with this provision in the article, his Majesty will agree to concur in doing anything in favour of the duke of Holstein and his pretensions that shall not be contrary to the engagements he is already under to Denmark.

His Majesty foresees, as well as you do, the difficulties and unreasonableness of this condescension on his part, and would not therefore have you mention any thing on this head unless you see an absolute necessity for the doing it and that you are sure that a proposal of that kind would have such an effect upon the Swedish senate as to make them vote for perfecting the accession immediately.

Whitehall, 20 May 1726.

. You must not expect at present a particular answer to the points contained in your last letters and papers, but I must lose no time in telling you that his Majesty thinks you are so well apprised of his sentiments with respect to the principal heads mentioned in your conferences with the Swedish commissarys that he hopes you will hasten on with all the diligence you can the business of the accession and not suspend your proceedings one

minute in expectation of instructions by way of ultimatum jointly concerted between the three powers. The speedy finishing this work is of so great importance, and the King sees you act with so much judgement and prudence, that his Majesty is of opinion that you and Count Brancas may from the instructions you have already received fix and settle the accession, which will be much better than to stay to consult the king of Prussia's thoughts upon the several particulars ; for it will be much easier to get that prince's consent to the whole when settled in the manner above mentioned, provided nothing be inserted at which he can take just exception, than to propose things in detail and ask his opinion upon every article ; for there is no question to be made but that his Prussian Majesty would entangle us in a thousand difficulties, if we should apply to him in that method.

If the Swedes are excused from being concerned with what may happen in the East or West Indies the King does not see what they can justly object against any other engagement of the treaty of Hanover, which would not lye as strong against their present defensive alliance with us, and those they have with France ; and you and Count Brancas have made such full and solid replys to all that was said by the Swedish commissarys that his Majesty is persuaded that, if the Swedish ministers are in earnest, the points in dispute are brought into so narrow a compass that they will be easily adjusted. I dare say you will have no difficulty with Sir Charles Wager. His orders are positive to act in everything as you and Count Horn shall advise, and he has as good sense and as good intentions as any man living can have.

Whitehall, 17th June 1726.

I received on Saturday morning your dispatch of the 27 of May by the messenger Du Commun, and on Monday I had by the post your letter of the 1st inst^t. They have both been laid before the King, who was extremely well satisfied with your accounts of the situation of affairs in your parts and was particularly glad to see that the decision of that grand one of the accession drew so near, and that you had such good hopes that the question would be determined in our favour.

His Majesty was indeed sorry to find that you were of opinion at the same time that they would still insist on most of their exceptions. As to what they desire of not extending the guaranty of the king and

kingdome of Sweden further than rights and possessions in Europe, you have seen sufficiently by my letter of the 3d of May that his Majesty makes no scruple of consenting to that limitation. And as to the separate article, which they supposed the king of Prussia had to excuse him from taking any part in the troubles which might arise in Spain or Italy during the time of the allyance, you was very fully informed by my abovementioned letter that they were under a mistake as to such an article, but that they might have a declaration of the same import with that given to the king of Prussia, if they desired it. And as to the extent of the guaranty in the 2d article, which they complain of as taking in all rights immunitys and advantages, and in particular those relating to commerce, which the allys do enjoy or ought to enjoy respectively, these they look upon to be expressions of a great extent and lyable to several interpretations, and therefore they would have those words explained and limited, that the crown of Sweden should not be obliged to support any treatys they have not been concerned in, nor any rights or pretensions which may be formed upon them or which have been already formed either within the Empire or without it, his Swedish Majesty likewise reserving to himself not to meddle with the affair of the company of Ostend otherwise than by good offices, as farr as they may be either usefull or agreeable to the partys concerned. This last point you say in yours of the 1st inst^t you apprehend they will not let drop, as having exacted the same restriction from the court of Vienna.

I have already in mine of the 3d of May explained to you the King's sentiments upon this head, which you will have found confirmed in mine of the 20th of the same month. And I hope what I wrote to you will have had its due weight at Stockholm. For really the King cannot conceive upon what ground the Swedes can pretend to be exempted by this treaty from any engagement, to which they were bound by our former defensive allyance. By that treaty they must acknowledge that if any prince in Italy Spain Flanders or any other part of Europe should attack England they would be obliged to furnish the succours stipulated. And in like manner undoubtedly their defensive allyance with France must engage them to assist that crown, if attacked by any power in Europe. But if we should be the aggressors they would be under no obligation at all. This is evidently the state of the case with respect to the treaty of 1720, and this is all we ask now ; we desire no more as to

our rights and possessions, nor even in point of our trade and our navigation, than what that last defensive treaty most plainly expresses. So that if the stipulation in the 2d article of the treaty of Hanover be confined to the limits of Europe, that is all they can in justice expect or we with prudence and safety grant. And his Majesty thinks that in this respect there is a great difference between him and the Emperor. His Imperial Majesty has no antecedent defensive treaty with Sweden, and what they ask of him concerning the business of Ostend and the other restrictions to be insisted on at Vienna has hapned since their invitation of him to the treaty of Stockholm and long before his accession, so that they have right eno' to demand such explanations of the Emperor and to restrain their guaranty with him, as they think necessary. But this nation was long ago in possession of the engagement, which the Swedes would now lessen. We had it by the treaty of 1700, and it was confirmed to us in the renewal of that treaty in 1720 by my Lord Carteret. And the Swedes themselves are so intent upon keeping strictly to the above mentioned treatys in those particulars, which are in their favour, that they even now insist on the arrears of subsidys due by virtue of the first of them and confirmed by the last of them. How then can we on our part derogate by this new alliance from what we are so justly entitled to by the old one? Wherefore his Majesty hopes that when you have set these arguments in their proper light the Swedes will be contented with the old limitation of not exceeding the bounds of Europe, and that as to the rest they will not be so unreasonable as to insist on making our condition by this new treaty worse than it was before, by excepting even things within Europe; which, you will easily imagine, no minister can ever stand the admitting of in this country.

The King makes no difficulty of letting their quota by this treaty be the same with that the king of Prussia is to furnish, tho' by former treatys the quotas between the crowns of Great Britain and Sweden were equal.

As to the business of the arrears of subsidys from the year 1713 to the year 1718, and the liquidation of captures, which you expect will be demanded according to Lord Carteret's treaty, the King sees no reason to refuse making an article upon those heads, provided it be founded on the abovementioned treaty and conformable to what is promised by it.

As to our not producing in parliament, when it meets again, the

motives for sending our fleet into the Baltick, I hope the effects of its going will prove so visibly good before the end of the summer that no one will think of calling for all our reasons for being at that great charge. But if our success should not answer expectation it will be impossible to withhold papers from the clamorous and inquisitives. You will tell Count Horn and our friends, therefore, that the best way to prevent such an enquiry is for them to accede as soon and as handsomely as possible to our treaty, which will undoubtedly put the nation in such good humour, that we shall have no further questions asked; or if any such motion should be made we could in that case very easily stop any enquiry of that nature.

I send you under a flying seal what I write to Sir Charles Wager; you will acquaint Count Horn with the orders he has, in case the Muscovites should march towards Sleswick. You will be pleased to seal it and forward it to the admiral by a messenger, since I make no question but you will find opportunitys to send him by sea to the place where the admiral is.

We have nothing remarkable from France since I wrote to you the 7th, all things continuing to go extremely well at that court.

Whitehall, 24th June 1726.

I have received yours of the 8th with the inclosed memorials, and having laid them before the King I am commanded to acquaint you that his Majesty approves of what you did, and thinks your memorial very proper to induce the Swedes to determine a question which has been depending so many months; and his Majesty hopes that your next letters will bring an account that the senate have come to a conclusion according to our wishes, and the true interest of Sweden.

The King was sorry to see that you expected no more than a bare majority and that you were not without apprehensions that their accession might be attended with demands of subsidys and other difficultys. If they resolve to accede, though it be only with the majority you mention and that their resolution be clogged with some demands, yet his Majesty would not have accession rejected, nor any mark of indignation shewn on this occasion. It is better to continue to sollicit and to endeavour with temper and calmness to shew the unreasonableness of the conditions they would impose than to fling up the game now and to throw ourselves in anger upon the future disposition of a dyett.

You will have seen by my dispatch, which Camara the messenger carries you, what his Majesty's sentiments are upon the chief of those objections mentioned by the commissioners in your conferences ; and if there should arise any thing new I shall send you further instructions. But the negociation must be kept on foot, and we must try to get off any hard terms, that may be offered, as well as we can ; and you must let our friends know that if we do not succeed in the accession, after we have sent our fleet and have been at such extraordinary charges, we shall be obliged to produce to the parliament the true reason of our sending it and own the solicitations we received from thence, which necessity we wish heartily they would help us to avoid.

Whitehall, 8th July 1726.

. I was surprised to find by your letter that Baron Sparre had informed his court that the King acquiesces in the restrictions proposed to be added to the Swedish act of accession. I have constantly talked to him in the same style I have always wrote to you, and in a conference I had with him yesterday morning I repeated to him what I had formerly said upon that subject. However I am glad to find you think that nothing of moment will be insisted on except the affair of Ostend, and as to that I hope I have stated his Majesty's sentiments to you in so clear a light that the Swedes cannot refuse to come into what his Majesty proposes on that head, since it is in truth no more than what they are already obliged to by the defensive allyance now subsisting between the two crowns. And I have already sent you his Majesty's thoughts so fully upon that matter, as well as upon the restrictions in general, that you will be very well able to judge whether those proposed are such as can be complied with. If there should be none offered that you shall think unreasonable his Majesty would have you, in conjunction with Count Brancas, endeavour to persuade the Swedish commissioners to sign immediately and leave a place open for the king of Prussia's minister to sign, when he shall receive his master's directions for that purpose. This will be absolutely necessary, his Prussian Majesty being in a disposition if not to defeat, at least to delay and clog our measures as much as possible, and he will hardly grow more tractable till he sees that the success of our negotiations, and the perfecting those matters that are now in agitation, do not entirely depend upon his concurrence. His Majesty is so thoroughly

persuaded of the king of Prussia's inclination to give us all the trouble and uneasiness he can, that he has sent orders to M^r Finch to do the same in Holland that you are directed to do in Sweden ; and I hope soon to receive the Dutch act of accession signed by the deputys, M^r Finch, and Mons^r Fenelon,¹ although his Prussian Majesty should not think proper to give directions to Mons^r Meynertzhagen² to joyn with them.

I am very glad the question for a dyett was determined so much to your satisfaction. I have had some discourse with Baron Sparre upon that head, who I find has received letters from Count Horn and M^r Törne³ desiring him to write to Sweden for leave to be present at the dyett. He seemed to make some difficulty of going unless he could be assured of some assistance in money for the king of Sweden, in order to facilitate the success of his affairs at the dyett. After some persuasions he promised me to write to Sweden as Törne had directed, but at the same time I let him know that the nature of our government was such that it would be impossible for the King to give them any help in money from hence unless the accession be previously concluded, that I therefore hoped the king of Sweden would not think of any assistance from his Majesty, till that affair was entirely finished. In case Count Horn should mention anything of that kind to you you will be sure to make him the same answer that I made to Baron Sparre ; you must, however, let Count Horn know he may depend upon being supported in the dyett, in case the accession to our treaty is previously finished, and that we do not doubt but France will joyn with us ; that it was with pleasure the King heard he was to be marshall, his Majesty placing his greatest confidence in his skill knowledge and integrity ; and that provided the king and senate will put it in his Majesty's power by concluding the accession, he need not doubt of his being vigorously supported in the dyett with every thing necessary for the carrying on and perfecting the great views he has for the service and interests of his country.

Whitehall, 12 July 1726.

. The resolution for the meeting of the dyet gave the King much satisfaction, and particularly that the business of the accession

¹ The marquis de Fénelon, French ambassador at the Hague.

² The Prussian envoy there.

³ Private Secretary to Frederick I of Sweden.

would be going on in the mean time and that you would use your utmost endeavours to get it finished before that assembly meets. That his Majesty takes to be the wisest and the safest measure, since, if that matter should remain unconcluded and the whole should be left to be tossed about in the debates of that numerous meeting, we should be thrown as it were into a wide sea and have new and great struggles, perhaps, to get through every article in dispute. Whereas if the accession is completed according to the resolution of the senate, then the contest in the dyet will lie in the compass of the single question, whether to approve or not, which will be much more easily managed and quicker decided, besides that if the accession is brought to a conclusion previously to the meeting of the dyet it will be a subject ready prepared for their deliberation, and worthy of their most serious thoughts not to refuse after the senate had gone so far in it. And indeed, as you rightly observe, the confirmation of the dyet will be very useful and necessary to give the finishing stroke to that work. Since considering the weakness and uncertainty of that majority, by which we shall have carried it in the senate, we shall run great risk of mis-carrying in any thing that were to be done in pursuance of the accession unless it has received the sanction of the dyet. So that the King's thoughts are that no stone should be left unturned to get the accession entirely finished before the meeting of the dyet, that it may come before them in it's perfect shape; and that then all application possible should be used to get it approved immediately by that assembly; that being agreed to by the voice of the nation our friends may have more spirit and authority, as occasion shall offer, in concerting proper measures for supporting and improving an alliance which, wisely conducted, may be of such infinite good and service to Sweden.

I have told you already that the King is concerting measures with Denmarke in conjunction with France, and I am hopeful that they will be soon adjusted and turned in such a manner as not only to secure the quiet of Germany from any invasion of the Muscovites or any other power whatsoever, but also that they may be extended afterwards in concert with Sweden and provide against any disturbance that shall affect the tranquillity of the north.¹

I hinted to you in my last that the King designed to concert with France the having a good summ of money ready in your's and Count

¹ See on this subject pp. xxxvi, 230-1.

Brancas's hands to be disposed of for our joynt service in the dyet. I believe we shall find France ready to concur with us in that most necessary point to make sure of all our negociations there. But his Majesty is sensible how needful that is and would not have your hands empty, and therefore gives you authority to draw to the value of ten thousand pounds as you shall find occasion, and care will be taken to answer your bills. . . .

Private.

Whitehall, 13th July 1726.

Since I wrote you mine of yesterday I have received by the post yours of the 29th June and have laid it before the King. His Majesty was indeed much surprized to find that the demand of subsidys was inserted in the advice of the chancery, and would be insisted on as absolutely necessary to procure the accession and to support Sweden after it. What you mention of Count Brancas's having privately given encouragement to Count Horn to expect money on the part of France his Majesty likewise finds to be true, for Count Broglie¹ has received orders from his court to propose to the King the paying to Sweden, jointly with France, a summ proper to putt them on a foot to preserve themselves. This resolution in Sweden to demand, and this proposal from France to give, putts his Majesty under almost insuperable difficultys. It has never been known in England for the parliament to give subsidys to any one in time of peace, and his Majesty knows not how well to turn this matter, in order to make everything as easy as possible in this most critical conjuncture. The King sees by what you write, and by what France as well as the Swedish ministers say, that the accession will be lost, or will be of no manner of significancy, unless the Swedes have money furnished them both to putt themselves in a posture of defence and to ballance the offer of a subsidy the Czarina has made, when this matter comes to be considered in the dyett. It is very certain, in the present state of affairs, Sweden will not dare to accede unless they can defend themselves afterwards. And weak and helpless as their present condition is, without money they will not be able to make any resistance against the force of Muscovy and the interest of the duke of Holstein. Besides, the King sees how dangerous it is, not only for Sweden but even for his own kingdoms, that they should be

¹ French ambassador in London, otherwise Broglie.

left in so wretched and defenceless a state as easily to be overrun by the Muscovites. This appears to be their case, if they should venture to accede without being assisted with money by England and France. And if they should refuse the accession, and not care to risque those dangers that hang over them, it is most undeniable that the power of Muscovy and of the Holstein faction will soon be predominant; that as the Emperor's accession to the treaty of Stockholm will then take place in full force Sweden will be lost to us and our allies and will no doubt be soon so much under the influence of Muscovy, that all the dangerous schemes formed at Petersburg will then be putt in execution, to the utter ruin of Sweden and to the endangering the trade together with the peace and tranquility of these kingdoms. You know very well yourself that the true aim of the Russian armaments has been all along not so much the recovering Sleswick from Denmark as the chasing the present king of Sweden from his throne and the placing the duke of Holstein on it in a forcible and arbitrary manner. And we are very well aware what pernicious projects the court of Petersbourg and the Holstein ministers have entred into from time to time in favor of the Pretender, and consequently what imminent dangers these his Majesty's dominions would be exposed to on that side, if ever the duke of Holstein by the power of Russia should make himself master of the kingdom of Sweden.

These weighty considerations have determined his Majesty to authorize you in conjunction with Count Brancas to promise the Swedes subsidies upon their finishing their accession forthwith and without delay. But whereas Count Broglie proposes that a summ should be paid the Swedes all at once, his Majesty does not like that way; for tho' France may have a view by that not to engage to be paying annual subsidies for a time unlimited, or even for the term of the treaty, yet his Majesty is more afraid that this money, given all at one time, may be misapplied, and that then we may be drawn into further expences to support them, when our first charges are misspent and lost. Therefore, when you consent to give subsidies, the King's thoughts are that you should tell them plainly that if his Majesty goes out of his way so much for the love of Sweden, as to give the subsidies in time of peace, he expects the money should be applied so that in the first place it shall not be expected that he should send a fleet into the Baltick next year, unless the Czarina, in resentment of Sweden's joining

with the two crowns, should actually declare warr against that crown, and, in the next that they do enter into a concert with Denmark for their mutual defence. Such a concert heartily made, and the money they shall receive from England and France being rightly laid out, will putt them in an independent state and enable them to defend themselves. I shall not say anything more to you about Denmark, having formerly spoke upon that head when I sent you the King's thoughts upon the use Sweden ought to make of the coming of the King's fleet. His Majesty likewise thinks it proper to mention another inducement for his giving these subsidies in so extraordinary a manner, that is, that Sweden should engage, as the landgrave of Hesse Cassell has done, to furnish the King and France with a body of 12/m men, as often as any case of the treaty of Hanover shall require it, during the time the subsidies are paid ; on condition these 12/m men, when they shall be demanded, be paid by England and France on the foot of Dutch pay. This stipulation can be no ways burthensome or uneasy to Sweden, since they have an army of between 40/m and 50/m men always ready and will not be obliged to raise the most part, as the landgrave is fain to do ; and as the kingdom will be putt to no charge the officers and soldiers will certainly be glad to find their account in serving upon Dutch pay, should there be occasion for them.

If Count Horn and the commissioners give you and Count Brancas reasonable satisfaction on these particulars, his Majesty gives you leave to promise that he will on his part pay the summ of fifty thousand pounds per annum to Sweden for three years successively ; that the first fifty thousand pounds shall be paid in the month of January next, after the accession is intirely finished ; and that the rest shall be paid yearly during the term of three years ; and you may accordingly enter, jointly with Count Brancas, into an article for that purpose.

The King thinks it proper likewise that you should take care that you and Count Brancas may be informed how the money will be laid out and see that it is employed, as intended, to the putting the kingdom in a posture of defence ; and in three years time at least his Majesty hopes, with this assistance, Sweden will gather so much strength, and be so well prepared by their own force and the measures they may take with Denmark, as to stand in need of no further support. France, we hope, will do something more than his Majesty can do, as it is reasonable they should, we having

already been at such vast charges to send a fleet this year to cover Sweden and give them time to provide for themselves and save their government from intire destruction and ruin.

His Majesty observes by Count Broglio's orders that France would have a secret article added to the accession to our treaty, that the ratification of the emperor's accession to the treaty of Stockholm should in no wise prejudice or derogate from their engagements with us. This the French court think ought to be annexed as a condition to the giving the subsidies. But the King is of opinion that such an article is neither very necessary nor very usefull; however, if it can be obtained without difficulty there can be no harm in it.

Wee find likewise by Count Broglio that France is very indifferent whether Sweden accedes to the 2d and 3d separate articles, as desiring rather to treat with them as an independent kingdom than as being in any wise subject to the Emperor and Empire. And if Count Brancas is instructed in that manner the King has no manner of difficulty in dropping those two articles, which were made at the earnest instance of France without any desire on the part of his Majesty or any notion of the use and significancy of them.

Upon the whole I must acquaint you that as the Swedes have departed from the point of Spain and Italy, as being inconsistent with their former alliances, so the King expects they should likewise drop any exception of the Ostend business, as being on the same foot, when their guaranty is confined to Europe only; and when the accession is agreed to be made in this manner, and you come to form the article concerning subsidies jointly with Count Brancas, it is not his Majesty's intention that the not sending our fleet, or the putting themselves in a posture of defence, or their entring into measures with Denmark, should be made part of the article. You should only press those things upon them as reasonable and as necessary for their own safety and advantage. But the King would have you use your utmost endeavors that the promise of holding ready the 12/m men upon the conditions above mentioned should be inserted, which will have a very good effect here and elsewhere to make the article to be much the better relished by the parliament and can bring no inconvenience upon Sweden; as being likely either never to be wanted or to be well paid when they are. His Majesty makes no question but Count Brancas will be empowered

to give as great a subsidy at least, if not more ; and therefore you will take care not to sign such an article, unless France be at least upon an equal foot with us.

Whitehall, 12 August 1726.

As I had only by last post a short letter from you of the 27th July, acknowledging the receipt of my dispatches by Du Commun and referring to what Mottram should bring, who is not yet arrived, I am under a great uncertainty what to say to you upon the state of our affairs in Sweden. The letters which General Diemar received from Monsieur Törne of the 27 July and communicated to me gave me a good deal of uneasiness, they being in a most lamenting strain upon the demand of the 12/m men as a condition for granting the subsidys, which would be attended with such difficulties as could not but disappoint the finishing their accession before the dyet, which was their design ; besides that you said nothing of your having money for secret service, which put them under great agonys as to the management of the dyet when it met, their adversaries pretending to be well supported and seeming flushed with hopes of doing great matters with that assembly. As I knew nothing of what you had done or said upon your receiving my letter of the 13th of last month I could not be without some pain upon seeing the desponding style in which Mo^r Törne wrote ; however I did not let either General Diemar or Baron Sparre perceive it, but told them they were very unreasonable to expect subsidys without giving us the name of having such a small body of forces at our command ; however, they might be sure that if in other respects they agreed to the accession in a right and a reasonable manner the King would not insist upon what was proposed about the troops. And I persuade myself that you will not have insisted upon the article of the 12/m men, if you found it likely to meet with those difficultys Mo^r Törne expresses, since my first letter upon that head only directs you to use your best endeavors for that purpose, without making it a condition not to be departed from, and in my letter of the 5th of August I have told you that the King would rather have it let fall than hinder the accession by it.

As to the money to be employed in secret service you had formerly a power to draw for £10,000, and since that his Majesty, being sensible that you never put him to any unnecessary expence, has

authorised you to draw for as much more, and even for whatever you shall judge to be necessary for that service ; so that you are effectually enabled to do all that can be desired on that head, and with the £20,000 Count Brancas is supplied with from France you will be in a condition to go beyond the utmost you ever mentioned, which was thirty thousand pounds.

As you are clearly instructed upon these essential points the King hopes all difficulties will be got over and that the accession will be signed before the dyet, which Mo^r Törne assures was always their earnest desire, as looking upon it to be much easier to get the dyet to approve the convention when signed than to bring them to settle and determine the several particulars, if they should be left open and unfinished at their meeting. However, should it happen that the accession cannot possibly be wholly got through before the dyet is assembled, his Majesty is always of opinion that we should go on and do our utmost, and not give over our pursuit of the accession on account of the delays and discouragements we have met with.

Count Broglie has communicated to me a letter he received from Mo^r de Morville, of which I send, enclosed to Lord Glenorchy, you a copy. It contains the thoughts of France, how Count Brancas should endeavor to prevent jealousies in Sweden on account of the ambassador they are sending to Copenhagen and of the measures it will be supposed we are concerting with Denmarke. The King thinks it very proper that you should joyn with Count Brancas in curing the Swedes of any suspicions they may conceive upon that subject, and in giving them right notions of the good intentions of the two crowns.

I have formerly given you some hints of our having under consideration a concert with Denmarke, and now I send you a copy of the convention and of the separate and secret articles, as they are settled between us and France and as they will be offered jointly by the ministers of the two crowns to Denmarke, who we hope will not refuse them ; these I entrust to you in the greatest confidence, not that they should be communicated to any one but that being master of the whole you may with more positiveness and assurance let Count Horn, and such as it shall be necessary to inform, know that you are sure that the whole tenour of our negociation with Denmark will be for the good and security of Sweden itself. And you may in the strictest secrecy, if you think

proper, acquaint Count Horn with the substance of the article in favour of the duke of Holstein, which is worded so as to please and give entire satisfaction to every honest Swede.¹

Private.

Whitehall, 19 August 1726.

I have received yours of the 3d inst^t and have laid it before the King, who has no new orders to send you with respect to the accession ; we have exhausted ourselves here both as to instructions for your conduct and as to the offers of subsidies and other money matters to enable you to carry your point ; and if all those means will not prove effectual we must bear our miscarriage as well as we can and labour to redress matters as conjunctures may give us opportunity. I told you by last post that Baron Sparre had out of his own caprice, without any the least foundation here for such hopes, writ to Sweden to give them encouragement to expect larger subsidys from us and from France, if they would insist upon them. But you must disabuse Count Horn as soon as you can as to that groundless insinuation, for we have both stretched farther than I ever imagined we should be able to do, and I do assure you it will be impossible on any consideration whatsoever to advance our offers.

As to what Count Horn surmises about Denmark, and his earnest desire that nothing should be done with that crown before the dyet, I have already sent you a copy of the convention as concerted between us and France, and you will be able from thence to convince the count that our measures intended to be taken with the Danish Court are not only very innocent but such as every true and honest Swede should desire, and you see how much more necessary those measures become daily even by the conduct of Sweden itself ; for the more precarious and uncertain they render their accession to our treaty, the more diligent ought we to be to secure other friends, whom we may safely depend on and by whose conjunction with us we may either bring a greater strength to Sweden, if they are inclined to concur in our measures, or fear them and want them the less if they should, after all we have done, forsake us and fall into contrary schemes ; for I must tell you that Denmark

¹ This article, of which Townshend boasted (elsewhere) that it meant nothing, was inserted in the Danish convention on the insistence of France, but in the end expunged.

is a power that has forces both by sea and land, which may be put in such a posture, with much less expence than Sweden will cost, as not only to counterbalance their loss but even to make them feel their error if they should desert such good and useful friends, as we might be.

You will have found by the orders to Sir Charles Wager of the 26th of July, which Bill carried, that our admiral has sufficient authority to stay with the King's fleet in those seas as long as Count Horn seems to desire, to countenance and encourage our friends in the dyet and to hinder the Russ from bringing a terror and a constraint upon them. Thus, you see, his Majesty readily does everything in his power to make Count Horn and his friends easy and to strengthen their hands in finishing the accession. Whereas we meet with nothing but delays and discouragements and have even had publick rebukes for sending our fleet, which was so earnestly desired and pressed for. For I can put no other construction upon their telling us that they were in so strict an amity with Muscovy that they had nothing to fear from them and consequently had no need of the assistance of his Majesty's squadron. But you may be sure that the nation, who have been at such great charges to equipp such a number of ships for the Baltick, will require some good reason at our hands for bringing that expence upon them; and if the accession is not done before the parliament meets, and if the dyet does not act as we expect in that business, we must be forced, as I have told you before, to discover the true motives and shew the earnest and repeated solicitations we had from Sweden to succour them in their distress and to hinder the Muscovites from coming on their coasts to compel that kingdom to follow their dictates and act as the court of Petersburg should prescribe.

To shew you what encouragement our adversaries take from the delays in the accession, what storys they spread, and what schemes they are forming to secure their own game, I send you by the King's command several letters that have come to my hands by the means you know of; they are from Count Freytag¹ to Mo^r Palm² and to the imperial chancery and to Count Rabutin, and from Mo^r Palm to Count Königsegg³ at Madrid, and from the Marquis de

¹ Imperial envoy to Denmark and Sweden.

² Imperial minister in London.

³ Imperial ambassador to Spain.

Pozobueno¹ to his court. These you will easily understand are communicated to you in great secrecy, but you will know how to make use of the contents and to shew Count Horn how freely Count Freytag treats his character and conduct, and what sort of methods he and his brethren employ to carry on their intrigues; for it is our misfortune to have to do with a set of opponents, who seem to have laid aside all shame and do not stick at spreading the grossest untruths, and the most notorious inventions, in order to attain their ends.

Very private.

Same date.

Since writing my other letter I have received an express from Mons^r de S^t Saphorin,² which brings news that the Czarina has acceded purely and simply to the treaty of Vienna. The freshest of those dispatches is dated the 15th August N.S. and says that the Emperor has engaged by that treaty to furnish the Czarina on his part, in case she should be attacked, with 30/m men, 10/m horse and 20/m footmen, and the Czarina promises on her part to assist the Emperor with 20/m foot and 15 ships of war and to use her utmost endeavors to make Sweden accede to the treaty of Vienna. The appearances of a war grow now stronger than ever, and the Emperor is endeavouring, not without hopes of success, to list all the Roman Catholick princes of the Empire in his party; and Mo^r de St. Saphorin thinks that an attempt may be made, even before winter, to bring a body of Russian troops into the Empire. His Majesty would therefore have you spare no pains nor money towards compassing the Swedish accession to our alliance. The proposal for that kingdom's furnishing us a number of men in case of necessity is so advantagious, that tho' his Majesty does not intend you should insist upon it, yet I cannot but think that if it were known to the officers of the Swedish army it must be very agreeable to them. You will represent to Count Horn how highly necessary it is that all the protestant powers should unite against the views of those engaged in the treaty of Vienna, which we have too much reason to think aim at the utter extirpation of our religion. For my own part I cannot but think that every honest and sensible

¹ Spanish ambassador in England.

² Lieut.-General Louis-François de Pesme de Saint-Saphorin, a Swiss, British minister at Vienna.

Swede must now be for the accession, since the Czarina and the Emperor have entred into the engagements above mentioned ; for in case of a war the two crowns will, for their own immediate interest and security, be obliged to support them vigorously in the recovery of all they have lost to Muscovy. On the other hand, as the duke of Holstein is now armed with the assistance of the Czarina and the Emperor, if the Swedes should neglect the support offered them by the two crowns they must expect to be reduced to the most shameful and abject slavery to Russia ; and in case the present face of affairs should alter, and the appearances of a war vanish, contrary to all expectation, their accession to our treaty will have involved them in no burthensome or dangerous engagement but will only have rescued them from the Muscovite influence and put them upon a foot of being more masters at home, and more considered and respected in Europe, than they have been of late years ; so that in all events their accession must turn greatly to their advantage and cannot possibly lead them into any difficulties whatsoever. Upon the whole you must resolve to get, whatever it costs, the majority in the dyet, for in our present circumstances we must not lose Sweden, and you must make them accede.

Whitehall, 20 September 1726.

I must begin with congratulations and tell you that I received yesterday yours of the 7th inst. with the greatest joy and carried it to the King with more satisfaction than I have done any despatch for a long time. His Majesty was extremely pleased to see by it that Count Horn was chosen marshal of the dyet by so considerable a majority, and you will take some method, tho' you are not to have access to him your self during the sitting of the dyet, to let him know the part the King takes in the choice the States of the kingdom have made of him to be their marshal. His Majesty, who has the highest opinion of his probity abilities and zeal for the true interest of Sweden, which has so near a connexion with that of these kingdoms, was so truly sensible of the good consequences of this election that I never observed him more pleased in my life, and at the same time I may without flattery let you know that your conduct in all this affair had the King's entire approbation. If you think my compliments to Count Horn may be either proper or agreeable I desire you would let him be acquainted that no true Swede could wish him more success than I do, being persuaded

that whatever shall be done for the real interest of his country cannot but square with the good of my own, especially when the direction is in the hands of one whose honour and judgment are of so superior a degree.

The King's thoughts are bent upon having the accession finished as soon as possible. Not that his Majesty would have Count Horn pressed beyond what he judges fitting to be done, but if it could be carried on with vigour and spirit it would be very acceptable, and of peculiar use here if it were concluded in time ; for tho' I told you lately that our parliament would not meet till after Christmas, yet you know of what advantage it will be to the disposition of our affairs to be assured of the accession of Sweden as soon as possible.

You will have seen by my dispatch of the 23th of August, which I sent by Gordon the messenger, what the King's sentiments were as to the managing the accession by the way of the dyet. His Majesty hopes you will be able to get it pass upon the terms therein mentioned, so that you will need no further instructions to bring that whole matter to bear according to the King's intentions.

We see that the French are fonder of having a body of troops from Sweden than we thought at first they would be ; you will therefore try if it be practicable to get the article of the 12/m men agreed to. We think that if the Swedes come to judge rightly they must be pleased with such a stipulation, which will be to their advantage in point of money as well as give them an opportunity to make a figure in the world, having 12/m men in our pay, which are to be employed for the preservation of the peace of the north and of the tranquillity of all Europe. But this and all other things relating to the accession the King leaves to your conduct, of the prudence whereof his Majesty has such convincing proofs as give him perfect satisfaction.

Whitehall, 30 September 1726.

I received yesterday your's of the 14th and laid them before the King, who was very well pleased to see that the dyet goes on with that spirit that becomes a free nation and hopes they will take such a turn as will deliver them from the dependance they seem to have been under to their powerful neighbours by adhering to their truest friends, England and France.

I told you in my last that the French court was grown very

desirous of having the article of the 12/m men insisted on ; and since the King finds that they continue to be more earnest than ever, and are displeased that we have been so yielding in that point, his Majesty would have you make use of the most warm and pressing instances, which France makes here, as an argument for your renewing that demand, which we really take to be very advantageous to Sweden. You will shew how the King, as to his own particular, was inclined to make the accession as easy as possible by giving up this point, because he saw it created a great deal of uneasiness among our friends ; but as France appears to be very resolute, and to lay a particular stress upon having these 12/m men, his Majesty thinks Sweden would do best not to disoblige that court in this article, in which he must not refuse to joyn with them ; and especially since, upon sounding of late several of the members of parliament here, we find there will be extreme difficulty in obtaining the subsidies for Sweden, unless the stipulation for the 12/m men goes along with them. You know our situation here in such cases, and how necessary it is to be able to give very solid and substantial proofs of the usefulness of a treaty in order to obtain such a summ as is designed to be given to Sweden; and the having a body of Swedish troops in readiness for our service is the only palpable argument that can justify our asking for subsidys to be given them in time of peace.

Whitehall, 28 October 1726.

Bill, the messenger, brought me on the 26th your dispatch of the 8th inst., which I laid before the King without loss of time. His Majesty was extremely well pleased with your account of what passes at Stockholm and with the strong hopes you give that every thing will go in the dyet in the best manner we could wish.

The King, however, was much concerned at your apprehensions of delays, which, if not prevented, will turn both to their and our confusion, and therefore nothing must be omitted or spared to quicken the resolutions of the dyet and to bring the accession to a conclusion as soon as possible. If the instruments cannot be dispatched and signed before our parliament meets, so as to be laid before them when the session opens, it will be impossible to get a vote passed for the payment of the subsidys and a whole year may be lost, so that our hands may be tied up from assisting

Sweden in these dangerous times. You will therefore press Count Horn and all our friends in the most earnest manner by setting before them the very ill consequences of delay ; we hope the most shameful part the king of Prussia has acted will animate them and let them see how dangerous a neighbour they may have of him, as being back'd by the Emperor and the Czarina, unless by a speedy conjunction with France and England they fortify themselves against all such enterprises. And the King, upon account of the same base conduct of that prince, is more concerned now than ever in point of credit both at home and abroad to secure the accession of Sweden as soon as possible, and therefore you will leave no stone unturn'd to obtain it speedily.

I can say nothing more than I have done about Ostend, and the troops, but as to a squadron which you find will be expected next summer, provided an article be not made expressly for it I believe they can't fail of having one in the Baltick in case of need ; but it will be impossible to do it by a formal stipulation, since we shall never be able to get a squadron and subsidys to pass together in our parliament. By our convention, which we are making with Denmarke, the King will be obliged to send a squadron into the Sound upon the requisition of that crown, and our former treaty with Sweden will empower us to succour them by sea, if there be any exigency or danger that shall make it necessary. So that you see Sweden will be secure of a squadron both ways, and you may give the strongest assurances that they will not fail of having one, if needful ; but you will make them feel at the same time that the likeliest way to defeat it will be to insist on an article in form now for it.

I hope to write fuller to you by a messenger I intend to dispatch next Tuesday ; but I thought it proper not to omit giving you thus much of his Majesty's sentiments without loss of time by the post.

Whitehall, 1 November 1726.

Upon looking over again your letters of the 5th, 8th, and 12th of last month I find I have already answered the most material parts amply enough for your instruction ; but I send you this messenger chiefly to convey Monsieur Diemar's packet. He is at my brother Walpole's in Norfolk, and I wrote to him strongly to stir up all his friends in the most pressing manner to cut off all delays as much as possible and to hasten the finishing the accession with the utmost

expedition, that a whole year might not be lost by it's coming too late to ask the subsidy of the parliament, for in that case delay would be as bad almost as a refusal. I hope the General will exert himself and lay it home to his friends, and that his exhortations, with your efforts, will convince them in Sweden that the only way to draw a real and immediate use from their accession is to dispatch it and enable us to lay it in time before the parliament and procure their consent to make good the terms of it. I have likewise talked to Monsieur Diemar in so strong a manner concerning the restrictions, with which we apprehend they will clog their accession, that I persuade myself he will represent what I have said in the best light he can.

Though your dispatch of the 8th gives us the state of the accession in it's best and it's worst view, yet I think the hopes of success outbalance the fears on the other side. You give us an account of the disposition of the secret committee and of other particulars in our favour as facts and certaintys, and what you oppose to them are conjectures about delays and hard conditions, which depend chiefly upon supposing Count Horn will continue to be over-cautious and to draw as many compliances as possible from us. I hope when the count is fortified with the resolution of the dyet he will lay aside his timorousness, and a few proper insinuations in a firm but civil manner may divert him from insisting on unreasonable stipulations. I hope what I said to you in my last concerning a squadron will be sufficient on that head, and the articles concerning Ostend and a body of troops I must leave to be managed according to former instructions.

Whitehall, 28th February 1726/7.

I received this morning by Du Commun the messenger your dispatch of the 11th inst., and having laid it immediately before the King I send you by another messenger without loss of time his Majesty's sentiments upon it, that you may want no orders that are proper for finishing the great work you have in hand.

I omit speaking upon the former part of your letter for the present, and only take notice of what relates to the accession. His Majesty was extremely well pleased with the account you gave of the resolution which the secret committee was come to of acceding to our treaty, and makes no question from the several particular circumstances you recount but that you will be able now to finish

the whole in a short time. We look upon the accession of Sweden to be at this time more necessary than ever for the good of our affairs, and therefore I am perswaded you will spare no pains nor applications to bring it to a happy and a speedy conclusion.

The King has read over the paper of articles communicated to you by Chancellor Duben,¹ and his Majesty approves intirely the remarks you made upon them.

The project of an article No. 1, in favour of the duke of Holstein his Majesty would have you decline accepting, as you propose, if you can do it safely and without hazard of the accession, but if you find the Swedish plenipotentiarys stiffer than you expected, and resolutely determined to have an article in behalf of the duke of Holstein, you may give way to the having one, turning it as you propose upon a change of conduct in the courts of Holstein and Muscovy and leaving the satisfaction to be procured in as loose and general terms as possible. I must acquaint you that as Denmark has all along made many difficultys with respect to the article proposed to that court in favour of the duke of Holstein, France has consented to let it drop, and I expect very soon to hear that our convention is concluded at Copenhagen without any such article.

His Majesty has no objection to an article of the tenour of that marked No. 2, provided it be made reciprocal, as you suggest, and as Chancellor Duben seems to agree that it ought to be.

The secret article concerning the subsidys makes indeed a very considerable addition to the summ at first proposed by the two crowns, but rather than lose the accession his Majesty is willing to agree to pay his share; and the duke of Newcastle writes to France by the King's command to persuade that court to send the like orders to Count Brancas. You have already sufficient instructions concerning the first payment of the subsidys, and France will be pressed to empower Count Brancas likewise to concur with you in fixing the term of that payment on their part to as short a time as possible; half yearly payments, as you intend to settle them, if you can, will certainly be easier and more convenient than advancing the whole summ at once at the beginning of the year, and I hope

¹ Court-chancellor Baron Joakim von Düben, reckoned by Poyntz "a very modest sensible person," neutral and generally liked, whose sister was in the queen's especial confidence and whose office came "the nearest to that of Attorney-General in England and gives him a share in the transaction of several weighty affairs."

you will have no difficulty in adjusting these particulars, as you propose, in which you are left to do the best you can.

The other secret article, as it is drawn up by the Swedes, is too loose and general, especially in those expressions which you had marked, but you may very well admit of one, if you see it needful, of the purport of what you mention in your remark in the margin ; we have one of the same nature with the States General, and our concern for the safety of Sweden would not suffer us to see them overrun, while we are only employing good offices.

I have so hearty a zeal for the publick good, and am so particularly concerned in any thing that relates to you personally, that I rejoice extremely to see that you have brought this important and necessary work so near its conclusion ; I wish you all imaginable success in what remains and hope you will not fail to compleat the whole in a very short time.

Whitehall, 28th March 1727.

On Saturday in the afternoon I received your dispatches of the 8th instant, which put me in some concern as to the article which you and Count Brancas had thought fit to reject. But at night Randall the messenger brought me your's of the 11th with a copy of the additional articles agreed to, by which I found with the utmost satisfaction that the whole was perfectly well settled and that you expected to sign the accession, together with the separate articles and the secret one, in a few days, as soon as the instruments could be engrossed.

You may be sure I lost no time in laying this welcome dispatch before the King, and I can assure you I never saw his Majesty in all my life better pleased with the service of any minister than he was with your finishing this accession. His Majesty read with satisfaction all the articles and the just and solid account you give of them in your letter, and in saying he did not find one word in them, that he desired to be altered, commanded me to signify to you in a particular manner that all you had done met with his intire approbation. Upon which I most heartily wish you all possible joy and congratulate this happy conclusion of your long and most important negotiation.

We shall now expect with impatience the arrival of M^r Zolman ¹

¹ Poyntz's secretary.

with the instruments signed, and no time shall be lost then in getting the King's ratification dispatched, in order to be exchanged with those of Sweden, which we understand that Baron Sparre will bring with him. We shall likewise prepare the money to be ready to be paid according to the secret article immediately after the exchange of the ratifications, and our friends in Sweden may depend upon it that the King will punctually make good the payments as promised, and exactly fulfil all the engagements of this treaty.

In making his Majesty's compliments to the king of Sweden on this occasion you will let him know that we have a good squadron of ships in a manner ready to sail to the Baltick, if his Majesty and the kingdom of Sweden find themselves in any want of such an assistance; the King our master is resolved as a good and faithful ally not only to perform religiously all that he has stipulated but even to prevent the desires of Sweden, where his Majesty thinks their safety is concerned. You will, therefore, mention this point as an instance of great friendship in the King, who is desirous to be informed of the necessities of Sweden and to do them all the service in his power, and let me know their sentiments. The squadron will be ready to sail in a fortnight or three weeks at farthest.

Now Sweden has acceded his Majesty would be glad to see them put themselves in a posture to be as secure themselves, and to be as useful to their friends, as possible. His Majesty thinks that a good body of their troops in Stralsund and Pomerania would be as serviceable to that end as any other measure whatsoever. The king of Prussia is far from acting a right part towards our alliance and daily grows more and more suspicious in his conduct, being capable of being hurried by the intrigues of Vienna and Petersbourg into very dangerous projects; but nothing would check his career sooner, nor make him more cautious in engaging too deeply with the Emperor and the Czarina, than the seeing a body of Swedish forces in Pomerania. This we believe they may be likewise very sensible of in Sweden, but as our treaty is young, and we should not terrify our new friends with dangers nor ruffle them with quick demands, you will insinuate this notion gently and in a dextrous manner, as from yourself alone and as your own way of thinking for the advantage of Sweden and for the security of that most necessary part of their territories, Pomerania, on which the king of Prussia has long and often cast a greedy eye.

Whitehall, 12 May 1727.

I received the 10th, by Parry, your letters of the 24th of April with the several curious papers inclosed and have laid them all before the King. His Majesty was extremely well pleased with the exact accounts you sent of all affairs relating to your province, and thinks you did very right in talking with Count Horn as you did on the subject of our fleet. You will have already had a copy of Sir John Norris's instructions, and before this comes to your hands will have heard that he has arrived at Copenhagen. Whether the secret committee shall have applied for the coming of a squadron, or no, you will judge best how to make the greatest merit you can of the King's most friendly attention to the welfare of Sweden to have a fleet early in the Baltick, in order to succour that kingdom upon any emergency ; for though the admiral is appointed to go by Copenhagen, yet you will have seen by his instructions that he will be at your call if the Swedes think it necessary for their service. He was not sent directly to the coasts of Sweden, because we did not know how welcome he might be there, and the reception of our fleet last year might very well make us somewhat cautious at present ; but we are glad to see the language is changed and that we may be owned publickly to be seasonable and useful allies.

The King would not be sorry to see the Swedes become solicitors with respect to bringing Prussia to reason, and, if that be their great bent, you will inquire privately what methods they will propose to do it and what troops they will think fit to transport to Pomerania, where they must chiefly bend their force, if they design to work upon that prince's fears. Sir John Norris, you know, will be ready to give his utmost assistance, whenever the king of Sweden shall find it proper to have a body of troops transported and conveyed to Stralsund. By what we hear of the King of Prussia he is still very strongly attached to the Emperor, tho' the business of procuring Bergue and Ravenstein for him from the Elector Palatin is rather further off being brought to bear than ever. So that the violent imperialism, that still continues, seems to be the effect of some secret promises of advantage ; and we cannot conjecture where his views may more probably tend than towards Swedish Pomerania. So that it is in prudence highly incumbent on them to have a strict eye to their own safety, and to the particular preservation of that province.

PRIVATE AND ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR ADMIRAL SIR JOHN NORRIS, KNT., 24 APRIL 1727.

(*Record Office, F.O. King's Letters 8, British Museum Add. MS. 28146, copies.*)

[The principal instructions, of even date (*British Museum, Add. MS. 28156, original, copies as above*) concern only Denmark.]

Whereas Our good brother the king of Sweden, together with that kingdom, has acceded to the treaty concluded at Hanover the 3d day of September 1725, whereby We are by new and particular engagements obliged to defend the territorys belonging to the said crown in case of any danger that shall threaten the same ; if therefore Our trusty and wel-beloved Stephen Poyntz Esq^r, Our envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary at Stockholm, with whom you shall constantly and regularly correspond, should acquaint you that the court of Sweden have just grounds to apprehend that any neighbouring power has formed a design to invade and attack that kingdom, and that Our good friends the Swedes do desire that you should sail with Our fleet under your command to assist in preventing the dangerous attempts of their enemies, you shall immediately comply with the desire of Our good brother, the king of Sweden, signified to you by the said Stephen Poyntz, and give them all the aid you can and endeavour to protect their coasts and to repel the attempts of their invaders.

2. As we do not apprehend that the coasts of Denmark and Sweden can both be in danger together from any naval power in the Baltick, you shall conduct your self in such manner as may best provide for the security of the territorys both of Sweden and Denmark.

3. You shall for this purpose particularly correspond with Our abovesaid minister at Stockholm, and upon your arrival in the Baltick you shall acquaint him therewith, that he may let the king of Sweden know that Our fleet under your command is ready to be employed in the defence of his kingdom, in pursuance of our engagements for that purpose, in case there be any need or any danger that requires their coming upon those coasts.

G. R.

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